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POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

BY

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VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS

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PREFACE.

THE first of the two volumes which I now publish is an introductory volume designed to throw light on the political teaching of Aristotle. I have sought to view his political teaching in connexion not only with the central principles of his philosophical system, but also with the results of earlier speculation. I have endeavoured to discover how it came to be what it is, and especially to trace its relation to the political teaching of Plato, and to ask how far the paths followed by the two inquirers lay together, how far and at what points they diverged. It is only thus that we can learn how much came to Aristotle by inheritance and how much is in a more especial sense his own. If the investigation of these questions has often carried me beyond the limits of the Politics, I have sought in recapitulating and illustrating Aristotle's political teaching to follow as far as possible in the track of its inquiries. It will be seen, however, that I have dealt in my First Volume with some books of the Politics at far greater length than with others. Thus, while I have analysed with some fulness the contents of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Books (in the order which I have adopted) and have also had much to say with regard to the inquiries of the First, I have dwelt but little on the Second Book and have given only a short summary of the contents of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth. My plan has been in my First Volume to devote most space to the books in which the Political Theory of Aristotle is more especially embodied, particularly as they are books

the full significance of which is easily missed, and which are perhaps better dealt with in a continuous exposition than in notes on the text, so far at least as their substance is concerned. Other books seemed to be best studied in a commentary: thus, while I have said but little in my First Volume with regard to the Second Book, I have dealt with it at some length in the Notes contained in the Second Volume. The two volumes are, in fact, designed to complete each other. I shall have much to add in a subsequent volume on the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books.

In both volumes I have sought to keep in view the links which connect the Politics with Greek literature generally. It is the work of a widely read man who writes for readers hardly less familiar with Greek literature than himself, and light is often thrown not only on the origin of a doctrine, but also on the meaning of a sentence or the turn of a phrase, when we can recall some kindred passage from the poets or prose-writers of Greece. Aristotle's contemporaries were probably far more aware than any modern reader of the Politics can be, how often he tacitly repeats or amends or controverts the opinions of others. He is especially fond of tacitly echoing or impugning the opinions of Plato, and in a less degree of Xenophon and Isocrates. But not a few works are lost to us which Aristotle had before him in writing the Politics. Among these is the historical work of Ephorus, of which we possess only fragments. We have no doubt lost much by losing all but the fragments of Aristotle's own 'Polities.'

My inquiries have carried me over a wide field, and the conclusions at which I have arrived cannot fail to be often open to correction. I would gladly have made my two volumes shorter than they are, but I have not found it easy to do so. The length of my explanatory notes is mainly due to the frequent—indeed, almost incessant—occurrence of ambiguities of language in the Greek of the Politics, which

cannot be cleared up without discussion, and which often need all the light that can be thrown on them from parallel passages. The style of the Politics is of an easy, half-conversational character and readily lends itself to ambiguities of this kind. My notes, however, would have been shorter if I had not often thought it well to print in full passages referred to in them. I hope to be less lengthy in my notes on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Books, with which I have already dealt pretty fully in my Introduction. I fear that I shall frequently be found to try the patience of my readers, and not least in some of the opening pages of the First Volume, which treat of matters of a somewhat technical nature. I trust, however, that this volume may sometimes serve to smooth the path of thoughtful readers of the Politics, though I am well aware that no single student of the treatise can hope to exhaust its meaning. The volume, or volumes, completing the work will, I hope, follow after a not too long interval.

Since my remarks on the MSS. of the Politics (vol. 2. p. xli sqq.) were in type, the general preference which I have expressed in them for the authority of the second family of MSS. has received welcome confirmation from the discovery, or rediscovery, in the Vatican Library of twelve palimpsest leaves forming part of the second volume of a Vatican MS. of Aristides (gr. 1298), which contain fragmentary portions of the Third and Sixth Books of the Politics and are said to belong to the tenth century. These fragments were already known to Mai, who gives a short notice of them in Script. vet. nova collectio 2. 584 without, however, enabling his readers to identify the MS. in which they occur; hence they were lost sight of till the winter of 1886, when they were brought to the knowledge of Dr. G. Heylbut, who has published a collation of them in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887 (p. 102 sqq.), to which I may refer my readers. The

twelve leaves are stated by him to comprise the following passages of the Politics:—

3. 1. 1275 a 13—3. 2. 1275 b 33,
3. 4. 1276 b 17—1277 b 1,
3. 5. 1278 a 24—3. 10. 1281 a 37,
3. 15. 1286 b 16—6 (4). 1. 1288 b 37,
6 (4). 4. 1290 a 36—6 (4). 5. 1292 b 20.

According to a short notice of Dr. Heylbut's article contributed by Mr. R. D. Hicks to the *Classical Review*, No. 1, p. 20 sq., Professor Susemihl finds that these Palimpsest Fragments agree with the readings of the second family of MSS. in sixty-two cases and with those of the first family in twenty-seven only. Mr. Hicks suggests that the codex of which these are the fragments, or its original, 'belongs to a period anterior to any sharp distinction between the manuscripts of the two families': be that, however, as it may, it is clear that the fragments lend the support of whatever authority they possess rather to the second family than to the first. Dr. Heylbut, in fact, holds (p. 107), that 'any future recension of the text of the Politics should be based primarily on the manuscripts of the second family (eine künftige Textrecension in erster Linie auf Grund von Π^2 herzustellen ist).' He here anticipates the conclusion at which I had myself already in the main arrived.

My indebtedness to the writings of others may be measured by the frequency with which I refer to them. To no one do I owe more than to Professor Susemihl. His editions of the Politics, and especially that of 1872, have been invaluable to me, though I have never been able to follow him in his preference for the first family of MSS. and have often arrived at conclusions respecting the text at variance with his. I need not repeat here what I have said elsewhere (vol. 2. pp. xlii, 57 sqq.) of my indebtedness to his *apparatus criticus*. My debt to the Index

Aristotelicus of Bonitz is only second to that which I owe to Susemihl. The concise but important comments on passages of the Politics which it contains are but too likely to escape notice from their brevity, and I have done my best to draw attention to them. Among the works which I have found especially useful I may mention Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen; C. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten; several of the writings of Vahlen, Bernays, Teichmüller, and Eucken; Leopold Schmidt's Ethik der alten Griechen; Büchsenschütz' Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume, and Henkel's Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat. Dittenberger's valuable review of Susemihl's first edition of the Politics has long been known to me. To my many predecessors in the task of editing and commenting on the Politics from Victorius downwards, and to the numerous translators of the work, beginning with Sepulveda, I owe not a little. Mr. Welldon's careful and thoughtful version has constantly been consulted by me and often with profit, and I have made as much use of Professor Jowett's interesting work on the Politics as the comparative lateness of its appearance allowed. For a mention of other works which have been used by me I may refer my readers to the citations scattered over my two volumes.

My best thanks are due to the President and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for twice allowing me the use at the Bodleian Library of the MS. of the Politics (No. 112) belonging to the College; to the authorities of Balliol and New College for the loan of their MSS. 112 and 228; and to the authorities of the Bodleian and Phillipps Libraries for the courtesy they have shown me. I have mentioned elsewhere (vol. 2. p. 60) how much I am indebted to Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, and to Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library, for important assistance in the

interpretation of an inscription in MS. Phillipps 891. To the friends who have done me the service of criticising my proof-sheets as they have passed through the press I am under the greatest obligations, and especially to Mr. Alfred Robinson of New College, who has kindly found time in the midst of his many engagements patiently to peruse the whole of them, and whose criticisms and suggestions have been of much value to me, to the Warden of Wadham College, to whom I owe a similar acknowledgment, and to Mr. Ingram Bywater, who has perused many of my proofs. The comments of Mr. R. L. Nettleship and Mr. Evelyn Abbott of Balliol College, and of Professor Andrew Bradley, on portions of my proof-sheets have also been of much use to me. I have profited much by the criticisms of friends, but for the shortcomings of this work I am alone responsible. I should add that Mr. Bywater has kindly lent me the late Mr. Mark Pattison's copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics, containing a few annotations from his hand, from which I have been glad to have the opportunity of quoting now and then.

In referring to the works of Aristotle, I give, in addition to the book and chapter of the treatise cited, the page, column, and line of Bekker's edition of 1831. My references to the work of Zeller are to the last edition, except where another is specified; those to C. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch are to K. B. Stark's edition of it, unless the contrary is specified, the latest edition being still incomplete. The abbreviation Sus.[1] refers to Susemihl's first edition of the Politics published in 1872, Sus.[2] and Sus.[3] to the two editions subsequently published by him. I have thought it better, especially in my First Volume, to translate the quotations which I have occasionally made from German books; I have, however, usually left German renderings of passages in the Politics untranslated.

August, 1887.

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

INTRODUCTION.

The Politics linked to the Nicomachean Ethics—the transition from the latter treatise to the former examined.

ARISTOTLE'S treatment of the science of *πολιτική* falls, unlike Plato's, into two distinct parts, and extends over two treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. The fact is significant, and we are not surprised to find that the two sections show, as we shall see hereafter, a certain tendency to draw away from each other. They stand, however, in the closest mutual relation: the Ethics comes first in order, the Politics second. The Ethics naturally precedes, as it mainly analyses happiness in the individual, and Aristotle's principle is that the study of the part (*τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τὸ ἀσύνθετον*) should precede the study of the whole. Other reasons for the precedence of the Ethics will be pointed out elsewhere.

The transition from the one treatise to the other, however, is by no means as smooth and easy as we might expect. We are told in the last chapter of the Ethics that it is not enough for the student of Practical Philosophy to know what happiness and virtue and pleasure are without seeking their realization in practice, and that they can hardly be realized in practice without the aid of Law. The State, Aristotle continues, should use Law with a view to their realization, but the Lacedaemonian State is almost the only one which does this systematically, and which exercises a supervision over the rearing and life of its members. The head of the household is almost everywhere left to himself by the State and allowed to rule his household as he

pleases. He is, in fact, a lawgiver on a small scale, and hence it is desirable that he should learn to use Law scientifically for the purpose of making those he rules better, or in other words, that he should acquire the art of Legislation. He will hardly learn this art from persons versed in political life; still less will he learn it from the Sophists: Aristotle will therefore himself take in hand the subject of legislation, and indeed the whole topic of constitutional organization, in order that, as far as may be, his philosophy of things human[1] may be brought to completion.

'First, then,' he proceeds, 'let us try to notice anything of value on the subject, which has been said by those who have gone before us, and then to learn from a comparison of constitutions what things are preservative of, or destructive to, States, and what are so to each separate constitution[2], and for what reasons some constitutions are good and others bad: for when we have considered all these matters, we shall perhaps be better able to discern both what form of constitution is the best, and how each form must be ordered, and with what laws and customs, to be what we should desire it to be[3].'

When Aristotle wrote these, the concluding sentences of the Ethics, he evidently intended to deduce the true structure of the best and other States from a study of various constitutions and from a study of the causes which tend to the preservation or decay of States and of each constitution. This is, in fact, to some extent the plan followed by Plato in the Laws, though he does not go on to draw conclusions as to the true form of every constitution,

[1] This expression is apparently inherited from Socrates (Xen. Mem. I. 1).

[2] This inquiry would seem to involve a study of the history of the States themselves—a matter, however, into which Aristotle does not propose to enter.

[3] As much doubt has been thrown, not without good ground, on the authenticity of many of the references, backwards or forwards, to be found in the writings which bear the name of Aristotle, it may be as well to remark that this programme would hardly have been forged by any one who had the Politics before him either in its traditional order or perhaps in any conceivable order.

but confines himself to tracing the outline of one ideal community. He reviews in the Third Book the Lacedaemonian, Persian, and Athenian constitutions, noting the causes of the failure or success of each, and then proceeds to construct his State. The Politics, however, is arranged on a different plan. The Second Book, which contains the review of constitutions, does not commence the work, nor does it include or introduce an inquiry into the things which preserve or destroy States or constitutions. This is reserved for a book which, wherever we place it, must come much later. The first book of the Politics deals with a subject not marked out for consideration in the last chapter of the Ethics: it seeks to establish and emphasize a distinction between the householder and the statesman, the household and the State. We hear no more of the notion that the individual householder can, by acquiring the legislative art, in some degree make up for the State's neglect of education.

In some respects, no doubt, the close of the Ethics and the opening of the Politics are in harmony. The one implies what the other emphatically asserts—the natural supremacy of the State over the household and the individual. So again, the programme in the Ethics correctly foreshadows the scope of the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for an inquiry, not merely into the best constitution, but into every constitution. Both treatises agree that the true lawgiver will be capable of organizing all constitutions aright, and not merely of devising a best constitution. Still the fact remains that a track is marked out in the Ethics for the investigations of the Politics which they certainly do not follow. There is no need to imagine any other cause for Aristotle's departure from his programme than a simple change of plan on his part. The Politics was probably not only not written, but also not fully conceived, when the paragraph in the Ethics was drawn up, and the paragraph had not been amended when Aristotle died.

Nature of the distinction drawn by Aristotle between Theoretic, Practical, and Productive Science: the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη falls under the second head.

Our first step must be to discuss as briefly as we may the somewhat thorny question, what is the nature of the science of πολιτική and its relation to other sciences. Is it a science in the sense in which Physics is a science, and how far is it related to sciences such as Physics?

If we follow the division of Science which we find in the Metaphysics (E. 1. 1025 b 18 sqq., E. 2. 1026 b 4) into theoretic, practical, and productive Science, πολιτική as a whole appears to fall within, or to be identical with, Practical Science, the kind of Science which serves as a guide to right action.

The groundwork of this classification of the Sciences seems to have been laid by Plato. Plato had already classified sciences by their subject-matter. In the Philebus (55 C sqq.) we find sciences contrasted in respect of the degree of truth attained by them, and this proves to vary according to their subject-matter, as does also the method employed. Sciences concerned with sensible things (τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα, 58 E sqq.) ask the aid of Opinion and attain only a low degree of truth: whereas the science dealing with Being and that which really is and that which is unchangeable is far the truest (58 A). This is Dialectic, which is thus distinguished from Physics (59 A). Πολιτική is not here mentioned, but would no doubt be distinguished by Plato from both, though we know not whether he conceived it as less or more exact than Physics: he describes it in the Gorgias (464) as 'ministering to the soul for its highest good,' and as comprising two parts, the art of legislation, which does for the soul what gymnastic does for the body, and justice, which does for the soul what medicine does for the body.

The distinction between Theoretic and Practical Science, again, is inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who distinguishes in the Politicus (258 E) between Cognitive (γνωστικαί) and Practical (πρακτικαί) Sciences, but the Practical Sciences of Plato correspond more nearly to the Productive Sciences of Aristotle, and the Political or

Kingly Science is classed by him among Cognitive Sciences: it is said to belong to that species of Cognitive Science which does not stop short at judging, but also rules (260 A–D). Plato seems to merge Ethical Science in πολιτική[1], for he has no separate name for it, and as his Political Science always has an ethical aim, he is quite consistent in closely connecting the two sciences of Ethics and Politics. Indeed, he not only relates Ethics more closely to Politics than Aristotle, but also makes the link between Dialectic and the less exact sciences a closer one than that which exists between the Theoretic Science of Aristotle and the other sciences. He seems usually to treat Political Science, at all events, as inseparably bound up with philosophy (Rep. 473 C, 501). A knowledge of the Ideas is as much a condition of true virtue and true statesmanship as it is of true knowledge[2].

Aristotle, on the other hand, though he describes the 'First Philosophy' in a remarkable passage of the Metaphysics (A. 2. 982 b 4 sqq.) as 'the most sovereign of the sciences, determining for what end everything is to be done,' appears in the Ethics to derive the first principles of Ethical, and probably also of Political, Science, not from the First Philosophy, but from Experience. He commonly speaks in the Ethics as if Practical Science sprang from a different root from Theoretic Science. It is to Opinion that he appeals in the First Book, not to the First Philosophy, when he seeks to discover what is 'the good for man' (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν)[3]. It is from correct minor premisses furnished by experience that the end of moral action is obtained (Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 b 4), or, as we read

[1] Cp. Euthyd. 291 C–D, where πολιτική is called ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

[2] See Zeller, Plato E. T., pp. 152, 218; and cp. Rep. 517 C, δεῖ ταύτην (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν) ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Plato does not seem even to arrange for any special training of his guardians in Political Science: all he appears to do in this direction is to give them fifteen years' practical experience in military command and in offices suited to young men (Rep. 537 D sqq.).

[3] Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 5. 1097 a 28, τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται: 30, τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν: 34, τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ.

elsewhere, in somewhat different language, from virtue rooted in the character by habituation.

Theoretic and Practical Science are regarded by him as differing (1) in subject-matter, (2) in aim, (3) in the faculty employed, and (4) in method[1].

1. The *subject-matter* of Theoretic Science is either 'things self-existent, unchangeable, and separable from matter' (this is the subject-matter of the First Philosophy), or 'things unchangeable and separable from matter only in logical conception' (the subject-matter of Mathematics), or 'things inseparable from matter and subject to change' (the subject-matter of Physics): see Metaph. E. 1. 1026 a 13[2]. The subject-matter of Physics is in close contact with that of Practical Science, though it is marked off from the latter by the fact that its principle is within and not outside itself (*ἐν αὑτῷ*, not *ἐν ἄλλῳ*). Man is a subject of Physics, so far as he has a soul which is the source of nutrition and growth (de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 a 32 sqq.: Metaph. E. 1. 1026 a 5), but at the point at which he commences to act, he ceases to be a subject of Physics and becomes the subject of Practical Science. So suddenly does the field of Physics break off and that of Practical Science begin. Both 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*), which are the subject of *πολιτική*, and 'things produced' (*τὰ ποιητά*) have their originating principle (*ἀρχή*) outside themselves in an agent or producer (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 1, *τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν*: cp. Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 22, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις*). It is thus that 'things done' lie as it were passively at the disposition of the agent, just as 'things produced' do at the disposition of the producer. They are therefore said to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 31), and we are said to deliberate about things

[1] In dealing with this subject I have found more than one of Teichmüller's works useful.

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 6, *ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.*

which 'come to pass by our agency, but not always uniformly' (1112 b 3). The defective exactness (*ἀκρίβεια*) of practical science is perhaps regarded by Aristotle as partly due to this subjection of 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*) to human *arbitrium*, but it is still more due to the fact that practical science, being concerned with action, is concerned with particulars. The Universal of Practical Science is only roughly exact. It cannot supply the place of a keen insight into particulars.

2. It follows from the modifiability both of the subject-matter of action and of the agent that the *purpose* of practical science is different from that of theoretic science. However much it may inquire, it never loses sight of the aim of promoting right action (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 26 sqq.). This need not, indeed, be its sole aim: cp. Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 12, *τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παροράν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν*: and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 10, *τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν* (sc. *τῶν θεωρημάτων*) *συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος*. Nor should it be forgotten that even in the interest of right action it is desirable to arrive at conclusions as scientifically accurate as possible (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 b 3, *ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς*).

3. Non-theoretic science differs from theoretic also in respect of the *faculty* employed in it. The rational part of the soul (*τὸ λόγον ἔχον*) is divided into two parts, the scientific and the calculative: *λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν* (Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1139 a 11). Both *τέχνη*, the faculty which operates in productive science, and *φρόνησις*, the chief virtue of the Practical Reason (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 655. 1), belong to the calculative part. In strictness *φρόνησις* deals with the individual and his welfare, *πολιτική* with that of the

State (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 23 sqq.), but they are so nearly the same that we need not attend to this distinction. The faculty concerned in moral action would seem to be in Aristotle's opinion the same as that which deals with the science of moral action. The deliberation which precedes a moral act and which is expressed in the practical syllogism is apparently regarded by him as a repetition on a small scale of the process which ends in the construction of practical science. In both operations the act of deliberation, as we shall see, is conceived to follow the same path[1].

The ends, or at all events the ultimate ends, of action are held by Aristotle to be given by the character, the true end by moral virtue: it remains for *φρόνησις* to determine the means, under which term we must probably include the intermediate ends. *Φρόνησις* conducts the whole process of deliberation, till it lights on the actual step which must be taken in order that the end may be attained: this is the last point reached in the deliberation, and the point at which action begins (Zeller, ibid. 650. 2). As these means must be morally correct, or in other words, as *φρόνησις* has to adjust its choice of means to the end suggested by moral virtue, *φρόνησις* needs to be completed by moral virtue, just as moral virtue is incomplete without *φρόνησις*. Its close connexion with moral virtue relates it to the passions and even to man's physical nature, and separates it from speculative virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.). It belongs to the more human part of man's nature, as that to the more divine. Its genesis is also different. Moral virtue, from which it is inseparable, is the outcome of correct habituation: the germ of it only, an undeveloped perception of the good and the bad, the just

[1] We note, however, in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 22 sqq. the recognition of two forms of *φρόνησις περὶ πόλιν*: one *ἀρχιτεκτονική*, the other more distinctly *πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική*, and therefore more impressed with the characteristics of *φρόνησις*, for *φρόνησις* is essentially *πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική*. Thus it would seem that the *φρόνησις* of the *νομοθέτης* is to some extent different from that of the practical statesman and less characteristically *φρόνησις*. We should have been glad of some further treatment of the subject, but we do not seem to learn anything more about it from Aristotle.

and the unjust (Pol. 1. 2. 1253a 15), is born with us and comes by nature. *Φρόνησις*, again, is mainly, though not exclusively (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 14), concerned with particulars (*τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*). Its particular judgments need to be correct, and this they can hardly be without experience: experience, though it arrives at a sort of Universal, never wanders far from particulars. It is evident, then, that the faculty which is concerned with practical science, is to be developed in life and in life only. Its beginning lies in habituation, its growth in experience. The young fall short in both respects. It is a faculty which cannot be passed from hand to hand. Hence, though the sphere of Contingency (and this is the sphere of Practical and Productive Science) is that which is most amenable to human influence, the faculty which is concerned with it can only be produced by a circuitous and indirect process beginning in infancy—a slower process than that by which speculative virtue comes into being, though intellectual virtue generally, which includes speculative virtue no less than *φρόνησις* and *τέχνη*, is said to 'stand in need of experience and time' (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15). Thus the faculty which presides over conduct was once for all parted off by Aristotle from the speculative faculty. The two faculties might be and should be possessed by the same person, but they were different. The Greek language already distinguished between *γνώμη* and *σοφία*, and Aristotle reasserted the important truth embodied in this distinction.

4. Lastly, non-theoretic science differs from theoretic in *method*. *Θεωρία* finds a place in the methods of both; but the *θεωρία* of the one is not the same as the *θεωρία* of the other. In theoretic science, the object is simply to analyse: in practical and productive science, to bring into being. *Τὸ ὄν* is to the former what *τὸ ἐσόμενον* is to the latter (de Part. An. 1. 1. 640 a 3). Theoretic Science takes a given fact or thing and inquires into its cause. Thus 'the plan of Aristotle's biological treatise on the Parts of Animals is to take the parts in succession and inquire what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have

in their formation[1].' Practical science, on the other hand (and productive science also), starts from an end to be attained, and inquires into the means of attaining it, till it arrives at a means which it lies within the power of the inquirer to set in action. Cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6, *γίγνεται δὴ τὸ ὑγιὲς νοήσαντος οὕτως· ἐπειδὴ τοδὶ ὑγίεια, ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔσται, τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, οἷον ὁμαλότητα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, θερμότητα· καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ νοεῖ ἕως ἂν ἀγάγῃ εἰς τοῦτο ὃ αὐτὸς δύναται ἔσχατον ποιεῖν. Εἶτα ἤδη ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.* (The illustration here is taken from productive science, not practical, but in this point there is no difference between the two: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 12 sqq.) In practical and productive science the analysis is pressed forward till we reach 'that which we have it in our power to do.' The man of practical science who wishes to produce happiness inquires into its cause, which he finds to be mainly virtue, then he inquires into the cause of virtue and finds it to be law; the framing of law, however, is a thing which lies in his power; hence here his analysis stops, and the question which he has to solve is, how should laws be framed so as to produce virtue? Thus, while both in theoretic and non-theoretic science there is a search for the cause, in the former we search for the cause which will explain a given thing or fact, in the latter for the cause with the aid of which we can attain a given end.

It is easy to see how different the plan of the Politics would have been if Aristotle had identified the methods of physical and political study. We should have had the actual phenomena presented by the life of States accepted as normal, and the problem would have been to refer them to the Material or the Final Cause. As it is, happiness is the starting-point of Political Science, and the object of the inquiry is to discover some line of action lying within the power of the inquirer—the correct way of framing laws, in fact—which will bring it into being to the utmost extent possible in each particular case.

The difference which exists between the problem of

[1] Ogle's translation, p. xxxv.

Practical Science and that of Theoretic Science is not, however, the only cause of the difference between their methods of inquiry. The subject-matter of Practical Science is more variable and less universal, and the faculty which operates in it, though scientific in its nature, ripens only with the help of Experience and correct habituation: it cannot hope to achieve the same exactness as is attained in Theoretic Science, and leans more largely on Opinion, and especially the opinion of *φρόνιμοι*.

How far does the method actually followed by Aristotle in the Politics agree with that which he ascribes to *πολιτική*?

We might almost expect, looking to the language which Aristotle holds, to find him constructing Practical Science from the judgments of experienced and well-habituated Greeks, and accepting in its fulness the principle that in this sphere the *φρόνιμος* is the standard.

But this he is far from doing. If he consults Opinion, as he constantly does, the opinion he consults is not exclusively the opinion of this small class, but that of Philosophers or even of the Many. The opinions of the Many are valuable as expressions of Experience[1]. But he does not accept Opinion as conclusive without verification: he subjects it to a variety of tests. First, that of 'observed fact' (*τὰ ἔργα, τὰ γινόμενα*). *Συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σόφων δόξαι· πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑπολητέον* (Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 16 sqq.). Thus, for instance, questions as to the true nature of happiness are to be settled by observing what sort of persons are, as a matter of fact, happy, and how they come to be so. We see that the happy individual is he who has much virtue and a not more than adequate amount of external goods (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 38 sqq.); that a State, if it is to be well ordered, must not exceed a certain size (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). We learn best from the lives men lead what their real opinions are (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 27 sqq.). It is true, that even

[1] See the authorities in Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3.

when Aristotle appeals to observed fact, he often means by this not so much 'facts' as men's impressions about them. This is not always so, however: see for instance the well-known passage, de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq.

Next, he controls Opinion by 'reasoning' (λόγος). That which is reasonable and probable (τὸ εὔλογον) has a certain *prima facie* weight with him: of this the arguments in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 760 a 31–b 27 afford an instance. These are arguments from our reasonable anticipations, looking to the principles which prevail generally in Nature. He has, indeed, more confidence in deductions from less general principles: still we shall find that his conception of Nature and the natural is constantly present to him in his political inquiries, and the conception of Nature is one which falls within the province of Theoretic Science.

Aristotle's own account in the Ethics of the method of πολιτική leads us, in fact, to expect in his treatment of the subject a larger use of unproved Opinion and a slighter reference to the results of Theoretic Science than we actually discover in it. Practical Science turns out to be more a matter of reasoning and less a matter of insight than we were prepared to find it. The interval which parts man as an agent—the subject of Practical Science—from man as possessing a nutritive and perceptive soul—the subject of Physics—cannot, after all, be insuperably great. The study of the passions falls within the province of Ethics, yet they are closely related to man's physical nature (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.), with which Physics has to do. The principle which enables Aristotle to explain the subject-matter of Physics is also that which enables him to explain moral action and the State: the movement from Potentiality to Actuality is common to both. The end of Man and of Society—living nobly and well (τὸ εὖ ζῆν)—is an end which appears also in the field of Physics[1]. The truth that man lives for this end, and that the State should be constructed for its attainment, is one which Aristotle does not need to rest on Opinion, for his physical

[1] De Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq.

studies have proved to him that the end of every individual thing, according to the design of Nature, is 'the best of which it is capable' (*τὸ ἑκάστῳ ἐνδεχόμενον βέλτιστον*). And if it be urged that without the aid of Opinion we cannot tell what is the best which is possible to man, we may reply that when Aristotle seeks to discover the highest element in happiness (Eth. Nic. 10. 7), or to illustrate its dependence on character rather than on external goods (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 23), he refers us to his conception of God—a chief topic of the First Philosophy, or, as it is otherwise called, the Theologic Science. Teichmüller has pointed out in reference to the Ethics, how much the actual method of Aristotle in Practical Science differs from that which he lays down for himself in theory. 'The philosophy of Aristotle,' he remarks, 'with its fondness for sharp distinctions cannot possibly preserve its logical consistency. It is as a complete man (als ganzer Mensch), in full possession of all practical, technical, and theoretic powers and perceptions, that Aristotle everywhere speaks: he forgets that he has only the right to speak as a good and wise man or Statesman (*φρόνιμος*)[1].'

Aristotle does not probably intend, even in theory, to ignore the links between Theoretic and Practical Science, or the elements which are common to both. He traces, as we have said, in 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*) no less than in the subject-matter of Physics the operation of the Four Causes —the movement of matter to an end, an advance from Potentiality to Actuality. If this could not be done, there would be no Science of Practice. He is less clear on the question whether Practical Science derives any of its principles from Theoretic. But even if he answered this question in the affirmative, it would still be open to him to assert the distinctness of Practical and Theoretic Science, as he unquestionably does. He not only holds that Practical Science aims at Practice in addition to knowledge, but that neither the end of man nor the means to its attainment can be ascertained, at all events in detail, except by

[1] Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, 3. 354–7.

an appeal to the judgment of the *φρόνιμος*, and also to the collective experience of men, sifted and corrected as we have seen that he sifts and corrects it. Even Plato does not think that a knowledge of the Ideas will suffice to make his guardians good rulers without fifteen years of practical experience. Perhaps, if Aristotle's treatment of Ethical and Political Science had been more abstract and had concerned itself less with concrete detail, and if, again, he had not construed its aim to be the promotion of correct Practice, he might have been better able to dispense with the aid of Opinion: but, after all, do not all inquirers on these subjects to this day tacitly follow the method which Aristotle avowedly adopts? Where is the inquirer who does not tacitly refer to the best Opinion of his own epoch in framing his account of virtue? What European philosopher ever doubts that European institutions are the best?

The alleged difference between the aims of Practical and Theoretic Science, which seems more than anything else to lead Aristotle to distinguish between the two, appears, indeed, to be an unreal ground of distinction between them. May not moral and political science speculate about moral action without any aim beyond the attainment of truth? Is not Aristotle himself led by his view that the aim of Political Science is to promote right action to make his study of social facts, patient and comprehensive though it is, less the central feature of the Politics than the study of Society as it ought to be? Should not the careful analysis of social tendencies, which we find, for instance, in the book on Revolutions, have preceded and prepared the way for the attempt to depict a best state[1]? Might we not have been gainers, if he had addressed himself even more closely than he has done to understanding social phenomena and less to modifying them? Political Science

[1] We have already noticed that this would seem to have been the plan which Aristotle intended to adopt in his political investigations, when he penned the concluding sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics.

'begins' for him 'in History,' no less than in Ethics: but might not History have filled with advantage an even greater place in his investigations?

It is possible, again, to overrate the value of the verdict of the *φρόνιμος*, both in ethical and political questions. In politics, the 'wise and good man' often clings overmuch to the Good at the very moment when the Better is about to take its place. Even on ethical questions, the *φρόνιμος* perhaps has no monopoly of insight. There is some truth in one of the many shrewd remarks which are scattered over the Laws of Plato—*οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἄχρηστοι, θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς, ὥστε παμπολλοὶ καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εὖ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας* (Laws, 950 B–C). With this we may compare a remarkable saying of Niebuhr:—'I am bold enough not to shrink from the admission that I can picture to myself as the inspired preacher of a wisdom at once elevated and profound, I won't exactly say Satan himself, but a possessed person over whom the evil spirit often comes and whom he often pervades; and looking to the risk that denouncers of heresy may lay hold of what I say, I will not speak hypothetically, but name Rousseau and Mirabeau[1].'

Powers acting within the domain of *πολιτική*—Necessity, Nature, Spontaneity, Fortune, Man.

We need not wonder that the science of *πολιτική* is one which is 'hardly meet to be called' a science, and that it demands maturity both of mind and character, if we bear in mind the sphere in which it works and the difficulties with which it has to grapple. Its sphere is, as we have seen, that of the Contingent—one in which the tendencies to Good, that here, as elsewhere, exist, are met, and often baffled, by the irregularities which attach to matter and, above all, to human agency. It possesses

[1] Kleine Schriften, I. 472, quoted by Bernays, Phokion, p. 104. I am well aware how imperfectly I have rendered this energetic and highly characteristic utterance.

not only all the variability which characterises Matter, but also that which characterises Man.

The first rude analysis of the subject-matter with which it has to deal—we now confine our attention to the political branch of πολιτική—reveals to us the working of powers well known to Greek literature and speculation—Necessity, Nature, Chance, and Man; and if, as we gain a clearer view of things, these agencies tend to fade away and to be replaced by less familiar and less personal entities—the four causes, or again, Potentiality and Actuality—it will still be worth while to cast a hasty glance over these more popular conceptions before they disappear.

The poets had spoken in well-known utterances of Chance, Art, Necessity and Nature, as supreme in human things. Agathon (Fr. 8) had said—

> Καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῇ τέχνῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ
> ἡμῖν ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.

Euripides had connected Necessity and Nature—

> Τί ταῦτα δεῖ
> στένειν ἅπερ δεῖ κατὰ φύσιν διεκπερᾶν;
> δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς.
>
> Fr. 757, from the Hypsipyle:

and had elsewhere doubted whether Zeus is the necessity which reigns in nature, or the intelligence of man—

> Ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
> Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν.
>
> Troad. 847–8: cp. Fragm. 1007.

There were philosophers who traced back the universe of things to Nature and Chance, Art supervening upon them but not adding much to their work (Plato, Laws, 889 A sqq.: cp. 967 A); and Plato himself finds it easy to understand how everything in the State, at all events, looks like the outcome of Chance (Laws, 709 A); but he adds at once that this is not the fact; on the contrary, God and Art co-operate with Chance to shape its destinies. More scientifically, Plato finds Matter, or Necessity, and Mind, or the Idea, at the root of things[1]. 'He is unable, owing

[1] Cp. Tim. 68 E–69 A.

to his Dualism, to merge these two causes in one, or to recognize in Necessity the work of Reason and the positive intermediary, not merely the limitation and negative condition, of her working' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 489 sq., ed. 2).

Necessity.

It is the tendency of Aristotle to soften this sharp antithesis, and to view the Necessary as the friend, if often the inconstant friend, of the Good. He distinguishes three kinds of the Necessary, two of which have no place in the State (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. 1): cp. Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 11, *τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς*: de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 1, *εἰσὶν ἄρα δύ' αἰτίαι αὗται, τό θ' οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πολλὰ γὰρ γίνεται ὅτι ἀνάγκη· ἴσως δ' ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε ποίαν λέγουσιν ἀνάγκην οἱ λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· ἔστι δ' ἕν γε τοῖς ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἡ τρίτη· λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ' οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*. The State falls so far under the sway of Necessity, as it begins in Matter[1] and needs instruments (*ὄργανα*)[2]: its matter and its provision of instruments are necessary pre-requisites, if it is to attain the Good: they are conditionally necessary (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*). But these indispensable conditions may assume two very different characters. They may, if favourably present, be positive contributors to the End, almost rising to the level of its efficient cause (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19 sqq.). Necessity, if only we have to do with favourable Matter, may be the fore-runner, the first or nascent form of the Best: it may be Nature in disguise. On the other hand, there may lurk in it an element of unfitness for the Best, which will mar the whole evolution: the indispensable condition, which may be the friend of the Best, may also be its worst foe. The State must have a territory; yet

[1] Phys. 2. 9. 200 a 30 sqq.: cp. 200 a 14, *ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*.

[2] Zeller, ibid.: cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 22 sqq.

the characteristics of this territory may be unfavourable to its political wellbeing (Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). It must start with a population, and here again the same thing may occur (Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23 sqq.). It must have a due supply of external goods; yet the pursuit of them may draw men away from higher things. Thus the indispensable condition may prove a fetter and even a stumbling-block, for men may mistake the necessary for the best, the means for the end. In any case, as the statesman, unlike the carpenter or builder, is seldom free to select the material for his State, this element is likely, whether for weal or for woe, to play a considerable part in shaping its destiny. It might be better away, were this possible: but there is a power capable of giving it a new direction and making it a positive aid to the Best. Many things come into existence for one end, marked out by Necessity; and then Nature adroitly gives them a new turn, directing them to the Best. The State itself came into existence, in the hands of Necessity, 'for the sake of mere life'; but Nature carries it on to the higher end of 'good life.' Slavery, which originates in necessity (Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 25), becomes eventually a source of virtue: the household in general undergoes a similar re-adaptation. But indeed things that are necessary may often be also expedient: thus the relation of ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary condition of unity, but also expedient (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 21); and if Necessity forges the link which binds together man and wife, father and child, master and slave (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 26 sqq.), and so calls into existence the Household and State, Necessity and Expediency here coincide.

Nature.

Closely allied with the 'conditionally necessary' is one side of the conception which Aristotle terms Nature. *Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον* (Phys. 2. 1. 193 a 28). It is in the former of these two senses that Nature borders closely on Necessity. Nature is also spoken

of as the end (ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 28); and even as the path which leads from the one point to the other (ἔτι δὲ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν, Phys. 2. 1. 193 b 12)[1]. Nature is thus 'a principle of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration' (Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 13). For though Aristotle in countless passages speaks of Nature as a person, seeking to realize aims and giving evidence of wisdom and virtue, we soon learn to seek its agency rather in things themselves. Its working seems hardly distinguishable from that of God[2], except that it is more ubiquitous, more immanent in things, more Protean and multiform; evidencing itself, as we see in the Politics, not only in 'that which is best,' but also in 'that which is necessary,' 'that which is coeval with birth' (τὸ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς), 'that which obtains for the most part' (τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). If we know the State to be the work of Nature from the fact that it brings what is best, we learn this also by tracing it back to its beginnings in Necessity, by investigating its origin in the Household and Village. The real being, however, of Nature is rather to be found in the end than in the process, and rather in the process than its starting-point.

With Aristotle's conception of Nature as bringing the Best we may contrast the less cheerful Epicurean view, which Lucretius adopts (5. 195 sqq.):—

> Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
> Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat
> Vitai causa valido consueta bidenti
> Ingemere et terram pressis proscindere aratris:

and Virgil in his train (Georg. 1. 197 sqq.):—

> Vidi lecta diu et multo spectata labore
> Degenerare tamen, ni vis humana quotannis
> Maxima quaeque manu legeret: sic omnia fatis
> In peius ruere, ac retro sublapsa referri.

Aristotle, on the contrary, finds in things a tendency to

[1] Sir A. Grant, Ethics, 1. 278–9. and cp. de Gen. An. 731 b 24
[2] See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 387–9, sqq.

evolve themselves right. Men sometimes can hardly choose but do or say the right thing (de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 19, 27: Metaph. A. 3. 984 a 18: Teichmüller, Kunst, p. 383): and if the State needs human contrivance to bring it into existence (cp. *ὁ πρῶτος συστήσας*, Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 30), its contriver perhaps only 'followed the guidance of things themselves,' for we hear of a 'growth in things' (*τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα*) in connexion with the rise of the State (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 24). Nature often gives us clear intimations of the true course: she seeks, for instance, to mark off the natural slave by a special physical aspect and bearing (1. 5. 1254 b 27 sqq.); she creates in men a difference of age, and so suggests the true basis for distinctions of political privilege within the citizen body (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 35). Yet she is often baffled (1. 5. 1254 b 32 sqq.), and needs the aid of Art to bring things right. Thus it is that Art partly completes what Nature is unable to carry to completion, partly imitates Nature (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Aristotle, as we shall see, is at even more pains to show that the State is a product of Nature than Plato[1] had been before him. His direct object in so doing is to strengthen and consecrate its authority and to exhibit its true relation to the individual. An incidental consequence of his arguments, however, is that whatever holds good of 'compounds formed by Nature' (*τὰ φύσει συνεστῶτα*) holds good of the State. Thus, as Nature does everything 'either from considerations of that which is necessary or from considerations of that which is better[2],' the structure of the State must satisfy one or other of these tests. So again, in all things that exist by nature, and not by accident, whose essence is disorder (*ἀταξία*)[3], we look to find order (*τάξις*) and proportion (cp. Phys. 8. 1. 252 a 11, *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε ἄτακτον τῶν φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσι τάξεως· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ ἄπειρον οὐδένα λόγον ἔχει, τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος*: Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 10, *ἐν γὰρ*

[1] Laws, 889 sq.

[2] De Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 15, *ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον*: cp. Plato, Tim. 75 D.

[3] De Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 23.

τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἂν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον). Consequently, Aristotle insists on order and proportion in the State: he cannot accept the haphazard organization of actual communities (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5), the social anarchy of democracies (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq.), or even the indefinite and varying magnitude of Greek cities (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 8 sqq.: cp. de An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως). So again, 'Nature always gives things to those who can use them, either exclusively or more largely than to others' (de Part. An. 4. 8. 684 a 28). The State, therefore, must follow the same rule in distributing the advantages at its disposal—wealth, office, political power, and the like. So again, in all products of Nature we find elements of two kinds—ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ and μέρη: the former necessary conditions of the thing but not parts of it, the latter its parts. This holds also of the State (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.), and thus we find Aristotle breaking the population of his State into two sections, the one merely a necessary condition of the State and not a part of it, the other concentrating in itself the substance and true life of the State.

Spontaneity and Fortune.

We have already seen that Matter, while indispensable as a condition of the things into which it enters, is also so variable that it may prove either the first step in the process of Nature which ends in Actuality, or a distorting and enfeebling influence. It is in this variability of Matter that Spontaneity (τὸ αὐτόματον) and Fortune (τύχη) take their rise (Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 13, ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος). 'The accidental,' says Zeller[1], 'arises when a free or unfree activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of external circumstances to produce a result other than that end.' Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and impeded is that of a being exercising Moral

[1] Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335.

Choice or not; Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus modified is a being exercising Moral Choice. A third form of the Accidental is the *σύμπτωμα*—e.g. the occurrence of an eclipse while one is taking a walk; and here the Accidental appears in its purest form[1]. It here takes the shape of a mere co-existence in Space or Time of two events standing in no causal relation to each other. As Torstrik points out[2], Accident is not always a marring influence: the movement to an end may be satisfactorily accomplished, and yet incidentally set going the aimless activity of Chance. Chance plays round the ordered process of Nature, careless whether it mars or aids it[3] or does neither. Its essential characteristic is to be without design and irregular; it is the negation of Intelligence and Nature—a power which acts without reason and without that approach to regularity (*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*) which Nature exhibits. Aristotle evidently holds that if everything happened by accident, nothing would be calculable beforehand. This is not really the case. Chance itself is in some degree reducible to uniformities.

The popular Greek view set down the Accidental to the Gods: thus Herodotus speaks frequently of *θείη τύχη*, Thucydides of *ἡ τύχη ἐκ τοῦ θείου*[4]; Timoleon, according to Plutarch[5], 'having built a temple to Automatia close to his house, sacrificed to her and consecrated the house itself to the 'Ιερὸς Δαίμων.' Euripides, however, distinguished between Fortune and the hand of the Deity[6], and we find Philemon[7] placing in the mouth of one of his characters the utterance—

[1] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335. 3.

[2] *Hermes*, 9. 425.

[3] It sometimes aids Art at all events: cp. *τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην* (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 19).

[4] Thuc. 5. 104, 112.

[5] Timol. c. 36. The fate of the Athenian Timotheus, who had said that his success was due to himself more than to Fortune (Scholiast on Aristophanes, Plutus, 180), was perhaps present to Timoleon's mind.

[6] L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. 56, who refers to Cycl. 606 (582 Bothe), Hecub. 491 (465 Bothe)—to which references may be added Herc. furens, 1205 sqq., where gods no less than men are viewed as the sport of fortune.

[7] Inc. Fab. Fragm. 48 Didot.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν οὐδεμία Τύχη θεός,
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτόματον, ὃ γίνεται
ὡς ἔτυχ' ἑκάστῳ, προσαγορεύεται Τύχη.

Menander makes a near approach to Aristotle in the lines—

Ὡς ἄδικον, ὅταν ἡ μὲν φύσις
ἀποδῷ τι σεμνόν, τοῦτο δ' ἡ Τύχη κακοῖ[1],

and

Οὐδὲν κατὰ λόγον γίνεθ' ὧν ποιεῖ Τύχη.

To Aristotle, at any rate when he speaks scientifically, Accident is an influence arising at the opposite pole of things to the Deity, and inasmuch as it is not directed to an end, bordering closely on the non-existent[2].

The domain of Politics is exposed to the action of Accident in all its forms. It was a *σύμπτωμα* that brought the extreme democracy of Athens into being (Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 12). It rests with Fortune whether the State possesses the adequate supply of accessories (*σύμμετρος χορηγία*) with which it should start, or not (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29: cp. c. 4. 1325 b 37 sq.).

To these powers Aristotle apparently adds as a fourth Man.
that of human agency, for though we might conceive it as already included under the heads of Nature, Necessity, and Accident, inasmuch as human beings form, as we shall see, the Matter of the State, he clearly marks off the agency of *διάνοια* from that of *φύσις* (e.g. Phys. 2. 5. 196 b 21)[3].

He does not trace the gradual ripening of political wisdom in man, as he traces in the Poetics the dawn of Poetry. We do not learn whether Chance played the same part in the growth of the State as it did in the development of the Poetic Art (Poet. 4. 1448 b 22: 14. 1454 a 10). Was the State the outcome of Trial and Failure (*πεῖρα*, Poet. 24. 1459 b 32)? We are not told, but we may probably

[1] *Ὀλυνθία*, Fragm. 1 Didot.
[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336.
[3] The enumeration in Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 31, *αἴτια δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου*, may also be referred to, though it loses weight owing to the employment of the word *δοκοῦσιν*.

assume that in this, as in other fields, Experience long preceded Science.

The State only imperfectly amenable to human control.

But even when human agency approaches the subject-matter of Politics with all the resources both of Experience and Science, it finds the State only imperfectly amenable to its control. The reason of this will be readily inferred from our review of the agencies at work in this sphere. Science has to steer her way among the potent influences of Necessity, Nature, and Accident, not to speak of human aberrations. Nature, indeed, is her ally and guide, but with the rest she has to do the best she can.

The State is to Aristotle neither an 'organism' which it is beyond man's power to influence, nor a creation of man which man can mould as he likes. It is in part, though only in part, beyond his control. The Matter out of which the State issues—the population with which it starts—may be untowardly; the territory may be other than it should be; and even if, as in the best State, both population and territory are all that can be wished, Accident may still mar its development. The lawgiver often has to deal with adverse conditions which he cannot alter, and it is the business of Political Science to point out not only what is to be done when wind and tide are favourable, but also how the best may be made of adverse circumstances [1].

The necessity of the State, its value to man and its authority over the

In entering on his subject, Aristotle's first care is to reassert the authority of the State, nominally in opposition to those who had drawn only a quantitative distinction between it and the household, but really in correction of more serious errors—the error of those who had asserted

[1] Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a. 5 sqq. It is hardly necessary to remark that in asserting the existence of a Science of Society Aristotle is far from claiming that it enables us to 'ascertain the fundamental laws of social evolution' or to 'forecast the future of society.' History hardly groups itself to him as an evolution. Accident plays a large part in it. All he asserts is that it is possible to determine more or less scientifically how the State should be organized and administered under varying social conditions.

it to exist, not *φύσει*, but *νόμῳ*, and the error of those who, like the Cynics, regarded it as a non-essential.

The distinction between *τὰ φύσει* and *τὰ νόμῳ* arose in connexion with the question as to the reality of things—a question which presented itself early in the history of Greek philosophy. Gorgias appears to have denied existence *in toto*. Others distinguished between things which exist *φύσει* and things which exist *νόμῳ*. Some inquirers found that which exists by nature mainly in sensible things—in the elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and their compounds (Plato, Laws, 889 A sqq.); others denied existence by nature to the heaven, but allowed it to the world of animal life[1]. More commonly, the natural was identified with the necessary, as in the already quoted fragment of Euripides: or with that which is fixed and invariable (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 14, *τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή*): or the immemorial, not 'made with hands'; as in Diog. Laert. 9. 45, *ποιητὰ δὲ νόμιμα εἶναι* (sc. *ἔφασκεν ὁ Δημόκριτος*), *φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*, and in the famous lines of the Antigone of Sophocles, which Aristotle quotes (Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 9 sqq.: cp. 15. 1375 a 32 sqq.), and understands as asserting existence by nature:—

> *Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε*
> *ζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη:*

or the true, as distinguished from that which seems true to the many (Aristot. Soph. Elench. 12. 173 a 15): or that which is universally or generally recognized: thus the sophist Hippias refused to recognize any laws as divinely authorized, except those which are everywhere accepted (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 19; cp. the passages from Aristotle's Rhetoric just quoted).

Plato would probably find the natural, above all, in that which participates in the Idea of Good; and Aristotle,

Individual reasserted by Aristotle. Human society and the State originate in Nature: the State is prior to the individual and the household, and is the whole of which they are parts.

[1] Cp. Aristot. de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 20 sqq., *οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζῴων ἕκαστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι, τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται.*

following in the same path, finds the natural in that which is either a necessary condition of, or a direct contributor to, that which is best for the species—the specific, not the universal, end. The tests of primitiveness (*τὸ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς*, Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 23: *τὸ ἀρχαῖον*, Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.) and of generality of occurrence (*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*) are also accepted by him. To ascertain what is natural, we are taught to ask what obtains in normal instances, what holds good of healthy and well-constituted subjects (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 36 sqq.). It is not from barbarians, but from Greeks that we learn the natural type of the State and household (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 34 sqq., *φύσει μὲν οὖν . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις*: cp. 6. 1255 a 33 sq.).

It is by showing that the State satisfies these tests that Aristotle is enabled to reassert its naturalness and its authority over the individual. Both had been impugned. The assertion that Right is not *φύσει* but *νόμῳ* led almost inevitably to a similar assertion with respect to the State, which represents a distribution of rights; and the effect of this view was to weaken the authority of the State over the individual. Some, indeed, like Callicles in the Gorgias of Plato, by implication allowed the State to be natural if it were in the hands of a man of transcendent ability and force of character, but this condition of things was the exception, not the rule.

Those who claimed that the State is not *φύσει* but *νόμῳ* did not necessarily imply that it owes its existence to a compact, though the two ideas do not lie far apart: they might mean only that its claims rest on general acceptance —that it is the traditional, received thing—that its authority is artificial, not based on Nature, but 'of man's devising,' and that it need not have existed, if men had not chosen that it should. The phrase brought its origin, however, perilously near that of money (*νόμισμα*) or of law (*νόμος*), both of them things commonly conceived to rest on compact and to depend on it for acceptance and authority[1]; and we

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 28 sqq.: Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 35. The sophist Hippias (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 13) treated law as a kind of compact,

are not surprised to find Glaucon, who undertakes in the Republic to state the views of Thrasymachus, tracing the origin of law and justice to compact. His language implies that not only law but anything like legally regulated society originates in compact. There are, indeed, passages even in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in which social relations seem to be rested on contract: thus we read in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13, *αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαὶ καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται (φιλίαι) κοινωνικαῖς (φιλίαις) ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι* (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1163 b 32 sqq.: Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., passages on which some light is thrown by Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 11 sqq.). In the Politics, however, Aristotle not only contrasts law with compact (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10), but seems everywhere to imply that the State neither came into being by way of compact nor is dependent on compact for its authority. It began in the blind impulses which first formed the household and broadened there into wider aims which nothing but the State could satisfy. It glided imperceptibly into existence, as men became successively aware of the various needs bound up with their nature. Men could not choose but form it, or some imperfect substitute for it. It is as much a necessity of human existence as food or fire. Its authority rests on the same basis as the authority of the father, not on consent, but on the constitution of human nature. Epicurus, on the contrary, 'insisted on an original compact between the individual members of society as the origin of its establishment[1],' and in so doing reasserted the doctrine ascribed by Glaucon to Thrasymachus in a slightly more unequivocal form[2].

in agreement with popular opinion (Aristot. Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 9), and asked, *νόμους, ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται*;

[1] Prof. Wallace, Epicureanism, p. 158.

[2] The doctrine of the origin of society in contract, when Epicurus at last distinctly put it forth, was put forth, not with the comparatively restricted aim of limiting monarchical authority, with which it has often been upheld in modern times, but with the far more revolutionary aim of throwing the State further into the background of human life by representing it as a thing of man's devising, not an imperious dic-

As the teaching of some of the Sophists had tended to impair the authority of the State, or to limit its functions to the protection of the individual from wrong, so the teaching of the Cynics led up to a denial that the wise man needs a State of his own other than the whole world. The doctrines of the Cynics, no less than those of these Sophists, are controverted in the opening chapters of the Politics. Even Plato, in one of his dialogues at all events, had failed, in Aristotle's opinion, to do full justice to the State and its claims. He had treated the City-State as a mere enlarged household, and had spoken as if the master of slaves, the head of a household, and the King or citizen-ruler of a State only differed in the number of those they ruled. It is primarily in correction of this doctrine, which is not indeed much in harmony with Plato's ordinary view of the comparative claims of State and household, and is perhaps rather Socratic than Platonic, that Aristotle traces, first the beginnings of the household, and then the rise of the household into the City-State. The inquiry, however, offers a convenient opportunity of refuting other and more serious errors—those of the Sophists and Cynics.

The genetic method which Aristotle follows in this inquiry may surprise those who remember that he lays down the principle elsewhere[1], that the genesis of a thing is to be explained by its nature or essence (*οὐσία*), not the nature of it by its genesis. It is, he says, because the thing is what it is, that it came into being as it did. If we want, therefore, to know what the State is, we must ask, it would seem, not the mode of its genesis, but rather its end. Yet he invites us, at the very outset of the Politics, to study the growth of the State *ab ovo* (*τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα*). His object, however, in this is not so much to ascertain what the State is as to prove that it exists by nature, and to show

tate of his nature. Epicurus, in fact, trod in the footsteps of the Sophists referred to in the text. But then he had a philosophical discipline to set in the place of the State, which they had not. They struck down the traditional guide of human life without having anything to substitute for it.

[1] De Part. An. I. 1. 640a 13sqq. (especially a 33–b 4): 642a 31.

that it stands to the household as a whole stands to its part or as a full-grown plant stands to the seed from which it sprang.

In correction of the errors of Plato and others to which reference has been made, Aristotle first traces back the household to necessity and nature, and then shows that the State is a derivative of the household. It differs in species from the household, but yet it is akin to it and issues from it. He takes the two relations which make up the earliest form of the household, before, with the birth of children, a third is added, that of father and child, and he shows how they issue, not from deliberate choice, but from impulse and necessity—the relation of husband and wife from an impulse common to man with animals and plants, that of master and slave from the instinct of self-preservation. The household thus arises; and probably some of those who were most earnest in impugning the naturalness of the State accepted the household as natural. The sophist Hippias, at all events, regarded the law which enjoins reverence to parents as a law universally accepted and imposed by the gods (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 20). But the State rises out of the household through the intermediate institution of the Village, which is properly a Clan-Village, and thus betrays its relation to the household. Already the Village supplies a wider range of wants than the household—ministers to some wants which are not mere daily wants; and the State does no more than proceed a little farther in the same path. The State itself originally exists for the sake of ministering to life, and only by degrees goes on to minister to noble living. Thus there is no traceable break in the rise of the State out of the household; the early State, like the household, is under kingly rule; and if the one is self-complete, while the other is not, if the one is the culmination, or full-grown form, of the other, there is but one movement, one aim—that of supplying human needs—underlying the whole process. The household cannot be natural and the State other than natural: what holds of the former must hold of the latter: if the household is

natural, *a fortiori* the State is so, for it is the completion of the household. We need not, however, trace the State back to the household, in order to prove that it is natural. It is by nature, because its end is the end of all natural things—that which is best (1252 b 34 sq.).

These facts already justify the assertion that man is a naturally political being, for we find that man is, as it were, started by nature on an inclined plane which carries him in the direction of the Best, and that thus a movement is initiated which cannot pause till it closes in the State: but he is a naturally political being for another reason also; he possesses the gift of language, which reflects a consciousness of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and it is this consciousness that serves as a basis for household and State; whereas even the most naturally social of the lower animals only possess voice, and voice expresses no more than a sense of pleasure and pain. In drawing this marked distinction between the sociality of man and that of gregarious animals, Aristotle probably aims at correcting the mistake, as he conceives it to be, of Plato, who had protested in the Politicus (262 A sqq.) against an abrupt distinction of ἀγελαιοτροφική in relation to man from ἀγελαιοτροφική in relation to other animals, explaining that one might just as well divide mankind into Hellenes and barbarians, or into Lydians and non-Lydians[1]. If, then, at the outset we found Society traced to impulses shared by the lower animals, we now learn to regard the household and State as exclusively human institutions[2]. We see also that the State

[1] He may possibly also have in his mind a passage of the Laws (680 E)—οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι, which occurs in Plato's sketch of the origin of society. Plato strangely enough seems more inclined than Aristotle to reason from the lower animals to man (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 4: and Laws, 713 D).

[2] It is indeed implied, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 32, that the πόλις might exist among the lower animals, if its end were τὸ ζῆν μόνον. Animals are said (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 4 sqq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 25) to possess φυσικὴ ἀρετή (see also Hist. An. 8. 1. 589 a 1 sqq.). Some echo of Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq. is possibly traceable in Plutarch de Amore Prolis, c. 3, a passage which may be based on, or contain extracts from, some composition of the great physician Erasistratus, who was a pupil of Theophrastus.

is not merely forced on man by his needs, but foreshadowed by his nature, and requisite to give full play to his faculties; that man bears marks of being intended for life in the State. The ἄπολις, if a man and not above or below humanity, is not only a man whose needs are incompletely satisfied, but also one whose faculties are without an adequate field for their exercise.

We might imagine that Aristotle would stop at this point, having now come to the end of the argument by which he seeks to establish that the State is by nature and that man is intended by nature for life in the State; but he goes on to assert that the State is prior in nature to the household and the individual. He argues that the individual, being incomplete without the State, is related to it as a part to a whole, and that the whole is prior in nature to its part. He makes no subsequent use of this principle[1]; so that we can only conjecture why he lays stress upon it. He does so probably, partly because if the State and individual were both pronounced to be by nature and therefore to stand so far on an equality, the authority of the State over the individual would still be imperfectly restored, and its relative dignity imperfectly vindicated; partly in order to place in the strongest light the disparity of the household and the State, and therefore the contrast of the householder and the statesman. He goes on further to enforce the claims of the State by showing from what a depth of degradation the State saves man, and how great are the benefits it has conferred upon him. Without the State and the virtue it developes in man, man would be the worst of animals: with it he rises far above their level.

In Aristotle's view, the State is as essential to man's existence as the act of birth. For existence means complete existence, and without the State a man is a mere bundle of capacities for good or evil without the faculty (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή), for whose hand they were intended:

[1] It is not on the priority of the State to the individual, but on the fact of its relation to him resembling that of a whole to its part that he dwells in 5.(8). 1. 1337 a 27.

he is, as it were, a helm without a helmsman—'nave senza nocchiero in gran tempesta.' Existence also means real living existence, not such an existence as that of the part after the whole is destroyed—as that of the hand or eye after life has left the body. The State is a condition of complete and real human existence—of existence in the full sense of the word: its place in the process of man's life is thus as assured as that of the act of birth, or of the taking of food. It matters not that whole races of men are doomed to remain half-grown and never to realize the City-State: we judge of what is natural for man by that which holds good of well-constituted natures. Man is a being marked out by nature for the gradual attainment of a definite limit of growth, and the State is the means of enabling him to do so. Man's duty to the State is no more a matter of compact than his duty to be virtuous. Compact is not needed as a basis for the authority of a State which fulfils the end of the State, nor can it lend authority to a State which does not do so.

The State does not come into being, in Aristotle's view, in derogation from, or limitation of, man's natural rights: on the contrary, it calls them into existence. It enunciates what is just (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 37, *ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις*): it is in the State, and with reference to its end, that men's rights are to be determined (Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq.). If persons outside a given State are recognized by those belonging to it as possessing rights—for example, rights to freedom or to be ruled not despotically but as freemen should be ruled, Aristotle would probably nevertheless say that rights in their origin are traceable to the internal relations of the State. Contrast Chrysippus, *Περὶ Θεῶν* (ap. Plutarch. de Stoicorum Repugn. c. 9)—*οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως*. Finding the natural in the best form of the State, Aristotle has no call to imagine a state of nature antecedent to society, and involving risks which compel the formation of the State as a *pis aller*. The State

exists, according to him, because of the better elements in human nature, rather than because human nature is a compound of good and bad. The love of society and the perception of right and wrong implanted by nature in man, the impulse of self-perpetuation, the need of protection and sustenance, the higher needs that gradually assert themselves: these are the things to which the State owes its existence. Man is a being the satisfaction of whose material needs suggests and leads on to the satisfaction of higher needs. The rise of the State merely reflects man's destination to moral development. Kant, on the contrary, in his 'Idee zu einer allgemeiner Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,' traces the State to antagonisms resulting from the fact that men have both tendencies to social union and tendencies disruptive of it, both general sympathies and private interests[1].

Remarks on Aristotle's argument.

The argument of Aristotle must probably have failed to convince the partisans of the opposite doctrine. Some of his opponents would reject his account of the functions of the State, and would confine them to the protection of men's rights: others might say that the picture he draws of the State is a picture of an ideal State very different from the State as it is, and that his defence of the State is consequently a defence of a State which is nowhere to be found: others would perhaps dispute the genesis of the State from the household, and make it out to be rather a thing of man's devising, and to be designed less for man's improvement, than his convenience.

For ourselves, the close historical connexion between the family relation and the State has been placed beyond doubt, though the intrinsic difference between the two institutions is more evident to us than to the Greeks, whose State was in many respects more like a household than our own. Aristotle indeed himself rightly rests the claims of the State rather on its adaptation to human nature and its incalculable services than on its succession to the household.

[1] Kant, Werke, 7. 321 sq. See Flint, Philosophy of History, 1. 391.

Its authority, however, may be vindicated without seeking to prove that it is everything to man; or even that it is a product of nature. The word 'nature' means less to us than it did to the Greeks. On the other hand, so far as Aristotle's argument goes to show that the authority of the State is not based on consent, it possesses permanent importance.

Cicero (de Rep. 1. 24. 38) is sarcastic at the expense of some inquirers who had begun their political speculations in a similar fashion to Aristotle, though one or two of his expressions (e.g. 'quot modis quidque dicatur') make it doubtful whether he is thinking of Aristotle:—'Nec vero, inquit Africanus, ita disseram de re tam illustri tamque nota, ut ad illa elementa revolvar, quibus uti docti homines his in rebus solent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae, deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar, verbisque quid sit et quot modis quidque dicatur definiam saepius: apud prudentes enim homines et in maxima re publica summa cum gloria belli domique versatos quum loquar, non committam ut sit illustrior illa ipsa res, de qua disputem, quam oratio mea.' He so states the primary cause of the formation of the State, as to give a greater prominence to man's natural sociality than to his needs: 'Coetus autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio: non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc' (Cic. de Rep. 1. 25. 39). Elsewhere, however, neglecting Aristotle's distinction between the cause of the original formation of the State and the cause of its existence[1], he makes τὸ εὖ ζῆν the cause of its formation: 'Considerate nunc cetera quam sint provisa sapienter ad illam civium beate et honeste vivendi societatem: ea est enim prima causa coeundi et id hominibus effici ex re publica debet partim institutis, alia legibus' (de Rep. 4. 3. 3).

Bacon's account of the origin of society[2] is noticeable,

[1] Something not altogether unlike Cicero's statement appears, however, to be implied in Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 21 sqq., and also, as a friend has pointed out to me, in Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq.

[2] 'Argument of Sir F. Bacon, His Majesty's Solicitor-General,

both because it is obviously influenced by Aristotle's views, and because it does not trace society to a primitive compact. 'The first platform of monarchy,' he says, 'is that of a father, who governing over his wife by prerogative of sex, over his children by prerogative of age and because he is author unto them of being, and over his servants by prerogative of virtue and providence (for he that is able of body and improvident of mind is *natura servus*), is the very model of a king.' On this pattern the earliest society was constructed. 'The first original submission is paternity or patriarchy, which was, when a family growing so great, as it could not contain itself within one habitation, some branches of the descendants were forced to plant themselves into new families, which second families could not by a natural instinct and inclination, but bear a reverence and yield an obeisance to the eldest line of the ancient family from which they were derived.' Bacon adds, as secondary and later sources of monarchy, admiration of virtue or gratitude towards merit, gratitude for salvation in war, or enforced submission to a conqueror. 'All these four submissions are evident to be natural and more ancient than law.' 'All other commonwealths, monarchies only excepted, do subsist by a law precedent . . . but in monarchies, especially hereditary . . . the submission is more natural and simple, which afterwards by laws subsequent is perfected and made more formal, but it is grounded upon nature[1].' 'Nulla apud Baconem,' Friedländer remarks,

in the case of the Postnati of Scotland;' quoted by C. Friedländer, De Francisci Baconis Verulamii doctrina politica, p. 15.

[1] Bacon evidently intends to suggest that the claims of Monarchy are superior to those of other constitutions—an inference which Aristotle is far from drawing from its priority in point of time. 'While the Protestant writers on Natural Law persistently maintain that the State is a divine ordinance—while they incline to place the subject in the same position with respect to his King as that which the child holds to the father whom he has had no part in selecting—while again they firmly assert the indefeasible Majesty of the Head of the State, the Jesuit writers on the subject take a diametrically opposite view. They insist in the interest of the Church on the human origin of the State, on its origin in a primitive social compact, and infer from this that where the Prince shows himself unworthy of the power committed

'vestigia ficti illius, quem Hobbesius profert, status naturalis, qui bellum fuisse cogitatur omnium contra omnes; nulla vestigia pactorum illorum quibus homines se invicem obstrinxissent, occurrunt.'

Aristotle's account of the origin of the State.

It will be observed that, if Aristotle deals with the question of the origin of the State, he deals with it only incidentally, and in course of proving that the State exists by nature. We must not, therefore, expect from him more than a cursory treatment of the question.

Plato had twice sketched the origin of society—first in the Republic and again in the Laws; and his two accounts do not altogether coincide. He had traced its origin in the Republic[1] to man's need of the services of his fellows: he here starts with the single individual and shows how unable he would be to supply his own needs without the aid of at least four or five others, and how the efforts of this group of individuals would fail of full efficiency in the absence of a scheme for distributing and combining their labour. The interchange of the products of their industry is thus, according to this passage, the first and most characteristic fact of social life. In the Laws[2], however, while tracing the succession of constitutions from its starting-point, he incidentally developes another view of the origin of society. He had apparently noticed that the sites of ancient cities were often close under the slopes of high hills, still more ancient traces of habitation being found on the summits of these hills[3]; and these facts seemed

to him, the mandate he holds may be withdrawn from him' (J. E. Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1. 574). A Solicitor-General's argument in the time of James I, and especially an argument of Bacon as Solicitor-General, was, however, certain to be sufficiently monarchical in tone.

[1] Rep. 369 A sqq., *εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ* κ.τ.λ. Plato's treatment of the subject in the Republic is no doubt, however, more ideal and less historical than in the Laws. Perhaps indeed we could hardly expect him to trace the State back to the household in a dialogue in which the household was about to be abolished.

[2] B. 3, 676 A–682 B.

[3] Or, very probably, he was merely building on Homer's description of the Cyclopes, which both Plato and Aristotle take as a picture of the earliest human society:—

to him to point to the further fact of a primitive deluge, the survivors of which began society afresh on the hill-tops, each household being ruled by the father and existing either independently or in combination with a few others. Why the survivors of the deluge should be found, when the curtain draws up, grouped in such small bodies, Plato does not explain. The next phase of society is a larger agglomeration of households, accompanied with a change of the site of the settlement to the foot of the hill-slope.

It is evident both from the general tenour of Aristotle's account of the origin of society, and from the repetition in it of incidental expressions used in this passage of the Laws[1], that he has this sketch before him in his own treatment of the subject. The deluge, indeed, is dropped out, and all the picturesque features of Plato's story: we lose also some instructive hints, such as the *aperçu* that the earliest men were hunters and herdsmen (Laws, 679 A); and the series of societies—household, clan-village, and city-State—is marshalled before us, stripped of historical detail and reduced to a somewhat bald outline. But Aristotle has seized the idea that society begins with the household, not with the group of producers to which the Republic traces it back, and he holds firmly to it. He adds, however, an account of the origin of the household—a subject which Plato had not touched. As we have seen, he traces this, not, like Locke, to the long infancy and long minority of the human being, which, but for wedlock, would impose an overwhelming burden on the mother, but

ἀλλ' οἵγ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα,
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι,
Cp. Laws, 677 B.

[1] e.g. Laws, 681 A, *τῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μειζόνων αὐξανομένων ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρώτων*—cp. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 15, *ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη*: Laws, 681 B, *παῖδας καὶ παίδων παῖδας*—cp. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 18: and Laws, 680 D–E, *μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων* (sc. *δυναστεῖαι γίγνονται*) *τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποίησουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι*;

to certain powerful instincts, which hardly, perhaps, account for the permanence of the conjugal relation.

We see that, in Aristotle's view, the State so far treads in the steps of the Household and Village, that it never ceases to be a common life, for this is implied in the term *κοινωνία*. A sundered and scattered citizen-body, like that of Rome, would not be to Aristotle a citizen-body at all. Mutual personal acquaintance (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14 sqq.) was essential to the citizens for the discharge of their political duties; and besides, a common life (*τὸ συζῆν*), though not enough of itself to constitute a State (3. 9. 1280 b 29 sqq.), is, in his opinion, a necessary condition of State-life. But though the State resembles the household and village in this particular, it developes virtues unknown or imperfectly known to them. Justice, in the true sense, first appears in the State.

We have already seen that too much must not be expected from a sketch of the origin of society, which is introduced mainly to prove its naturalness, and does not profess to aim at exhaustiveness. It is, evidently, largely ideal. Each of the successive *κοινωνίαι* is represented in its correct and normal form. The confusion, common among barbarians, of the wife with the slave (1. 2. 1252 b 5 sq.) is just noticed and no more. No time is spent on such deviation-forms of the Household as that mentioned as prevalent in Persia (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160b 27), where the father uses his sons as slaves. The relation between master and slave is conceived as a relation in which each side finds its advantage. The retrospect thus acquires rather an ideal aspect. It is an historical retrospect, but the many erroneous types of each *κοινωνία* which have presented themselves are thrown on one side, and we take note only of the normal evolution. The gradual expansion of the solitary household into the clan-village and the city-State is an ideal picture, rather than an historically traceable fact. If Aristotle intends to imply that the household is coeval with the first origin of society, he omits to notice that society occasionally exists, as Hero-

dotus already knew, without the institution of marriage, even in its rudest polyandric form. Aristotle, again, traces the development of society without reference either to religion or to war, each of which has probably exercised a powerful influence upon it, even if they have not been the main factors in the movement.

If we doubt whether the household finds a place in the most rudimentary form of society, and therefore whether the starting-point of Aristotle's evolution is really the true starting-point, we need not hesitate to deny that the culmination of the process, as he conceives it, is really its culmination. He seems to close the social evolution long before its real termination. The city-State, as he depicts it, without a Church, without fully developed professions, with an imperfectly organized industrial and agricultural system and a merely parochial extent of territory, cannot be considered 'self-complete,' as he asserts it to be: perhaps, indeed, no single State can be held to be so. The *ἔθνος*, again, finds no place in this sketch of social development: Aristotle's view of it, indeed, does not seem to be wholly self-consistent. For though not only *βασιλεία*, which is one of the normal constitutions, but even *παμβασιλεία*, the most divine of them all, might exist in an *ἔθνος* or group of *ἔθνη* (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), the *ἔθνος* is pronounced to be self-complete only in respect of things necessary (*αὐτάρκης ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις*, 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), and also deficient in the 'differentiation' which marks the State (2. 2. 1261 a 27).

Two conclusions, especially, result from this inquiry: the one, that the *πόλις* is the true subject of the investigations of Political Science; the other, that the *πόλις*, being a natural entity (*τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων*), is not a thing to take any and every shape that the convenience of the individual may dictate, but, on the contrary, has a physiology of its own, and a natural structure of its own, which must be ascertained.

The *πόλις* the culmination of human society and therefore the true subject of political study.

The Greek language left Aristotle no alternative, save

to identify the πόλις with the State. The term, which was thus placed before him for analysis, was not a term like our word 'State,' vague in etymology and meaning and thus susceptible of any connotation. It came to him fresh from popular use and full of associations of a definite kind. Evidently it implied, in the first place, that a State without a city at its centre was not a State at all. It is true that the word πόλις is occasionally used in the sense of 'a country[1]'; but it has nothing of the vagueness in this respect of the Latin word 'respublica.'

Another obvious inference from the word πόλις was that the State was something inclusive and all-comprehending. The word 'respublica,' on the contrary, implies a distinction between 'res publica' and 'res privata.' The Greek word made it easy to regard the State as the whole of which the individual was a part. It led to a view of human society as a whole: no line was drawn between the social and the political system: production, trade, science, religion were as much phenomena of the State as government. Πολιτική was held to regulate all human activities and to provide for their harmonious co-operation for a common end.

The word πόλις, again, tended to suggest a limit to the size of the State. The city, it would be felt, could not be indefinitely large, and therefore, as the State was a city, neither could the State. It implied, further, that the State involved a common social life (τὸ συζῆν); that a mere participation in a common government was not enough. It perhaps suggested the idea that the State was not an abstraction, existing apart from the human beings and the territory which made it up, but that it was a concrete thing hardly separable from its walls, its soil, its inhabitants, and, above all, its citizens. Aristotle, indeed, uses the word πόλις in conflicting senses. He often seems to use it so as to include all who exchange services of whatever kind within the State (e.g. Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 2 sqq.: 2. 2. 1261 a 23: 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sqq., a passage which is perhaps only aporetic): more strictly, the πολῖται are the πόλις (6 (4).

[1] See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

11. 1295 b 25: 3. 6. 1279 a 21); and this appears to be his prevailing view (3. 1. 1274 b 41).

Lastly, the word implied, by its antithesis to the Household and the Village, that the State, though the highest, was not the only form of Society. To Hobbes the State is the earliest social unity. It was not so to Aristotle.

The *πόλις* a *κοινωνία*, and a compound Whole, a *σύνθετον*.

Aristotle assumes, in the very first sentence of the Politics, that the State is a *κοινωνία*[1]. But what is a *κοινωνία*? We search in vain in Aristotle's writings for any systematic account of *κοινωνία*. As in the case of many other terms, we are left to make out the meaning he attaches to the word from a number of scattered passages which rather imply than state it. The subject of *κοινωνία* is touched upon by Aristotle, partly in the Nicomachean Ethics, partly in the Politics. The household, for instance, so far as it is a form of Friendship (*φιλία*), is treated in the Ethics. The virtues which go to the maintenance of a *κοινωνία* are described in the Ethics. In the Politics we have mostly to do with *κοινωνίαι* composed of rulers and ruled, and with the principles which determine the nature of the rule exercised. For there are *κοινωνίαι* which are not composed of rulers and ruled, as will shortly be seen. We seem to gather from the scattered data we possess that every *κοινωνία* must—

1. Consist of at least two human beings diverse from each other (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 16 sqq.): and these human beings must not stand to each other in the relation of instrument and end, for in that case there will not be enough in common between them. At least, this is the teaching of Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq.: yet the first book of the Politics asserts a *κοινωνία* between master and slave, which is a case of precisely that disparity. Perhaps the very unequal *κοινωνία*, like the unequal form of friendship, is to be regarded as a lower form of the thing, though not so low as wholly to forfeit the name.

[1] The word *κοινωνία* is hardly translatable in English. It is, as will be seen from the text, a far wider term than 'association.'

2. These human beings are regarded as possessing *ἀγαθά* and exchanging them: thus a *κοινωνία* is formed by a buyer and a seller, or by husband and wife. Beings who do not stand in need of anything or anybody do not form *κοινωνίαι*: thus the gods, whom the Stoics conceived as being in *κοινωνία* with men, cannot be so in Aristotle's view. The *ἀγαθά* exchanged, even if in truth so diverse as to be incommensurable, must be commensurable in relation to demand (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18): their ratio will in a fully developed society be measured by money.

3. The two parties unite in a common action (*πρᾶξις*): see for illustrations Eth. Nic. 9. 12. 1172 a 3 sqq. Buyer and seller unite in exchanging. The *κοινωνοί* of a State unite in 'the best life of which they are capable' (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 36): those of the best State in 'the actualization and perfect exercise of virtue' (38). This is the *κοινόν τι*, which the existence of the *κοινωνία* implies—a common aim (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8 sqq.) and common action.

4. A passage here and there in the Ethics seems to imply a compact, tacit or other, between the parties to the *κοινωνία*. So in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13 sq. we are told that 'Political Friendship' appears to rest on compact (*αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαὶ καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται (φιλίαι) κοινωνικαῖς (φιλίαις) ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι· εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν*), while the friendship of relatives and comrades is held, on the contrary, not to rest on any such basis. There is nothing, however, to this effect in the Politics, where the State is distinctly traced to a root in the family relation.

If we examine the *ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία*, or union for exchange, we shall find all these features present. Buyer and seller combine to exchange certain commodities on certain terms with a view to their own advantage.

In a *κοινωνία* of this simple kind, however, we notice the absence of one feature which is conspicuously present in the *κοινωνίαι* which pass before us in the opening chapters of the Politics—the household, village, and State. In Trade no relation of rule and subjection is established between

the κοινωνοί[1]. The parties to an union for exchange stand, as such, on one and the same level.

The State is thus not only a κοινωνία, but a κοινωνία consisting of rulers and ruled. It is a Whole composed of parts (1. 2. 1253 a 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sq.), not a μίξις or a κρᾶσις in which the mingled elements vanish, replaced by a new entity, the result of the mixture; still less is it a σύμφυσις (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 10 sq.): it is, on the contrary, a σύνθεσις (3. 3. 1276 b 6), an union in a compound form of uncompounded elements (ἀσύνθετα), which continue to subsist as elements or parts within the compound Whole. Being a Whole, the State is composed of dissimilars (2. 2. 1261 a 29), and includes within itself a ruling element and a ruled (1. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). Its parts—and here its parts are taken to be the individuals composing it—stand to it in just the same relation as the parts of any other Whole do to that Whole (1. 2. 1253 a 26). The fact that the State is a Whole thus leads to various important inferences as to its nature.

Plato had drawn a close parallel between the State and the soul of the individual human being, but had not explained how this resemblance comes to exist. Aristotle finds a parallel between the structure of the State and that of all σύνθετα; so that it resembles, according to him, not one single exceptional entity, but nine-tenths of existent things, and the analogy becomes more comprehensible. If Aristotle seems, in one passage (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 24), to speak of the State as the outcome of a process of growth, he does not apparently entertain the idea that this creates a special resemblance between it and a plant or animal—an 'organism,' as we term it. Still all Wholes,

[1] By using the expression οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25: cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 28), Aristotle seems to imply that there are κοινωνίαι which do not issue, like the State, in a Generic Unity, but if so, it is doubtful to what κοινωνίαι he refers. For the meaning of this term, see Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 a 24 sqq.: 1016 b 31 sqq. Just as men, horses, and dogs are one in kind, for they are all animals, so the members of a State are one in kind, for they are all κοινωνοί. One in kind, not merely one ἀναλογίᾳ: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 27.

and animals among them, are used occasionally to throw light on the structure of the State (e. g. 1. 5. 1254 a 2 sqq.). The individual man, composed of soul and body, beyond all other members of the class—not, as Plato thought, the soul of the individual—affords an instructive analogy to the State, for he is, like it, a moral agent (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 33 sq.). Still, even here the parallel is not complete; for the State is essentially a plurality of human beings (2. 5. 1263 b 36), and far more self-complete than the individual (2. 2. 1261 b 11). The State, however, as we have seen, resembles the individual in being a Whole constituted by nature.

To understand a thing, however, it is necessary to trace it to its four causes, and especially to discover its matter and its end.

We have thus ascertained the genus of things to which the State belongs, but we must ascertain much more than this about it, before we can claim to understand what the State is. Aristotle knew more clearly than any of his predecessors how much an answer to the old Socratic inquiry, what this or that thing is, involved. The definition of a thing is the statement of its causes: it involves the tracing out of all the causes which make it what it is: but, above all, it involves a knowledge of its end. To understand a thing is not to understand what it is made of, or what it looks like[1], but to understand its living operation; and if we are to understand this, we must, above all, know its end. It is thus and thus only that we penetrate into its inmost being. This holds of the State, as of other things, though, as we have already seen, Political Science does not speculate about the State with a purely speculative aim, but with the aim of regulating human action.

In every object not devoid of Matter, the source of its being, or cause, which first attracts attention, is the mate-

[1] Cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 640 b 29 sqq., *εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῴων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι· φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν. φησὶ γοῦν παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι οἷόν τι τὴν μορφήν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι γνωρίμου· καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.*

rial out of which it is made. Ex nihilo nihil fit. How this material came to exist, how the Potential was brought into being, Aristotle does not attempt to explain. It is evident that his account of Becoming leaves Matter unexplained: it deals only with the later stage of the process, not with its earliest moments. He held Matter, in fact, to be eternal. Starting, however, from this point, we see that, if we wish to refer a statue to its causes, the bronze or marble of which it is made takes a first place among them. Apart from this, it would not be in existence at all. *Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης*, Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 23. In this case the material is material in our sense of the word—it is body: in other cases it is not so—in fact not sensible, but intelligible: cp. Metaph. Z. 10. 1036 a 8, *ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὑτήν· ὕλη δ' ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μη ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά*[1]. But whether body or not, matter is always a *substratum* in things susceptible of change; cp. Metaph. H. 1. 1042 a 32, *ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς.* Thus cold air becomes warm air or warm air becomes cold air: there is a transition from one contrary affection to another: but this, and any other change, implies the existence of a *tertium quid* in addition to 'cold' and 'warm,' a thing neither cold nor warm in itself, but capable of becoming cold or warm—this is 'air.' Air, then, is in this example the matter and *substratum* (*ὕλη* and *ὑποκείμενον*). *Ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει*, Metaph. Λ. 1. 1069 b 6. The characteristic, then, of matter is its capability of becoming this or that—its 'potentiality' (*τὸ δυνάμει ὄν*), in a word. 'Matter is the potential, imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the perfect and complete, a transition from half-reality to entire reality or act. The Potential is

[1] Quoted by Grote, Aristotle, 2. 185.

the undefined or indeterminate—what may be or what may not be—what is not yet actual, and may perhaps never become so, but is prepared to pass into actuality when the energizing principle comes to aid' (Grote, Aristotle, 2. 184). Aristotle's account of Matter varies from time to time, according as he finds himself obliged to read more or fewer attributes into the primitive *οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ* or *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον*. Taken at the lowest, this must possess a certain amount of spontaneous power—a capability of favouring by its suitability or marring by its defects the process from Potentiality to Actuality. Aristotle, however, as we have seen[1], occasionally treats it as almost an efficient cause. Indeed, as the *πρώτη ὕλη* and the *ἐσχάτη ὕλη* are both of them Matter, its nature must inevitably vary greatly.

Evidently, then, though Matter is for certain things an indispensable condition of their being, it is nevertheless insufficient by itself fully to account for their existence. *Ἐκ γὰρ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάντα γίγνεσθαί φαμεν, οὐ τὸν χαλκὸν ἀνδριάντα*, Phys. 1. 7. 190 a 25. If bronze is to become a statue, the form of a statue must be impressed upon it. Thus (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26) *ἄλλον [τρόπον αἰτία λέγεται] τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη* (the kinds or genera under which the species and specific form falls). If a saw is to be a saw, it must not only have a correct Material Cause (be made of iron), but also assume a correct Form (have teeth). It is then that the Potential passes into Actuality. 'In this way of putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much implicated with the Actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the Actual; it is as a half-grown passing into a full-grown; being itself essential as a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation. The three logical divisions —Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or Concrete (*τὸ σύνολον, τὸ συνειλημμένον*)—are here compressed into two, the Potential and the Actualization thereof. Actuality (*ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια*) coincides in meaning partly with the Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form being

[1] P. 17, where de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19 sqq. was referred to.

so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost effaced' (Grote, Aristotle, ibid.).

But, however we conceive the process by which Matter receives Form—whether as a growth of one into the other or as a combination of the two (*σύνθεσις*)—in either case a further power is necessary, whether to assist the growth or to effect the combination. This is the 'source of change' (*ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*)—the efficient cause (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 29 sqq., *ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου*). But what is the efficient cause of a thing? A house is built by a man: but then it is built by the man *qua* builder; and he is a builder so far as he is possessed of the art of building. *Ἄνθρωπος οἰκοδομεῖ ὅτι οἰκοδόμος, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος κατὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν· τοῦτο τοίνυν πρότερον τὸ αἴτιον* (Phys. 2. 3. 195 b 23). The art of building, then, we find, is the efficient cause of the house. But then—still observing the same rule of following the chain of causation up to the highest cause (*δεῖ ἀεὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἑκάστου τὸ ἀκρότατον ζητεῖν*, Phys. 2. 3. 195 b 21)—the art of building a house is insight into the Form of a house, possession of the Form (*ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος*, Metaph. Z. 9. 1034 a 24): it is the presence in the mind of the conception, the type (*τὸ παράδειγμα*, Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26): thus both in Nature and in Art like produces like, a man produces a man, a house a house, and so forth. We might even expect that Aristotle, like Plato (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 439. 3, 2nd edit.), would absorb the Efficient Cause wholly in the Formal, but this he does not do: a place is left by him for the efficient cause and a part for it to play (cp. de Gen. et Corr. 2. 9. 335 b 7 sqq., *δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ἅπαντες μὲν ὀνειρώττουσι, λέγει δ' οὐδείς* (the efficient cause) . . . . *εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτια τὰ εἴδη, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δ' οὔ, ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν*;). Thus with him the art of building or the builder remains the efficient cause of the house, though we see that the Form must not only be ultimately im-

pressed on the Matter, but must be pre-existent to the whole operation.

Nor yet is it sufficient that the Form of the thing should be complete if it cannot fulfil the end for which it is designed. A hand is not a hand if it does not fulfil the end of a hand: a stone hand, for instance, is not a hand at all, except in name. *Πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα* (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 23). It is in the end, and the end alone, that the whole evolution finds rest and completion. This is its term, and it is, if we look well into the matter, the deepest and most determining cause throughout the movement. *Ὅμοιον δ' ἔοικε τὸ λέγειν τὰ αἴτια ἐξ ἀνάγκης κἂν εἴ τις διὰ τὸ μαχαίριον οἷοιτο τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξεληλυθέναι μόνον τοῖς ὑδρωπιῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ μαχαίριον ἔτεμεν* (de Gen. An. 5. 8. 789 b 12). The End masters, as it were, every other agency—Form, Efficient Cause, Matter—and bends it to its service. It determines the Form the thing must assume: the saw is intended to saw—therefore it must have teeth (its Form). It sets in motion the efficient cause, the worker in iron and his tools. It also produces, or chooses, or adapts for its purpose, the material out of which the saw is to be made. It must be made of iron: why? Because its end is to saw. The End is thus, in truth, the Beginning. It is a fixed point at the commencement and termination of a process (*ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις*, Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 1). To seize and determine this fixed point is always possible, and till this has been done, the cause of the thing cannot be said to have been ascertained. *Ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν φυσικήν, οἷον τήν τε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων ποία πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα πέφυκεν. φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ' ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν· ἢ γὰρ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ*

ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως (de Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 11 sqq.)[1].

In the foregoing statement of a familiar doctrine Teichmüller's clear and concise exposition (Kunst, pp. 63–78) has been especially followed.

So nearly related, in Aristotle's view, are the formal, efficient, and final causes, that the four causes are often treated by him as, in fact, two only: e.g. de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 1, εἰσὶν ἄρα δύ' αἰτίαι αὗται τό θ' οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 30, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δ' ὡς μορφή, τέλος δ' αὕτη, τοῦ τέλους δ' ἕνεκα τἄλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα. We come back, then, to the Dualism of influences—Matter, and the Good or the End—which our examination of Necessity, Spontaneity, Nature, and Human Agency disclosed to us[2].

This doctrine, it will be observed, does more than merely enumerate and classify the agencies, whose operation makes a thing what it is: it asserts that everything into the composition of which matter enters, bears traces of a process, and it announces the law of this process—or motion, in the wide Aristotelian signification of the word—which is, that it begins in the Potential and ends in the Actual. The most diverse things can all of them be traced back to an ἐξ οὗ, or material cause: 'not only the statue to the metal of which it is formed, but the tree to seed, the conclusion to its premisses, moral virtue to desires implanted by nature, the octave to its component notes, these notes to the instrument which gives them utterance, words to syllables or sounds[3]': and the ἐξ οὗ is always the Potential.

[1] This does not exclude occasional assertions that 'scientiae natura ac virtus in formali potius quam in finali causa cognoscenda ponitur' (Bonitz), such as that in Metaph. Z. 6. 1031 b 6, ἐπιστήμη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἐστὶν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκείνῳ γνῶμεν (cp. 20). Contrast Metaph. A. 9. 992 a 29, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν ὂν αἴτιον, διὸ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἣν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐδὲν ἅπτεται τὰ εἴδη.

[2] Aristotle's theory of the four causes did not long remain unchallenged, for the Stoics recognized only two, the material and the efficient causes (Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 136).

[3] J. E. Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1. 125.

The Matter of the State.

If we now turn to the πόλις or City-State, we shall find that it also originates in an appropriate ἐξ οὗ, or material cause (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). It is not quite clear whether we are to reckon as part of its Matter, in addition to a population suitable in numbers and quality, a territory suitable in character and extent: but perhaps this may be Aristotle's meaning. The Matter of the State comprises not only things tangible and 'material' (in our sense of the word), such as the soil of the territory and the physical frames of the population, but also, as we see from a subsequent chapter (4 (7). 7), those gifts of mind and character (τὸ ἔνθυμον, τὸ διανοητικόν), which are there held to be characteristic of the Hellenic race, in contradistinction to other European races and to the races of Asia.

The End of the State.

But to understand what the State normally is, we must ascertain its true End. Without a knowledge of the End of the State, we cannot decide what Matter it must start with, what external goods must be at its command and how they are to be distributed, what 'activities' it presupposes and to whom they are to be assigned—we cannot, in fact, take a single step in the exploration of the field of Political Science.

We see that to Aristotle the two central questions of Political Science were: 1. What is the end of the State—not the universal end of things, but the end of the thing we call a State? 2. What Matter and organization will enable it to realize this end?

The method of inquiry in Politics to which Plato's philosophical principles point.

The aim of Plato[1] had been less to explain the actual world, than to find a region of realities which would afford a firm foothold to Science. 'His whole philosophy is from the outset directed far less to the explanation of Becoming than to the consideration of Being: the concepts hypostasized in the Ideas represent to us primarily that which is permanent in the vicissitude of phenomena, not the causes

[1] I have followed Zeller mainly in this brief reference to the Platonic metaphysics, but I am aware that the subject is still under investigation.

of that vicissitude. If Plato conceives them as living powers, this is only a concession forced from him by the facts of natural and spiritual life. But it is antagonistic to the main current of his system, and cannot be harmonized with his other theories respecting Ideas[1].' He is thus led, in theory at all events[2], to throw aside much as unworthy of his study and greatly to contract the field to which he directs his scrutiny[3]. The phenomenon is merely a shadow (Rep. 515): it is to be used merely as a starting-point (Rep. 511 B, 508 D): Dialectic must keep as far as possible on the level of the Ideas and must limit to the utmost its contact with the sensible world (Rep. 511 B, 532 A: Phileb. 58 A). His effort is to reach 'what is purest' (*τὸ καθαρώτατον*) in each thing (Phileb. 55 C), to arrive at the abstract (Phileb. 56 D–E): thus the study of 'matters relating to the sensible world, its origin, its affections, and its action on other things' will be eschewed as concerned with things involved in a process of change (*τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα*, Phileb. 59 A); or else tolerated as 'a source of recreation not involving repentance' (Tim. 59 C, *τἄλλα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἔτι διαλογίσασθαι τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν· ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ κατατιθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως πέρι διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοῖτο*: cp. Tim. 29 C–D: Rep. 508 D). Plato seems even to regard this department of physical study as possessing less exactness (*ἀκρίβεια*) than Ethics and Politics: we may contrast, at least, his hesitating, almost apologetic, tone in the Timaeus (e. g. 29 C, 59 C) with his positiveness in the Republic and the Laws.

But to this view he could not adhere. He could not turn away from the phenomenal world, just at the moment when he had, as he thought, obtained a clue to its comprehension. He subjects the sphere of 'sensible things' to examina-

[1] Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 269.

[2] 'Aristotle does not employ that purely conceptual method, which Plato inculcates on the philosopher, although he himself has attempted it only in special instances and incompletely' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 173).

[3] See Zeller, Plato, E. T., p. 147.

tion, and finds that the Ideas stand related to it as causes. Thus, in the Meno (98 A, cp. Tim. 51 D–E), the cognition of cause (*αἰτίας λογισμός*) is made the characteristic of Science: in the Phaedo the Ideas are viewed as 'the proper and only efficient causes of things' (Zeller, Plato, Eng. Tr. p. 262 sq.): and further, the Idea of Good is to Plato the highest efficient and the highest final cause (Rep. 508 C, 517 C: Tim. 28 C sq.: and Phaedo 97 B sqq., 100 B: Rep. 540). 'In Plato's mind the conception of knowledge and truth, the conception of objective reality or essence, and the conception of a systematic order or cosmos, alike implied the conception of a 'good,' which cannot be identified with any of them, but is the condition or logical *prius* of them all[1].' Aristotle asserts, in a well-known passage (Metaph. A. 6. 988 a 8 sqq.: cp. A. 9. 991 a 20: 992 a 29), that Plato employed only two kinds of cause, the formal and the material, but, as Zeller has pointed out (Plato, p. 76), this does not appear to be altogether true. His treatment, however, of the efficient and final causes seems to leave much to be desired in respect of clearness and completeness. 'It was a difficult problem to conceive classes as self-existent substances; but it was far more difficult to endow these unchangeable entities with motion, life, and thought' (as appears to be done in Soph. 248 E); 'to conceive them as moved, and yet as invariable and not subject to Becoming; as powers, in spite of their absoluteness, operating in things' (Zeller, Plato, p. 268). So again, side by side with the Universal End, the Idea of Good, though far below it, we discern specific ends, or *ἔργα*, of individual things (e.g. Rep. 352 D sqq.): and if the connexion between the two is traceable[2], it hardly seems sufficiently

[1] Mr. R. L. Nettleship in 'Hellenica,' p. 176.

[2] 'A thing is what it is in virtue of its position in such an order. As in the physical organism the character of each organ depends upon its relation to the whole, and has no existence apart from that relation (Rep. 420 D); as in the larger whole of the State each member only preserves his true individuality, so long as he takes his proper place in the organization of labour, and loses it when he ceases to do so (Rep. 420 E–421 A: cp. 417 B, 466 B); so in the universal order of existence each constituent not only is understood,

worked out. 'The teleology of Plato preserves in the main the external character of the Socratic view of Nature, though the end of Nature is no longer exclusively the welfare of men, but the Good, Beauty, Proportion, and Order. The natural world and the forces of Nature are thus referred to an end external to themselves' (Zeller, Plato, p. 340). Thus to him the causes of things were not their immanent tendencies, but entities external to them—the Ideas and, above all, the Idea of Good—which alone can be said fully to exist, and whose uncongenial union with Matter generated a world of secondary and derivative reality. Plato's view, in fact, is found to involve the existence of a third power—a World-Soul or a δημιουργός—to wed Ideas with Matter. It is, indeed, true that Matter itself is not, with Plato, wholly passive; for he recognizes in things 'a kind of existence that cannot be derived from the Idea' (Zeller, Plato, p. 333); a power which the Idea cannot wholly master, the power of Necessity immanent in Matter, which may co-operate with or thwart the Idea. Still, on the whole, the one cause stands to the other as the indispensable condition stands to the actual and operative cause, for such is the Idea. The true Atlas which holds the world together is the Idea (Phaedo, 99 C).

It is for this reason that the genuine lawgiver and ruler is the philosopher, whose gaze is fixed on 'ordered and unchanging things, neither wronging nor wronged by each other, but all keeping order and obedient to Reason,' and who has learnt from them lessons of a godlike orderliness and freedom from change. His business will be to look at 'that which is naturally just and noble and temperate' and then at the corresponding elements in man[1], to glance repeatedly from one to the other, and, mingling the two, to create by appropriate modes of life 'the true human image[2]'

but subsists, only so far as it remains true to its place in the order, and as that place is determined by the ruling principle, end, or "good" of the order, it is to this ultimately that it owes what it is' (Mr. R. L. Nettleship, 'Hellenica,' pp. 176–7).

[1] Stallbaum compares Rep. 597 B, ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα κλίνη and ἣν ὁ τέκτων εἰργάσατο: and Phaedo 103 B, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναντίον οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.

[2] Prof. Jowett's Translation, 2. 335 (edit. 1).

(midway between the two?), 'taking a hint from that which Homer called divine and godlike in man: he will erase one feature and paint another in, till he has made human character as far as possible agreeable to God[1].'

The method to which Plato's philosophical principles point would seem to be open to objection on the following grounds:—

1. it gives less prominence than Aristotle's to the necessity of a careful and minute study of the concrete thing:

2. it affords less of definite guidance to the investigator. It fails to point out with equal clearness the path he is to follow: it is also less easy to say what contributes to the realization of the Idea of Good than what contributes to the realization of the specific end of a given thing, always supposing that that end can be determined:

3. it supplies no philosophical reason for allowing weight to the opinions of men possessing experience but devoid of philosophy:

4. in Politics, it points to the absolute rule of the few who know (i.e. have vision of the Ideas).

How far is this method followed by Plato?

How far does the method thus indicated appear to be employed in the political investigations of Plato? It is possible, with Zeller (Plato, p. 466), to find the central fact which determines the structure of the Republic in the principle that philosophers (or those who are conversant with the Ideas) are to rule: yet it is on a review of men's varied wants, and on a distribution of the task of supplying them in conformity with the principle of Division of Labour, that the organization of the State in three great classes—a point of critical importance—is made to rest (Rep. 369–376). The parallel of the soul of the individual human being also counts for much; nor is the example of

[1] See Rep. 500 B–501 C, esp. 501 B–C. I add the Greek, not feeling confident of the correctness of my own interpretation:—*ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσε ἀποβλέποιεν πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σώφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐμποιοῖεν ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρεικελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.*

the Lacedaemonian State without influence. The method actually followed in the Republic seems, therefore, to correspond only imperfectly with that announced by Plato[1]. If this is true of the Republic, it is still more conspicuously true of the Laws. The State of the Laws evidences a closer attention to the facts of human nature, a fuller consciousness of its weaker side. The rulers must be less trusted and less autocratic—the ruled must be flattered with a semblance of political power. The specific end of the State—the production of virtue in its citizens—is more largely taken into account: institutions must tend to produce virtue, or they have no *raison d'être* (Laws, 770 D, 771 A). The best Hellenic experience is more fully drawn upon.

The method to which Aristotle's philosophical principles point—ascertainment of the specific end.

The method actually followed by Aristotle stands in a closer relation to his philosophical principles. To him the world is to be explained, not by the fact of a mysterious intermingling[2] of two strongly contrasted things, the non-existent and the existent, but by the rise of the semi-existent into the existent. What the world evidences is not a conjunction, but an universal process of growth. The lowest and earliest term of the process contains the potentiality of the highest and last: the evolution is homogeneous from beginning to end, and must be studied as a whole. In place of the non-existent and the existent, we have the Potential and the Actual, means and an end; and it is no longer possible to say that the one term of the process must be studied to the exclusion of the other. The end, again, being to Aristotle the specific end of the concrete thing, not an universal and extrinsic Idea, could only be ascertained, and its working traced, by means of a careful study of the concrete thing. When once identified, how-

[1] In the view of Mr. H. Jackson (*Journal of Philology*, No. 19, p. 149), the true, or highest, method is confessed by Plato both in the Phaedo (100 A sq.) and in the Republic (509 D sqq.) to be 'an unrealized aspiration.'

[2] The Stoics returned to the notion of an intermingling (κρᾶσις) evidenced in the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of φύσις to φυτόν, of God to the world (Zeller, Stoics, E. T., p. 133, note 2), but to them the things intermingled were alike material.

ever, it afforded real guidance to the investigator[1]. The process, further, was one which had been striving to realize itself in the past—with imperfect success, no doubt, in the sphere of things human (*πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται*, Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 20), but still the world, or at all events the Hellenic world, had not gone altogether astray. The Household had passed into the Village, and the Village into the City-State; and now it only remained to make the City-State all that it should be. It was not reserved for philosophy in the fourth century before Christ to impress for the first time the Idea on the phenomena of politics: what was needed was to assist Nature in achieving her own already half-executed design[2]. Political Science is not called upon, as a *deus ex machina*, to bring passive matter to intermingle with the Ideas: on the contrary, it finds a natural process already in action, and its business is to study this process, to assist it and amend it. Aristotle's principle, in its application to Political Science, did not, indeed, amount to a metaphysical justification of History in general, or even of the History of the best-endowed race or races, but it suggested an acceptance of the best Greek experience, whether recorded in institutions or opinion, as the rough ore of truth, needing to be sifted and purged from dross, but capable of yielding, in skilful hands, much that was of permanent value.

To Aristotle the world of concrete existence was not

[1] Cp. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 8 sqq., *ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος· φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει.* On this, however, see Ramsauer's note on Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 12, who contrasts Rhet. 1. 2. 1356 b 28, *οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν).*

[2] Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 25–35, where the argument is that the world and mankind have existed from everlasting, and that the business of the philosopher is not so much to discover something wholly new, as to accept what men have been obliged by necessity or enabled by leisure long ago to discover, and to add the finishing touch where anything has been overlooked. See also 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq.

a mere world of 'copies,' or, at best, of derivative reality, from which one should escape and pass on as rapidly as possible to the world of complete reality; it was thoroughly real[1], if not the only reality[2], and deserved the closest study. That which Plato, starting from the Ideas, had viewed as a gratuitous or unexplained decadence, Aristotle, starting from the opposite pole, regards as an upward movement, an ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν. Where Plato had traced a dilution or obscuration of real existence, Aristotle finds the process by which real existence is achieved. The world of change, which Plato approached with half-averted eyes, was exactly the subject to which Aristotle was most drawn, for he claimed to have discovered the law of all change. It was not to him in itself the most knowable of subjects, but it was perhaps that of which we know most. Physical study, for example, which Plato had been inclined to eschew, and which, in fact, occupies only a subordinate position in his writings, claimed a larger share of Aristotle's attention than any other subject; and the greater part of his works as we possess them has to do with this subject (Zeller, Plato, p. 146). It is not to him, as it had been to Plato, in comparison with the study of things eternally existent, a pastime or recreation, or 'a source of pleasure not involving repentance' (Tim. 59 C); it is a part of Theoretic Science, linked by this common title to Mathematics and the First Philosophy.

Aristotle had already taken an important step in extending and accentuating the recognition previously given by Plato to the Material Cause. Matter to him is something more than a subordinate power which may assist or impede,

[1] Cp. Categ. 5. 2 a 11, οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 305 sqq.

[2] Cp. Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 339: 'In addition to corporeal entities, Aristotle recognizes in the Deity, the spirits of the spheres' (as to these, see Zeller, ibid. p. 455), 'and the rational part of the human soul incorporeal entities not encumbered with Matter, which we must likewise regard as individual entities.' See also Heyder, Vergleichung der Aristot. und Hegel'schen Dialektik, i. p. 186, n.

something more than a mere ἐξ οὗ, or οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ, or a mere Potential in a passive sense; it is the source not only of the accidental concomitants of a thing, but also of some which enter deeply into its essence and help to constitute its specific form, such as the difference of sex, the contrast of man and brute, the distinction of the transitory and variable from the eternal and invariable. It is, apparently, even the source of individuality in things falling under one and the same *infima species*, for it marks off Socrates from Callias. It is, above all, the source of the evolution, which, wherever change and movement find a place, carries the particular thing on to the realization of its specific end[1]. It is susceptible of affection, and, it would seem, of affection for the highest of objects (for God 'causes motion as an object of love'—κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον, Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 3), though it reaches the highest only by realizing, as part of a Compound Whole (σύνολον), the specific end of that Compound Whole. Even the 'First Matter' (πρώτη ὕλη)—the furthest point to which we penetrate in stripping off attributes, the *substratum* in its most naked form—has something active in its Potentiality. Trace things back as far as we may, we come to nothing purely passive. Any defect in the composition of the Material Cause distorts the outcome of the evolution, without, however, depriving it of the reality which always attaches to the concrete thing, or justifying its neglect by the inquirer. In the Politics, as we have seen, the defective forms of the πόλις, if only the πόλις type is attained, are held to deserve most careful study.

It was, however, a far more important step to make the specific end the key to Science. But in what sense are things said to have a specific end? In the broadest and most general interpretation of the term, the specific end is that for the sake of which the species exists to which the thing belongs (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα). But this phrase is susceptible of many meanings. We are told, for instance, in the Politics, that the worse exists always for the sake of the

[1] On the foregoing, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336–344.

better (*αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν*, 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 21). This implies, not only that the worse elements in the individual thing exist for the sake of the better, but also that the thing itself exists for the sake of that which is better than it. So plants and animals exist for the sake of man (Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.); and we seem to be on the high road to a purely external teleology [1], like that of Socrates, a creed which adds this to its other disadvantages, that the end it assumes throws no light on the nature of the thing. For how do we learn the nature of animals by learning that they exist for the sake of man? The prevailing view of Aristotle, however, is very different from this. He does not hold that man exists for the sake of the State, though the State is better than man, or for the sake of the heavenly bodies, though these are far diviner than man (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 34 sqq.), nor even for the sake of God. And so again, man is only in a sense the end of the things to which he is an end (*πως τέλος*, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 35).

We obtain a clearer view of the true nature of the specific end, when we conceive it as the term of a movement. Movement exists and needs explanation: it becomes explainable if it has a term. There are four kinds of movement, or change—change in essence (generation and destruction), change in quantity (increase and diminution), change in quality (alteration), change in place (motion). Aristotle's theory implies a likeness between the terminal point of a movement and the aim of a change; and indeed a likeness between movement and the act of 'striving after' (*τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἀγαθοῦ τινός*, Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 2). Both analogies seem somewhat strained. If we ask, what is this terminal point to which each thing is supposed to move —which appears as the goal of movement, the aim in change, the object of desire—the answer is 'Actuality.' The Actualization of the Potential is always the end. In what does this consist? 'That is always most desirable

[1] See Eucken, Methode der Aristot. Forschung, pp. 83–7: p. 98, for the traces in Aristotle's writings of this point of view.

for every one which is the highest attainable by him' (Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 29): or, as we are elsewhere told, 'that which is special to each thing (*ἴδιον*) is the end for which it came into being' (de Gen. An. 2. 3. 736 b 4). The Potential becomes actualized, when the given thing is found to discharge its highest attainable function, or the function which is specially its own. Thus the end of the natural slave is to do the best thing he can do (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sqq., *διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον*); and the same thing is true of the State. Aristotle, in fact, identifies 'that which is best for each thing' with 'the best which it can do' (*τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον*, or, as it is usually expressed, *τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον βέλτιστον*). The relation of the specific end to the Supreme End—God—is left obscure, but we gather that the true way to the latter lies through the realization of the former.

In this immense generalization, which views everything as having a single *raison d'être*, and this assignable by man, a thousand minor distinctions between things seem to vanish. The law holds of things inanimate and things animate—of movement (or change), of growth, of the action of brutes, of moral action, of thought. An end is viewed as equally an end, whether pursued unconsciously or consciously, by an inanimate object or by man, with an exercise of Moral Choice or without it. Moral action (*πρᾶξις*) and movement (*κίνησις*), though usually distinguished (e.g. Metaph. Θ. 6. 1048 b 21), agree in obeying this law.

We need not wonder that Aristotle himself feels the principle to be more applicable to some things than to others. As we go upward in Nature, the end discloses itself more distinctly (*ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον δῆλον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ ὅλως ὅσα οἷον ὄργανα καὶ ἕνεκά του . . . ἧττον δ' ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ ὀστοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλα. ἔτι δ' ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος [καὶ] γῆς ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκιστα ἐνταῦθα δῆλον ὅπου πλεῖστον τῆς ὕλης*, Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 29: *καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, ἧττον δὲ διήρθρωται*, Phys. 2. 8. 199 b 9: both pas-

sages are referred to by Eucken, Op. cit., p. 70). Compare the noble passage in the Metaphysics (Λ. 10. 1075 a 11 sqq.), *πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐστί τι· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν.* Even in organic life preferences of Nature can be traced not contributing to the end (Eucken, p. 79. 2); nor yet to the preservation of the particular animal or species (ibid. p. 83. 1, 3). If the end eludes us at the lower pole of the scale of being, can we trace it at the opposite pole? Has the Supreme End an end? And where the teleological relation most clearly manifests itself, we ask how it is that each object exists for only one, or one chief, end? Why has it not twenty ends, all on a level? Is it true, again, that the end of a thing is not the sum of the functions it fulfils, or ought to fulfil, but the highest of them only? And how is the highest to be identified?

The teleological method in Politics, and the use made of it by Aristotle.

We are here, however, concerned with Practical Science, and in Practical Science the teleological method may be more applicable than in relation to other subjects. It is obvious that the question, 'what a thing is for,' may be a far more fruitful question in relation to some things than to others. It may result in little when we raise it in relation to a plant or an animal, and be full of instruction when we raise it in relation to a State. 'In purely physical science there is not much temptation to assume the ulterior office' of deciding whether the ends pursued 'are such as ought to be pursued, and, if so, in what cases and to how great a length'; 'but those who treat of human nature and society invariably claim it; they always undertake to say, not merely what is, but what ought to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine of Teleology is indispensable[1].'

[1] J. S. Mill, System of Logic, 2. 524 (ed. 3). See also Mr. Herbert Spencer's remarks in *Mind* for Jan. 1881, p. 82 sqq.

It is necessary to know what the State is to do before we can decide what it ought to be.

Yet is it possible to prescribe a single end to the State—one invariable end at all times and in all places—or even one chief end? The difficulty is increased when Aristotle identifies the end of the State with the end of social existence, and that with the end of human action; for the vast question of the end of human life is thus cast like a barrier across the threshold of Politics. The method, again, by which he seeks to determine the end of the State seems hardly adequate to such a problem. We look in vain for a careful historical investigation into what the State *can* do: what it *tends* to do, is indirectly considered in the chapter (Pol. 1. 2) which treats of the origin of society; but even this question can hardly be said to receive sufficient consideration. Yet these are points which should be investigated before we inquire what the State ought to do. Aristotle seems to rest his solution of this latter problem on Opinion (that of οἱ ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦντες, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 28), so far as he does not rest it on a rather ideal historical retrospect (Pol. 1. 2). He himself sees that the true end of society only discloses itself after the State has existed a certain time, for at its first appearance its end is mere life, not good life; yet he believes that in his day experience was sufficiently complete to justify an absolute conclusion on the subject. In reality, however, his view of the end of the State stands in close connexion with his general conception of the end of organic life. Good life is the end of man in a higher degree than of animals and plants[1], and as the State is a collection of human beings, it must be the end of the State.

Even, however, when the end is ascertained, we are not in possession of a means of determining once for all the true structure of the State. The concrete interpretation of the

[1] Cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq., τὰ δὲ πρὸς τῷ ζῆν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα πολυμορφοτέραν ἔχει τὴν ἰδέαν, καὶ τούτων ἕτερα πρὸ ἑτέρων μᾶλλον καὶ πολυχουστέραν, ὅσων μὴ μόνον τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἡ φύσις μετείληφεν· τοιοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· ἡ γὰρ μόνον μετέχει τοῦ θείου τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων ζῴων ἢ μάλιστα πάντων.

end may vary[1]. One and the same end, again, may be reached by different paths under different circumstances. Aristotle, it is true, does not recognize this, for he conceives that the end which he assigns to the State can only be fully realized by a single type of social and political organization. But he allows that the instances are few in which the 'best State' can come into being (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.), and he seems to make but little use of the end of the State in his inquiries respecting the imperfect constitutions[2], under which, nevertheless, nine-tenths of those who reach the πόλις stage of society must expect to live. The durability of the constitution, rather than its favourableness to good life, seems here to be the aim he keeps in view. Nor can the institutions of even the best State be nakedly deduced from its end. The means of realizing the end (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος)—in other words, the organization of the State—have to be otherwise ascertained. For this purpose, the 'social functions' (ἔργα) necessary to the πόλις are enumerated, and as it proves on inquiry that they ought not to be indiscriminately opened to all the denizens of the State, the creation of γένη—a term under which classes, trades, and departments of the State are included without distinction—follows of necessity[3]. In the whole inquiry it is evident that the institutions of actually existing societies, and especially of Hellenic societies, are present to Aristotle's mind, the End being used as a standard by which to correct the data thus gained. The End is kept in view in selecting the Matter of the State and in improving it by education and law: it serves as a measure of rights within the State, for the just is relative to the End (3. 9: 3. 12–13): it helps us to determine the true size of the State, and the limits within which the participation in ἀγαθά it implies is to be confined:

[1] Compare, for instance, Aristotle's interpretation of τὸ εὖ ζῆν with Cicero's (de Rep. 4. 3. 3: 5. 6. 8).

[2] So far at least as the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) are concerned, for the true end of the State is evidently often present to Aristotle's mind in his criticisms of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions.

[3] Pol. 4 (7). 8–10.

it regulates the creation and accumulation of wealth; but it will not supply the place of a knowledge of human nature, or of political experience, or of historical information.

The application of the teleological method by Aristotle is further qualified by an occasional resort to principles not special to Political, or even to Practical, Science. He not unfrequently accepts a kind of evidence which he terms 'the evidence of reasoning' (ἡ τῶν λόγων πίστις), and which is distinguished by him from proof based on principles special to a given science (ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν)[1], and from proof based on detailed knowledge and experience[2]. He recognizes, in fact, more roads than one to the truth; and thus, when in the Politics (4 (7). 4) he investigates the true size of the State, he finds that the evidence of reasoning—broad reasoning from the universal conditions of order (τάξις)—leads him to a true conclusion; and indeed, not only the evidence of reasoning, but that of observed facts, and in particular, the fact that no reputedly well-constituted State is indefinitely large.

It is thus evident that the teleological method is not applied by Aristotle in its purity. He could not approach the problem, how best to adjust the State to its end, without a consciousness that the State is not an unique thing, or a thing capable of being severed from other things, and dealt with by itself. On the contrary, it belongs, in his view, to a whole class of things—the class of things into which Matter enters; it is, consequently, subject to the play of Potentiality and Actuality: it is, further, a κοινωνία and a κοινωνία issuing in a Natural Whole. We are not, therefore, at liberty to determine the mode in which it is to achieve the end for which it exists, without reference to the

[1] e.g. de Gen. An. 2. 8. 747 b 28, λέγω δὲ λογικὴν (ἀπόδειξιν) διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσῳ καθόλου μᾶλλον, πορρωτέρω τῶν οἰκείων ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν.

[2] e.g. de Gen. et Corr. 1. 2. 316 a 5 sqq., αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογούμενα συνορᾶν ἡ ἀπειρία· διὸ ὅσοι ἐνῳκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἳ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾷον· ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες. See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 171. 2.

general laws which govern all cases of genesis. We cannot deal with Political Science apart from the Science of Being and Becoming. Nor can we deal with it without the guidance of the best attainable Experience and Opinion. In well-constituted individuals and races, things tend to work themselves out right, and we must take the history and institutions of such races into account.

We see, therefore, that Aristotle approached the subject of Politics with some prepossessions: on the one hand, he brought to its study a metaphysical creed, which led him to expect the State to conform to the laws of structure and working which he traced in things in general; on the other, he was biassed in favour of Hellenic institutions. He was thus led on from the assertion of a single and invariable end for the State to the far more questionable doctrine, that the State can only achieve this end by the adoption of one unvarying type of structure, which it is possible to map out in considerable detail[1]. Nor was the end which he assigned to the State one that was likely to suggest a satisfactory structure. The end of a thing is, in his view, as has been said, not the sum of the functions discharged by it, but the highest of them only. If that highest function can only be discharged by a part of the Whole, then that part becomes, in fact, the Whole. To it all other parts become mere means; they exist for it and are merely subsidiary to it. The State thus came to be, as we shall hereafter see, not only an union of unequals, which may very well be its character, but an union of classes which are mere means with a class which is related to them as their end. The mutual relation of the component elements of the State was thus distorted and denaturalised. Aristotle's 'best State' is exactly the kind of State to which a Teleology such as his pointed. The classes of which it is composed are remorselessly distributed into means and ends. Two thirds

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 28, *τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς.* We need not here pause to consider, how far Aristotle's error, if such it is, has been repeated, even down to our own day.

of them fall under the former head, one third under the latter. Since, further, the particular type of social and political organization, which Aristotle held to be the only true one, was nowhere even approximately realized, a shadow of illegitimacy was cast on the actual State; it did not, perhaps it could not, fulfil the true end, or distribute social functions and social advantages in accordance with true justice or true expediency; and a doubt might well arise whether it possessed any real claim to the obedience of the citizen, or, at all events, to his active participation in its concerns. Its authority was weakened, and a sanction indirectly given to that detachment from politics, which Aristotle probably desired to combat[1], but which was the growing tendency of the age; and not only to detachment from politics, but to political indifference and disaffection.

On the other hand, his emphatic reference of the State to an end had its advantages. There had been a time when the State itself had been viewed as the end of human life[2]; and if Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had already 'taught the existence of a virtue of man as man, not limited in its exercise to action on behalf of the State, and had treated the State only as a means for the realization of virtue, not as the ultimate moral end[3],' Aristotle's more systematic reference of the State to an end was a welcome confirmation of their view. It seemed to provide a definite standard, the application of which would rob political inquiry of its arbitrariness and uncertainty, would supply it with a criterion of right and wrong, and raise men above those 'media axiomata,' among which in these subjects they

[1] We may perhaps infer this from the general tenour of the Politics. Aristotle not only insists that the individual is a part of the State (1. 2. 1253 a 18 sq.) and belongs to the State, not to himself (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 27 sq.), and that the active virtues contribute to the enjoyment of leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sq.), but he also presses the improvement of actual constitutions on the attention of political inquirers, and declares that this is as much the business of Political Science as the portraiture of an ideal State (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 1 sqq.).

[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 61 (4th edit.): cp. Plato, Meno 73 A: 73 C.

[3] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 33 (ed. 2).

usually move. If a knowledge of the End was useful in departments of science where we cannot hope to modify phenomena but only to understand them, it was likely to be doubly so in Practical Science—a field in which imperfection seemed to arise more easily, and almost more legitimately, than elsewhere; where the material cause was more commonly defective or treacherous, where error or oversight was more fatal, and 'deviation from the true path' (*παρέκβασις*) was especially frequent[1]; and where, at the same time, we might hope to effect amendment, for though the best State might lie beyond the reach of almost all, there were (so Aristotle held) fairly satisfactory forms of social and political organization, of which this could not be said. For one important lesson, at all events, we may probably thank Aristotle's teleological treatment of Politics. It tended to negative in advance the many theories, which, from century to century, down to our own day, have claimed for some one social element—whether King, people, or Pope—an indefeasible right of sovereignty irrespective of contribution to the general welfare. Power falls of right, in Aristotle's view, to those who, be they many or few, are qualified by intrinsic merit and command of material resources to contribute effectually to the end for which the State exists.

Aristotle's error lay, not in seeking to discover the end of the State, for he was right in accounting this to be the first step in Political Science, but in imposing on it one unvarying end, in giving too narrow an interpretation to that end, and in holding that it could only be fully attained through one type of society.

[1] Communities are liable to *ἀκρασία* no less than individuals (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 18); and Political Science, in Aristotle's hands, is evidently far more tolerant of the faultier constitutions than Ethical Science is of the faultier types of character. We have only to read the book of the Politics which treats of Revolutions, to see how easily the constitution may slip from one form to another: the configuration of its territory, accident, as at Athens (Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 12), a want of vigilance on the part of the holders of power, facts in the past history of the State, may all avail to bring about a change.

The end assigned by Aristotle to the πόλις examined.

If we pass on to examine the end assigned by Aristotle to the πόλις, we shall find that here he diverges to a certain extent from the Socratic tradition, to which both Xenophon and Plato adhered. The office of the Statesman, according to Socrates, was to make the citizens better (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 32: 2. 6. 13 sq.). Xenophon contrasts the ideal Persians of his romance, who 'seek to secure that the citizens of their State shall be as good as possible' (Cyrop. 1. 2. 5), with the Assyrians, whose State aimed at the production of wealth (ibid. 5. 2. 20). So again, Plato holds that the end of the πόλις is to make the citizens happy by making them virtuous[1]. Aristotle describes the end of the πόλις somewhat differently: its end is not merely the production of virtue in its citizens, but the production of virtuous action; it not only makes men good and happy, but gives the action of men already good and happy its full natural scope and character. It produces virtue and developes virtuous action in those who are not yet virtuous, but its end is to afford the virtuous and happy a field for the exercise of their virtue and happiness. It comes into being 'for the sake of life,' but exists 'for the sake of good life'; or, if this is an end common to it with other things, it exists for the sake of noble action (τῶν καλῶν πράξεων), or still more definitely, for the sake of 'life perfect and complete in itself' (Pol. 3. 9. 1281 a 1). As the Christian is said to be 'complete in Christ[2],' so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις. Not completeness as a whole (for this includes 'completeness in respect of necessaries' as well as 'completeness in respect of good life'), but completeness in respect of good life is the end of the πόλις. Its end is, however, sometimes stated to be 'noble action' (καλαὶ πράξεις)—under which term, in the Politics (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 16 sqq.), though not in the Ethics (10. 7. 1177 a 21), the exercise of the speculative faculty is included. Aristotle, in fact, though he still stands firmly in the Politics by his view of the

[1] Gorg. 515 B: Laws 631 B: and other passages referred to by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 464, n. 12.

[2] Coloss. 2. 10.

superiority of the virtues exercised in leisure, which include those concerned in speculation, shows nevertheless an inclination which he had not shown in the Ethics, to dwell on the features common to speculative and practical activity. In the Ethics they are parted by the interval which separates the divine in man from the human, and *σοφία* from *φρόνησις*. Aristotle is there, perhaps, still under the impressions which were present to his mind when he described the 'creative reason' (*νοῦς ποιητικός*) in the De Anima: he may have seen the matter in another light when he looked at it from the more social, less psychological point of view which prevails in the Politics.

It should be observed, however, that the end of the *πόλις* is not to promote good life in mankind generally, but only in those within its own pale who are capable of it; and also that the *πόλις* must not only set itself to foster good life, but all that is contributory thereto. The *πόλις*, it may be added, will not achieve good life or happiness, unless some or all of its members achieve it. The happiness of the Whole will be achieved through the happiness of its parts, and thus we find the happiness and even the pleasure of the individual more considered by Aristotle than by Plato. See (e.g.) Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 5: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.: 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. The sense must further be noticed which Aristotle attaches to good life. He construes it as bound up with the pursuit of politics and philosophy. As we shall see, not all ages nor both sexes are held by him to be capable of rising to this kind of life; nor are all callings compatible with it.

Three propositions implied in Aristotle's account of the end of the *πόλις*.

Aristotle's account of the end of the *πόλις*, or City-State, involves three separate assertions:

(1) That the State is, or rather may be and should be, not only the negative condition, but the positive source of virtuous action in individuals:

(2) That it is an all-sufficient source of virtuous action (*αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) in them:

(3) That virtuous action is its end.

Examination of these propositions—the first.

(1) So far as the first of these assertions is implied in his view, Aristotle would not probably feel that he was departing in any degree from the best opinion current among his countrymen. The Hellenic State began in a group of tribes and clans, and was itself, like a tribe or clan, an unity based on common worship and consecrated by common festivals. It was thus a common life, as much as an union for protection against foes, or the redress of injuries, or the making of laws. The State was the centre and guide of social existence: Delphi early taught the citizen to worship the gods which the State directed him to worship and in the manner which the State prescribed: the institutions and the laws, written and unwritten, which every Greek felt had made him what he was, were traced back by popular belief to some lawgiver commissioned by the State. Even in barbarous communities, the laws, whether written or unwritten, were observed to be commonly directed to the production of military virtue[1]; and the end to which their rude legislation was addressed was sought more scientifically and successfully by the laws of the Lacedaemonian State. The devotion of the Three Hundred at Thermopylae was an homage to law:

> Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇδε
> κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι[2].

Each little community, like Israel, drew its moral inspiration and its moral atmosphere from its laws. The State was 'the rock whence' each man 'was hewn' and 'the hole of the pit whence he was digged[3].' Lysias had said: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι πάσας τὰς πόλεις διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς νόμους τίθεσθαι, ἵνα, περὶ ὧν ἂν πραγμάτων ἀπορῶμεν, παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντες σκεψώμεθα ὅ τι ἡμῖν ποιητέον ἐστίν[4]: and Aristotle takes it

[1] Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5 sqq.

[2] Ῥήμασι is here explained as = νομίμοις. If this is the meaning, cp. Thuc. 1. 84. 3.

[3] Probably the same thing might be traced in the early Teutonic community, and would have been still more easily traceable in it, if the Christian Church had not relieved the State of many of its prerogatives. Rude early communities do not trouble themselves over-much to draw sharp distinctions between sin and crime.

[4] Lys. 1. 35, quoted by L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. p. 199, who also refers to Demosth. 23. 141 (p. 202). See L. Schmidt's remarks on the above subject, pp. 198–203.

for granted that the aim of every lawgiver is to make men good: *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης* (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 2 sqq.)[1]. But the influence of the Hellenic State asserted itself through other channels than that of the law, written or unwritten: both Isocrates and Aristotle dwell on the influence exercised by the example of the rulers of the State[2], and Plato (Rep. 492 A) contrasts the small effect produced by a few sophists in comparison with the influence on the individual of a whole people gathered in its assemblies or law-courts or theatres. The distinctive characteristic of a *πόλις* according to Aristotle—that which marks it off from an alliance—is to be found in the benevolent care of each citizen for the virtue of all belonging to the State (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). In every way the saying of Simonides—Πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει[3]—held good. It is true that another view of the State had been put forward by the sophist Lycophron, who treated it as merely a 'security to the citizens against mutual wrong' (*ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων*, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10); and that the sophist Hippias, as has been said, acknowledged only those laws which are universally accepted to be divinely authorized: but we note in other sophists a tendency to accept as just whatever the strongest element in each State held to be for its own interest (Plato, Rep. 343), and thus to assert the ethical authority, not merely of a well-ordered State, but of any and every State in which the strongest element ruled.

No doubt, the Hellenic State had not always, or even generally, made full use of the position thus accorded to it: it failed, we are told, even to give its members a training

[1] The peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver lay in this, that he sought to regulate the rearing and habits of his citizens (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.), not in his seeking to produce virtue. His aim was the same as that of others, though his methods were more effectual.

[2] Aristot. Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 39: Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 31: Areopag. § 22: Nicocl. § 37.

[3] Plutarch, An seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 1.

appropriate to the constitution (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.); and if it failed in this, we need not wonder that it failed, except in one or two places, to train them systematically to virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Its laws were a chaos, directed to no special aim, or, if to any, to success in war (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5): its guidance of religion was imperfect, its chastisement of heresy fitful: it allowed education to fall into the hands of men who travelled from State to State, detached from State-allegiance, or who sought inspiration from sources other than the laws and traditions of the State[1]. Its authority was still further impaired, or even made harmful, by falling into the hands first of one faction, and then of another (3. 3. 1276 a 8 sqq.). Yet those who questioned it were probably the few, rather than the many; and even Isocrates (de Antid. §§ 295–6) could claim that culture at Athens was virtually the product of the State. It was easy to forget how much in the Athenian character, for instance, was due to other than indigenous influences; how the philosophy of Athens, its metres and its music, its rhetoric and its triremes, and, above all, its Homer, came to it from outside. The springs that fed the moral and intellectual life of an Athenian were gathered from a wider area than that of the Athenian State.

It was on this foundation of common sentiment that the philosophers built up their conception of the office of the State. Plato, indeed, was not unaware that the State could not afford to rely exclusively on its own spiritual resources (Laws 950 A sq.: 951 A sqq.), though he subjects communications with other States to strict regulation: and if Aristotle speaks more emphatically of the self-completeness of the single State (e. g. Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 23 sq.), he can hardly have intended to go beyond Plato in this matter. Still both seem inclined to recur to the long-past time, if indeed there ever was such a time, when each Hellenic

[1] To Plato men seem to speak not without plausibility when they make out Circumstance to be the real legislator of the State (Laws 709 A).

State was its own spiritual counsellor and oracle, not drawing life from the central stem of Hellas, but finding the 'light of the city' in its own law. The self-contained Lacedaemonian State was, notwithstanding Leuctra, the model constantly before the eyes of both. Why should not a nobler State of this kind be possible? They seem to have thought that moral influence was not a thing which could be expected to travel far from its source; the conception of a world-wide Church was alien to their ideas; men could not be spiritual guides to each other without knowing each other, without belonging to, and living in, one and the same city; nor could spiritual authority be effectual without coercive power behind it. Everything, in their view, pointed to the City-State. They forgot that it may be more within the power of the State to communicate what the Lacedaemonian State had communicated to its citizens than what they wished to be communicated to theirs. They did not ask themselves whether a State can make men philosophers, or give them moral wisdom, as easily as it can inspire a readiness to die for it.

We must remember that the moral life of a Greek community would not seem beyond the control of its authorities and its law: not only was it small, and its life passed mainly in public, but the popular mind had hardly perhaps as yet been stirred as deeply as it was stirred by the rise of Christianity under the Roman Empire, and by the Reformation and the French Revolution in later days. The forces with which the State has to deal seemed far more docile than they really are. Even Aristotle fails to comprehend the possibilities of popular enthusiasm. In his view, the masses are well content to be left to their daily struggle for a livelihood, and are little inclined to press for office, unless they are wronged or outraged, or unless they see that office is made a source of gain (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34): their aim is rather profit than honour (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sqq.). Passionate loyalty, or patriotism, or religious feeling, passionate enthusiasm for an idea of any kind, find no place in his notion of the popular mind.

The world had not yet drunk deep of the creeds which, more than aught else, have made men fanatics and robbed the lawgiver and the statesman of their command over things; nor did it then know much even of those non-religious popular movements ('national' movements, for example), which have so often proved beyond the control of statesmanship.

Aristotle, like Plato before him, thought he saw his way to making the influence of the State more of a reality. Let it be so organized as to become to the individual all that the popular voice assumed it to be already. Let it regulate man's existence from the cradle to the grave—regulate marriage and education, property, production and trade, art, poetry and religion. Statesmanship was not statesmanship unless it was equal to this overwhelming mission: the statesman must be capable of guiding, and indeed of leading, the whole culture of the community. It is thus that πολιτική is described as supreme over the sciences, as determining which are to exist within the State and which are not, as adjusting to her end the arts of war, of household management, of rhetoric, and prescribing through legislation what men ought to do and to abstain from doing (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 28–b 7).

The whole action of the State in relation to the individual is apparently conceived by Aristotle (except in the case of a παμβασιλεία) to be governed by law. He seems to be aware that there are some things which law is too general to regulate aright or indeed at all (Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 24 sqq.)[1]: but its limitations are hardly so present to him as they are to Plato in the Laws (e. g. 788 B: 807 E: 822 D), though it is true, on the other hand, that he looks to the educational influence of Law for much that Plato had sought in the Republic to achieve by laws abolishing the Household and Several Property (2. 5. 1263 b 37 sqq.). Law is a means not only of protecting men's rights, or of preventing or punishing criminal acts, but of promoting

[1] The writer of the Eudemian Ethics excepts from the sphere of law our relations to friends (Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1235 a 2).

right action and developing virtue—of developing the right motive of action. We must not measure the operation of Law in the State by the operation of the law-court: law finds its true function in distributive rather than in corrective justice: it assigns to each individual his true position and work: it speaks through the constitution: it regulates the relation of the lower vocations to the higher: it regulates education, property, the household, citizenship, the daily life of the individual in the syssitia and festivals of the State. 'Institutions,' to use a modern word, are the product and creature of Law, and whatever they achieve—whatever, for example, such an institution as that of the monogamic household achieves—is the achievement of Law. In full accord with the popular view, Aristotle includes even 'unwritten laws' under Law and ascribes them to a legislator[1]. Much, therefore, of what we term the influence of Public Opinion, so far at least as it rests on tradition and custom, would apparently be brought under the head of Law. Armed with this powerful weapon, *πολιτική* need not fear to undertake the immense mission assigned to her.

Aristotle's conception of the office of the State unquestionably possesses elements of truth. It is true that the State exercises a vast moral influence on the individual, however narrowly it may construe its functions. The society of which a man forms a part contributes largely to the formation of his character. Mere temporary residence, for instance, in the United States is sufficient, as we say, to 'Americanize' the German or Irish immigrant, and the active discharge of a citizen's duties must greatly deepen

[1] Cp. Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 38, *ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους κ. τ. λ.* Herein he follows Plato (Polit. 295 A, 298 D, Laws 793 B–C, referred to by L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 202). Contrast the language of Plato and Aristotle on this subject with that of Dio Chrysostom, Or. 76. p. 648 M (quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 2. § 1. 9), *ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔθος γνώμη μὲν τῶν χρωμένων κοινή, νόμος δὲ ἄγραφος ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως . . . εὕρημα δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ βίου καὶ χρόνου.* Aristotle himself occasionally uses expressions which distinguish *ἔθη* from *νόμοι* (e. g. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 39, *τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις*).

the impression. The small mass gravitates to the large mass: the individual accepts the point of view, the moral estimate of men and things, which he finds prevailing around him. This is the general rule, though Plato himself notices that the 'divine men whose acquaintance is beyond all price' (Laws 951 B: cp. Meno 99) spring up as much in ill-constituted States as in well-constituted ones, and it is evident that character cannot always be traceable to Society or the State, for otherwise how could a Socrates arise in the defective society of Athens? Even, however, if we admit to the fullest extent that the character of the individual in nine cases out of ten takes its impress from that of the society of which he is a part, the question still remains, how far, where that is so, the laws of the society have contributed to the character thus communicated. If it is possible to exaggerate the influence of the State on character, it is still more possible to exaggerate the influence of law and Statesmanship on character; and Aristotle's doctrine is not merely that morality insensibly adjusts itself to the State as the whole which it has to sustain and keep in healthy working, but that it is in a more positive way its product as being the offspring of its Law.

To a certain extent constitutions—for example, the democratic constitution of the United States—do reflect themselves in character. De Tocqueville and others have sufficiently proved this. Law does far more than protect men's persons and property, or even the whole sum of their rights: it would do so even if it designedly confined its aims within this limit. Even then it would incidentally develope a type of character (ἦθος), or at all events would modify in some degree the predominant motives of action. Laws such as that which enforces monogamy, or those which regulate the devolution of property, whatever the motive with which they may be imposed, exercise a powerful influence on character; they not only enforce certain outward acts, but they create dispositions. The members of a polygamic household are ethically different from the members of a monogamic household. If, again, as Aris-

totle holds, the State can devise and work a system of education which will not only develop the intelligence, but train the moral sympathies, the law by which it effects this will prove itself a moral influence of no ordinary kind.

But the influence of the lawgiver may be overrated. He contributes something to the character of the society for which he legislates, but does not circumstance or race contribute more? are not a thousand nameless influences more potent than he? It is the rarest thing in the world when some lawgiver—Mahomet, for example—subdues society to his will. Aristotle himself sees that the character of a community depends to a large extent on matters beyond the control of the legislator—the nature and situation of the territory, the initial qualities of the population, the turn fortune gives to its history. He did not, however, recognize all the causes which tend to limit the legislator's influence: he did not know how little religion, or science, or the distribution of wealth, or the relative prominence of particular occupations in a State can be controlled by law. However favourable the initial Matter of the State may be, it is only in the world's best moments, when some great Teacher has won men to him, that Law can assume the position which Aristotle assigns to it; and it is precisely at these moments that law and organization are least needed and least in place. When an idea is 'in the air' as a pervading influence, it does not need to be embodied in institutions; these arise later, and seek, usually in vain, to preserve for posterity something of its fugitive greatness. Aristotle[1] ascribes an extent of authority and influence to the Statesman which is hardly ever his, and also invests him with attributes of spiritual leadership which he hardly ever possesses. He is in part misled by the notion of a 'best State' immobile and exempt from change, or at all events travelling in a groove traced for it by its founder. He did not see that society lives by incessant renewal, and that the fresh ideas which reinvigorate it will seldom owe their birth to the statesmen

[1] Plato no doubt in the Republic went even further in this direction than Aristotle.

at its head. It is not to them that we look for the first word of Progress: we are content if they adopt and protect a movement in advance, when already originated by others. Still more is this true of Law. Law is usually the last to register an accomplished advance[1]. Nor again must we set down to Law all that it regulates. It regulates the household; it may regulate the Church: but we need not assume that either of these institutions owes its existence, or its influence, to Law. There are beliefs (the belief in God, for example) which are not traceable with certainty to the influence of social life, much less to Law—they seem rather to be, as it were, self-sown—yet which have done as much, or more, for civilization than any others. Certainly, the Law cannot 'prescribe what men ought to do and abstain from doing.' Even in the best State, the lawgiver can hardly be the source of unwritten law. To us Aristotle seems to call the State to functions too spiritual for it. We know what law is and what statesmen are: we see the State constantly doing, not that which it holds to be right, but that which is dictated by political necessity—constantly studying in its policy its own security rather than the broad interests of morality, and while we quite agree that the State is in some sense a spiritual power, we hesitate to recognize in it the true and only adequate guide to right action or the appointed nursing-mother of science and philosophy.

The second.

Still, to whatever extent we may conceive that Aristotle overrated the influence of the State, and especially of its Law, as positive sources of virtuous action, it seems clear that his view contains an element of truth. He was on less solid ground when he asserted that the State is all-

[1] Or indeed a decline. Plato sees this, as we shall find if we read his picture of the way in which a change in *μουσικῆς τρόποι* gradually affects society (Rep. 424 sqq.)—*ἡ παρανομία αὕτη . . . κατὰ μικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἠρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἤθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ξυμβολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας.*

sufficient for good life (*αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*)[1]. Perhaps in making this assertion he is thinking only of the best State; still, as has been said, he seems to forget that the citizen of a Greek State was not a product of that State alone, but in part of influences originating in other States. The influence of the common festivals of Greece, of its poets, philosophers, and historians, overleapt the barriers between State and State, and Greece would not have been what it was, if civilizing influences originating outside the State had not, for the most part, been allowed full play. It is very probable that, notwithstanding his expressions with regard to the self-completeness of the State, Aristotle would willingly admit all salutary influences from outside, but he seems hardly as alive to the value of such influences as we should expect.

The third.

We next come to the question, is good life, in the sense which Aristotle attaches to it of perfect and self-complete life, not only a thing which the State is capable of producing, but the end for which it exists?

If we take it for granted that one unvarying end is to be set before every State, whatever its environment or circumstances, there is much to be said in favour of Aristotle's conclusion. We may wish that he had construed the end of the State as the production not only in those within the State, but also in those outside it, of the maximum amount of virtuous activity attainable by them: yet the view that the State does not exist for the indefinite increase of its wealth or population or trade, or for conquest and empire, but that these aims are to be subordinated to considerations of moral and intellectual wellbeing, is one which has by no means lost its value or applicability at the present day.

Some may hold it to be too comfortable a doctrine, that the State, whose development often seems to us to follow laws of its own, not always, apparently, conducive to the

[1] He adds *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 28.

welfare or happiness of men, is really a thing to be shaped as may best suit men's moral and intellectual interests; and may think that if it subserves this aim, it does so in its ultimate tendencies and in the long run, rather than directly. We seem often to notice that institutions and classes, to which every statesman wishes well, disappear in the torrent of social change, unable for some reason or other to maintain their footing. We see the State half the champion, half the victim of some over-mastering idea which drives it onward, often to its own destruction. We see it existing, not for its own happiness, but to play some critical part in history—to 'wander in the gloomy walks of Fate.' Others, again, may feel that ends which Aristotle hardly notices—such as that of self-preservation—more largely influence the structure and action of the State, than the nobler end to which he subordinates them—the end of good life: and it may be true that this latter aim, though never lost sight of by the State, is commonly so thrown into the background by the difficulties which beset every State, as to be unable to assert itself with persistency and effect. Here, as elsewhere, he may have been misled by the mirage of an ideal State, exempt (*ex hypothesi*) from the embarrassments from which no State is in reality exempt. Others may insist that the chief duty of a State—the duty it can least afford to neglect—is the protection of men's life and property and freedom of action; or may urge that the moral and intellectual advancement of the members of a State is an end to the attainment of which the Statesman can directly contribute but little, and that, consequently, it can hardly be the end of the State. Others, again, may plead that different States may legitimately have different ends. The end which Aristotle sets before the State may be the highest, and yet a given State may be right in adjusting its organization to another end. The individual State—and this Aristotle forgets—is usually a member of a group, and should address itself to the work for which the characteristics of its territory and population fit it, leaving that which others can do better to be done by

them[1]. It is not necessary that the civilization of each separate State should be absolutely complete. Occasionally, indeed, the circumstances of a State leave it no choice but to be predominantly military or commercial or industrial. Even in these cases, however, the spirit of Aristotle's teaching, if not its letter, may be observed. The State may do its utmost to secure that its legislation and its action shall be in the interest of civilization, rightly understood.

It is when Aristotle descends into detail and interprets good life as inseparable from the pursuit of politics or philosophy that we feel least inclined to agree with him. This doctrine of his forces him to view the less noble vocations as existing only for the sake of the highest. Good life is not, in his view, capable of realization in various degrees by all men; it is the appanage of certain vocations. There was nothing in his formula which compelled him to interpret it thus. He was misled, partly by the general sentiment of his race and age, which exaggerated the contrast of vocations; partly by his own Teleology, always too ready to classify things as means and ends.

We must not, however, forget that the conception of the office of the State which Plato and Aristotle were led to form was the expression of a profound social need. There was pressing need of a power capable of taking the spiritual direction of Greek society. In practice, the poets had long held spiritual sway, and Plato with perfect justice objected to them as religious and moral guides (e. g. Laws 801 B: 941 B): to such guides as he held many of the sophists to be, he objected still more: he longed, as is evident from page after page of the Laws[2], for an authoritative religious and moral revelation, such as that which the modern world possesses, and Greece and Rome did not: the City-State was to be the depositary of this revelation, and to do what the City-State alone could do; by

[1] 'If Great Britain has turned itself into a coal-shed and blacksmith's forge, it is for the behoof of mankind as well as its own' (*Times*, August 27, 1885).

[2] e. g. Laws 887 sq. The remark is one which I owe to Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, to whom it was suggested by a perusal of the Laws.

the regulation of marriage and education, by law, written and unwritten, coercive and suasory, it was to build up a people with whose very being the revelation would be interwoven and who would find in it the principle of their life. The distinction of Church and State, if the thought of it could ever have occurred to him, would probably have struck him as likely to imperil the spiritual influence for which he sought to find a place in society. It would do so, even if the Church were made supreme over the State—the only relation of the two powers which we can imagine him approving—for the Church even then would not have in its own hands the means of enforcing its teaching: and besides, the very distinction of matters spiritual from matters temporal would seem to him to imply forgetfulness of the fact that even the most temporal of temporal matters has spiritual issues of its own, and is in some sense a spiritual matter, to be dealt with on spiritual grounds.

Aristotle, with some variations, followed in Plato's footsteps. Their conception of the State interests us because it forms one of the earliest indications (outside Jewish history) of a feeling that society needs a spiritual authority: the subsequent rise of a Christian Church within the State is sure evidence that they did not err when they craved something more of organized spiritual influence than the actual Greek State offered. So far Plato and Aristotle were moving in the right direction. But when they sought to make the City-State an oracle of spiritual truth, and seemed to aim at providing every man with a kind of parochial Sinai, they greatly erred. If we are to have a Pope, we instinctively wish him to be Oecumenical. Men's conceptions of the office of the State may possibly have come to be somewhat more contracted than they should be, since it has been able to devolve a part of its burden on the Christian Church; and it may be true that if we were to imagine Christianity absent from the scene, it might be necessary for the State, its law and its authorities to play a different part: but even then it would hardly be to the City-State of Plato and Aristotle that

the world would entrust its spiritual fortunes. Its well-proportioned minuteness and Hellenic delicateness of articulation would alone suffice to rob it of its authority over modern minds, which ask for somewhat more of vastness and mystery.

One remark, however, applies to all attempts to determine the abstract end of the State. The thing which it is important that every State and nation should make perfectly clear to itself, is, not what the office of the State in general is, but what is the work which it is individually called to do. There can be little doubt that the work marked out by circumstances for the Greek race and for every Greek State was not only the realization of the maximum of good life, but also the diffusion of Hellenic civilization among the barbarians round about Hellas, and especially among those who bordered on its Northern frontier. The two aims were quite reconcileable, and the latter of them deserved recognition at Aristotle's hands. It seems, however, to have been little, if at all, present to his mind; and even in Alexander's it was probably an afterthought.

We have now arrived at our definition of the πόλις, for we have ascertained the *genus* to which it belongs, and have discovered its *differentia* in its end. It is a κοινωνία issuing in a Whole, and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete life.

A definition of the πόλις has now been arrived at: it is a κοινωνία issuing in a Whole and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete life.

The next question evidently will be—and here we face the central problem of Political Science, as understood by Aristotle—how must this κοινωνία be organized in order to fulfil this end? This is substantially the question that Aristotle puts to himself, though it frequently appears in other forms. He asks, for instance, in the First Book of the Politics, what organization of Slavery or of Supply is in accordance with Nature; and in the Third he discusses the question of the Supreme Authority from the point of view of Justice. These inquiries, however, ultimately pass into

How must the πόλις be organized to attain its end? The answer given in the

portraiture of a 'best constitution'—merits and defects of this mode of dealing with the subject.

the other: the natural is that which contributes to the End, and the just cannot be determined without reference to the End.

The answer is given in the portraiture of a 'best constitution[1].' Aristotle tacitly implies, that it is possible for the inquirer to discover once for all the form of κοινωνία best adapted for the attainment of the end, and, under certain not hopelessly unrealizable conditions, to bring it into existence.

It was not his view that the office of Political Science is simply to register the phenomena of society, and to refer them to their laws—to watch and to understand a process which defies modification—or to inquire what are the conditions which tend to predominate in the future, and to adjust society to them: it must work hand in hand with Ethics—ask of Ethics what type of character it should aim at producing, and then construct the State, if possible, in such a way as to produce it. The path of Political Science lies, in his view, rather through Ethics than through History. It is not enough to watch the tendencies of History and to accept what it brings. History is the record of a process which is partly for the best, and partly not—partly the work of Nature, partly of causes, such as Fortune, which may bring the opposite of the best. There is nothing fixed or infallibly beneficent about the historical process. When the City-State evolves itself out of the Household and Village, we trace the hand of Nature in History; but even in well-constituted races, the dominant tendency of things may be quite other than Natural. The tendency of constitutional development in Greece, for instance, so far from being in the direction of the best constitution, was in the direction of democracy[2]. History, therefore, must be brought to the bar of Ethics, and its natural tendencies discriminated from the rest. Its outcome has a legitimate

[1] Plato had done more: he had thought himself called on to display in the Critias and the projected Hermocrates the 'actual working and manifestation' of 'the political scheme of which the Republic had described the constituent elements' (Grote, Plato 3. 302).

[2] Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 20 sqq.

claim on our acceptance, only so far as it satisfies a teleological test. The ethical point of view must be our guiding light in the historical wilderness: it alone can enable us to choose the right path.

Holding, again, the belief that it is possible to assign one legitimate end to the State, whatever its circumstances, Aristotle also held that this end could be fully realized only through one form of social organization. He had not asked himself the question which Cicero was perhaps the first to ask[1], whether it is not beyond the power of any single inquirer to discover this one form. Cicero (de Rep. 2. 1. 1–3) ascribes to Cato the Censor the striking view, that the construction of a best State is beyond the power not only of any single individual, however able, but even of the united wisdom of humanity at any single moment of time, and can be accomplished only by the combined wisdom and good fortune (de Rep. 2. 16. 30) of a number of individuals spread over a series of generations and centuries, so that, according to him, a State glides (de Rep. 2. 16. 30: cp. 18. 33) into its 'perfect form' (optimus status) 'naturali quodam itinere et cursu.' In one respect, however, Aristotle is wiser than Cicero. Cicero apparently hopes to have an 'optimus status civitatis' revealed to him in this way, which will be suitable to all possible communities. Aristotle is aware that his 'best constitution' can only be suitable to a few.

The quest of a 'best constitution' was a tradition of political inquiry in Greece, and Aristotle fully accepts it. The question, what constitution is the best, was apparently first raised in Greece by practical statesmen (Aristot. Pol. 2. 8. 1267 b 29): it was thus, perhaps, that Herodotus came to imagine a group of Persian grandees discussing the claims of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy to be the best (Hdt. 3. 80 sqq.). It was a later idea that a combina-

[1] Cp. de Rep. 2. 11. 21: nos vero videmus et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. The germ of Cicero's view, however, is no doubt to be found in the Greek conception of Time as the Discoverer, which Aristotle fully adopts (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 23: Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq.).

tion of all three, such as some thought they found in the Lacedaemonian constitution, was the best (Aristot. Pol. 2.6.1265b 33 sq.). When the question was taken up by men unversed in political life, like Hippodamus, fancy went farther afield. Plato was the first to find out that one may discover a 'best constitution' without in so doing discovering a generally available remedy for political ills. He saw, at all events in the later years of his life[1], that his earlier ideal of the Republic had been pitched too high for men, and was only suitable for 'gods or the sons of gods.' Aristotle went further in this direction, and studied the question why a given constitution is applicable to one community and not to another. Not only moral causes, but social or economical circumstances, or the character of the territory, may place a particular constitution beyond the reach of a particular community. The best constitution, for example, is unrealizable without exceptional virtue and exceptionally favourable circumstances (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26). In sketching it, therefore, Aristotle is aware that he is doing what will be useful only to a few.

We may wonder that under these circumstances he made the portraiture of an ideal State the chief task of the Politics. He has not stated the reasons which led him to do so, and we can only guess what they were. Perhaps he found it hard to break with a well-established tradition of political inquiry. Apart from this, however, he would probably feel, that if the Politics was to 'complete' the Ethics, it must contain a sketch of the 'best constitution'—the constitution most favourable to virtue and happiness. He would also feel that if the 'best constitution' were only for the few, those few were the best. The παμβασιλεία was the rarest, if the divinest, of possible forms; yet he describes it with the rest. To omit to tell the Statesman what sort of State he should construct when everything was in his favour would be to leave the best moments of Statesmanship without guidance. The main object of Political Science is to con-

[1] See Laws 739 D : 853 C : 691 C, and other passages from the Laws collected by Susemihl (Sus.², Note 191).

struct a State which will develope, not mar, man's nature—which will call forth virtuous action and form a fit home for virtue. The best State is the State; it is the only form which can in strictness be said to be the State as Nature willed it to be, the normal product undistorted by defects of character or fortune or legislative skill.

We can see that the practice of depicting a best State was not without its advantages. It taught the political inquirer not to rest content with suggesting isolated reforms, but to view them in relation to Society as a whole. It obliged him to construct a more or less consistent and coherent whole, in which each element should match the rest. Territory, national character, the economical and social system, the political organization, must all be such as to work together harmoniously for the common good. Nor could we in any other way have obtained so full a revelation in so small a compass of the political views of Plato and Aristotle.

Yet this practice was a misleading one. It accustomed the student of politics to imagine the legislator in a position which he practically never occupies—to imagine him with a *tabula rasa* before him, free to write on it whatever he pleases. It implied that the supreme task of Political Science is to construct a State 'in the air'—without a given historical past, without given environing circumstances. We can better understand Plato depicting a 'best State' than Aristotle, for Plato believed that in sketching the States of the Republic[1] and Laws he was sketching States not hopelessly beyond the reach of the actual States around him, but Aristotle knows that his best State is realizable only by a very few. His ideal is pitched too high for most States. His citizen-body is to consist of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς*)[2], and they are to possess exactly the right

[1] No doubt, when he wrote the Laws, he had come to see that the State of the Republic made too great demands on human nature to be suitable to men.

[2] Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq. Dio Chrysostom would seem to have Aristotle's ideal State in view when he says (Or. 36. 443 M)—*ἀγαθὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἀγαθῶν πόλιν οὔτε τις γενομένην πρότερον οἶδε θνητὴν οὔτε ποτὲ ὡς ἐσομένην ὕστερον ἄξιον διανοηθῆναι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ θεῶν μακάρων κατ' οὐρανόν.*

measure of external and bodily goods. Nor is his best State apparently conceived as likely to be of use as a guide to reformers of actual societies. When Aristotle turns to the task of making actual constitutions as tolerable as possible, we do not find that he makes much use of his sketch of a best constitution[1]. Its value seems to be this, that it shows how much the State may be to men. It is the 'new garment,' not intended to be used for 'patching' an old one, but rather as a foil to it and to show what the State ought to be and naturally is.

The Cynics and Stoics were apparently the first to hit on the notion of an ideal State which might be superadded to the actual State, and which a man might regard as his true home, though he belonged also to an actual State[2]; and in a somewhat similar spirit Christianity taught men to look up to a 'kingdom of heaven,' to which the kingdoms of the world were to be as far as possible approximated by the Church. Aristotle's conception of the relation of the ideal State to the actual State is wholly different: the actual State seems to profit but little by the projection of the ideal State, which is apparently of use only to the fortunate few who are in a position to realize it.

The attempt to portray a 'best State,' again, led Aristotle to encumber the broad outlines of his political teaching with much transitory detail. Lessons of permanent value come thus to be mixed up in the Politics with recommendations of institutions like that of common meals, which the world has long outgrown. Every philosophy, and still more every political philosophy, is 'the child of its time,' and bears unmistakable marks of its origin, but the Greek method of portraying a best State made the ephemeral element in political inquiry larger than it need have been.

[1] In criticising the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions he is careful to note any points in which they deviate from the *ἀρίστη τάξις*. But we hear little or nothing of the *ἀρίστη τάξις* in the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Books.

[2] To Marcus Aurelius, at all events, the actual State is as it were a household within the true or universal State (Comm. 3. 11. *πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης, ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν*).

One thing, however, is evident: the vision of an ideal State did not make Aristotle indifferent to the problems and difficulties of the actual State. The age which dreams of ideal States is often on the point of losing its interest in politics; but this was far from being the case with Aristotle, who is perhaps all the more unwearied in suggesting practicable amendments of the actual State[1], because he has learnt from the study of the best State how rarely it can be realized. We even seem to gather from his language in the Politics that the main service which Political Science can practically render to the world is that of limited amelioration. It cannot make things right, but it can make them bearable.

How, then, is the best State to be constituted?

How, then, is the best State to be constituted? We must first ask fit Matter of Nature and Fortune.

The beginnings of the State are in the hands of Nature and Fortune (4 (7). 13. 1331 b 41). These powers must supply the founder of the State with appropriate raw material; otherwise his labour will be in vain. This raw material (ὕλη, 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sq.: χορηγία πολιτική, 1326 a 5: χορηγία τυχηρά, 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 28) must be such as may be fashioned into a community seeking happiness rather in virtue than in external or even bodily goods. Place in the founder's hands the potentiality of a noble society—a population and a territory possessing the fit initial qualities—and he will call one forth in act. We shall later on study more closely the characteristics for which we must look in the primitive nucleus of the State, but a few of them may be at once noticed. The human beings composing it must, first, be neither too many nor too few: next, they must possess aptitudes not always found in combination — the spirited nature which gives warmth of heart and the will to be free, intelligence which gives organizing power. Singly, these qualities will not generate the best State. The territory must be just large enough to sustain them in a mode of life removed alike

[1] Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 5 sqq.

from meanness and luxury; and it must be of such a nature as to aid the healthy development of the State—to favour, in fact, both freedom and organization, and make the community independent of foreign commerce.

Conditions of the formation of this Matter into a State: 1. Common locality; common life; common aim; common ethical creed expressed in a constitution.

The next thing is to vitalise this Matter into a State.

We have already seen that a *κοινωνία* is composed of dissimilar members united by a common aim and by common action. The same holds good of the State. The members of the State must participate in something, for otherwise the State would not be a *κοινωνία*: they must, to begin with, 'participate in locality'; they must inhabit one and the same spot[1]. But they must have more in common than this. They must unite in common gatherings and live a common life (3. 9. 1280 b 13 sqq.). But, above all, they must have a common aim (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 sqq., esp. 35–37: 3. 13. 1284 a 2), and a common ethical creed—a common view as to what gives happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.), whatever this view may be. As the constitution is regarded as embodying the life preferred by the State (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40), the *κοινόν τι* which constitutes the *κοινωνία* is, in one passage, said to be the constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 2).

2. Differentiation. A State implies a distribution of functions and an exchange of service.

This is one characteristic of State-life: another is differentiation. The mere fact that the State begins in need implies differentiation even at its outset. That which brings the slave into society is not the need of another slave, but of a master. He is in quest, not of his like, but of his complement or correlative. Some things, again, cannot be enjoyed by all the members of the State at the same moment—political authority (*ἀρχή*), for instance (2. 2. 1261 a 32)—and hence arises the inevitable contrast of rulers and ruled. On the other hand, there are things which may or may not be left to common enjoyment. Plato had proposed in the Republic, that women, children, and property should be held in common (2. 1. 1261 a 2 sqq.). The same question of several allotment, or the reverse, may be raised as to the various 'activities' (*ἔργα*, 4 (7).

[1] Pol. 2. 1. 1260 b 40, *καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν.*

8, or πράξεις), of which the State is a co-ordination. There is the work of the cultivator, the artisan, the soldier, the man of capital, the priest, the judge, the statesman. Here, again, the question arises, 'whether every one is to share in all these functions' (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 24): that is to say, whether every individual is to be cultivator, artisan, soldier, judge, and statesman at once, or whether we are to allow some of these vocations to be united in the hands of one and the same individual, and not the whole, or what arrangement is to be adopted. Democracy, which in its extreme form (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2) drew no line between the artisan and the statesman[1], solved this question in one way: other constitutions in another. But if in some communities there will be less differentiation than in others, it will exist to some extent in all. It is not only the secret of efficient work, but in every whole the indispensable condition of its unity. Aristotle finds differentiation even in a bee-hive (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq.). Not indeed that any and every scheme of differentiation will secure unity: to do so, it must be based on principles of justice; and, as has been said, the differentiated members, or the chief of them, must be animated by a common aim, must be men of full virtue (σπουδαῖοι)[2]. We may compare the words of Milton in his 'Areopagitica[3]': 'Neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay rather, the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure.' Milton, however, has differences of opinion here mainly in view, and these, if on vital points, would hardly be welcome in the Aristotelian, any more than in the Platonic State.

In adopting the principle that the unity of the State rests on differentiation, Aristotle returns in a measure to the conception of Pythagoras and Heraclitus of a harmony

[1] 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων.

[2] Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 4 sqq.

[3] Prose Works 2. 92, ed. Bohn.

resting on contrast, if not on seeming or actual conflict[1]. Plato had not expressly done so, though the distinction of classes in his ideal Republic is apparently viewed by him as a condition of its unity. His conception of the world, indeed, often seems at variance with the idea of contrasted elements working in combination for the best: the element of Matter is in his view at best passive, and sometimes unruly and disturbing. Aristotle could adopt the idea with less of metaphysical inconsistency.

The Stoics, on the other hand, often speak as if the resemblance between men as rational beings were an adequate guarantee of political unity, and rest on this basis their great conception of a World-State[2]. They were led, in fact, even to include the gods as citizens of the World-State. Aristotle rests the State both on the resemblances between its members and on their dissimilarities. But for the latter, they would be unable to satisfy each other's needs. The State implies an exchange of service by dissimilars. 'Aristotle,' says Auguste Comte[3], 'laid down the true principle of every collective organism, when he described it as the distribution of functions and the combination' (rather the exchange) 'of labour.' Without exchange of service, mere similarity forms no basis for a State. There are, no doubt, other conditions of the existence of a State besides differentiation and resemblance —for instance, a care on the part of the citizens for each other's moral well-being[4]—but these are among its primary conditions.

Another remark of Comte's[5] deserves to be mentioned here. 'The institution of Capital,' he says, 'forms the necessary basis of the Division of Labour, which in the dawn of true science was considered by Aristotle to be the

[1] Heraclitus, however, had spoken of *ἐναντία* (Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1235 a 25 sqq.) where Aristotle speaks of *διαφέροντα*.

[2] Marcus Aurelius, Comm. 4. 4, *εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν λογικοί ἐσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων, ἢ μή, λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖταί ἐσμεν· εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί.*

[3] Social Statics, E. T. p. 234.

[4] Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.

[5] Social Statics, E. T. p. 135.

great practical characteristic of social union. In order to allow each worker to devote himself to the exclusive production of one of the various indispensable materials of human life, the other necessary productions must first be independently accumulated, so as to allow the simultaneous satisfaction of all the personal wants by means of gift or exchange. A closer examination, therefore, shows that it is the formation of Capital which is the true source of the great moral and mental results which the greatest of philosophers attributed to the distribution of industrial tasks.'

We see then that while a certain amount of social differentiation is incidental to the State, it rests with the State to say how far it is to be carried. One State, for instance, will place the work of an artisan and that of a statesman in the same hands, while another will not.

The State is, in fact, a distributor. It distributes 'advantages' (ἀγαθά)[1]: it distributes 'functions' (ἔργα or πράξεις)[2]: it makes possible by its distribution of advantages that exchange of services (πράξεις) which is the initial fact of society. Aristotle seldom, if ever, goes behind the services, the exchange of which constitutes society, to the rights which are implied in that exchange: still less has he realized the importance of such questions as 'what is a right?' or 'how do rights come into existence, and why?' But if we follow his ideal sketch of the creation of the best State in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, we shall find him allotting functions (c. 9) and possessions (κτήσεις, c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.) as the first step in its construction.

The principle on which the State makes this allot-

[1] Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 30, τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 15 sq. where a distribution of κόλασις and τιμωρία seems to be implied. The boundaries of distributive and corrective justice, and indeed also of justice in exchange, seem hardly to be definitely fixed.

[2] 4 (7). 9.

The distribution of advantages and functions within a State is regulated by its constitution, which should be just—i. e. should distribute them with a view to the true end of the State, and should take account of all elements which contribute to that end.

ment is expressed in its πολιτεία[1] or constitution, for this embodies the end which the community sets before itself as the end of its common life (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστί)[2]: thus the constitution is said to be the course of life which the State marks out for itself (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, ἡ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως, which is explained by Plutarch, de Monarchia, Democratia, et Oligarchia, c. 1, καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βίοι πλέονες, ἔστι καὶ δήμου πολιτεία βίος). This course of life may be that which is really most preferable (4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sq.), or it may be 'in a mean' in a sense other than that in which the best life is so (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37), or it may be still lower in the scale, a life in extremes (καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἢ ἔλλειψιν).

When the constitution wins its rule of distribution from a correct appreciation of the end of the State and from a correct estimate of the relative contributions of different individuals to that end, it is said by Aristotle to be just. It must place both the functions and the advantages it has to distribute in the hands in which it is most conducive to the end of the State that they should be placed. Nature entrusts the instruments she has at her disposal to those who are capable of using them (de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10,

[1] The πόλις is hardly a πόλις, if it is too large to have a πολιτεία (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3), though it may have a πολιτεία—for instance, a δυναστεία or an extreme democracy or a tyranny—which scarcely deserves the name. This passage of the Fourth Book seems to treat the ἔθνος as hardly susceptible of a πολιτεία, though we gather from other passages that Kingship, and even παμβασιλεία (3. 14. 1285 b 32), may find a place in the ἔθνος.

[2] See Sus.[2], Note 466. Aristotle inherits his view of the nature of a πολιτεία from Plato and also from Isocrates. Isocrates regards the πολιτεία as distributing ἀρχαί and ἔργα (Areopag. §§ 20–23): his Busiris, as the author of 'a constitution and laws,' distributes the population into distinct vocations (Isocr. Busir. § 15). He twice calls the πολιτεία the ψυχὴ πόλεως (Areopag. § 14: Panath. § 138). Like Prudence in the individual, it is the deliberative element in the State, guarding and preserving all good things and warding off ill: it is the model into accordance with which all laws, all advisers of the State (οἱ ῥήτορες), and all private men must be brought. Compare with this Aristot. Pol. 3. 4. 1276 b 30: 3. 11. 1282 b 10.

ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι), and the State should do the same.

Distributive justice—the term itself is not used in the Politics—is the primary virtue of a State and Constitution[1]. A correct distribution of duties and advantages, and, above all, of political authority is essential, and no distribution can be correct which is not just. Cicero went even farther than Aristotle and brought justice into the very definition of the State (de Rep. 1. 25. 39, cp. Augustin. de Civ. Dei, 19. 21). In his view, the 'deviation-forms' of State, being unjust, are not 'respublicae' at all. A constitution may, indeed, be just without being the best constitution. The conditions of the best constitution are seldom present. It presupposes the rule of 'virtue fully furnished with the means of virtuous action' (ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη, 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32).

It is thus in justice, and particularly in distributive justice, that Aristotle finds the true basis of the State. Distributive justice needs, indeed, to be completed by other kinds of justice: (1) by justice in exchange, which is occasionally conceived by Aristotle as not merely confined to the commercial relation (ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία) and the exchange of commodities, but as regulating even the interchange of offices between free and equal citizens[2], whereas elsewhere[3] the distribution of offices is viewed as the sphere of distributive justice. It is especially in its more comprehensive sense that justice in exchange is said to be the secret of safety and union in States[4].

(2) By corrective justice (διορθωτική), the justice of the judge or juror, remedying a faulty exchange, and thus incidentally redressing crime, which Aristotle brings under this head[5].

[1] Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 13, αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν.

[2] Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq.

[3] Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 31.

[4] Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις: Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις.

[5] Is the function of the law-court conceived by Aristotle to be summed up in this? Is its task completed, when an unjust withdrawal of advantages allotted to an individual by Distributive Justice has been made good by a restoration at the expense of the

But both these forms of justice presuppose a correct original award to individuals, which must be maintained intact through all processes of exchange. It is the task of distributive justice to make this original award.

Distributive justice is not, indeed, the sole security for the cohesion and equilibrium of the State, for the natural passiveness of the masses will be a sufficient support for an oligarchy which abstains from insulting or plundering them (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sq.) and from robbing the State (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq.)[1], and democracies are made durable by mere populousness (8 (6). 6. 1321 a 1, *τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σώζει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν*). But it is the best security: 'for if a constitution is to last, it should take its stand on equality proportioned to desert and on giving men their due' (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). A just constitution realizes the main condition of durability, which is that 'none of the parts of the State even desires a change in the constitution' (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 38 sqq.).

An attempt to effect an equipoise between contribution and requital is thus imposed on the State and its founder. It must, however, be borne in mind that, in the best State at all events, the motive by which the citizens are actuated is love of *τὸ καλόν*; and that if requital is secured to them, they do what they do irrespectively of the requital they receive.

List of functions to be distributed.

Before we proceed to consider what distribution of functions is correct, we must first obtain a list of the functions which have to be allotted, or, which is the same thing, of the *γένη* which are to discharge them.

offender? If so, the law-court of Aristotle seems hardly adjusted to his conception of the end of the State, which is the promotion of good life. We look for a spiritual court from him, and find only a temporal court somewhat narrowly conceived. *Κολάσεις* and *τιμωρίαι* are, however, contemplated (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 11): and the corrective justice of the Fifth Book of the Ethics is not probably intended as a complete representation of the action of the law-court.

[1] The same thought is expressed by Isocrates, ad Nicocl. § 16.

Aristotle supplies us with two lists, which we will here set side by side:

A. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 2 sqq.

1. γεωργοί
2. τεχνῖται
3. τὸ μάχιμον
4. τὸ εὔπορον
5. ἱερεῖς
6. κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων
7. τὸ θητικόν (not enumerated in its place, but incidentally mentioned as necessary in c. 9. 1329 a 36)[1].

B. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sqq.

1. γεωργοί
2. τὸ βάναυσον
3. τὸ ἀγοραῖον
4. τὸ θητικόν
5. τὸ προπολεμῆσον
6. τὸ δικαστικόν
7. τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν[2]
8. τὸ δημιουργικόν (official class)
9. τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι (where τὸ δικαστικόν is again mentioned by an evident slip).

The above are called μέρη τῆς πόλεως, 1290 b 38–40: μόρια τῆς πόλεως, 1291 a 32.

Of these lists, list A is drawn up for use in the construction of the best State: list B is intended to account for the variety of constitutions by exhibiting the full variety of classes in a State. The latter is thus the more complete. In list A τὸ ἀγοραῖον and also τὸ δημιουργικόν are omitted: list B omits the class of priests. Both lists reflect the very imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society: perhaps indeed they fail to do justice even to it. Instructors of youth and physicians are absent from both lists. We hear nothing of fishermen, though fishing is included in the First Book among the natural modes of obtaining food. Sailors, it is true, are expressly denied a place among the parts of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b 7 sqq.), and fishermen perhaps among them. The oarsmen of the triremes are to be recruited among the serfs or slaves who till the soil, and the crews of the trading vessels employed in bringing the produce of the territory to the port (4 (7).

[1] We are surprised to find τεχνῖται and θῆτες existing in the best State, when in the First Book we find these vocations reckoned with the unnatural sort of χρηματιστική. The views there expressed on this subject seem, however, to be more uncompromising than those expressed elsewhere.

[2] Cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 145, τοὺς διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς εἰσφέροντας καὶ λειτουργοῦντας.

5. 1327 a 7 sqq.) are probably to be obtained from the same source.

The lists recognize no distinction between trades (i. e. groups formed by similarity of occupation) and classes, or between either of these and organs of State-authority (e. g. the deliberative or judicial authority). All are brought under the comprehensive head of 'parts of the State[1]' (*μέρη τῆς πόλεως*), a term inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who includes under it (Rep. 552 A) 'horsemen, hoplites, traders, and artisans.' Terms to express the distinctions referred to had hardly as yet been developed, though we find the judicial, administrative, and deliberative organs of the State described (6 (4). 14) as *μόρια τῆς πολιτείας*. We learn from the same passage that it is on the constitution of these organs that the character of the *πολιτεία* depends (*ὧν ἐχόντων καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τούτων*, 1297 b 38 sq.)[2].

The problem is to organize these diverse elements in such a way as will accord with justice and prove conducive to the end of the State.

Are the lower functions to be committed to the same hands as the higher?

The first question for consideration is whether those who practise the lower social functions—husbandmen, artisans, day-labourers, and the like—are to be admitted to the higher social functions of legislation, administration, justice, and war. Most Greek States did admit them to these functions. Even in oligarchies, artisans were freely admitted to military service—they formed, it would seem, a large element in the forces of the allies of the Lacedaemonians[3]—and in all but the extremer forms of oligarchy, in which power went by birth[4], the rich artisan[5] or trader would be admitted to office. Many of the most famous early oligarchies of Greece—those of Aegina, Corinth, and Corcyra, for instance—were, like the Venetian, oligarchies of trade.

[1] This is so at least in Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 38–40: contrast however 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

[2] With regard to Aristotle's use of the phrase *μέρος τῆς πόλεως* in the Politics, see Appendix A.

[3] Plutarch, Ages. c. 26.

[4] 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq.

[5] 3. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.

Democracy went further—it tended to give these classes political supremacy; and democracy was coming more and more to prevail in Greece, for cities were growing larger and large cities tended to democracy. No doubt, even in the extreme form of democracy—the first form, apparently, in many cases to admit artisans and day-labourers to office[1]—persons directly concerned with what Aristotle terms 'necessary functions[2]' would not commonly, in all probability, be either 'State-orators' (*ῥήτορες*) or great executive officers of State; they would not often be strategi, for instance, at Athens: their power would rather be exercised collectively through the popular assembly and dicasteries. Still neither democracy nor oligarchy made a principle of interposing a barrier between the exercise of the minor social functions and the major. Even in the military city of Thebes the practice of the so-called 'sordid arts' or of retail trade only involved exclusion from office for ten years after retirement from business[3].

The Lacedaemonian State and the States of Crete stood almost alone[4] in ordering these matters differently. They set an example in relation to them which Plato and Aristotle held to be sound, but from which Greece tended every day to depart more widely. They 'sorted' the elements of the State, and forbade those who discharged the nobler social functions to meddle with the less noble.

Social estimate of agriculture, trade, and industry current in ancient Greece.

Even in States which admitted the industrial and commercial classes to power, popular sentiment held trade and industry cheap. 'Nowhere in Homer,' says Büchsenschütz[5], 'is contempt for any useful occupation ex-

[1] 3. 4. 1277 b 2: cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 18. This is not wonderful, considering that at one time those of the *βάναυσοι τεχνῖται* who were not slaves were mostly of alien origin, and that even in Aristotle's day a majority of them continued to be either slaves or aliens, 3. 5. 1278 a 6.

[2] Wealthy employers of slaves in manufacture, like Cleon, are of course not here referred to.

[3] 3. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.

[4] In some military States the citizens were forbidden to practise the *βάναυσοι τέχναι* (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3).

[5] Besitz und Erwerb, p. 258. It is doubtful, however, how far the Homeric pictures reflect the early social life of Greece Proper, at all events as a whole. Plato says in the Laws (680 C) that the mode of life Homer depicts is Ionic.

pressed.' But a change of feeling came, he thinks, at the epoch of the great migrations. 'The ruling class, in possession of wide domains and disposing freely of the labour of the subject populations and of the purchased slaves whose numbers begin from this time forward to increase, withdrew from all occupations connected with the supply of daily wants, and by leaving labour of this kind exclusively to the subject races stamped it as unworthy of a freeman. Accordingly, it is in States which maintained in some degree intact the traditions of that epoch—in the Lacedaemonian State and that of Thespiae, for instance—that we find these occupations forbidden to the citizen.' It was, on the other hand, in maritime and commercial cities like Corinth—the first, according to Thucydides, to 'cleave to the sea'—that handicrafts were least despised[1]. The oligarchies of early Greece, however, were less often oligarchies of trade than oligarchies of knights and warriors, and the prejudices of the oligarchs may well have spread to the average citizen. The attempts of the tyrants to relegate their subjects from the city to the country[2], to make peasants of them, and to divert their attention from politics to the useful arts may have had a contrary effect to that intended. But the prevailing scorn for trade and industry was probably more largely due to the wide diffusion of military aptitude and efficiency which came with the rise of the hoplite system of warfare, and which was so important a factor in the successful resistance of Greece to Persia.

Agriculture stood at the head of the lower occupations. In this, the healthiest, if not the oldest, of them, the drawbacks were absent which told against so many others. The work of the cultivator was not work merely for the body, like that of the day-labourer: it called for alert intelligence, for foresight and knowledge; it did not impair the physique like the sedentary arts; the keenness for gain, which was held to be incidental to the occupation of the

[1] Thuc. 1. 13: Hdt. 2. 167. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 41. 14.

[2] Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13: 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 20 sqq.: and see C. F.

merchant and retail tradesman, was thought to be less marked here; above all, agriculture produced no inaptitude for arms. Thus the Peloponnesians tilled the soil with their own hands[1]: the *αὐτουργός* was to Euripides the true safeguard of the State[2]: Philopoemen combined farming with politics[3]. Yet there were two opinions even about agriculture, for while Tanagra was a town of cultivators[4], Thespiae held agriculture, no less than handicraft, to be a pursuit unworthy of freemen[5]. So one of Menander's characters says:

> *Ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις [πολεμικοῖς?] ὑπερέχειν τὸν ἄνδρα δεῖ,*
> *τὸ γὰρ γεωργεῖν ἔργον ἐστὶν οἰκέτου*[6].

Other pursuits, which demanded far more skill, capacity, and capital, but which were less favourable to military aptitude, were held in much lower estimation. The merchant (*ἔμπορος*) who purchased in the cheapest market a cargo which he conveyed, in a hired vessel or his own, for sale in the dearest, needed a thorough knowledge of the varying requirements of the different ports of the Greek world: yet, whatever may have been his position in trading cities such as Corcyra, Byzantium, Corinth, or the Pontic colonies, his vocation was for the most part abandoned at Athens to metoeci[7], citizens of good position

[1] Thuc. 1. 141.

[2] Eurip. Orest. 892 (Bothe).

[3] Plut. Philop. c. 4, *πρῶτ ἀναστὰς καὶ συνεφαψάμενος ἔργου τοῖς ἀμπελουργοῦσιν ἢ βοηλατοῦσιν αὖθις εἰς πόλιν ἀπῄει καὶ περὶ τὰ δημόσια τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι συνησχολεῖτο.*

[4] Büchsenschütz, p. 297.

[5] Ibid. p. 258.

[6] Inc. Fab. Frag. xcvi. ed. Didot, quoted by Büchsenschütz, p. 258 n. 4.

[7] Thus Aristotle assumes that merchants will be *ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένοι νόμοις*, 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 14: cp. Isocr. de Pace, § 21, *ὀψόμεθα δὲ τὴν πόλιν διπλασίας μὲν ἢ νῦν τὰς προσόδους λαμβάνουσαν, μεστὴν δὲ γιγνομένην ἐμπόρων καὶ ξένων καὶ μετοίκων, ὧν νῦν ἐρήμη καθέστηκεν*—a passage which mentions *ἔμποροι* in connexion with aliens, and also indicates that even at Athens the numbers of these classes varied from time to time considerably. In its judgment of *ἔμποροι* Greek feeling would probably somewhat differ from Roman. 'While the Romans disdained retail trade and manual labour, they had not the same dislike for commercial enterprise upon a larger scale' (Capes, Early Empire, p. 194). Still it is evident from Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28 sq. that the *ναύκληροι*, a section of the class of *ἔμποροι*, were more favoured by the writer than the *ἀγοραῖοι*.

preferring not to embark in commerce themselves, but only to lend money to merchants[1].

The body of τεχνῖται, again, included in its upper ranks sculptors, painters, architects, musicians, and singers of genius[2], some of whom, at all events, would possess a wide acquaintance with men and things in Greece, might be the favoured companions of tyrants (Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 3), or might even aspire to make a figure as philosophers (Plato, Rep. 495 C). Of the latter Hippodamus of Miletus was perhaps an instance[3]. Yet, according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 2), 'no well-constituted (εὐφυής) Greek youth after viewing the Zeus at Olympia or the Hera of Argos would wish to be Phidias or Polycletus, their authors'; and Lucian (Somn. c. 9) puts the same remark in the mouth of Culture (Παιδεία), adding that no one would desire to be accounted 'a sordid craftsman living by manual labour.' The stigma, indeed, might be escaped, if the work was done, not for pay, but out of patriotism: so Polygnotus, we are told, 'was no mere ordinary craftsman, nor did he paint the portico for hire: he worked without reward, emulous to add to the splendour of the city[4].'

[1] Büchsenschütz, p. 510.

[2] Phidias is called a τεχνίτης, Strabo, p. 353: Praxiteles, ibid. p. 410: Parrhasius the painter is classed among οἱ τὰς τέχνας ἔχοντες, Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 1. Aristotle, however, in one passage, recognizes a distinction between arts which must exist of necessity and arts which contribute to luxury or τὸ καλῶς ζῆν (Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2).

[3] Socrates himself was said by some to have worked at his craft of sculpture before he became a philosopher, far as the thought of Socrates is from the mind of Plato in the passage referred to. A group on the Acropolis (three draped Graces) was imagined to be from his hand (see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 44. 4, ed. 2).

[4] Plut. Cim. c. 4: the passages quoted are given by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 41. 15. We shall all approve the alleged reply of Albert Dürer to the Emperor Maximilian. 'The Emperor, in the attempt to draw something himself, found the chalk perpetually break in his hands, while Dürer had no such interruption; on which Maximilian asked Albert Dürer how it came that his chalk did not break, and the painter answered, smiling, "Most gracious Emperor, I should be sorry your Majesty were as skilled in this respect as I" (*Quart. Rev.* Oct. 1879, p. 404). The story, however, like many other good ones, is an adaptation from the Greek, for a similar anecdote is told of Philip of Macedon (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata—Philippi patris Alexandri 29, 179 B). Cp. also Plato, Laws 769 B.

If occupations of this kind were held to be so little honourable, we need not ask what was the position of the useful arts. The handicrafts which fall under this head are very dissimilar to each other in character. Not all of them would be either sedentary or prejudicial to health. If the smith, working at a forge in a hot climate, suffered in health, the same could not be said of the mason or bricklayer, who wrought in the open air: yet no distinction seems to have been made between these trades and those of the carpenter, cook, shoemaker, dyer, and weaver, which might fairly be accounted sedentary[1]. Sedentary or not, those who practised them (and agriculturists no less, Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 41) were held to be forced by the necessity of the case to devote their whole time to their craft, and thus to lose that leisure which Socrates said was the sister of ἐλευθερία (Ael. V. H. 10. 14). Their work also involved that 'living at the disposal of another,' which was a mark of slavery (cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31, καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην [σημεῖον τῶν ἐπαινουμένων]· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν: Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17: 1. 13. 1260 a 33).

Still public sentiment at Athens favoured the artisan class more than the trading class (τὸ ἀγοραῖον) or the day-labourers (τὸ θητικόν). Many more citizens would be found among the former than among the latter (Büchsenschütz, p. 344–5, p. 511). A retail tradesman was often a resident-alien (Demosth. c. Eubulid. 30–34, referred to by Büchsenschütz, p. 511: yet see Xen. Mem. 3. 7. 6). The artisans probably sold their own manufactures to a large extent; and this must have contracted the dealings of the trading class strictly so called. The Peiraeus was perhaps their headquarters: at Athens much selling seems to have been done in temporary booths in the agora, probably in part by persons who came in from the country with their produce. The shops even at Pompeii 'indicate that the tribe of shopkeepers was very inferior in wealth and comfort to that of our own time and country' (Dyer's Pompeii, p. 302).

[1] See Xen. Oecon. 4. 2: cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D: Eurip. fragm. 636, Nauck.

The position of the θής, or hired day-labourer (μισθωτός), on the other hand, was all that extreme poverty could make it. If the most slave-like of occupations were those in which the bodily powers were most called into play (Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 38), then there was little to choose between the life of a day-labourer and that of a slave. The class of day-labourers was, however, one in which impoverished freemen often took refuge (Büchsenschütz, p. 344 sq.), mainly no doubt because the work done by this class required no previous training.

It is worthy of notice that the Greek estimate of these occupations passed with their civilization to the Jews, as we learn from the remarkable passage in Ecclesiasticus on the subject (38. 24–34). Here it is the want of leisure which is held to unfit these classes for high positions, and agriculture fares no better than the trades of the smith, potter, and carpenter[1].

There is little need to seek far for the origin of a feeling which has existed more or less in most ages and countries, occasionally indeed in an even less discriminating form and with less excuse than in Greece, and considerable traces of which, to say the least, are observable among ourselves. If Schiller has said[2],

'Euch, ihr Götter, gehört der Kaufmann: Güter zu suchen
Geht er, doch an sein Schiff knüpfet das Gute sich an,'

[1] A kindlier feeling for labour appears in connexion with the worship of Saturn and Ops, or rather their Greek equivalents (see Philochor. Fr. 13—Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. p. 386: 'Philochorus Saturno et Opi primum in Attica statuisse aram Cecropem dicit, eosque deos pro Jove Terraque coluisse, instituisseque ut patres familiarum et frugibus et fructibus jam coactis passim cum servis vescerentur, cum quibus patientiam laboris in colendo rure toleraverant: delectari enim deum honore servorum contemplatu laboris'). The feeling survived in old-fashioned regions like Arcadia, where slaves and masters gathered at entertainments round one table (Theopomp. Fr. 243). Seneca commends this kindly behaviour in his 47th Epistle, and advises a discreet observance of it. It is interesting to notice that the sceptic Pyrrho, who prided himself on his 'indifference' (ἀδιαφορία), drove pigs to market and sold them, or swept out his house with his own hands (Diog. Laert. 9. 66).

[2] In his poem, 'Der Kaufmann.'

Hobbes is credited with the saying that 'the only glory of a tradesman is to grow exceedingly rich by the wisdom of buying and selling[1]'; and Bacon, who holds that 'sedentary and within-door arts and delicate manufactures that require rather the finger than the arm have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition,' advises States 'to leave those arts chiefly to strangers, which for that purpose are the more easily to be received[2].'

In ancient Greece, it is significant to observe, the feeling was strongest in the more military States[3]; but slavery, no doubt, contributed to lower the dignity of work performed to the order and for the convenience of another. To do manual work[4], even if the work were not sedentary and unfavourable to health or bodily strength, and especially to do manual work for pay, was to put oneself in a subservient relation[5], not only unfavourable to the independence and incompatible with the leisure of a freeman, but also the probable source of a mean and sordid spirit. Industrial and commercial life was thus held to begin by robbing the physique of strength or grace, and to end by degrading the character. We must remember that in the social life of Greece the spirit of trade was probably often presented to view in its narrowest and least attractive form and in sharp contrast to striking examples of public virtue. The inculpated occupations were mostly occupations engrafted on the primitive pursuits of Greek life, and were to a large extent, as they had been from the first, practised by aliens

[1] I cannot give the reference to Hobbes' Works: the passage is quoted in a note in Pope's Works, vol. 2. p. 243 (ed. 1767) on the well-known couplet (Moral Essays, Epist. 1)—

'Boastful and rough, your first son is a 'squire;
The next a tradesman, meek and much a liar.'

[2] Essay 29, Of the true greatness of Kingdoms and Estates (Works, 6. 448–9), referred to by C. Friedländer, de Francisci Baconis Doctrina Politica, p. 78. Bacon, however, does not feel the same objection to the crafts of the smith, mason, and carpenter, which he here terms 'strong and manly arts.'

[3] Xen. Oecon. 4. 3.

[4] So closely was the idea of *βαναυσία* connected with *χειρουργία* that even learning to play on a musical instrument was accounted *βαναυσία* — an exaggeration corrected by Aristotle, Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 40 sqq.

[5] Cp. *διακονίαν*, Plato, Laws 919 D.

and even Asiatics[1]. The mixture, or rather the intermingling, of races had already gone far, at Athens at all events; indeed, the more unchanging were men's ways and aptitudes in antiquity, the more necessary was the aid of some extraneous race or races to do what the indigenous population could not, or would not do[2]. Not only foreigners, but also slaves were largely employed on work of this kind, and free industrial labour was both lowered in estimation and cheapened by the competition of slave-labour. The autochthonous Athenian, or the descendant of immigrant Dorian conquerors looked down with not always ill-grounded contempt on the foreign and perhaps Asiatic artisan or trader, who would often differ but little in external appearance from a slave[3], and would be engaged on work often done by slaves.

So far, indeed, as this prepossession against industry and trade kept in check the eagerness for gain, which was one element in the Greek character, it exerted a favourable influence. A time came when the Greeks ranked the handicrafts higher, but it was at the expense of nobler, though less lucrative, vocations[4]. There is a real difference of ethical level between some vocations and others, though amidst the growing industrialism of our own day we may sometimes be tempted to forget this.

If the popular estimate of the industrial and trading

[1] Cp. Xen. de Vectig. 2. 3, Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ ἄλλοι παντοδαποὶ βάρβαροι· πολλοὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μετοίκων.

[2] The same tendency to call in extraneous aid in some departments of industry is noticeable in modern Europe. Since 1850, according to a paper by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in *L'Economiste Français* (referred to in the *Times* of Feb. 8, 1883), the number of foreigners resident in France has grown at an increasing rate. It increased between 1851 and 1861 at the rate of 12,000 annually, but between 1876 and 1881 at the annual rate of 40,000. M. Leroy-Beaulieu appears to think that these immigrants often undertake rough work which French workmen gladly leave to others. In England and the United States the increase of the Irish population serves the same end.

[3] [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10, ἐσθῆτα γὰρ οὐδὲν βελτίω ἔχει ὁ δῆμος αὐτόθι ἢ οἱ δοῦλοι: and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 13. 19.

[4] Cp. Athen. Deipn. 1. 34, p. 19 b (quoted by Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 42. 15), τὰς γὰρ βαναύσους τέχνας Ἕλληνες ὕστερον περὶ πλείστου μᾶλλον ἐποιοῦντο ἢ τὰς κατὰ παιδείαν γινομένας ἐπινοίας.

classes did not everywhere rise with their elevation in the political scale, and if, as not unfrequently happens, the political change was not accompanied by a corresponding change in social sentiment, a correction of the general feeling on the subject was hardly to be looked for from the philosophers. Already in the apologue of Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 321) the contrast of the 'wisdom necessary for the support of life' and 'political wisdom' appears, and we learn how insufficient is the former for the well-being of a State without the latter. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, indeed, in the Euthydemus of Plato claim that a money-making life is quite compatible with the acquisition of the kind of wisdom they imparted[1]; but then this kind of wisdom was not worth much.

Opinions of Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato.

Socrates, though, in conformity with Athenian opinion[2], he seems to have held that in case of need there was nothing unbefitting in the practice of a trade[3], is represented in a conversation with Euthydemus, whom possibly he did not care to shock, as acquiescing in the ordinary Greek assumption that craftsmen such as smiths and shoemakers are, as a rule, slavish (*ἀνδραποδώδεις*), and know nothing of 'things noble and good and just' (Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 22). He probably felt that leisure was more conducive to the indescribable characteristic which the Greeks called *ἐλευθερία* (Ael. V. H. 10. 14), as it certainly was more conducive to the pursuit of knowledge in the colloquial Socratic fashion.

Xenophon drew a marked distinction between agriculture, which he panegyrizes (Oecon. cc. 5–6: cp. c. 15), and the handicrafts, which he condemns (Oecon. 4. 2). His praises

[1] Euthydem. 304 C, *οὔτε φύσιν οὔθ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν οὐδεμίαν—ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παραλαβεῖν ὁντινοῦν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.*

[2] Thuc. 2. 40.

[3] Xen. Mem. 2. 7. 3 sqq. He was, indeed, charged with impressing on his disciples the lesson of Hesiod—

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργείη δέ τ' ὄνειδος,

in the sense that they should do anything, however unjust or disgraceful, for gain (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 56 sqq.). This is corrected by Xenophon (ibid.), and by Critias himself, who was supposed to be a product of this kind of teaching, in the Charmides of Plato (Charm. 163 B–C).

of the former include both the actual tilling of the soil and the management of a farm (Oecon. 5). In this enthusiasm for agriculture he departs to some extent, we may notice, from his model the Lacedaemonian State, which forbade it to its citizens (Plato, Rep. 547 D)[1].

Plato has glimpses of a more favourable view of handicraft and even of retail trade. Thus, in Symp. 209 A, Phileb. 55 C sqq. (cited by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 222), he finds in the handicraft arts an early stage of philosophy, and is led, in fact, to range carpentering above music as more largely partaking in number and more exact (Phileb. 56 C). So again in the Laws he holds that retail trade has nothing intrinsically harmful about it (918 B); the retailer is a benefactor to his species, in so far as he measures by means of coin the comparative value of different commodities and sets them in a proportionate relation to each other; the hired labourer, the innkeeper do the same; indeed (918 D–E), if, which Heaven forbid, some one were to compel the very best men or women to act for a while as retail traders, we should learn to regard retail trade and kindred pursuits in the light of a mother or a nurse, and recognize how deserving they are of love and acceptance[2]. It is a relation of this kind that he designs in the Republic between his third class (*τὸ χρηματιστικόν*) and the two higher classes. The third class, no less than the remaining two, were to be citizens, and not only so, but the source of pay and sustenance (*μισθοδοταὶ καὶ τροφεῖς*) to the rest; they were to be their brothers (Rep. 415 A); they are joined with the military class in a common obedience to the first or ruling class, and thus the two lower classes are together called *τὼ ἀρχομένω* in contradistinction to *τὸ ἄρχον* (Rep. 442 D). In the same way, though each of the two upper classes has a virtue of its own, temperance and justice are possessed by the third class, and apparently in a complete form; the possible transference of members from one class

[1] The same contrast of feeling appears between Cicero (de Offic. 1. 42. 151) and Sallust (de Conj. Catil. 4: see Jacobs ad loc.).

[2] Cp. Menand. Fragm. Inc. Fab. 279 (p. 80 Didot): *ἐλευθέρως δούλευε, δοῦλος οὐκ ἔσει.*

to another, in itself, softens the contrast between them. Moreover, the third class were, it would seem, to own the lands they tilled subject to a contribution for the maintenance of the other classes. The first sign, in fact, of the decline of the ideal Republic is said to appear in a conflict between its classes or races, the result of which is that severalty of property is introduced within its upper section, and the gold and silver races enslave their friends and maintainers whose freedom they had before respected, and make of them subjects and servants (Rep. 547 B–C). It is probably by design that Plato (Rep. 552 A) allows the title of 'part of the State,' the application of which was afterwards narrowed by Aristotle, to the commercial and artisan classes (*χρηματισταί, δημιουργοί*) no less than to 'horsemen and hoplites.' In the view of the former, in fact, the third class answered to a part of the soul[1], while in that of Aristotle the natural slave stands to the citizen as the body to the soul, and the whole class which has to do with 'necessary work,' whether free or slave, is related to the citizen-body merely as an instrument, or means, is related to the end it subserves; it stands outside the State, forming in strictness no part of it. It is true, however, that the title of citizen, which Plato concedes to the members of his third class (*χρηματιστικοί*), carries with it no share in political power, for he excludes this class from office, both military and civil. Indeed, in one passage of the Ninth book of the Republic (590 C–D), perhaps the source from which Aristotle derived his theory of natural slavery, he admits, notwithstanding what he has said in the passage from the Eighth (547 B–C) referred to above, that when 'the Best is weak within a man, so that he is unable to control the creatures within him and has to court them'—when he has not 'the divine principle of wisdom abiding in him,' but needs a ruling principle outside himself, then 'in order that he may be under the same rule as the best of men, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best of men, inasmuch as the latter has the divine ruling principle

[1] Τὸ *ἐπιθυμητικόν*.

indwelling in him'; so that in a case like this slavery is expedient and just, and may find a place even within the ideal Republic. It may be doubted, however, whether he would have held with Aristotle that all those 'whose function is the use of the body, and this is the best that they can do' (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 17), are in need of an extraneous ruling principle—whether, in fact, to Plato the natural slave is not the morally weak or bad man, rather than the man of thews and sinews who is only fit for manual work[1].

In the Laws, perhaps because the type of society is lower, the relation between the governing class and the classes concerned with these lower occupations is otherwise conceived. They lose even the name of citizen, and become a dependent—in some cases, an enslaved—body. Those of them who are slaves have not the consolation of being slaves to 'the best of men' as in the Republic, for the citizens of the State described in the Laws are not an ideal or heroic class, like the guardians of the Republic, or the citizens of Aristotle's best State. Even agriculture, except perhaps in the sense of superintendence (Laws 842 D: cp. 806 D–E) is forbidden to the citizens; much more other occupations of an industrial or commercial nature (Laws 806 D–E: 741 E: 846 D: 919 D: 842 D). Plato's reason for these prohibitions is partly that the citizen has quite enough to do without practising any other art than his own (Laws 846 D–E, 807 C); partly, that *βανανσία* warps the character of the freeman (Laws 741 E); even the very best men (*οἱ πανταχῇ ἄριστοι*, Laws 918 E), though in their hands vocations like that of the retail trader would assume a helpful and kindly aspect, suffer profanation by having to do with them (918 D). In the Laws, unlike the Republic, the industrial and commercial classes exist for the sake of the ruling class, stand wholly outside the State, and are adjusted in number and position to the needs of their social superiors. In this respect the society sketched in the Laws serves as a model for the 'best State' of

[1] Cp. Plato Polit. 309 A, *τοὺς δ' ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ τ' αὖ καὶ ταπεινότητι πολλῇ κυλινδουμένους εἰς τὸ δουλικὸν ὑποζεύγνυσι γένος.*

Aristotle; there is, however, this important difference, that the citizens of Aristotle's State are not only men of ideal excellence living an ideal life, dependence on whom might be a source of pride and moral advantage, but also are charged with the duty of caring for the virtue of their slaves at any rate, if not of other members of the subordinate classes; while the citizens in the Laws are not conceived as attaining to the same ethical level, nor have they apparently a similar duty imposed upon them. But then the Laws is admittedly a sketch of a second-rate society.

View of Aristotle.

Throughout Aristotle's treatment of this subject and also of slavery, it must be borne in mind that he has in view an ideal State, in which the citizen-body is composed of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς*). If it is well for the artisan to accept a lowly position and for the slave to be even enslaved, it is so because the men on whom they are thus made dependent are men of noble character and high capacity, spending their lives in an arduous exercise of virtue, through serving whom they rise to an ethical level they could not otherwise attain. It is the 'best State' (or, at all events an 'aristocratic' State, Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a 18), that 'will not make the artisan a citizen' (3. 5. 1278 a 8): the less elevated and more attainable constitution described in the Eleventh Chapter of the Sixth (the old Fourth) Book (*ἡ κοινοτάτη πολιτεία—ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων*) would not probably refuse a share of power to artisans (3. 5. 1278 a 24) or other well-to-do members of the industrial and commercial classes.

Aristotle fully accepts the traditional estimate of 'the sordid occupations' (*βάναυσα ἔργα*), and perhaps his account of them gives additional definiteness to the conception of *βαναυσία*. 'We must set down as sordid,' he says (Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq.), 'any work or art or study which makes freemen unfit for the active exercise of virtue either in body or character or intelligence': the 'sordid arts' deteriorate the body, and 'trades plied for hire' (*μισθαρνικαὶ*

ἐργασίαι—a term of uncertain comprehension)—make the mind unfree (ἄσχολον) and abject (ταπεινήν). Βαναυσία, however, he adds, is not confined to the practice of 'sordid occupations,' for an over-exact study of some sciences not in themselves unworthy of a freeman—according to Susemihl (Sus.[2], Note 982), Gymnastic, Music, Drawing, and Painting are among the sciences meant—produces the same effect and deserves the same name[1]. But again, work of an unfree nature may be relieved of this stigma, if it is done not in the service of another, but for one's own sake or for the sake of friends or for the sake of virtue (δι' ἀρετήν)[2]. So in the Rhetoric (1. 9. 1367 a 31) it is implied that the βάναυσος, unlike the freeman, lives 'for the convenience of another' (πρὸς ἄλλον)[3]. The freeman (Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25) is 'he who exists for his own sake and not that of another[4].' Both the life of the artisan and the life of the shopkeeper are forbidden to the citizens of Aristotle's best State (Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.), 'for those lives are ignoble and unfavourable to virtue[5].' This is not said of agriculture, which is, however, excluded on the ground that leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and for political activity (1329 a 1). The life of a farmer is a life of incessant occupation in the country, which forbids even frequent attendance at the meetings of the popular assembly

[1] Thus the Indians of the territory of Musicanus were praised by the Cynic Onesicritus for not carrying the sciences (except medicine) to a high point of minute accuracy (Strabo 701, μὴ ἀκριβοῦν δὲ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πλὴν ἰατρικῆς).

[2] Cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ) γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς· διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι. See also the story told of Antisthenes by Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15, and Plutarch's addition to it.

[3] His actions are διακονικαί, like those of the slave, 3. 4. 1277 a 36 sqq., with whom he is here for the moment identified.

[4] Thus it is the characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος, πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον (Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31).

[5] Their very friendship was of the interested kind which rests on utility (Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 21, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία ἀγοραίων). Aristotle does not mention, though the fact may well have been present to his mind, that it was the determination with which these classes pressed their claims to complete political equality that was fast making democracy the prevailing constitution in Greece.

(8 (6). 4. 1318b 11 sqq.), much more anything like systematic political action. Aristotle's view of agriculture differs, in fact, so much from that put forward by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus, that he praises the States which marked off the military class from the cultivating class (4 (7). 10. 1329a 40 sqq.), whereas Xenophon, like the Romans later, viewed the work of the peasant as an excellent preparation for the life of a soldier. Aristotle, with whom Plato appears to concur, may have held that the peasant would have but little leisure, except in winter, for the constant gymnastic practice on which the efficiency of a hoplite must have depended far more than that of a modern soldier, or he may have desired to reserve the military service of the State for those who would in after years be its rulers; but he does not explain the grounds of his view, in which he had been anticipated, not only, as has been said, by Plato, but also by Hippodamus (Pol. 2. 8. 1267b 32).

It is from a different point of view that the various vocations falling under the Science of Supply are classified in the First Book, as natural or the contrary. They are here distinguished, not according to their effect on the agent, but according to their intrinsic conformity to the design of Nature. Measured by this standard, agriculture, the tending of animals, hunting, fishing, and the like stand on a very different level to the vocations of the artisan, day-labourer, merchant, and retail dealer. Even in the First Book, however, we are told (c. 11. 1258b 10), that the practice of the very best of them is unworthy of a freeman[1]. 'Necessary functions' as a whole, whether natural or otherwise, appear so far to be liable to objection on two grounds: (1) they are unfavourable to the development of virtue and stand in the way of higher things: (2) they are practised for the convenience of another. Aristotle has, however, other reasons for his low estimate of them. They are 'necessary' (ἀναγκαῖαι), not 'noble' (καλαί). Necessary, in the first place, because concerned with things necessary for life, for that which provides things necessary is itself necessary.

Aristotle marks off 'necessary' from 'noble' functions.

[1] If I am right in thus interpreting this passage.

Necessary, again, as being an indispensable condition of 'noble' action—action which is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else (*τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν*). Thus the word *ἀναγκαῖον* is used in contradistinction to *αἱρετὸν καθ' αὑτό*, Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1147 b 24, 29: it is used in connexion with *τούτου ἕνεκεν* and in contrast to *οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ βέλτιον*, de Part. An. 3. 10. 672 b 23, and so in Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 13 we find some subjects of study marked off as 'desirable for their own sake' from others which are described as 'necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else.' Thus, just as the *βάνανσος* is held to exist for the sake of another man, all 'necessary functions'—not those of the *βάνανσος* only—are for the sake of other forms of activity which are desirable for their own sake. Hence the frequent contrast of the necessary and the noble, which indeed Aristotle inherited from Plato[1], though Plato is not perhaps equally faithful to this distinction as a standard for measuring the relative excellence of various paths in life.

It is not that, in Aristotle's view, these pursuits are not compatible with a certain type and level of virtue. They are, indeed, unfavourable to virtue of the higher kind (*ὑπεναντίοι πρὸς ἀρετήν*, 1328 b 40), but the slave, at all events, must possess some of the homelier virtues (industry and temperance, for instance, Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 34), if he is to do his work well. Still the fraction of moral virtue which falls to the lot of the slave is not enough to give him any share in happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), which presupposes a certain complex of attributes quite beyond his reach (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 33 sqq.). This view of happiness, if held by Plato, is not pressed by him to the same extent: he nowhere says that the third class in his Republic will not share in the general happiness of the State, whereas to Aristotle the free artisan or day-labourer seems to be still further removed from happiness than the slave, who shares the

[1] Cp. Plato, Rep. 493 C, *τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι.*

society of a master able to raise him to the level of virtue which he is capable of attaining.

Over against the large group of vocations concerned with 'necessary work,' Aristotle ranges those concerned with 'noble work.' What pursuits exactly fall under the latter head, we fail to learn in any detail. Politics and philosophy, if not practised for gain, evidently do so (Pol. 1. 7. 1255 b 36). A soldier's life does so too, though it is abandoned to those who are still under the age which qualifies for offices of State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.): it is 'noble,' but it is not the supreme end (4 (7). 2. 1325 a 6). The management of a household, also, ranks as 'noble work,' though there are perhaps relations in life higher than the relation to wife or child, just as the care of wife or child is a higher thing than the care of slaves, which again is higher than the care of property (1. 13. 1259 b 18). The duties of a guardian or of an executor would rank, probably, with those of a householder. The cases of the poet, historian, and biographer, and generally of the writer, seem to escape consideration; but Aristotle can hardly intend an unfavourable judgment. Comedy, however, stands at a far lower level than tragedy or epic poetry; to witness a tragedy or to listen to music is a noble use of leisure (διαγωγή). The composition of music and even the writing of a tragedy are tasks which would hardly fall within the province of a true citizen, if done for pay. Instruction in 'noble work,' not rendered for pay, appears to rank among the chief duties of the father and the citizen. The work of the professional sculptor, painter, architect, musician, or physician, if done for pay, would probably be accounted unworthy of the citizen; indeed, the acquisition of skill of this kind, apart altogether from the terms of its exercise, would entail a closeness of application unbefitting a freeman (5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 sqq.).

Necessary and noble functions to be placed in different hands.

Aristotle's first step, then, was to distinguish necessary from noble work. His next was to insist that, in the best State at all events, they must be placed in different hands. Necessary functions must not be assigned to natures capable

of noble functions, nor must the latter be assigned to natures only capable of the former.

It is easy to see why the higher functions should not be entrusted to the lower natures[1], but why should not necessary functions be shared in by those capable of noble ones? If this arrangement were adopted, the State would not need the presence of lower natures within its borders, while the higher need only be called on to give up a part of their time to necessary work. The reasons which weigh with Aristotle seem to be that—

1. The principle of entrusting one function only to one agent (ἓν πρὸς ἕν) should be observed, except where the functions are such as can be discharged without reciprocal embarrassment, which does not hold of necessary and noble functions.

2. Happiness does not lie wholly in the motive: a man is not happy, if he does necessary work even from the highest motive (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα): happiness lies partly in motive, partly in the character of the action, which must itself belong to the class of noble actions (πράξεις αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτάς). It may be said that if eating, drinking, and sleeping are necessary functions, it is not possible altogether to release the higher natures from functions of this kind, but this is not present to Aristotle's mind. Aristotle defined happiness not as a habit (ἕξις), like Plato and the Platonists[2], but as an activity (ἐνέργεια or χρῆσις, Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 9), and the more he insisted on this, the more important the subject-matter of the activity became. A life spent even in the distribution of 'things good under special circumstances' (τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καλά)—

[1] On the principle expressed in de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10, ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι. The same illustration from αὐλοί is used in this passage as in the discussion on the distribution of power in the State, Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 31 sq.

[2] Cp. Clem. Strom. 418 D (quoted by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 579, n. 62): Σπεύσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν· ἡ ἕξιν ἀγαθῶν. Contrast the emphatic statement (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7): φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι (sc. τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς.

in the infliction, for instance, of just punishment beneficial to the offender—would not be a life of full happiness (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.); much less would a life spent in necessary work be so.

3. Even Plato, though he held that in the hands of the best men retail trade would assume a new aspect, and be recognized as a work of charity and beneficence, shrank from the idea of allowing them to meddle with such work[1]; and Aristotle holds that most functions of a necessary kind are *per se* enfeebling in their effect on the character. Even the learning of some arts, not in themselves unbefitting freemen, to the full professional limit of exactness made a man *βάναυσος* in Aristotle's opinion.

4. That which is appropriate (*τὸ πρέπον*) is always kept in view in the Politics (e.g. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33); and it would be a solecism to give any share in the lower functions to the higher natures.

It follows that a separate class or classes must exist in the State devoted to the discharge of the lower functions, and that the human beings employed for this purpose must be capable of nothing higher—otherwise there will be an infraction of justice, both wrong in itself and fatal to the harmony of the State. Aristotle does not appear to point out, in what we have of the Politics, the measures by which he proposes to secure that natures shall not be pronounced to be fit only for necessary work, which better rearing or training, or more favourable circumstances might possibly raise to the higher level. He seems also hardly conscious of the sadness of the view that the existence in adequate numbers of natures fit only for the lower functions is essential to the realization of the highest type of human society. If all men were capable of becoming men of full excellence (*σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς*), the 'best State' could not exist. The attainment by the higher natures of their true level has its accompanying shadow; it involves and implies the existence of lower natures who must remain beneath

[1] Laws 918 D, *ὃ μήποτε γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἔσται.*

them. The State at its best breaks society into two sharply contrasted grades — those who can live for the highest ends and those who cannot; the parting of the one from the other is the first and most indispensable step towards its realization. It is of course true that the lower grade would, *ex hypothesi*, gain nothing by being called to the discharge of noble functions, and that it rises to a higher level of virtue and pleasure, when linked to the higher grade, than it could otherwise achieve.

Position in the State assigned by Aristotle to the classes concerned with necessary functions.

The relation of the classes discharging necessary functions to those discharging noble functions, as will readily be foreseen, can only be a dependent one. The latter fulfil the end of the State; they consequently are the State. The former exist within the State, because otherwise the latter could not exist; their existence is an unwelcome necessity. What numerical proportion these classes are to bear to the classes which form the State, we do not distinctly learn; but no more of them must find a place in the State than is necessary for the purposes of the higher grade. Those of them who are slaves must be recruited from populations submissive enough to accept a dependent position without giving trouble. It may be asked why all are not made slaves, public or private. The answer is twofold. The slave by nature is conceived as one whose intelligence is of the lowest type and whose value lies in his thews and sinews, whereas the merchant or the artisan needs intellectual qualifications of a higher kind. The slave is also viewed, especially in the chapters where the naturalness of slavery is discussed, as in the main an instrument of the household[1], whereas the artisan or the merchant could hardly be treated as an appendage of the household.

The position of the classes concerned with necessary work, except indeed the slaves, seems to be but little studied in

[1] Though Aristotle provides for the existence of public slaves in his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 30: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 16), and includes in his definition of wealth *χρήματα χρήσιμα εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως*, 1. 8. 1256 b 29, he, at first at all events, treats the slave as an animate instrument of the household and the chattel of a *δεσπότης* (1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle refuses to follow Phaleas in making the *τεχνῖται* public slaves (2. 7. 1267 b 13 sqq.).

what we possess of the Politics. We hear nothing of any provision for their education. In the picture of household life which is given us, the householder is conceived as belonging to the superior grade to which alone citizenship is accorded. No non-citizen is to own land in the best State. Not only are the classes in question excluded from office and from membership of the assembly and the dicasteries, but they are assigned a separate market-place, distinct from that of the citizens, while those of them who are merchants reside at the port. Unlike the slaves, who are brought within the household and consequently within the range of the ideal householder's influence, they are apparently abandoned to the deteriorating influences of necessary work without any counteracting safeguard.

Remarks on Aristotle's view and the considerations which led him to adopt it.

Aristotle regards the State at its best as an union of men who are heart and soul purposed and qualified to live the highest life, and whose co-operation rests, not on force or fear, but on that temper of mind as its condition. The State is not fully a State whose members do right with any after-thought or secondary aim; they must love virtue and practise it for its own sake, not for the sake of the external goods it brings. It is useless and wrong to admit those to membership who cannot fulfil these conditions, and this is the case with those whose initial unfitness is increased by the practice of the lower kind of work. They cannot share in the common aim of living the highest life, or in the capacity for common action of the highest kind, both of which the best State presupposes. Not only, indeed, are they not to share in ruling, but the State is not to be ruled in their interest, except so far as this cannot be neglected without injury to the citizens[1].

Aristotle's conception of happiness and his conception of

[1] The common advantage (*τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*) which a State should study is the common advantage of the citizens (cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 40, *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν λεπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν*), and that of other classes, only so far as their advantage is bound up with that of the citizens (3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq.). This is here said expressly of the slave; whether it holds also of the *τεχνίτης*, *θής*, etc., we are not told.

κοινωνία forced him to find in the classes which live for noble work the sole sharers in the true life of the State: what then could he say but that these were the State, and that if the Statesman is to rule for the benefit of the State, he must rule for their benefit? It must, however, be borne in mind that this holds good only of the best constitution; it is only where the citizens are men of full human excellence (σπουδαῖοι ἁπλῶς), and actually living the highest human life, that the doctrine applies. If the Few 'inherit the earth,' the Few, it must be remembered, are to live an arduous life of moral and intellectual greatness, toilsome though happy. Not a life of self-sacrifice for the sake of others, like that of Plato's guardians, for they live for themselves, and no other life would be so full for them of happiness and pleasure; nor an ascetic life, for besides the happiness and pleasure of the highest life, they are to possess its due external conditions and to share in the occasional recreation and relaxation which human nature demands; but a life making great demands on human energy, self-mastery, and intellect. Would the supply of the material necessities of men living a life of this kind be indeed a vocation unworthy of the lower natures? Is it an unsatisfactory destiny for such natures to be caught into the train of some heroic character and to be raised by his aid to the highest level attainable by them[1]? Perhaps not: but we feel that their subordinate position in the State should be the result of their original inferiority rather than of their participation in necessary functions. It is one thing, too, to follow the lead of a heroic class as freemen, though subordinate, and quite another to accept a relation of absolute dependence and even slavery. It is, besides, true that Aristotle provides no means for making the most that can be made of these classes, or indeed of any individuals belonging to them who are equal to higher things; so far as we can judge from what remains

[1] 'I can see my dear father's life in some measure as the sunk pillar on which mine was to rise and be built,' says Carlyle in his Reminiscences (1. 65); and Aristotle designs the life of these subordinated classes to serve a somewhat similar purpose.

to us of the Politics, he drops the arrangements which Plato had devised for the purpose of raising those who deserve it to a higher place in the State, and removing to a lower place natures ill-adapted to the higher.

The contrast of necessary and noble work is too sharply drawn by Aristotle: it is, besides, incorrectly drawn; and the effect of men's vocation on their character is also overrated. What a man is, cannot always be measured by the social functions which he is fit to discharge. To exclude the hardy peasant from the military service of the State was surely a mistake; and it can hardly have been necessary to forbid his access to all official functions, however humble. Aristotle will not allow him even to be a 'Warden of the Woods' (ὑλωρός). His best State reminds us of Menander's lines:

> Ὥσπερ τῶν χορῶν
> οὐ πάντες ᾄδουσ', ἀλλ' ἄφωνοι δύο τινὲς
> ἢ τρεῖς παρεστήκασι πάντων ἔσχατοι
> εἰς τὸν ἀριθμόν· καὶ τοῦθ' ὁμοίως πως ἔχει·
> χώραν κατέχουσι, ζῶσι δ' οἷς ἔστιν βίος[1].

The individuals excluded by Aristotle, indeed, are not idle, or, in his view, cumberers of the ground, but essential conditions of the existence of the State.

Modern inquirers, while still drawing a distinction between the one class of vocations and the other, draw it in a less unqualified way. Thus to Hegel the activities which fall under the head of 'social life' (Gesellschaft) are marked off from those of political life by their primary aim being private, if their result is the general advantage. In industry or trade the individual acts for his own interest, and if at the same moment he in effect acts for the general advantage, this is no part of his aim[2]. In this sphere the Whole and its interest asserts itself as a Necessity or Compelling Force. Yet it does assert itself. For with the development of trade and industry comes the Division of Labour, which

[1] Menand. Ἐπίκληρος, Fr. 1 (p. 17, ed. Didot).

[2] Compare Mr. Herbert Spencer's contrast between industrial and governmental organization (*Fortnightly Review*, Dec. 1. 1880, p. 683).

while it facilitates supply and increases skill, also binds men closer to their fellows and makes each individual more dependent on the rest. Classes spring up, which gather men into large unities based on similarity of vocation, and impress on them the interest of the Whole. From this point of view the supposed antagonism of trade and industry to the higher life is softened down. These vocations present themselves rather as a not uncongenial preparatory stage. Our common life in the State ceases to seem marred and spoilt by the unwelcome participation of classes, alien in function to the general purpose of the State, but yet indispensable to its existence. The State comes to present the aspect of a self-consistent unity; its higher and lower elements no longer stand to each other in a relation of strong antithesis; one end and purpose is supreme throughout the whole. The bisected State of Aristotle is replaced by a 'city at unity with itself.'

It was not, however, entirely by considerations special to the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη that Aristotle was led to his conception of the true social structure of the perfect State. More passages than one in the Politics imply that the phenomena of the State do but repeat the phenomena of the whole class of things to which the State belongs. If we find in the State the contrast of ruler and ruled, it is in part because this contrast is a constant phenomenon in every Whole composed of a plurality of members, whether continuous or discrete (1. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). So again, the State belongs to the class of 'natural compounds' (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21), and Aristotle's study of this class of things prepared him to find a decided inequality to be the law of the State. Not only in the State, but in all natural compounds, the Whole is dependent for its existence on things which nevertheless are no part of it, and which stand to it in the relation of means to end. Thus, a house (for Aristotle takes his example from an object which does not strictly belong to the class of natural compounds) cannot exist without a builder and

instruments of building; yet these are no part of the house. And so the State cannot exist without property, and property is both animate and inanimate; yet even animate property is not a part of the State. In an animal, again (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 28 sqq.), we can distinguish three things: (1) the Whole (*τὸ ὅλον*), which is here conceived as the end or *οὗ ἕνεκα*: (2) the moving and generating principle, which is both part of the end, being a part of the Whole, and also a means to the existence of the Whole (or the attainment of the end): (3) 'parts which are useful to the Whole as instruments for certain purposes' (*τὰ ὀργανικὰ τούτοις μέρη πρὸς ἐνίας χρήσεις*). So in the human body (742 b 16 sqq.), 'the lower half exists for the sake of the upper half, and is neither a part of the End nor its generating source.' It is for the sake of the flesh that all the other homogeneous parts of an animal (bone, skin, sinew, bloodvessels, hair, etc.) exist (de Part. An. 2. 8. 653 b 30 sqq.). In any object into which Matter enters there is 'the fashioning element' (*τὸ δημιουργοῦν*), and there is Matter (de Gen. An. 1. 18. 723 b 29: 2. 4. 738 b 20). In the soul as in everything else there are two contrasted parts—the 'passive reason' (*νοῦς παθητικός*), answering to Matter, and the 'creative reason' (*νοῦς ποιητικός, ὁ πάντα ποιῶν*, de An. 3. 5. 430 a 10 sqq.). This duality runs through the entire universe of things (430 a 10). In an egg no less than in an animal or a State, two contrasted parts can be discerned—'that which is the principle of growth' (*ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχή*), and 'that which supplies nutriment' (*ὅθεν ἡ τροφή*, de Gen. An. 3. 1. 751 b 22). The same thing appears in a beehive (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq., *εὖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ὥσπερ πεποιημένους ἐπὶ τέκνωσιν ἔσω μένειν, ἀφειμένους τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔργων, καὶ μέγεθος δὲ ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τεκνοποιίαν συστάντος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν· τούς τε κηφῆνας ἀργοὺς ἅτ' οὐδὲν ἔχοντας ὅπλον πρὸς τὸ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ διὰ τὴν βραδυτῆτα τὴν τοῦ σώματος· αἱ δὲ μέλιτται μέσαι τὸ μέγεθός εἰσιν ἀμφοῖν (χρήσιμοι γὰρ οὕτω πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν), καὶ ἐργάτιδες, ὡς καὶ τέκνα τρέφουσαι καὶ πατέρας*). Steps and gradations

within the State reflect the universal tendency to order (τάξις) in things which conform to Nature (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 31).

To Aristotle the study of nature meant the discrimination between the Conditionally Necessary and the Good —between the operation of the Material and the operation of the Final Cause. To distinguish what is necessary from what is noble—to mark off, for instance, the rule of a master over slaves from the rule of a citizen over his fellow-citizens, or of a king over his subjects—was as incumbent on the statesman as on the philosopher. If the State is not to exalt means into ends, it must know what vocations are necessary and what are noble.

Exclusion of women from political functions in the best State taken for granted.

The exclusion of women (and of course children) from political functions in the best State, unlike that of the classes concerned with necessary work, is taken for granted by Aristotle without discussion, notwithstanding that Plato had come to a different conclusion with respect to women. His silence on the subject is the more noticeable, inasmuch as he argues at length against Plato's abrogation (in the Republic) of the household and several property. The true place for women is tacitly taken to be the household, where indeed their service is indispensable (2. 5. 1264 b 1). Women possess the faculty of moral deliberation, but in a form in which it is not always capable of making itself obeyed [1]; it is therefore in subordinate co-operation with the ideal head of the household, that the female character best realizes the type of virtue which belongs to it (1. 13. 1260 a 20 sq.). This being the view of Aristotle, we might have expected that in his argument against Plato in defence of the household (Pol. 2. 1–4), the interest of women in its preservation and the loss they would incur through its abolition would be more conspicuously noticed. They are probably included among those who would be less cared for in the absence of the institution (2. 3. 1261 b 33), but no express reference is made to their interest in its main-

[1] Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν [τὸ βουλευτικόν], ἀλλ' ἄκυρον.

tenance. The exclusion of women from citizenship in the best State follows necessarily from the hypothesis that in it all citizens will be possessed of full virtue and happiness. Women have their share of virtue and enjoyment, but they are not held to possess the full virtue of a good man, which is required of all citizens there, nor consequently happiness (εὐδαιμονία).

The 'economic substructure' of Aristotle's State to be largely formed of non-Hellenic materials.

If we ask to whom, if not to citizens, necessary functions are to be assigned, the answer is that a separate population, distinct from that which we sought at starting from Nature and Fortune (p. 89) to serve as the raw material of the State, must be called in for the discharge of these functions. The cultivators of the soil will either be slaves, and consequently men of that low degree of intelligence which slavery, as Aristotle conceives it, presupposes, or else a dependent class non-Hellenic by extraction and not dissimilar from slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The same class will serve as oarsmen in the triremes of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b 11 sqq.). There will thus be a considerable non-Hellenic element in the best State of Aristotle; its 'economic substructure,' if so we may term it, will be formed to a large extent of non-Hellenic materials. In this Aristotle departs, no doubt designedly, from Lacedaemonian precedents, for the subordinate working and trading populations of the Lacedaemonian State were Hellenic. The model he follows seems to be rather that of the more commercial States of Greece, the lower places in whose social systems were filled with aliens and imported slaves. Here the dependent classes were more under control and less formidable, and the infraction of justice was less[1]. An interchange of population had long been going forward on the coasts of the Aegean and the Euxine, resulting in the introduction of a non-Hellenic element within Hellenic communities for purposes of trade and labour, while Hellenes settled in the

[1] Cp. Levit. 25. 44: 'Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.'

wild regions round about Greece, and implanted the first germs of civilization[1]. The scheme of Aristotle's best State involves a similar division of functions between the Hellene and the non-Hellene, though the alien element in it would be far more carefully controlled, kept apart, and limited in amount.

We see that the lower section of society—which in modern States includes perhaps four-fifths of the total population, though its relative numbers would no doubt be far less in the best State of Aristotle—is to form in extraction and character the strongest possible contrast to the upper section. It is designed to be submissive and serviceable; its vocation is to obey, rather than to co-operate with its superiors. Aristotle has apparently forgotten how often war, or disease, or famine made great gaps in the ranks of the citizens of Greek States, which could only be filled by drafts from the dependent classes, free or slave, for certainly the lower section of his State would be quite unsuited to recruit the ranks of the higher.

It is not, however, enough to sever the citizens of the State from necessary work:

Aristotle's commission of 'necessary work'[2] to a class thus constituted is, however, only a first step to a purgation of the commercial and industrial life of the State. The Science of Supply[3], which had degenerated into a Science of Profit, must be recalled to a sense of its true limits and

[1] Thus the low estimate of trade and industry, which prevailed among Greeks and Romans, helped in some degree to mingle races which might otherwise have held apart. Nothing would probably strike a modern observer more, if he could be transported to the streets of ancient Athens or to those of any other Greek city where resident aliens and imported slaves were numerous, than the magnitude of the Oriental and barbarian element of its population. In many parts of the Peloponnese, no doubt, the case was very different. Observe Aristotle's acceptance of this state of things as a matter of course (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18, *ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων*).

[2] Aristotle, we note, includes the work of the *τεχνίτης* and *θής* under the term *ἀναγκαῖαι πράξεις*, though not under the sound form of *χρηματιστική*. *Ἀναγκαῖος*, however, as thus used, is little more than a negative of *καλός*.

[3] I use the term 'Science' in relation both to *χρηματιστική* and to *οἰκονομική*, but the former is probably in strictness an Art or Productive Science, the latter a Practical Science, like *πολιτική*.

methods: measures must be taken to ensure that the lower social activities shall not overgrow and stifle the higher, and to still the unquiet and inventive spirit of gain, which springs from a misconception of the end of human life. Aristotle's wish is that as little 'necessary activity' as possible, and as much 'noble activity' as possible, shall find a place in his State. It is one of the functions of the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομία* or *οἰκονομική*) to effect this by exercising a control over the Science of Supply. The household must be placed under the authority of a head who knows that the quest of commodities should be kept within the limits which the interests of virtue and happiness (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) impose.

the Science of Supply (*χρηματιστική*) must be purged, and recalled to a sense of its true limits and methods: it must be marked off from the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομική*) and placed under its control.

He arrives at this conclusion by a long discussion of the question, how the Science of Supply (*χρηματιστική*) stands to the Science of Household Management (1. 3. 1253 b 12: 8. 1256 a 1 sqq.)—a question, at first sight, of purely scientific interest, but which is made the starting-point of a sweeping social reform. Some had held the Science of Supply to be the main element in Household Science (1. 3. 1253 b 13), while others had gone so far as to identify the two (1253 b 12), thus merging the head of the household in the provider of commodities. Who these were who went so far as to forget the husband and parent in the bread-winner, we do not know.

Aristotle, on the other hand, feels bound to ask whether the Science of Supply is a part of Household Science at all. He had, indeed, incidentally taken this for granted in an early chapter of the Politics (1. 3. 1253 b 12), but later on (1. 8. 1256 a 3 sq.), he seems inclined to recede from this hasty admission, for he suggests the question whether, after all, the former is not merely auxiliary (*ὑπηρετική*) to the latter. He asks, further, whether it is not the business of Household Science to use rather than to acquire. If this is so, it cannot be identical with the Science of Supply, whose object is to acquire; and we may doubt whether the latter science is not too distinct from the former to be even a part of it.

Aristotle's theory of the Science of Supply: its sound and unsound forms.

The first thing, however, is to ask what the Science of Supply is. Its business is to 'consider whence property may be acquired.' But then there are more kinds than one of property. One of them is food: is agriculture, then, or any other science connected with the acquisition of food, a part of the Science of Supply? Aristotle reviews the various modes of acquiring food—the pastoral, that of hunting, and that of agriculture—and the combinations of them to which men resort. These methods of acquiring food, he continues, have recourse for the purpose of sustenance to objects designed by nature to be so used—designed for the purpose just as much as milk is designed for the sustenance of the newborn animal, or as other provisions of a similar nature are designed to serve the same end. Plants and animals are to the adult what milk is to the infant—the provision of Nature for his support. We know them to be so designed, for otherwise they would exist for no purpose whatever (*μάτην*, 1256 b 21), and this is never the case with products of Nature. Nature has made plants for the use of animals, and the lower animals for the use of man, not merely indeed as food, but also to supply him with raiment and other commodities. We may even go farther and say that not only the capture of animals by hunting, but also the capture of men who, though designed by nature for slavery, are unwilling to be slaves, is a natural mode of acquiring commodities, and that consequently war, the means by which this is effected, falls, in one of its forms, within the natural form of the Science of Supply. But plants and animals cannot exist except on, or in, earth and water (1. 10. 1258 a 23); therefore Nature must provide earth and water, and from these man must obtain the commodities he needs[1]. Here Aristotle falls back on the teaching of Socrates, as recorded by Xenophon (Mem. 4. 3. 5–6)[2].

[1] Aristotle seems to forget that slaves, though *κτήματα*, can hardly be said to be obtained from earth and water.

[2] Dicaearchus, the pupil of Aristotle, seems in his sketch of the development of human society to have gone back, like Plato (Polit. 271 C sqq.), to an 'age of Cronus,' 'quum viverent homines ex illis

One form of the Science of Supply, then, is naturally a part[1] of the Science of Household Management, for either it must exist, or the latter Science must itself provide that commodities shall be forthcoming necessary for life and useful for human society in household and State. Commodities of this nature constitute true wealth, for this kind of wealth is not open to the charge which has been preferred against wealth, that it does not belong to the class of 'things subject to a limit' (*τὰ πεπερασμένα*).

There is, however, another form of the Science of Supply, which is not natural. It arises thus:—Every article of property may be employed in one or other of two ways; it may be used or it may be exchanged. Both uses are natural. Exchange is perfectly natural, so far as it is used for the supply of the wants of the two parties to the exchange. The articles exchanged must, however, be used by the parties, or be intended to be used by them. This seems to be implied in Aristotle's language, and his principle evidently excludes an intermediary who buys to sell again. A perfectly legitimate step was taken when money was invented to facilitate exchange between distant or comparatively distant parties. It was, however, the invention of money—a commodity which invited by its

rebus quae inviolata ultro ferret terra.' This mode of existence was to him alone 'natural,' the pastoral life coming next in order of time and marking a decline, inasmuch as it brought with it the slaughter of animals for food, and also war: last of all, men took to agriculture (Dicaearch. Fragm. 1–5: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 230 sqq.). To Aristotle, on the contrary, the earliest age of the world is an age of Cyclopes, not an age of Cronus, and the pastoral and agricultural modes of life are equally natural. He would probably agree that the pastoral life is historically prior to the agricultural (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14, if this passage is from Aristotle's pen: the life of the Cyclopes is also represented by Homer as pastoral).

We see that Dicaearchus, like Theophrastus, had come to entertain objections to the slaughter of harmless animals for food which are quite strange to Aristotle (see as to Theophrastus, Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit).

Some Indian races were believed by Herodotus to subsist after a fashion which even Dicaearchus would admit to be natural (Hdt. 3. 100).

[1] Later on, this conclusion turns out to be only provisional, for we are taught to regard even the sound form of the Science of Supply as in strictness rather subsidiary to, than a part of, Household Science.

compactness its own indefinite increase, that carried exchange beyond the natural function of its earlier days—the provision for man's needs—and developed the other form of the Science of Supply, the mercantile form (*τὸ καπηλικόν*). This form errs in two ways: (1) it wins produce, not from earth and water, but from the process of exchange, or in other words, from fellow-men (*ἀπ' ἀλλήλων*): (2) its aim is not the supply of men's needs, but the acquisition of an indefinite amount of money; consequently, wealth loses for it the limited character which makes it natural. In fact, its procedure, if we analyse this still further, betrays a wrong conception of the end of life, which it conceives either as the mere preservation of existence (*τὸ ζῆν*), or if as good life, good life in the mistaken sense of bodily enjoyment[1]. This is the form assumed by the Science of Supply, when it is abandoned to itself and not controlled by Household Science, which knows the true end of life and should impress it on the Science of Supply.

Comments on this theory.

Aristotle apparently objects not merely to commercial dealing conducted with a view to unlimited gain, but to all commercial dealing in which the parties do not come together in order to provide themselves with articles for their own use. His principle might, indeed, be construed to involve an objection to commercial dealing in which the parties seek to provide themselves with articles not really necessary to life or to good life; but into this further question he does not go. The use of things for purposes for which nature did not intend them—the error as to the end of life which makes the indefinite heaping up of money an object of desire: these are the main grounds on which

[1] Aristotle finds it hard to understand the *χρηματιστικὸς βίος* (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 5): and Plutarch speaks in the same way, Vita Catonis Censoris, c. 18, *οὕτως ὁ τοῦ πλούτου ζῆλος οὐδενὶ πάθει φυσικῷ συνημμένος ἐκ τῆς ὀχλώδους καὶ θυραίου δόξης ἐπεισόδιός ἐστιν.* Obviously a desire for unlimited gain may exist where there is neither any irrational anxiety as to subsistence nor any craving for sensual pleasure. Plato has a good passage (Rep. 330 C) on the love of money in men who have not inherited but acquired wealth. They love it not only for its usefulness, but also as a man loves his child—as being their own creation.

he censures the unsound form of the Science of Supply. The first objection applies especially to usury; for it is even more unnatural to make the barren metal breed money, than to win it from the process of exchange. Aristotle, it should be added, is conscious that other social functions besides that of exchange may be exercised with a view to unlimited gain—those, for example, of the general or the physician (1. 9. 1258 a 8 sqq.). The same thing might of course be said of agriculture.

He misinterprets the work of the intermediary between producers, who purchases, not because he needs the thing for his own consumption or use, but in order to resell, and whose profit is in reality payment for a social service, not something filched from his neighbour[1]. It may well be true that there are elements in the organization of commerce and modes of commercial operation which represent no social service[2]; it might also be a gain to the world if commerce were confined within the limits which considerations of good life impose; but as to this Aristotle does not observe that some States may with advantage to themselves and to other States extend their production and exchange of products beyond the limit of their own needs, or, in other words, may trade and manufacture for other communities which are less favourably situated for carrying on trade and manufactures[3].

His principle that land and water are the true sources of wealth leads him a step further in c. 11[4], where he ranges among unsound sources of Supply labour rendered for

[1] Plato had, as we have seen, construed the social function of *καπηλεία* in a truer way (Laws 918 B–E).

[2] E. g. the practice of 'cornering,' which 'consists in buying up so much of a commodity as gives the buyers command over the market for that particular commodity' (*Times*, June 26, 1883). Aristotle seems to regard *καπηλικὴ χρηματιστική* as being little else than systematic cornering.

[3] He, in fact, forbids his best State to trade for others (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 27, *αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν*).

[4] In this chapter also he places the cutting of timber and quarrying or mining in a class apart as partaking both of the natural and the unnatural Science of Supply—which is strange, as he recognizes the use of Nature's products not only for food, but for other services to man.

wages (*μισθαρνία*)—in other words, the acquisition of money through placing at the service of others for pay (i. e. exchanging) bodily or mental aptitudes. It is not easy to see why a man should not be allowed to exchange his labour, just as much as the produce of his vines, for any commodities he requires, even on Aristotle's own principle (*ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν*, 1. 9. 1257 a 18). There need not be in 'labouring for hire' any such desire for an indefinite amount of coin as Aristotle connects with the unsound form of the Science of Supply. In the Ninth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics (9. 1. 1164 a 22 sqq.) the receipt of money from pupils appears to be contemplated and not objected to[1]. In the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book of the Politics (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sq.: cp. 9. 1329 a 35) artisans and day-labourers (who are said to practise 'working for hire,' 1. 11. 1258 b 25) are held to be necessary to the State. He seems to have been lured back for the moment in the First Book of the Politics to an old doctrine of Socrates, which Plato had also accepted, though only in a cursory way and with a slight modification[2]. Aristotle, we must remember, has

[1] Compare the doctrine of the Epicurean Philodemus as to the best source of *κτητική* (Philodem. de Virtutibus et Vitiis, lib. ix.: see Schömann, Opusc. 3. 240, whose completion of the text is followed): *πρῶτον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἀπὸ λόγων φιλοσόφων ἀνδράσιν δεκτικοῖς μεταδιδόμενον (μεταδιδομένων ?) ἀντιμεταλαμβάνειν εὐχαριστό[τατα, οἷα] μετὰ σεβασμοῦ παντελῶς ἐγένετο Ἐπικούρῳ· λόγων δὲ ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλονείκων καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν ἀταράχων· [ἐπεὶ] τό γε διὰ σοφιστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν οὐδέν ἐστι βέλτιον τοῦ διὰ δημοκοπικῶν καὶ συκοφαντικῶν.* For the views of the Stoics as to the legitimate forms of *κτητική*, see Zeller, Stoics, E. T. p. 269 n. Columella (de Re Rustica, praefatio, § 10) comes to the conclusion—'superest unum genus liberale et ingenuum rei familiaris augendae quod ex agricolatione contingit.'

[2] Cp. Laws 842 C, *ἐκ γῆς γὰρ καὶ ἐκ θαλάττης τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐστὶ κατεσκευασμένα τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν· τούτοις δὲ* ('but for my citizens') *μόνον ἐκ γῆς.* Except in this respect, Plato approves of much the same sources of supply as Aristotle. His citizens in the Laws are to be *γεωργοὶ καὶ νομεῖς καὶ μελιττουργοί* (842 D, a passage which perhaps suggested Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 12–20), and to have nothing to do with *ναυκληρικὰ καὶ ἐμπορικὰ καὶ καπηλευτικὰ καὶ πανδοκεύσεις καὶ τελωνικὰ καὶ μεταλλείας* (contrast Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 27 sq.) *καὶ δανεισμοὶ καὶ ἐπίτοκοι τόκοι.* Cp. also Menexen. 237 E sqq. Theophrastus held similar language about the earth, if Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 92) in ascribing Porphyr. de Abstin. 2. 32 to him. We

here the ideal State in view; he does not seem in the Ethics to impose these limits on 'getting.' There is no hint, at any rate, in the account of the 'liberal man' there given, that his 'getting' (λῆψις) will conform to the standard here laid down. He will not be, like the man who lives only for gain (ὁ αἰσχροκερδής), a lender of small sums at usurious interest, or the keeper of a house of ill-fame, nor will he be a gambler, or a thief, or a robber (Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 31 sqq.: 1122 a 7): on the contrary, 'he will win an income from legitimate sources, such as property of his own, and will regard the winning of an income, not as a noble thing, but as a necessity, if he is to have the means of giving' (1120 a 34). Not a word is said of his abstaining from lending money at moderate interest. Aristotle's language, in fact, implies that it is not illiberal to do this.

The Science of Supply to be subordinated to Household Science.

We now know what the Science of Supply properly is, and are in a position to settle its relation to Household Science. Even its sound form is not in strictness a part of Household Science: it is rather its condition—one of those ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ which form no part of the thing whose existence they make possible[1]. What it provides, Household Science uses. If the Science of Supply does much for Household Science, this in its turn does much for it—imposes a limit on its efforts and adjusts them to the true end. Household Science has higher functions to discharge in regulating the relations of husband and wife, father and child, but one of its functions is to act as the intermediary by whose agency the end of the State is impressed on the business of Supply. But for it, the Science of Supply might resort to false sources and false methods of supply, and fail to pause when the amount has been obtained which is most favourable to good life. Household Science is possessed of the true end of human life—is an ethical science, which the other is not.

find similar expressions in Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 b 1.

[1] The question raised in 1. 8. 1256 a 5, whether the Science of Supply provides 'instruments' (ὄργανα) or Matter (ὕλη), or both, is not distinctly settled.

It is subordinate to πολιτική (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 2), if it is not, indeed, a part of the political section of πολιτική (Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 31); in any case, its principles are in accord with those of πολιτική, from which it differs in the sphere of its action, not in aim.

One might, indeed, ask—seeing that the State, no less than the household, may mistake the true nature of the Science of Supply and obtain commodities from improper sources and to an unlimited extent—why the so-called Household Science is viewed as connected especially, if not exclusively, with the household; why it is not the concern of the statesman at least as much as the householder; why economy is not public as well as private. If the eleventh chapter of the First Book of the Politics is genuine, this question had already occurred to Aristotle (see 1259 a 21 sqq.). It is clear, however, from the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics, that the side of Household Science which relates to the State had come to receive more attention by the time it was written.

Aristotle's aims in this inquiry.

Aristotle's aim evidently is, in the first place, to lead back the Science of Supply to nature. He had not, however, fully worked out his conception of nature, or freed it from inconsistency and obscurity. He reckons as natural, on the one hand, whatever contributes to that which is best for the given species—in the case of man, whatever contributes to good life; and if he had held to this point of view, he might have arrived at the broad and sound conclusion that trade and the other modes of Supply whose legitimacy is in question are natural, if and so far as they contribute to the end of the State (i.e. to civilization rightly understood). But then he also regards as natural that which is coeval with birth (1. 5. 1254 a 23), primitive, ancient (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.); that which is 'given by nature herself' (1. 8. 1256 b 7); that which conforms to the primordial law of zoological sustenance, which prescribes that sustenance is to be won from 'the residue of the substance from which the creature springs' (1. 10. 1258 a 36)—in the case of man, from earth and water; and again the necessary. From

these points of view, commerce in its more developed form and labouring for hire are both of them regarded as contrary to nature.

If Aristotle had consistently adhered to the view that the primitive is the natural, we might have found him denying the naturalness of the City-State in comparison with the household[1], and of the pursuit of good life in comparison with that of mere life. But this he fortunately does not do. His examination of the relative justifiability of the various methods by which human wants are supplied is an exception to his general treatment of political and social questions; a standard is applied which is quite other than the standard usually applied—the end of the State. The attempt to trace in the mode by which the nascent or infant animal is sustained the type of all natural sustenance seems especially fanciful[2].

He has, however, a further aim—to show that even the sound and natural form of the Science of Supply is not in strictness a part of Household Science[3], but a dependent science which accepts its guidance. It is true that just as the householder has to see that the members of his household enjoy health, so it is his business to see that they possess a due supply of necessary and useful commodities; but it is the business of the physician to produce health in them, and it is the business of the Science of Supply in league with nature, not of Household Science, to produce those commodities. Not only did the current view of householding, with which Aristotle himself seems occasionally to fall in (e.g. Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 24: Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9: cp. Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 8), teach a different lesson,

[1] He seems to approach this view in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 16 sqq.

[2] It is just possible that this censure of *καπηλικὴ χρηματιστική* was penned during the period (330–326 B.C.: Schäfer, Demosthenes 3. 2. 339) when, owing, as was thought, to the arts of the corn-merchants or the devices of huckstering officials in Egypt, corn was extremely scarce and dear at Athens. But popular feeling always ran high against the corn-dealers, as we see from Lysias' oration against them.

[3] The Stoics appear to have distinguished between *οἰκονομική* and *χρηματιστική* no less than Aristotle (Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 6: p. 51 Meineke).

but writers like Xenophon had put the contrary opinion in the mouth of Socrates (Xen. Oecon. c. 6. 4: cp. c. 7. 15, and c. 11. 9) and others (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 23, *οὐ τοὺς πλεῖστα ἔχοντας καὶ φυλάττοντας πλεῖστα εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἡγοῦμαι . . . ἀλλ' ὃς ἂν κτᾶσθαί τε πλεῖστα δύνηται σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ, καὶ χρῆσθαι δὲ πλείστοις σὺν τῷ καλῷ, τοῦτον ἐγὼ εὐδαιμονέστατον νομίζω*)[1]. Plato, however, had already declared against the unlimited pursuit of wealth (Rep. 591 D–E): *οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύνταξίν τε καὶ ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; οὐκ οἶομαι, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων μή τι παρακινῇ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτω κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾖ*[2]. With this Aristotle would agree, but he adds that acquiring lies, in strictness, altogether outside the province of the head of the household, as such, and that his function is to use the commodities, for the provision of which the Science of Supply is responsible, though even this is not his highest function, which lies rather in the government of persons, and especially of free persons, than in the care for, or use of things. Xenophon had already made it one of the duties of the head of the household to seek to teach his slaves justice (Oecon. c. 14. 4): Aristotle makes it his main duty to develope in all the members of the household all the virtue of which they are capable.

The householder, as Aristotle conceives him, is by no means to be indifferent whether the household under his charge does or does not possess an adequate supply of things useful and necessary for good life: on the contrary, he is to see that this is forthcoming; but further than this he is not to go in quest of commodities. He certainly will not hold, with Cato the Censor, whose ideas

[1] It should be noticed, however, that in the short treatise on the Lacedaemonian constitution Xenophon praises Lycurgus for his discouragement of money-making (c. 7).

[2] Cp. Laws 870 A, *ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἁπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις.*

on household management were as clearly pronounced as on public affairs, 'that the man truly wonderful and godlike and fit to be registered in the lists of glory, was he, by whose accounts it should at last appear that he had more than doubled what he had received from his ancestors[1]'; nor would he 'labour with his domestics, and afterwards sit down with them, and eat the same kind of bread and drink of the same wine[2]'; nor would it be said of him with truth, that he 'amassed a great deal and used but little[3]'. Aristotle would have found more to praise in Cato's untiring care for his son's due nurture and education, though he himself would commit the education of boys, when past a certain age, to the common schools of the State.

The limitations which Aristotle imposes on the Science of Supply remind us of a reflection of Wordsworth's in the Eighth Book of the Excursion:—

> 'I rejoice,
> Measuring the force of those gigantic powers,
> That by the thinking mind have been compelled
> To serve the will of feeble-bodied man;
> For with the sense of admiration blends
> The animating hope that time may come
> When, strengthened, yet not dazzled, by the might
> Of this dominion over nature gained,
> Men of all lands shall exercise the same
> In due proportion to their country's need;
> Learning, though late, that all true glory rests,
> All praise, all safety, and all happiness,
> Upon the moral law.'

Aristotle, however, goes far beyond Wordsworth, though the latter forgets no less than the former that the accumulation of capital in one country beyond its needs may well be useful in aiding the material and moral development of other communities. It can hardly have been true of commerce even in Aristotle's day, that it had passed far beyond its sound original function of supplying men's needs into an ingenious artificial contrivance which served only the pur-

[1] Plutarch, Cato Censor c. 21 (Langhorne's translation).
[2] Ibid. c. 3.
[3] Ibid., Comparison of Cato and Aristides, c. 4.

pose of enriching its practitioners indefinitely at the expense of each other or of other men; but, at any rate, his censure of labour for hire and of lending money at interest is wholly mistaken. So far as he asserts the principle that commodities are made for man, not man for the multiplication of commodities—that the pursuit of wealth, which so easily masters and moulds society to its purpose, is to be governed by the true interests of civilization, or, as Wordsworth says, 'the moral law,' he is on solid ground; but in his application of this principle, and indeed in his combination of it with others of more doubtful authority, he has been led into error. We may trace, perhaps, in the background the influence of prejudices which he shared with his age and nation, and which made a dispassionate examination of this subject unusually difficult for him. He appears to understand better the true nature of Wealth than the laws of its production or the office of Capital. Political Economy almost originated with him, and the clearness of his economical vision in some directions is balanced by blindness in others. He is besides too much inclined to cut all societies after the same pattern. Some States seem marked out by nature for industry and commerce, others for agriculture; and the world would be a loser if one and the same career were enforced on all.

Status of those concerned with necessary work—some to be free, some to be slaves.

So far we have studied the classes concerned with trade and production in the best State of Aristotle rather with respect to the source from which they are to be recruited, the services they are to render, and the limitations under which they are to act, than with respect to their place in the State-system, or the connexion between them and the other agencies of the State. We possess, indeed, but few data as to a large section of these classes—that which comprises the merchant (*ἔμπορος*), the artisan, the day-labourer, the shopkeeper[1]. On the other hand, the cultivator of the soil and the domestic attendant have their

[1] How near all *χερνῆτες*, and among them the *βάναυσος τεχνίτης*, come to slaves, we see from 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.

lot pretty clearly marked out. They are to be slaves—not all of them, indeed, private slaves, for the territory of the State is to be divided into two parts—whether equal or not, we are not told—the one to be retained in the hands of the State, and itself subdivided into two sections, devoted respectively to the maintenance of the worship of the gods and to the supply of the public meal-tables; the other to be allotted to individuals in several ownership. Both parts are to be cultivated by slaves; the public land by public, the private by private slaves. Dependent serfs (*περίοικοι*) of barbarian origin might be employed in the cultivation of the soil; but it was better to give this function to slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.).

We observe, when we turn to the examination of the legitimacy of slavery contained in the First Book, that it is treated as entirely a domestic institution. The case of public slaves is left wholly out of consideration. It is not till the chapter on Phaleas in the Second Book (2. 7. 1267 b 16 sq.) that we get any hint of the arrangement adopted in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book.

Slavery—its naturalness and justice impugned by some inquirers.

We do not know with certainty who were the impugners of the naturalness and justice of the institution of slavery referred to by Aristotle (1. 3. 1253 b 20 sq.)[1]. The distinction between nature and convention, which their view presupposes, is one recognized by many schools. A Sophist may well have struck the first blow. Some Sophists, indeed, denied that the Naturally Just exists; for them all right was based on convention only; but those who held this view cannot be referred to here, for in this passage we evidently have to do with men who accepted the existence of a Natural Justice, which slavery contravened. Others, however, did not go so far; and it may well be that in the general reference of existing institutions, and indeed of social order

[1] Were they the same as those who are mentioned in 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35, as maintaining that the exercise of despotic rule over neighbours involves the greatest injustice, while the exercise of *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* over others interferes with the ruler's felicity?

as a whole, to custom and tradition, or even compact, as opposed to nature, which marks the Sophistic epoch, the institution of slavery did not escape without challenge. The Sophist Lycophron denied the reality of the distinction between the noble and the ill-born [1], a distinction nearly related to that between slave and free (Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.). Gorgias praised Rhetoric as the best of all arts in words that remind us of Aristotle's language here—because it 'made all other things its slaves, not by compulsion, but of their own free will' (Plato, Phileb. 58 A–B). The Cynics, again, might be referred to, were it not that they were more given to asserting the 'indifference' of positive institutions than to attacking them [2]. We can trace among the followers of the Cynic Diogenes, however, one opponent of slavery—Onesicritus, who accompanied the Oriental expedition of Alexander; for Strabo (15. p. 710), in mentioning an authority who affirmed that the Indians had no slaves, adds—'but Onesicritus alleges that this was the case only in the territory of Musicanus, and regards the absence of slavery as an excellent thing: he finds, in fact, many other excellent institutions in that region and describes it as especially well-ordered.' It appears from Strabo, p. 701, that in the part of India referred to, it was the custom for the young to render similar services to those elsewhere rendered by serfs, such as the Cretan Aphamiotae and the Helots of the Lacedaemonian State.

Apart, however, from the movement of philosophical opinion, much had happened, and was happening every day in Greece, to suggest doubts in the minds of men respecting the institution. Dio Chrysostom (Or. 15. 239 M) refers to the many Athenians who, in consequence of the defeat at Syracuse, had to serve as slaves in Sicily and the

[1] Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10.

[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 230 (2nd edit.): cp. 208. 8: 238. 5, where the language of Antisthenes and Diogenes seems to imply that the wise man is not only not a natural slave, but not a slave at all. Diogenes, we are told, was especially given to distinguishing between τὰ κατὰ νόμον and τὰ κατὰ φύσιν (Diog. Laert. 6. 71): so far as this goes, therefore, he might be referred to here.

Peloponnese, and to the case of the Messenians (242 M), who after long years of slavery became again free citizens; and he notices how narrowly the whole body of slaves at Athens missed enfranchisement, when the Athenians offered them freedom after Chaeroneia on condition of their serving against Macedon, and would have given it if the war had continued (240 M). It was just the facility of the transition from slavery to freedom, and from freedom to slavery, and the dependence of men's status on accident and superior force and the will of men (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 30: Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14), that would give rise to the view that it was based on convention, not nature. A fragment from the Ἀγχίσης of Anaxandrides (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. 3. 162) gives expression to what must have been a common feeling:—

> Οὐκ ἔστι δούλων, ὦ 'γαθ', οὐδαμοῦ πόλις,
> τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,
> πολλοὶ δὲ νῦν μέν εἰσιν οὐκ ἐλεύθεροι,
> εἰς ταὔριον δὲ Σουνιεῖς, εἶτ' εἰς τρίτην
> ἀγορᾷ κέχρηνται· τὸν γὰρ οἶακα στρέφει
> δαίμων ἑκάστῳ.

So again Philemon, Fr. 39 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. 4. 47):—

> Κἂν δοῦλος ᾖ τις, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει,
> φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ·
> ἡ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

According, again, to the Scholiast on Aristot. Rhet. 1. 13, the saying 'God made all men free: nature has made no man a slave' (ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν) occurred in the 'Messenian Oration' of the orator Alcidamas. It is, perhaps, to these words of Alcidamas that Aristotle refers in the passage we are considering (1. 3. 1253 b 20)[1]. It is certain, at all events, that

[1] So think Henkel (Studien, p. 124, n. 11) and Susemihl. Zeller, however, thinks (Gr. Ph. 1. 1007. 2) that Aristotle is not 'referring to Alcidamas specially' in this passage of the Politics: he holds that though Alcidamas may well have used in this oration the expression ascribed to him by the Scholiast, he can hardly have gone so far as to assail the institution of slavery, when seeking to

the restoration of Messenia to independence must have brought the question prominently before men's minds. Many who did not go so far as to impugn the naturalness of the institution as a whole, appear to have contested the justice of enslavement through war. Thus Callicratidas, when pressed on the capture of Methymna to sell the citizens as slaves, declared that, while he was in command, no Greek should be enslaved if he could help it, though he nevertheless sold the Athenian garrison as slaves the day after (Xen. Hell. 1. 6. 14–15). Agesilaus gave utterance to similar sentiments (Xen. Ages. 7. 6)[1]. Epaminondas and Pelopidas are said by Plutarch to have enslaved no captured cities (Pelop. et Marcell. Inter se Compar. c. 1, *Μάρκελλος μὲν ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὑποχειρίοις γενομέναις σφαγὰς ἐποίησεν, Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ καὶ Πελοπίδας οὐδένα πώποτε κρατήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν οὐδὲ πόλεις ἠνδραποδίσαντο*). The severities of this nature practised by Philip of Macedon indicate, therefore, a decided retrogression in international policy.

Even those who defended enslavement through war did so only in a qualified way, for they condemned the enslavement of Greeks through war (1. 6. 1255 a 21 sqq.). Enslavement for debt had been abolished at Athens by Solon [2], though elsewhere it may have been legal [3]. The law itself both at Athens and in other States drew a tacit distinction between the slave by birth (*ὁ φύσει δοῦλος γενόμενος*) and the slave not descended from slave-parents by making the former incapable of becoming a citizen (Dio Chrys. Or. 15. 239 M) [4]. Dio Chrysostom, in his Fifteenth Oration, mentions a general feeling that the slave by birth was a slave in the truest sense, but then he goes on to reason

win from the Lacedaemonians the recognition of Messenian independence. As to the oration in question, see Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, p. 14 sqq.

[1] Plato declares against the enslavement of Greeks in wars between one Greek State and another (Rep. 471 A).

[2] It survived in a single case only (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 58. 15).

[3] Ibid. § 58. 20.

[4] There seems to have been a special name for the slave by birth, or *δουλέκδουλος*. He was called *σίνδρων* (Athen. Deipn. 267 C).

that slaves by birth are descended from those who have been enslaved through war, and that this form of slavery, 'the oldest and that which has given birth to all the rest[1],' is 'very weak in point of justice' (242 M); and thus he arrives at the conclusion (243 M) that the true slave is the man who is unfree and servile in soul—a conclusion possibly suggested by Aristotle's examination of the subject, though arrived at in a different way.

If we add that the form which slavery assumed in the Lacedaemonian State gave rise to an especial amount of debate (Plato, Laws 776 C), we shall see that the institution was undergoing a rigorous examination, in the course of which one form of it after another was being weighed in the balance and found wanting, and that first enslavement for debt, then the enslavement of Greeks[2], then enslavement through war, were successively being eliminated, so that a total condemnation of the institution might well seem to be at hand. Hence a careful investigation of its true basis, such as that which Aristotle made, was especially timely.

Reinvestigation of the basis of slavery by Aristotle.

Both Xenophon and Plato furnished him with some hints on the subject. Xenophon had insisted that rule should, if possible, be so exercised as to win willing obedience from the ruled, and had shown how the master might be a means of developing virtue in his slaves. Plato had, in one and the same dialogue (the Republic), made it a distinguishing feature of the ideal State not to enslave the class which provided it with necessary or useful commodities (τὸ χρηματιστικόν)[3], and also pointed to the man in whom there is a natural weakness of the higher principle as a

[1] He overlooks the fact that slavery originating in voluntary surrender and slavery for debt could not be said to have developed out of war.

[2] Cp. Levit. 25. 44: 'Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.' I have already quoted this passage for another purpose.

[3] Rep. 547 C. This class (the third) is probably conceived as Hellenic, like the two higher classes, and the fact that it is not a slave-class in the ideal State of the Republic does not necessarily imply the non-existence of slavery in this State: on the contrary, slavery is here and there tacitly implied to exist in it (e.g. Rep. 549 A).

being designed by nature to be enslaved to another who can supply that deficiency (Rep. 590 C–D: cp. Polit. 309 A). This view of the institution, which, as has been remarked, probably suggested Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, seems, however, to be lost sight of in the Laws, where little, if any, attention appears to be paid to the ethical interests of the slave.

Aristotle defends, but reforms slavery.

It is on these foundations that Aristotle builds. He consents to retain the institution in his best State on condition of a complete reform, which would restore the willingness of the relation by making it advantageous both to master and slave. Natural slavery presupposed, according to him, not only a low intellectual level in the slave, but high moral and intellectual excellence in the master. The *raison d'être* of slavery was to make a noble life possible for the master, and if the master could not, or did not, live such a life, slavery failed to achieve the end of its existence. Aristotle would not have been satisfied to incorporate in his best State a relation which, though necessary, was not advantageous to both the parties to it. Indeed, it is less on the social necessity of slavery than on the benefits which it confers on master and slave, that he insists. Thus, while he argues in the First Book (1. 4. 1253 b 23 sqq.) that the slave is a necessity to Household Science, he allows in the Fourth (the old Seventh) the substitution of serfs for slaves, so far as the cultivation of the soil is concerned (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The necessity of slavery to ancient society has perhaps been somewhat overrated. 'Coloni' seem to have served its purpose in the later days of the Roman Empire as well as slaves. The submissiveness of the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' was the important thing, and this was rather a matter of nationality than of civil status. If they were not submissive, we know from a variety of instances that the status of slavery was but a poor security for their obedience or tranquillity.

Aristotle has already in the Second Chapter of the First

Book recognized as the constituent elements of the household the relations of husband and wife and master and slave, and treated the one relation as equally necessary and natural with the other, the master's intelligence and the slave's bodily strength being mutually complementary and indispensable, just as the union of male and female is necessary for the purpose of reproduction. The naturalness of slavery is thus already established, and it may be asked why the question should be again taken up in c. 3. The answer probably is, that in c. 2 Aristotle deals with the question of slavery only in course of proving the naturalness of the State, and that in conformity with his usual practice he is not content to dispense with a special examination of this particular question apart from all others, which he conducts wholly without reference to the result already hastily reached.

In tracing the course of the investigation respecting slavery in c. 3 (1253 b 14 sqq.), it must be borne in mind that Aristotle is testing not one opinion but two—not alone the view of those who asserted that slavery is contrary to nature (which is the more interesting of the two contentions to us), but also the view of the Platonic Socrates, who had said that rule over slaves is a science and identical with the rule of the householder, statesman, and king. It is thus as much his purpose to show that the rule over slaves is nothing exalted—and this he shows by his definition of the slave (c. 4. 1253 b 23–1254 a 17) and by occasional hints later on (1254 a 24 sqq.: 1255 b 33 sqq.)—as that there is a natural kind of slavery.

His first inquiry is, what is the nature and function of the slave?—his next, is such a being forthcoming? He deals with the former question first, and starts from two propositions, which for the moment he assumes as true, though he will later on see reason to modify them—1. that Property is a part of the Household: 2. that the Science of acquiring property (in the sense of things necessary for living and living well) is a part of the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομία*). He then proceeds to say that just as arts with

some single definite end stand in need of instruments for the accomplishment of that end, so does Household Science, though it is not, strictly speaking, an Art, and its end is broader. The slave, he goes on to show, is one of the animate instruments which Household Science needs and an article of household property, but he is an exceptional kind of instrument, an instrument prior to other instruments, and an instrument of action, not of production; and being an article of property, he stands to his master in a peculiarly close relation—he is a part of him and wholly his.

The next question is—is any human being so constituted by nature? As nature always does that which is best for each thing and that which is just, this question resolves itself into another—is any human being in existence for whom it is best and also just that he should be placed in this position? We have here a question of fact, and one would have expected it to be answered by a direct appeal to facts, and by that alone. But Aristotle says (5. 1254 a 20), that it is one which it is not difficult to answer, whether by process of reasoning (*τῷ λόγῳ*), or by noting actual facts (*τὰ γινόμενα*). The thing both must be, if something quite contrary to analogy is not to take place, and it also, as a matter of fact, is.

Ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary but an advantageous thing; and in some cases a destination for the one position or the other appears immediately on birth. A ruling element and a ruled appears wherever a Whole proceeds from the union of a plurality of elements; and thus it is not surprising that there are many different kinds of ruling and ruled elements, varying in excellence according to the function which ruler and ruled unite to discharge. We need not reject slavery as unnatural, because we do not rank the relation of master and slave with the rule of the householder, or the statesman, or the king. We can trace a kind of rule even in things inanimate; we can trace ruling and ruled elements in an animal; here we find both the despotic and the political form of rule, the rule of the soul over the body being of the former kind, that of

the rational over the appetitive part being of the latter; and in both cases, the relation is natural and advantageous. The same thing appears in the relation of man to the other animals. The tame are better than the wild, and it is advantageous to them to be ruled by man; what holds of the better, however, is natural. So again, the male sex is naturally stronger than the female; consequently, the male rules, the female is ruled. The same thing holds between one human being and another, irrespective of sex. The naturalness of rule does not depend on its being of the highest type, but on its adjustment to the interval between ruler and ruled. If there are human beings who are as far inferior to others as the body is to the soul, or as the lower animals are to man, then the relation of rule which obtains between soul and body, and man and other animals, will be properly applicable to them and will be natural and for their good. This is the case with human beings whose best function is the use of the body. They are fit only to belong to another; they are but little above the lower animals: the only psychological difference between them and the lower animals is that they can listen to reason, though they have it not, whereas animals follow passion. In use and, where Nature succeeds in her aim, in bodily aspect, they differ little from tame animals; their strength and their stoop are points of resemblance. In their case slavery is advantageous to the slave and just.

The question then arises, how it is that so many deny the justice and therefore the naturalness of slavery. The reason is that there is a kind of slavery which rests only on convention. A law exists, not based on Nature, but only on agreement, which confers on victors in war a property in the vanquished and all they possess. The justice of this law is impugned by many who occupy themselves with law; and it is true that it cannot be seriously defended except on the ground that superiority in force implies superiority in virtue. This is the common premiss from which the disputants on either side must start, if their arguments are to have any weight; and it is on superiority of virtue that

Aristotle bases natural slavery. His view is confirmed by the tacit agreement of the disputants on this point and on this point only. But there is another view put forward. Some claim that this kind of slavery is just, simply because it is allowed by law. To them the legal is the just. But then the particular application of the law may not be just, for the war may have been begun unjustly, or again persons may be enslaved in this way who are incapable of becoming slaves, like the heaven-descended Hecuba. And this would be admitted by these inquirers. Thus, by this path also we arrive at the conclusion that the true test of just freedom and just slavery is to be found in relative goodness and badness. Aristotle, in fact, finds his view of slavery confirmed by Common Opinion; but instead of basing Natural Slavery, as most did, on the extraction of the persons enslaved, or the circumstances of their enslavement, he bases it on their nature and the nature of their enslavers.

We see that the objections to slavery current in Aristotle's day were objections based on its alleged unfairness to the slave rather than on the interest of the community. That the captive taken in war should be enslaved seemed hard to many, especially if he were a Greek: the right to enslave was too exorbitant a privilege to be granted to those who could only boast a superiority of force; if this was the basis of the right, it had no more to say for itself than tyranny[1], which met with universal condemnation. Others passed the same criticism on the whole institution of slavery, however it originated. Force and injustice lay at its root. Thus slavery was attacked, not on the ground of its social or economical inexpediency, but on the ground of justice and the right of human beings to have their interests considered, and not to be forced to be parties to an one-sided bargain[2].

Aristotle's defence of slavery and his reform of it are

[1] Cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313a 9, *ἂν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἢ βίας, ἤδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς.*

[2] Compare the use of *δουλεία*, Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133a 1: and *δοῦλος*, Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 18.

designed to meet objections of this nature. He is too fully convinced of the expediency of the remodelled institution in the interest of the slave to make any point of its indispensability to society; on this he touches only incidentally while seeking to ascertain the definition of the slave. To learn what a slave is and then to ask whether there are those to whom such a position brings advantage, is all that is necessary for the full treatment of the question of the naturalness of slavery. If the slave is a gainer, society, it is taken for granted, cannot be a loser. Aristotle's object is to show that slavery, rightly constituted, is not an one-sided bargain for the slave at all. The natural slave has not that part of the soul (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*), which is necessary to make moral virtue complete. He gains, therefore, by being linked to some controlling force possessing that which he lacks. Aristotle does not pause to examine whether this defect of nature could be mended by education; he implies, however, that it could not. The human being designed by nature for slavery, unlike the brute, can apprehend and listen to reason, but he does not possess reason (1. 5. 1254 b 22)[1]. Yet he possesses a kind of moral virtue—the kind which enables him to do his work in subordination to his master—the moral virtue, in fact, of a subordinate confined to humble functions, and itself of a humble type. How any form of moral virtue can subsist in the absence of the deliberative faculty, Aristotle does not explain, nor how the use of the body is the best that comes of the slave (*τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον*, 1. 5. 1254 b 18), if virtuous action is not beyond him. There are, indeed, other indications that it was not possible for Aristotle wholly to reconcile the two aspects of the slave, as a man and as an instrument or article of property. In the First Book of the

[1] Though Aristotle's tone in this passage in regard to the distance between man and brute differs much from his tone in a previous chapter of the same book (1. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq.), he says nothing here that conflicts with what he has said there. He had there allowed to men in contrast with brutes a perception of the good and bad, the just and unjust, and here he allows even to the natural slave a perception of reason.

Politics the slave, though the mere animate chattel of his master, is nevertheless conceived as forming a κοινωνία with him (cp. 1. 2. 1252b 9, τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν: 1. 5. 1254a 29, ἕν τι κοινόν: 1. 13. 1260a 40, κοινωνὸς ζωῆς), and as united to him by a dependent friendship (1. 6. 1255b 13); but in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Property, and consequently, it would seem, the slave, is implied to be no part of the household (4 (7). 8. 1328a 28 sqq.)[1], and κοινωνία appears to be pronounced impossible between those whose aim is the best life and those who have no such aim, unless indeed the κοινωνία of the State is alone here referred to. The distinction between the slave *qua* slave and the slave *qua* human being, which, whether it be a satisfactory distinction or not, serves in the Nicomachean Ethics to make the contradictions inherent in the position of the slave a little less glaring, does not appear to be used in the Politics. The same inconsistency is evident, if we examine Aristotle's conception of the office of the master in relation to his slave. He is charged in the First Book with the task of developing in the slave all the moral virtue of which he is capable, and thus the relation between them is adjusted to the aim of good life, and becomes a relation not unworthy of the husband and father or unfit to find a place in the household and the State; but then we find in the Third Book that the aim of the master in his rule over the slave is primarily his own advantage and only accidentally that of the slave. If this is so, and the slave feels it to be so, one may doubt whether the affectionate reverence and sense of common interest, which Aristotle hopes to create in the mind of the slave, would be found in reality to exist, however high the character of the master might be, and however great the moral benefits conferred by him. Aristotle's arguments may perhaps prove that a human being of the stamp of his 'natural slave' should be subjected to a strict rule; they do not prove that he should be made an article of property.

[1] Aristotle is here insisting on the contrast between the higher and lower elements of the State, whereas in the First Book he is making the most he can of the position of the slave.

The ambiguity of the word δεσπόζειν, which was used to denote both the relation of an absolute ruler to his subjects and that of a proprietor to his property, concealed from his view the vast difference between the two propositions. From absolute rule (δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή) to ownership (δεσποτεία) is a great and momentous step. We may feel that his 'natural slave' would be all the better for being ruled by a man of full virtue (σπουδαῖος ἁπλῶς), but not for being his chattel[1].

Aristotle approached the subject under the influence of a scientific reaction both against the views of those who, like some of the Sophists, were inclined to challenge the claims of every existing institution, and against the views of those who, like Plato, had dealt very freely with some institutions of great importance. His bias was in favour of accepting and amending the institutions to which the collective experience of his race had given birth, rather than sweeping them away. He pleaded against Plato for the continued existence of the parental and conjugal relations, and he was led on to find good in the relation of master and slave.

He deserves, however, to be remembered rather as the author of a suggestion for the reformation of slavery than as the defender of the institution. The slavery he defends is an ideal slavery which can exist only where the master is intellectually and morally as high as the slave is low. Aristotle would find in the Greek society of his own day as many slave-owners who had no business to own slaves as slaves who had no business to be enslaved. His theory of slavery implies, if followed out to its results, the illegitimacy of the relation of master and slave in a large proportion of the cases in which it existed. In how many instances

[1] The Stoics appear to have distinguished slavery in the sense of subjection from slavery in the sense of possession and subjection —Diog. Laert. 7. 122, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην δουλείαν (besides the *ipso facto* slavery of the bad) τὴν ἐν ὑποτάξει, καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐν κτήσει τε καὶ ὑποτάξει, ᾗ ἀντιτίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία, φαύλη οὖσα καὶ αὐτή. Aristotle regards the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη as φαύλη, but hardly δεσποτεία, when exercised over natural slaves. It is natural and a means of virtue to the slave, and would hardly be said by him to be φαύλη.

would not the master, if judged by his rules, be found unfit to be a master and the slave unfit to be a slave! This would be so even in Greece; among the barbarians, if we may judge from a passage in the First Book (1. 2. 1252 b 6), natural slavery could not exist, for there that which is marked out by nature for rule (*τὸ φύσει ἄρχον*) is wanting. The limitations Aristotle imposed on slavery would probably attract more attention and comment from most of his contemporaries than his recognition of slavery subject to those limitations. He confined it to a relatively small class of human beings—to those whose vocation was rude physical labour, the exercise of mere muscle and sinew. Human beings fit for no higher work than that—whether Greek or barbarian, and they would commonly be barbarians—were to be slaves. His plan seems to be to limit the incidence of slavery rather than to lighten its yoke. He allows, though reluctantly, the substitution of serfs (*περίοικοι*) for slaves in agriculture. He recommends that all slaves shall have the hope of freedom held out to them, as a reward for good conduct[1] (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 32 sq.), but we are not distinctly told whether the master is to have the right of manumission, nor do we learn whether he is to have the right to sell, or bequeath, or give away the slave. There is no indication, however, that Aristotle was inclined to depart greatly from the general practice of Greece in relation to the rights of the master over the slave.

All the economical objections to slavery would apply to the reorganization of it which Aristotle designed. Agriculture would not prosper in the hands of slaves. Indeed, in recommending that the cultivators of the soil in his best State should be slaves, Aristotle extended slavery to a class which in contemporary Greece was frequently free. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that he proposes to limit the number of the slaves in a State to that which is imperatively requisite for its well-

[1] Yet obviously a natural slave would *ex hypothesi* lose by being set free: we infer, therefore, but are not distinctly told, that a natural slave can be fitted by slavery for the enjoyment of freedom.

being, just as he applies the same limit to Property and 'instruments' and 'necessary work' generally; that he brings even the slaves of the farm within the household (except of course such as are public slaves), herein true to the old-fashioned conception of the slave as οἰκέτης[1]; and that he is against the employment as slaves, not merely of those who are not natural slaves, but also of members of courageous and high-spirited races, like those which inhabited the barbarous portions of Europe. Thrace, for instance, would probably be no longer drawn upon for slaves, and many fine races would escape degradation[2]. The free population would thus have no cause to feel that they were oppressing a body of men who deserved, or at least wished, to be free. They would have been saved the consciousness of injustice, the terror, suspicion, and consequent tendency to cruelty which comes of such a situation—results with which Greece was familiar in the instance of the Lacedaemonian State. The adoption of Aristotle's reform would have left but few Hellenic slaves, no slaves possessed of capacity, none certainly of that gifted or learned sort of which we hear much in Greece and still more in the Roman Empire[3]. It is curious, indeed, to notice that Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, had a slave of philosophical capacity: 'sed et Theophrasti Peripatetici servus Pompylus, et Zenonis Stoici servus qui Persaeus vocatus est, et Epicuri cui nomen Mys fuit, philosophi non incelebres vixerunt' (Gell. 2. 18, quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 10. 3). But, if this Pompylus is the Pompylus

[1] Cp. Seneca, Epist. 47: ne illud quidem videtis quam omnem invidiam majores nostri dominis, omnem contumeliam servis detraxerint? Dominum patrem familiae appellaverunt; servos (quod etiam in mimis adhuc durat) familiares.

[2] There is a striking description in Strabo (p. 224) of the conduct of some refractory Corsican slaves, which shows that in these European races mere 'brutishness' (τὸ θηριῶδες καὶ τὸ βοσκηματῶδες) was no security for willing slavery.

[3] Some of these learned slaves discharged an useful function in Roman society, for they were largely employed in copying MSS. 'The place of the press in our literature was taken by the slaves' (Schmidt, Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit, p. 119, quoted by Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, E. T., p. 529).

mentioned in Theophrastus' will (Diog. Laert. 5. 54), he is there referred to as 'for a long time past free.' Theophrastus had not retained as a slave one who was in no sense a natural slave. The system of keeping skilled slaves for the profit to be got from their work (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 13) would vanish with the unsound form of the Science of Supply. The class of slaves, by losing all its intelligent members, would well nigh lose all chance of influencing or corrupting the free population. The position of the free labourer or artisan would still be lower, as it always is, than in a society where slavery does not exist; but slavery would do far less harm in a community like the best State of Aristotle, sound in tone and studiously secured against its influence, than it did in most Greek States.

Aristotle was probably not aware how much evil and misery would be caused in the slave-producing regions of Asia and Africa by the wars which he sanctions for the purpose of capturing natural slaves[1]. Nothing can have tended more to demoralize barbarian society in the countries round about Greece than the demand for slaves in Greece itself, and it may well be doubted whether the moral influence even of Aristotle's ideal householder on the slave would have been an adequate compensation for the perennial disturbance and degradation of the races from which slaves were to be sought. On the other hand, Aristotle's reform would have done much to soften the customs of war waged between Hellenes, or between Hellenes and civilized non-Hellenes. The indiscriminate enslavement of the population of cities taken by storm would cease. Only those who were natural slaves would be enslaved; the rest would be ransomed. Wars of one Greek State with another, or of Greeks with some non-Hellenic States would have entailed hardly any enslavement. The many Greek cities which after the time of Aristotle experienced this fate would have escaped. The decrease of population in Greece, which became more and more

[1] 1. 8. 1256 b 23 sqq.; 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2.

marked as time went on[1], had probably already begun in Aristotle's day; and one of its causes, at all events, would have been removed if enslavement through war had been abandoned in the case of those who were not slaves by nature. The ransom of captives in war was, it is true, already permitted in most cases; it was not, however, in all, and the lesson which Aristotle taught was one which none needed to learn more than Philip of Macedon. Potidaea and Olynthus with the neighbouring Chalcidian cities endured enslavement at his hands[2]. If Stageira was destroyed by Philip and its inhabitants sold as slaves (Plutarch, Alexander c. 7), its fate may well have been present to Aristotle's mind in this discussion. Epirus was permanently ruined by the enslavement of 150,000 of its population after the subjugation of Perseus by Rome. It is evident that in his investigation of the subject of slavery Aristotle raised questions of vital importance to the future of Greece.

We may wish that he had dispensed altogether with slavery in his State. If he does not do so, the reason is that while he sees rude manual labour to be necessary to society, and holds such labour cheap, he also holds that the worker must not be too good for his work, on pain of being deteriorated by it, and that the humble type of worker appropriate to work of this kind must find a suitable social niche ready for his reception, in which whatever good there is in him may be developed. That Aristotle's premisses did not logically compel him to make a worker of this type the property of a master, we have already seen.

Slow decadence of Slavery.

In the result, slavery long escaped both abolition and reform. There was much in Stoicism that might have led to a condemnation of slavery. The idea of the natural

[1] See Thirlwall, History of Greece, 8. 460–7.

[2] See A. Schäfer, Demosth. 2. 40. See also Polyb. 8. 11, where Polybius complains that Theopompus, after praising Philip as the greatest man Greece had ever produced, went on to depict him as most vicious, and 'as having enslaved and captured through treason with fraud and violence more cities than any other man.'

equality of men was familiar to many adherents of the school. The Stoics drew a stronger line of demarcation than Aristotle had drawn between man and the lower animals. They did not probably rate the influence of a man's vocation on his character, or its importance as a source of happiness, as high as Aristotle. Cleanthes was not the less a 'wise man' for his labours as a 'drawer of water.' Slaves were, therefore, no longer necessary to save the higher natures from deterioration; and slavery lost its Aristotelian *raison d'être*. The wise man's virtue and happiness were not at the mercy of social conditions; they were the fruit of conviction and self-discipline rather than of social arrangements. The Stoics did not absolutely teach that the structure of society was an indifferent matter, for they had their preferences on the subject—their favourite constitutions and the like; but the general tendency of their teaching, was, in contrast to that of Plato, to trace virtue, which, like Socrates, they identified with knowledge, to philosophical training apart from social habituation and State guidance [1]. Epicureanism ranked slavery, with wealth and poverty, among the things

> Quorum
> Adventu manet incolumis natura abituque:
> Haec solitei sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare[2].

Christianity itself, whatever its ultimate tendency, long made it its aim rather to mitigate, than to put an end to, the institution. Its earliest view is expressed in the words—'Let every man abide in the same calling, wherein he was called. Art thou called being a servant? care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freedman: likewise also, he that is called being free is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men[3].' 'Servants, obey in all things your masters according

[1] Cp. Cic. Acad. Post. 1. 10. 38 (quoted by Zeller, Stoics, E.T., p. 238): cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas, hic (Zeno) omnes in ratione ponebat.

[2] Lucr. 1. 456.

[3] 1 Cor. 7. 20–23.

to the flesh, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God; and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord and not unto men; knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance, for ye serve the Lord Jesus Christ. But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons[1].' The master and the slave were thus alike required to do their duty—the master, inasmuch as he also had 'a Master in heaven' (Col. 4. 1.): the slave, inasmuch as he was the servant of Christ. Between the slave, who was 'the Lord's freedman,' and the master, who was Christ's servant, a spiritual, though not a social, equality was thus established, and if this did not apply to slaves who were not Christians, at all events a door of approach was thrown open to all. As time went on, however, and slave after slave was admitted to Orders in the Christian Church, the whole class of slaves probably gained somewhat in general estimation; and though sees and monasteries felt no scruple in exercising proprietary rights over slaves, they did much, in conformity with St. Paul's injunction, to set the example of a milder treatment of them; till the abbot Theodore Studita, who died in 826, condemned in his will the owning of slaves by monks or monasteries on the ground that the slave no less than the freeman is made in the image of God, and the synod of Enham in 1009 forbade the sale of Christians as slaves because Christ had redeemed slaves as well as freemen by the shedding of His blood[2]. Long ere this, serfage had, for secular reasons, taken the place of predial slavery in the Roman Empire: still the institution has lingered on into modern times. 'So recently as the reign of James the Second, political prisoners of our own kith and kin were sold as slaves to toil and die in the tropics of the

[1] Col. 3. 22–5.

[2] See on this subject Schiller, Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei, pp. 1–3, from whom the above facts are taken. A fuller treatment of the subject will be found in Wallon, Histoire de l'Esclavage, tome 3: see especially p. 409 sqq. As to this provision of Theodore Studita's will, see Finlay, Byzantine Empire, 1. 261 (ed. 2).

West Indies. The maids of honour of the Court of James the Second (not 200 years ago) received presents of Englishmen condemned for treasonable offences[1].' Locke would seem to accept slavery in his Treatise on Civil Government[2]. 'There is another sort of servants,' he says, 'which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their lives and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being, in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.' In this view he goes beyond Aristotle, who is far from accounting as natural slaves all 'captives taken in a just war.'

Plato's scheme of a community in women and children, and also in property, rejected by Aristotle: his grounds for rejecting it considered.

The slave is a member of the household and also an object of property; and the transition is natural from the part to the whole, from the slave to the Household and Property. And here we find Aristotle overtly impugning the teaching of Plato without the preliminary apologies of the well-known chapter in the Nicomachean Ethics. It was perhaps impossible for him even nominally to father the Theory of Ideas on Socrates as here he does the Platonic Communism[3]. His rehabilitation of the Household and of the right of Several Property is certainly more successful than his attempted rehabilitation of Slavery.

Plato had sought in the Republic, for the sake of unity of feeling among the members of his State, to extend the sphere of 'the common' to the utmost possible limit. He had noticed that when some piece of good or ill fortune befel individual members of an ordinarily constituted State,

[1] Sir S. Baker, Rede Lecture on Slavery and the Slave Trade, *Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1874, p. 187.

[2] 2. § 85.

[3] Pol. 2. cc. 1–6 *passim*. Contrast the most doubtfully authentic part of c. 12 of the same book—Πλάτωνος δ' ἥ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης κ.τ.λ. (1274 b 9). In 2. 7. 1266 b 5 sq. certain provisions in the Laws are ascribed to Plato, and not to the Athenian Stranger.

some of their fellows sympathized with them, while others did not; and he seems to have ascribed this disharmony of feeling to the existence of separate households and separate rights of property[1]. Carry the element of 'community' further till the distinction of *meum* and *tuum* ceased to exist in relation to women, children, and property, and the whole society would feel as one man. This was the end he had in view. If in the Republic he appears to confine his communistic scheme to the upper section of his State[2], he affirms in the Laws with the utmost emphasis that the best form of the State is that in which the saying, 'Friends have all things in common,' holds of the entire State in the highest possible degree; in which women, children, and property are common, and 'the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private such as eyes, and ears, and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions,' and the laws do their best to make the State as much one as possible[3]. It is evident from this passage that to Plato the society in which the household and several property do not exist offers the true type of social organization, though for some reason he applies his principle in the Republic only to the upper section of the State. His view apparently is that if the upper section of the State is so organized as to be at one with itself, then the whole State will be so too (cp. Rep. 545 D, *ἢ τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται; ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγου ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινη-*

[1] Rep. 462–3.

[2] His aim is, in the Third Book of the Republic, to secure that 'the guardians shall be as good as possible and shall not wrong the other citizens' (3. 416 C): in the Fifth it is rather to secure the harmony of the whole State by securing the internal harmony of the guardians (5. 465 B, *τοῦτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ*). The latter aim is far more prominently put forward than the other, and it is that with which Aristotle is pre-occupied. It is clearly implied in Tim. 18 B that the plan of Communism applies only to the upper section.

[3] Laws 739 B–D (Prof. Jowett's translation 4. 258).

θῆναι;). Throughout the Republic, in fact, he seems to avoid spending time over the arrangements respecting the third class, and to treat this class as of little moment (Rep. 421 A).

Most modern forms of communism—those in which there is community of property without community of women and children—would in no way satisfy Plato. It is the existence of the household to which he especially objects; he would object to it, even if the household were supported out of a common stock[1]. My wife—my children—my relatives—my clan, phratry, or tribe—to these terms used in any exclusive sense he objects. He retains the words 'father,' 'son,' 'brother,' but expands their application, so that all exclusiveness of meaning would practically pass from them. He seems to hope that relationship would thus be rendered powerless for harm. 'The guardians,' he claims (Rep. 464 D), 'will be free from those quarrels of which property, or children, or relations are the occasion.' His language here evidently betrays a consciousness that all causes of disharmony would not be removed, and it is obvious that even in the ideal State of Plato a guardian would feel the misfortunes of a friend far more than those of one who was not a friend.

Aristotle, however, does not pause, as he might have done, to point out that Plato's remedy for sectional feeling is after all only a partial one, even from his own point of view. He argues the question on its merits, which is, no doubt, the most instructive way of treating it.

His objections to the scheme of a community in women and children seem to be, in the main, the following:—

(1) He questions the end which Plato set before the State; and this on two grounds—

A. The State cannot be made as completely one as the individual, or it can be so, only at the cost of its own existence. The State is held together, not by contrivances

[1] This is the tenour of his language in the Republic; in the Politicus, however, he speaks of marriage and common offspring, as among, not indeed the divine, but the human guarantees of union for States (310 B).

for impressing on it the sort of unity which obtains in the individual, but by justice and virtue in its members (2. 2. 1261 a 30: cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq.), which must be called into existence by the lawgiver. Whether Aristotle quite appreciates the meaning with which Plato used the expression, 'the maximum unity of the State'—whether he is right in conceiving Plato to use it in a sense conflicting with the inevitable plurality in number and diversity in kind of the individuals composing the State, is another question. A little later on, as we shall see, he rightly construes Plato's 'unity' as equivalent to 'unanimity.'

B. Not the maximum of unity, but the maximum of self-completeness is the true end of the State. Here, again, we feel that unanimity in no way conflicts with self-completeness, though we also feel that Aristotle's dictum is a profound one, and more far-reaching than he was perhaps himself aware. It explains how the large national State of modern times has come to take the place of the small city-State of antiquity.

(2) He questions the means which Plato adopts to secure his end. Plato's citizens will indeed say 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same thing (*ἅμα*), but they will so speak collectively, not individually. When, for instance, all say of the same child 'this is my child,' they will only mean 'this is my child in a collective sense,' not 'this is my own child.' That is all that the scheme will secure, and that in no way contributes to unanimity (*οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν*). We note that here Aristotle understands the 'unity' spoken of by Plato as equivalent to 'unanimity' (*ὁμόνοια*), whereas in the preceding argument he had treated it as equivalent to mathematical unity[1].

(3) Leaving on one side the question of end and means, Aristotle goes on to advance other objections[2] to the

[1] We also note that Aristotle's only illustration of 'all saying "mine" and "not mine" of the same thing' is taken from children, whereas it would seem from Rep. 462–3 that Plato is thinking rather of events, joyful or the reverse, occurring to members of the community.

[2] See Cicero's apparent reproduction of them in de Rep. 4. 5. 5.

scheme of a community in women and children. It will diminish the amount of care and attention given to them [1], for things held in common receive less attention than things held in severalty, and here too the very number of common children, and the citizen's uncertainty what individuals really stand in this relation to him, will add to the difficulty. It will also diminish 'closeness of connexion' (*οἰκειότης*) within the State, and make affection (*φιλία*) weak and watery; it will relieve relatives of their duties to each other and lessen the chance of their getting help from each other; it will leave no room for the exercise of temperance (*σωφροσύνη*), in relation at least to women (Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 9). Certain religious and moral difficulties are also raised—such as the probability of incest, parricide, etc., occurring between relatives not known by each other to be relatives [2], and no expiations (*λύσεις*) being forthcoming, as in similar cases at present [3]. Nor will Aristotle admit the practicability of effectually concealing relationship, which will be betrayed by likeness, and also by the revelations of those who are charged by the State with the transfer of children from one class to another.

Aristotle does not apply to the proposal of a community in women and children one criticism which he passes on that of a community in property—that it will take away a source of pleasure—though this argument might certainly be here too urged with truth, and no one would feel its truth more than Aristotle [4]. In many of the criticisms which he does make there is much weight. It is probably true that warmth of affection would be impaired in a society which, though nominally united by ties of relationship, would practically be an 'unitized' society. It is of course also true that things held in common receive less

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 11 sq.

[2] Plato probably hopes to prevent this by the regulations as to relationship, Rep. 461 D, which, however, would fail of their effect where the exact age was unknown.

[3] The thing was known to occur already: cp. Clem. Alex. Paed. 3. 3. p. 265 Potter (quoted by Marquardt, Röm. Alterth. 7. 1. 81. 6), *παιδὶ πορνεύσαντι καὶ μαχλώσαις θυγατράσιν ἀγνοήσαντες πολλάκις μίγνυνται πατέρες, οὐ μεμνημένοι τῶν ἐκτεθέντων παιδίων.*

[4] Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24.

attention than things not so held. Yet Aristotle himself proposes that the State shall own land and slaves, and that the education of boys shall be managed by State-officers as a matter of common concern. He does not explain how it is that in these matters he has no fear of 'neglect' occurring.

It is remarkable that the defence of the Household against Plato in the Second Book contains no reference to the statement of the First Book that the Household exists by nature, though one would have thought that if this is a fact, it ought to be decisive. The claims of the Household are rested in the First Book partly on its necessity, partly on its value as a source of virtue and good life in women, children, and slaves. If in the Second Book Aristotle adds a reference to its services in promoting affection in the State, the new point of view is suggested to him by Plato's error in considering it a source of discord. The value of Relationship apart from the Household is a topic that emerges only in the Second Book [1].

Aristotle's criticisms on the plan of a community of property are not very dissimilar from his criticisms on the plan of a community in women and children. He evidently feels, however, that there is more to be said for the former than the latter [2]. He wholly rejects the one, while he allows that the other has certain advantages [3]. But

[1] Aristotle approaches very near to, but does not perhaps actually use, an argument used by Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (Works, 2. 467 Bohn). 'We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods and our habitual provincial connexions. These are inns and resting-places... The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards.'

[2] Cp. Cic. de Rep. 4. 5. 5: de patrimoniis tolerabile est, licet sit injustum; nec enim aut obesse cuiquam debet, si sua industria plus habet, aut prodesse, si sua culpa minus. Sed, ut dixi, potest aliquo modo ferri. Etiamne conjuges, etiamne liberi communes erunt?

[3] 2. 5. 1263 a 24, *ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας.* He probably means that community of property would exclude the possibility of absolute want.

then these advantages can be secured in a less objectionable way. For there are many objections to a community of property. First, it involves that community in all things human (*ἀνθρωπικὰ πάντα*), down to the smallest matters and matters of everyday recurrence, which more than anything else tries men's temper and leads to quarrels[1]; next, it sacrifices that increase of efficiency, which results when men are set to work at that which is their own (*πρὸς ἴδιον ἑκάστου προσεδρεύοντος*, 1263 a 28)[2]. It thus effects at a great cost what can be effected at no cost at all; for the legislator, as the example of the Lacedaemonian and other States proves, can produce in the minds of his citizens a readiness to make that which is severally owned available in use to others; and if he does this, he has done all that community of property can do. A third disadvantage is that there is a loss of pleasure when men are deprived of the right of calling something their own[3]; the pleasure is lost that results from the gratification of that natural and universal love of self which is only censured when it is excessive, and also the pleasure that results from aiding and gratifying friends.

At this point (1263 b 7) Aristotle passes from criticisms applicable to community of property only to others which apply to both forms of communism, and we see from his language (1263 b 7, *τοῖς λίαν ἓν ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν*), how closely his objections to communism are connected with the attempt to intensify overmuch the unity of the State. The State is a *κοινωνία*, but it should not be a *κοινωνία* in all things human, in everything that can possibly be shared (2. 1. 1261 a 2 sq.): the common element in a State, we learn elsewhere, is, above all, a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b

[1] It is thus that small matters are often the occasion of civil disturbance (7 (5). 4. 1303 b 17).

[2] 'Sir W. Siemens said that if any invention lay in the gutter, it should be given to a separate owner, that he might have an interest in its furtherance and development' (Letter of B. in *Times*, Jan. 23, 1884).

[3] Est aliquid quocunque loco, quocunque recessu,
Unius sese dominum fecisse lacertae.
Juv. 3. 230.

1 sq.), and a common constitution means a common plan of life (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35).

A few remarks, applicable to communism in both its forms, wind up Aristotle's discussion of the subject. Its superficial promise of peace is an illusion. If much that is evil would disappear with severalty of property, much that is good would also be lost. Life would not be worth living in Plato's State (1263 b 29). It was the choice of a false end for the State—the utmost possible unity—that led Socrates astray. The State must not be made 'one' at the cost of its essential characteristic of 'plurality' (πλῆθος); the unifying agency must be education. After an appeal to the evidence of history[1] against Plato's scheme, Aristotle adds that Plato would find, if he made the experiment, that a State cannot be brought into existence without tribal and other divisions incompatible with a too strictly constituted unity. The State, it is implied, is not a mathematical unit, but a Whole consisting of differentiated parts held together by virtue. Not the maximum of unity in the sense of community in everything, but virtue, is the end at which the legislator should aim. Unity will come with virtue, not otherwise. This is the burden of the chapters on Communism. It is evident that Aristotle's argument against Communism is primarily an argument against 'unitarian' Communism, though many of his objections apply to the Communism with which we are familiar.

Some of them would be more in place if Aristotle himself recognized no common property in his State. His shrewd anticipation of social discord in societies where property is held in common, seems hardly to be borne out by experience, if we may judge by recorded or existing cases of common ownership. To his argument that pro-

[1] Though Aristotle takes notice of various forms of Communism, or approximate Communism, in relation to land and its produce, prevailing among certain barbarian races, he is not aware how important a part the modified Communism of the Village Community has played in the history of mankind; still less is he acquainted with the story of its general, though gradual, rejection and abandonment.

prietary right ('the magic of property,' as we say) increases the care devoted to things, it may be added that it stimulates industry by the hope which it holds forth of an assured reward. A communistic society could not appeal to hope to the same extent. The argument that some pleasures, and opportunities for the exercise of some virtues, would cease to exist in a communistic society, is deserving of notice. The test of the satisfactoriness of institutions in the Laws of Plato had been their favourableness to virtue (705 E: 770 C–771 A: 836 D): it is interesting to observe that Aristotle takes pleasure also into account[1]. The question, indeed, may be raised, whether the mere fact that an institution is productive of pleasure, or of particular kinds of virtue, is decisive in its favour. May we not fairly ask for proof that it is productive of more pleasure or more virtue, than of the opposites to pleasure and virtue, or of more pleasure or virtue than would exist without it? Bull-fighting is no doubt productive of some kinds of virtue; yet is this a decisive argument in its favour[2]? We discern, however, in the background of Aristotle's reasoning a principle of importance—that the institutions of the State should satisfy the permanent and universal tendencies of human nature: it seems to be implied that these tendencies are sure to be sound, if kept within due bounds (1263 a 41 sq.). The legislator must recognize and accept them, and find a place for them in his scheme; he must not try to eradicate them. The State is intended to fulfil man's nature, not to do violence to it; and just as the nature of the individual must be respected, so must the nature of the State. No attempt must be made to impress on it an uncongenial degree of unity. The industrial value of the institution of several property—the part it has played and is playing in the subjugation of Nature by man—is, of course, not dwelt on by Aristotle.

[1] In the same spirit he makes the pleasurableness of music an argument in its favour (5 (8). 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.).

[2] It may also be argued that though certain forms of virtue might disappear under a Communistic *régime*, they might be replaced by others of equal or greater worth.

What is present to his mind is the influence of the institution on the individual, not on the fortunes of the race. The same defect appears in his view of the State, which he holds to exist, not in any degree for the benefit of mankind, but solely for the benefit of its members. So again, it is less the industrial, than the political and ethical, bearings of Communism that are present to his mind. Workers in modern societies sigh for some relief from crushing industrial competition and often seek it in Communism, but excessive competition is a social ailment of which Aristotle is altogether unconscious.

Nor does he anywhere recognize the undoubted element of truth contained in Plato's rejection of the Household and Several Property. He seems to hold that there are no drawbacks connected with either institution, which a correct system of rearing and education, acting on well-constituted natures, is not fully capable of obviating. His arguments against community of property, again, though directed against its fitness to form the base of an entire social system, are so unqualified that they might be employed against its use in minor societies within a State. It may well be, however, that Plato's error lay, not so much in his belief in the possibility and advantageousness of an union in which the individual life should be lost and merged in that of the whole, but rather in his setting it forth as the standard to which political society ought to conform, if possible, everywhere. The *régime* which is out of place in a State may be salutary in a monastic community.

It should be noticed also that the proprietary right which Aristotle defends is the bare right of several property, apart from the right of inheritance, which stands equally in need of explanation and defence. And then again, while he defends the institution of several property, he is apparently in favour of limiting the amount held by individuals, and he marks out with some care the ways in which property is to be acquired and used. We note, further, that in his best State the right of owning land is confined to the citizens—

men who have received a careful moral training and are likely to use it aright. Aristotle is as little an unqualified defender of the right of several property as he is of Slavery.

The question of Communism has never been discussed with a closer reference to the end for which human society exists. Communism is held by Aristotle to spoil and impoverish human life, to rob men of opportunities of virtuous activity and harmless enjoyment, and thus to diminish happiness: this is his main reason for rejecting it. In effect, he rests the institutions of the Household and Several Property on their true basis—their value to man as a means to perfect life, or, in modern language, as a means of civilization.

Sketch of the Greek household as Plato and Aristotle found it.

Aristotle, then, declares in favour of the Household. The Greek household does not, however, escape without some modification at his hands. It will be best first to cast a hasty glance at the Greek household as Aristotle found it, before we go on to study his conception of what it ought to be.

In the view of the Greeks, a man's first duty to his household was to perpetuate it by marriage. The gods of the family must not lose their worship; the ranks of the clan (*γένος*), phratry, tribe, and State must not be thinned. Indeed, the begetting of offspring was, for the father himself, a means of immortal existence[1]. Views of this kind may often have been a source of over-population, and thus of pauperism and even of political danger, in ancient Greece, for the prejudices of the Greeks made the practice of many branches of industry and trade distasteful to them, while emigration involved the loss of the valuable rights of a citizen. It is easy to understand how the poorer citizens, in States in which they were the masters, often came to quarter themselves on the public revenues to a considerable extent. It is easy, again, to understand how the exposure of children,

[1] Cp. Plato, Laws 721 B–C: 773 E: and Aristot. de Gen. An. 2. 2. 731 b 31 sqq. See Stallbaum's note on the first named passage.

and especially of female children, was not uncommon; and how at length, at Athens, Antipater found that out of 21,000 citizens only 9000 possessed property in excess of the value of 2000 drachmas[1]. The first problem, then, in reference to the household was how to adjust its rate of reproduction to the interests of the community.

Another common view as to the household made the main function of its head the increase of its substance. Many, as we have seen, almost or altogether identified the Science of Supply with the Science of Household Management, and Xenophon in the Oeconomicus had gone so far as to put this view into the mouth of Socrates. *Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης μέν τινος ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ὄνομα εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία· ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη ἐφαίνετο, ᾗ οἴκους δύνανται αὔξειν ἄνθρωποι· οἶκος δὲ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο ὅπερ κτῆσις ἡ σύμπασα* (Xen. Oecon. 6. 4). It is true that Xenophon is here rather interpreting the word *οἰκονομία* than attempting to determine which of the functions of the head of the household is the highest and most truly characteristic; elsewhere he fully recognizes the educational responsibilities of the parent (Oecon. 7. 12). Still he not only tolerates but commends that unlimited quest of wealth which Aristotle condemns—at any rate he does so, when an unselfish and liberal use is made of what is acquired. His Cyrus says in the Cyropaedia (8. 2. 20 sqq.): *ἀλλ' εἰμὶ ἄπληστος κἀγὼ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων· τῇδέ γε μέντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκῶ τῶν πλείστων, ὅτι οἱ μέν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν ἀρκούντων περιττὰ κτήσωνται, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κατορύττουσι, τὰ δὲ κατασήπουσι, τὰ δὲ . . . φυλάττοντες πράγματα ἔχουσιν . . . ἐγὼ δ' ὑπηρετῶ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ὀρέγομαι ἀεὶ πλειόνων· ἐπειδὰν δὲ κτήσωμαι, ἂν ἴδω περιττὰ ὄντα τῶν ἐμοὶ ἀρκούντων, τούτοις τάς τ' ἐνδείας τῶν φίλων ἐξακοῦμαι, καὶ πλουτίζων καὶ εὐεργετῶν ἀνθρώπους εὔνοιαν ἐξ αὐτῶν κτῶμαι καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων καρποῦμαι ἀσφάλειαν καὶ εὔκλειαν*[2].

[1] Diod. 18. 18.

[2] See L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 380, who compares Xen. Oecon. 11. 9. The passage quoted in the text makes it abundantly clear that Cyrus' object in acquiring is to give away; some of his friends, in fact, say of him (Cyrop. 8. 4. 31)—*οὐχ ὁ Κύρου τρόπος τοιοῦτος οἷος χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διδοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ κτώμενος ἥδεται*: and Cyrus says

Apart, however, from prepossessions as to the main function of the household, its constituent relations, those of husband and wife, father and child, master and slave, tended to vary considerably. It was only, indeed, in barbarian communities that the wife was commonly the slave (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 5), or else the tyrant (2. 9. 1269 b 24 sq.), of her husband, or that the father's authority over his son became a despotism (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 27, *ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν*); yet even in Greek States these relations were far from being the same under different constitutions or even in different classes of society. In oligarchies the sons and wives of the ruling class were greatly over-indulged (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22: 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 7); in the tyranny and extreme democracy the 'domination of women and over-indulgence of slaves' (*γυναικοκρατία καὶ δούλων ἄνεσις*, 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sq.) are said to prevail[1]: at Sparta also, though for quite other reasons, women were over-powerful (2. 9. 1269 b 31), and the large dowries which were the natural concomitant of this state of things added in their turn to the evil. In households of the poorer class, again, the wife and children were necessarily employed as attendants (*ἀκόλουθοι*), no slaves being kept (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5); and here the wife could not possibly be confined to the house (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 6). The whole aspect of the household consequently altered.

In the average household of the better class at Athens, the wife was often married at the age of fourteen or fifteen (Xen. Oecon. 7. 5), after a maidenhood spent in the recesses of her father's house, from which, in the city at all events, she only rarely emerged[2]; robbed as a girl of her due share of air and exercise, white-complexioned beside her sunburnt father and brothers who spent their lives in the open air, or even beside women and girls of the poorer class, delicate in comparison with the strong-limbed maidens

himself to his friends (ibid. 8. 4. 36)—*ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἅπαντα δεῖ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐμὰ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὑμέτερα κ.τ.λ.*

[1] Cp. Plato, Rep. 563 B.

[2] In Lysias c. Sim. c. 6, the daughters of the speaker's sister had been so quietly and decorously brought up that they blushed even to be seen by their relations!

of Sparta; taught to weave and to command her appetite[1], and perhaps also to read, write, and cipher[2], but necessarily relying much on her husband (as we see from Xenophon's Oeconomicus) for any real assistance in the development of her character and intelligence. The natural quickness of the race, however, would make a little experience go a long way.

In matters of property, the Attic law was not unkind to females, for though the sons alone inherited where sons there were, daughters often received liberal portions or dowers, and these remained available for their support[3], if on the death of the husband the widow preferred to leave his house, which she sometimes did even when there were children of the marriage[4], while, if she did not, she had a claim for alimony on her sons[5]. The dower was also returned by the husband, if he put away his wife. The husband, on receiving it at the time of the marriage, gave the family of his bride some tangible security for it[6], the revenues of which he continued to receive, though he must no doubt have been unable to alienate it without their consent. As the husband could divorce his wife at a moment's notice

[1] Xen. Oecon. 7. 6.

[2] Xenophon makes no mention of Ischomachus' wife having been taught these things, but Oecon. 9. 10 (a passage to which Mr. Evelyn Abbott has drawn my attention) seems to imply that she could at any rate read an inventory. Göll (Kulturbilder 3. 328) holds that girls' education did just reach this point. 'Kept out of the way of all public instruction, and pent within doors which seldom opened for them, the girls learnt from their mothers and nurses the arts of spinning, weaving, and sewing, and that of cookery in its higher forms, adding to these accomplishments at the utmost a rudimentary knowledge of reading and writing.' Perhaps they were not always taught reading and writing, for we find Theophrastus insisting that girls should be taught these subjects, though not beyond the limit of household exigencies (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 864. 3).

[3] The dower in this case reverted to the κύριος of the wife, and he was bound to support her.

[4] Demosth. in Boeot. de Dote p. 1010. The remarriage of widows appears to have been common at Athens. Plato recommends, on the contrary, that 'when a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up,' unless 'she appears to be too young to remain fitly unmarried' (Laws 930 C).

[5] [Demosth.] in Phaenipp. p. 1047.

[6] Where the dowry was large, this cannot have been possible unless the bridegroom had at least equal means.

by simply turning her out of the house, dowers were almost a necessity of married life at Athens. The position of a dowerless wife was so precarious that it was little better than that of a concubine. But then the system of dowers, no doubt, gave additional facilities to divorce, and when the dowry was considerable, the wife was commonly thought to be likely to be overbearing and the husband to be unduly subservient (Plato, Laws 774 C). For this and other reasons Plato thinks it best to abolish dowries (Laws 742 C : 774 C sq.), and to reserve the right of divorce for the State (Laws 929 E sqq.).

The dowry system, as practised at Athens, and very probably in Greece generally[1], evidently tended to maintain a connexion between the wife and her father's family; her entrance into her husband's house was not irrevocable, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus has good ground for the contrast which he draws[2] between Greek wedlock and wedlock as he describes it in the earlier days of Rome, when both dower and wife passed irrevocably to the husband, marriage being indissoluble, and the dower not reclaimable by action at law. The wife, in fact, in early Rome became once for all a member of her husband's family, 'a complete participant both in property and sacred rites' (*κοινωνὸς ἁπάντων χρημάτων τε καὶ ἱερῶν*), and inherited from her husband just as a daughter would.

After marriage, the care of the children, the supervision of the slaves, and the general management of a household in which much that we buy was probably made at home, would leave but little spare time to the wife. She would now be freer to pass the threshold of the house, accompanied, no doubt, by one or more female slaves—would appear at marriage feasts and the family gatherings which answered to our christenings, take part in funeral processions, and be present at some State festivals, especially at festivals confined to her sex. But the husband would be

[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 2. 25) seems to have the Greek household in view generally, and not to be thinking of the Attic household only.

[2] Ant. Rom. 2. 25.

much away from home during the day[1], and both for this reason and because the only servants were slaves, it was well that the wife should leave the house but little—indeed, apart from this, the proper place for the wife was felt to be the home. Many women seem to have hugged their fetters; Plato speaks of the sex in the Laws (781 A, C) as loving darkness and seclusion, and anticipates some difficulty in prevailing on women to come forth into the light of day. The poorer sort of women were comparatively free from these disabilities, and it was a social distinction to be subject to them. The men, with their heads full of politics and war, would feel that if they were themselves not domestic in their tastes, others must be so for them, and that the indoor life of Greek women was the natural complement of the outdoor life of Greek husbands and fathers; but the race was too aspiring to do full justice to a woman's life, especially after the improvement in male education and the increase in the interest of Greek politics which mark the fifth century before Christ. It was seldom that Greek wives, elsewhere than in the Lacedaemonian State (Pol. 2. 9. 1269 b 31), invaded the men's domain and made their influence felt in the political field, though tyrannies and extreme democracies seem sometimes to have found it worth their while to court their good will (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sqq.); more often they consoled themselves by indulging in religious enthusiasm[2], to the dismay of men like Menander's Misogynist, who complains (Misog. fr. 4 and 5):

> Ἐπιτρίβουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ θεοὶ
> μάλιστα τοὺς γήμαντας· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα
> ἄγειν ἑορτὴν ἐστ' ἀνάγκη,

[1] Xen. Oecon. 3. 12, ἔστιν ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ τῶν σπουδαίων πλείω ἐπιτρέπεις ἢ τῇ γυναικί; Οὐδενί, ἔφη. Ἔστι δὲ ὅτῳ ἐλάσσονα διαλέγῃ ἢ τῇ γυναικί; Εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ πολλοῖς γε, ἔφη.

[2] Cp. Plato, Laws 909 E; Plutarch, Praecept. Conjug. c. 19. Plutarch's picture of the interior of a γυναικωνῖτις is not a very cheerful one—ἔπειτα καὶ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ εὐθυμεῖν τοὺς μὴ πολλὰ πράσσοντας· ἔδει γὰρ εὐθυμοτέρας εἶναι γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν, οἰκουρίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ συνούσας· νυνὶ δὲ ὁ μὲν βορέας διὰ παρθενικῆς ἁπαλόχροος οὐ διάησιν,

ὥς φησιν Ἡσίοδος· λύπαι δὲ καὶ ταραχαὶ καὶ κακοθυμίαι διὰ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ κενῶν δοξῶν, ὅσας οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις, εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ὑπορρέουσιν (De Tranq. Animi, c. 2).

and again:

> Ἐθύομεν δὲ πεντάκις τῆς ἡμέρας,
> ἐκυμβάλιζον δ' ἑπτὰ θεράπαιναι κύκλῳ·
> αἱ δ' ὠλόλυζον.

On the other hand, the wife had often to complain of her husband's unfaithfulness, which escaped with little censure in a society based on slavery[1]. If we may judge, however, from Aristotle's testimony to the prevalence of 'feminine ascendency' and the 'over-indulgence of women' in extreme democracies, which is borne out by that of Plato (Rep. 563 B: cp. Laws 774 C), the Athenian wife was as often the oppressor as the oppressed. It was the fashion to give considerable dowries[2], and consequently the wife had her husband a good deal in her power, for a divorce entailed the withdrawal, not only from him, but also apparently from the children, of revenues which they could in many cases ill afford to lose. A change in the position of the wife may well have come about, as L. Schmidt points out[3], in the period which commences with Alexander, when the loss of political freedom contributed with other causes to divert men's minds in some degree from politics and to give increased prominence to family life. The old traditions would also be less powerful in the great new cities, which now became the most conspicuous centres of Greek life[4].

As to the relation of parent and child, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us that in Greece 'children were often guilty of unseemly conduct to their fathers[5]'; he is not satisfied with the temporary authority which was all that Greek custom conceded to the father, ceasing with the second year after puberty or at marriage or with enrolment

[1] See L. Schmidt, 2. 194 sqq. Even Plutarch's language on this point is not quite what we should expect (Conj. Praec. c. 16).

[2] See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. pp. 483 and 514.

[3] 2. 426.

[4] L. Schmidt contrasts the freedom with which Gorgo and Praxinoe, in the 15th Idyll of Theocritus, find their way about Alexandria, with Athenian custom (2. 427).

[5] Ant. Rom. 2. 26, πολλὰ ἐν Ἕλλησιν ὑπὸ τέκνων εἰς πατέρας ἀσχημονεῖται. Compare Plato, Rep. 562 E.

in the public registers, nor again with the comparatively moderate penalties for disobedience which Greek law permitted the father to inflict, such as expulsion from the home or disinheritance. He prefers a fuller paternal authority, more nearly resembling the Roman *patria potestas*. Greek law, it is true, regarded the father rather as 'the natural guardian and administrator of the common property of the household[1],' than as its absolute owner, but the powers it conferred on him were not perhaps insufficient, and the remedy was probably to be sought in an improvement of the training of the parents, and especially of the mother, and in making her more of a spiritual force in the household. Loved and honoured she was already:

> Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μητρὸς ἡδίον τέκνοις·
> ἐρᾶτε μητρός, παῖδες, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως
> τοιοῦτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδίων ἐρᾶν,

says one of Euripides' characters in a fragment of the Erechtheus preserved by Stobaeus (Floril. 79. 4); but another says,

> Ἀλλ' ἴστ', ἐμοὶ μὲν οὗτος οὐκ ἔσται νόμος
> τὸ μὴ οὔ σε, μᾶτερ, προσφιλῆ νέμειν ἀεὶ
> καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τόκων τῶν σῶν χάριν·
> στέργω δὲ τὸν φύσαντα τῶν πάντων βροτῶν
> μάλισθ'· ὁρίζω τοῦτο, καὶ σὺ μὴ φθόνει,
> κείνου γὰρ ἐξέβλαστον· οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἀνὴρ
> γυναικὸς αὐδήσειεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πατρός[2].

And thus, while Xenophon, in his kindly Oeconomicus, fully recognizes her as the colleague of the father in the education of the children[3], the writer of the (so-called) first

[1] C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 11. The Attic father had, however, the right to renounce his son by proclamation through a herald and so to disinherit him—a right which Plato in the Laws makes over to the whole kith and kin on the father's proposition (928-9); and his unchecked power of gift would be an additional security for his authority over his children. Plato's reform of the paternal renunciation anticipates in some degree the change in the law, which, in Lucian's day, permitted the renounced son to appeal against his father's decision to a dicastery (see Lucian's Ἀποκηρυττόμενος, c. 8).

[2] Stob. Floril. 79. 27.

[3] Oecon. 7. 12. Plato in the Laws is for adding to the powers of the mother: see Stallbaum's note on Laws 774 E.

book of the Oeconomics falsely attributed to Aristotle, thoughtful as he is, appears to leave her only the function of rearing the child, and to claim for the father the task of educating it (Oecon. 1. 3. 1344 a 7). On the whole, she was hardly one of the heads of the household (except when the accident of a great dowry made her too potent), and its only real head was for a large part of the day an absentee. The gentler influence for good in the household is often not the least powerful, but it had no proper place made for it in Greece. Greek civilization did not give women an adequate training, or call for enough from them: these were more serious faults than its contraction of their rights or of their freedom. The most glaring defects of the actual Greek household, in Aristotle's view, were, however, probably the insufficient preparation of its head for his functions and its 'Cyclopic' freedom from State-guidance (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Each household was allowed to make of itself exactly what it liked, and to train its subordinate members in its own way, as if it did not matter to the State what training they received.

It was unfortunate that in the Lacedaemonian State, in which women appear to have been least controlled and most powerful, they were, in the view of Aristotle at all events, worst. Lycurgus was believed to have tried to train the Lacedaemonian women in the same hardy habits as the men, but to have been foiled by their resistance[1]: at any rate, their life was in complete contrast to that of the men—luxurious and abandoned to every kind of vice (Pol. 2. 9. 1269 b 22). Aristotle does not distinctly mention the fact that they shared in youth the gymnastic training of the boys, but he may well be referring to it when he implies that they were trained to be 'fearless'

[1] Pol. 2. 9. 1270 a 6 sq.: cp. Plato, Laws 781 A, *εἴξαντος τοῦ νομοθέτου*. Both Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 1. 3-4) and Plato (Laws 806 A) speak of the girls of this State as receiving a gymnastic training—Plato, indeed, adds that they were also trained in 'music' (*μουσική*)—but this does not prevent the latter from regarding the women (with Aristotle) as 'unregulated by law,' the result being that 'many laxities had crept in (*πολλὰ παρέρρει*) which law might have mended' (Laws 781 A).

(θρασύτητος, 1269 b 35); their fearlessness, however, he says, was of no use in household life, and broke down in war, as their conduct during the Theban invasion of Laconia showed. On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians, like many other military races, were very submissive to feminine influence; they gave their daughters large dowries, which the law left it in their power to do; nor did the State retain any control over the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage. The result was that wealth came to be concentrated in a few hands, that the number of proprietors and also of citizens dwindled, and that the greed for wealth, which was a feature of the Lacedaemonian character, was intensified in the few remaining citizens by the desire to provide the women with the means of lavish living. So great, in fact, was the power of the women that their influence made itself felt even in the administration of the shortlived Lacedaemonian empire.

Aristotle's criticism of the institutions of this State in relation to women illustrates his remark (1. 13. 1260 b 15 sq.) as to the importance of training women to virtue, and to the kind of virtue most in accordance with the given constitution, for in this instance the defects of the women were among the causes which led to the deterioration of the men and the enfeeblement of the State. He seems to imply that the women should have been trained to temperance, and their habits of life better regulated. Whether he wished that women should have any further intellectual training than Greek women usually enjoyed in his day, we do not know; but he seems to have been in favour of giving them, probably through the medium of their fathers and husbands, some sort of moral education and also of regulating their habits of life within the household. The Lacedaemonian household, he evidently feels, was more actively prejudicial than any other form of the household known to Greece[1].

[1] Plutarch's lives of Agis and Cleomenes refer to a generation a century later than that of which Aristotle speaks, but they show that the wealth and power of the Lacedaemonian women remained

Plato abolishes the household in the Republic and reconstructs it in the Laws, leaving it even there only a somewhat shadowy existence.

We may now turn to the question, how Plato and Aristotle respectively deal with the Household. In the Republic, as we have already seen, Plato abolished the household. In the Laws he retains it, but makes considerable changes in its arrangements, some of which are improvements, while others, such as the institution of public meal-tables for women and girls no less than for men and boys, would have impaired its intimacy and probably its influence. His plan, stated briefly, is to set not only women but also girls free from their enforced seclusion, and to call them forth into the light of day; to educate girls in much the same way as boys, though after six years of age apart from them[1]; to open office in the State to women, or, at all events, any offices for which they have a special fitness; to admit them in some degree even to military service; to postpone the age of marriage in the case of girls, so that they may be the fitter to be mothers; to forbid dowries, both as tending to place wife and husband in a false relation to each other and as leading to the union of fortunes and the over-enrichment of a few; to treat marriage as instituted less for the comfort or pleasure of the individuals composing the household, than for the end of providing the State with offspring fit in mind and body to become its citizens; and to make succession to the citizens'

unbroken up to that time, and so far bear out Aristotle's account; they reveal to us, however, some noble characters among them, not unworthy of the influence they possessed, and 'spiritual forces' in the fullest sense of the word. These lives are probably based on the history of Phylarchus, who took the side of Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians against Aratus and the Achaeans (Polyb. 2. 56), and was perhaps somewhat given to writing for effect; but there may well have been women at Sparta to whom Aristotle's general judgment would not apply, both in his days and later.

[1] Both sexes are to be trained in the following studies, taken successively: — Riding, military exercises, and the use of warlike weapons; wrestling, dancing under arms, recitation, and singing; reading and writing, the use of the lyre, the rudiments of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Plato knows, however, that the male and female character are not the same (802 D–E), and he will have different songs composed for the two sexes: males are to learn songs expressive of τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον, females songs in which τὸ κόσμιον καὶ σῶφρον predominates.

lots of land follow the rule of Unigeniture, in order that these may remain undivided, permission being given to the father to choose the son who is to succeed him, and care being taken that the other sons shall not want[1]. Plato's language in Laws 909 D sqq. is wide enough to include the abolition of the domestic worship of Hestia at the household hearth and of other household gods: *ἱερὰ μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω· θύειν δ' ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω θύσων, καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ ἱερείαις ἐγχειριζέτω τὰ θύματα, οἷς ἀγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής· συνευξάσθω δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ μετ' αὐτοῦ ξυνεύχεσθαι.* He appears to make the public places for sacrifice the only places for sacrifice, and the public priests and priestesses the only sacrificers. But this is not probably his intention, for in other passages of the Laws he evidently contemplates the continued existence of private rites (717 B: 785 A): his wish is to prevent the household becoming what it seems often to have been, the secret nursery of superstitious worships (909 E: 910 B); he probably does not mean to meddle with old-established cults, like those of Hestia and *Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος* or *ἐφέστιος*.

Plato is eager to flood the recesses of the Greek household with the light of day, and partly with this end in view institutes public meals not only for the men and boys but also for the women and girls (*ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευασμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγγὺς δ' ἐχόμενα τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων, παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς*, 806 E)[2]. The members of the household described in the Laws would apparently be but little alone with each other, and not probably often at home except at night, for their meals would be taken in the public halls, the women and girls sitting apart from the men and boys[3]. The household

[1] Plutarch (Comment. in Hesiod. c. 20) attributes a similar preference for Unigeniture to Lycurgus—*μήποτε δέ, φησὶν ὁ Πλούταρχος, καὶ Πλάτων ἕπεται τῷ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Λυκοῦργος πρὸ τούτων· οἱ πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν ἕνα κληρονόμον καταλιπεῖν.*

[2] It is curious that Plato takes no notice of the architectural arrangements of the Greek dwelling-house, which reflected so conspicuously the contrast between male and female life. One would have expected him to insist on its reconstruction.

[3] Sir T. More adopts in his Utopia the plan of common

would thus cease to be a body of persons supplied from a common store of their own (ὁμοσίπυοι), and the relations of husband and wife and of parent and child would probably suffer some relaxation. Plato's pretty ideal picture (Laws 931 A) of the parents seated by the hearth like sacred statues among children who half worship them would perhaps hardly be realized in so scattered an unity as the household of the Laws. The State appears to take upon itself not only the physical and intellectual, but also the moral training of young and old, and to leave little for the household to do, except indeed to bring 'fools' into the world and 'suckle' them[1]. It would seem to escape abolition only to be condemned to a somewhat shadowy existence.

Aristotle's view of the household and its true organization.

With Aristotle's views as to the true organization of the household we are only imperfectly acquainted. We get many separate glimpses of them, but no continuous and systematic statement. He glances at its structure in the Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, and again in the Eighth Book; but Justice is the subject with which he is more immediately concerned in the former book, and Friendship in the latter. In the First Book of the Politics the question before him is not so much what is the true constitution of the household as who is the true householder; and we penetrate into the subject only far enough to ascertain the true relation of the head of the household to wife, child, and slave. Even this topic is not fully treated, and cannot be so till the constitution is dealt with (1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.). In the Second Book we are as much

meals, but ranges men and women along opposite sides of the same table (Utopia, lib. ii. p. 90, ed. Bas. 1518).

[1] Even mere babies of three years old, girls and boys alike, are to gather at the village-temples, and to be formed into ἀγέλαι for games, under the control of women appointed by the State (Laws 794 A). They are not even to play in families or under their mother's eye, when once over three. In fact, as mothers in the State of the Laws were to engage in the same pursuits as men and to take their meals at public meal-tables, some arrangement of this kind was almost necessary.

concerned with the family relation as with the household, and the whole question is approached from a different point of view. Then there is a chapter or two in the Fourth Book on the age of marriage and the management of young children. We have also the so-called First Book of the Oeconomics, which can hardly have been written by Aristotle, and the *νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς* preserved only in a Latin translation (Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 644 sqq.), of the Greek original of which the same thing may be said. On the two latter documents, therefore, we cannot venture to rely. It is not, however, difficult to trace the general tendency of Aristotle's views.

According to him, the household, like the State, comes into being for one end and exists for another. It begins in the impulses of reproduction and self-preservation, perhaps also in the impulse of sociality (*ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν*, Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 17); but, when thus brought into existence, it rises above these aims and exists for better things. It is not a mere means of recruiting the population; still less is it a mere means of heaping up wealth. If in the De Generatione Animalium (2. 1. 731 b 31 sqq.) Aristotle regards reproduction as the path, for men no less than other animals, to immortality, this point of view disappears in the Politics. The household is, in its definitive form, a sort of younger sister of the State; good life is its aim, no less than it is that of the State; it is, like the State, a *κοινωνία*, though a less comprehensive and less noble *κοινωνία*; it is at once a group of friends, a body of rulers and ruled, and a school of moral training. It is a group of friends, ruled by the head of the household for their good, and especially for their growth in virtue; varying in the degree of their inequality, but all unequal, and some not even 'proportionately equal.' For the child and the slave are hardly subjects of right, and the latter is in strictness no member of the *κοινωνία*. This varying inequality among the components of the household—this variation of the distance at which they respectively stand from the head—is a characteristic feature of the society,

and Aristotle insists on nothing so much as that these differences must be respected in its organization. The wife is not to be ruled as the child, nor the child as the slave.

The tendency of the household is to inequality, that of the State to equality, absolute or proportionate (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα*). The household is ruled by a king, whereas the rule of a king is of rare occurrence in the fully developed State[1]. The household is at once a less self-complete (2. 2. 1261 b 12), and a more intimate, society than the State. In it everything is common (1. 9. 1257 a 21): not so in the State. On the other hand, the household resembles the State in not existing for some narrow or transitory end, but as an aid to human life (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 20 sq.: cp. 8. 11. 1160 a 14–25). It is in the household that the future citizens of the State first see the light (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 19) and receive their earliest training, which often exercises a decisive influence on their subsequent life[2]; it is here that women and slaves find the moral guidance they need. Obedience here is rendered all the more willingly for being rendered to a relative and a benefactor (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 5); and persons and things are all the better attended to for being attended to individually (1180 b 7). The household lightens the burden of the State by taking off its hands, to some extent at all events, the care of women, children, and slaves; and if on the principle that 'the better the persons ruled, the better is the rule exercised' (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 25), the rule

[1] Marquardt (Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer, 7. 1. 1) attributes to the Romans the feeling that 'not only is the Family a condition of the State, but the constitution of the Family is also the basis and the prototype of the constitution of the State.' Aristotle would admit this of the early State, but not of the State in its definitive form. Even the rule of the husband over the wife, though a *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*—which cannot be said of the rule over children or slaves—differs in some respects from most types of *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 4).

[2] The sixteenth and seventeenth chapters of the Fourth Book of the Politics show what importance Aristotle, following in the steps of Plato (Laws 765 E), attached to the earliest epoch of human existence and even to its embryo stage.

of the household stands on a lower level than that of the State, in which rule is exercised over citizens, it is nevertheless fit work, in Aristotle's opinion, for the man of full virtue (σπουδαῖος).

Aristotle omits to treat of some important questions in relation to marriage. He does not pause to prove that the household should be a monogamic household, but takes this for granted. We do not learn his views as to divorce; he does not mention the subject of prohibited degrees of relationship. We must remember that we are not in possession of his whole mind. On the other hand, he raises questions which seem rather startling to us. Are men and women of any and every age, if only of adult years, to be allowed to marry, and, again, to become parents[1]? Greek inquirers, with their characteristic combination of logic and audacity, insisted that the interests of the State made a negative answer necessary[2]. The Lacedaemonian State required that marriage should take place in the prime of physical vigour on both sides (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 6), and both Plato and Aristotle fix an age for marriage. The former, in the Republic, allows unions (marriage does not exist) to take place between men from 25 to 55 years of age and women from 20 to 40 (Rep. 460 E). In the Laws the arrangement is that a man is to marry not earlier than 25 (772 D) or 30 (721 A: 785 B), and not later than 35—a woman not

Aristotle, like Plato before him, requires the State to fix limits of age for marriage.

[1] The question does not seem to have been raised whether a hereditary disease or predisposition to disease should be a bar to marriage.

[2] Mr. Mahaffy observes, with much truth (Old Greek Education, p. 117 sq.), that 'there is no valid reason why the physical production of the race should not receive infinitely more attention than it does, within the bounds of our present social arrangements. . . . If even now there are civilized countries and classes of people who openly profess prudential reasons as the best for marrying, it will only require a better education of public opinion to enable men to advance to the position that the physical and mental vigour of the resulting children is a motive to be consciously considered in the selection.' Plato and Aristotle, it is true, went a step farther: they were not content with advising their citizens to keep these considerations in view, but recommended that the State should see that they did so. See on this subject Prof. Jowett's interesting remarks in his Introduction to Plato's Republic (Translation of Plato, 3. 168, ed. 2).

earlier than 16[1] or later than 20; and that the begetting of children is to continue only for 10 years (784 B). This latter period would thus close at least ten years earlier than in the Republic; but the reason of this is that in the Republic the interests of the State are secured by giving the magistrates an absolute control over unions (cp. Rep. 460 A, *τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ἵν' ὡς μάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν*).

Considerations kept in view by Aristotle in relation to this matter.

Plato's main aims in dealing with this subject appear to be to save both the family and the State from the evils connected with over-population and to secure a healthy and vigorous progeny. Aristotle thinks that other considerations also need to be taken into account. He recommends a difference of 20 years between the ages of husband and wife, or, more precisely, the difference between the ages of 37 and 18. One of his reasons for this recommendation is that the procreative powers of women cease at 50, twenty years before those of men, and that if account is not taken of this fact, the harmony of the union may be impaired by inequalities in this respect. The disadvantages which attend a too great nearness or difference of age between the father and the child will also be avoided. For the children, if born, as may naturally be expected, at no long interval after marriage, will be reaching years of discretion while their father is still vigorous and able to help them; nor will their return for the care taken of them in childhood come too late to be of any use[2]; while, on the other hand, they will not be near enough in age to their father to lose reverence for him or to embarrass his management of the household. The father, it is evident, will be just

[1] 785 B. Susemihl (Note 940) notices that the age of 18 is mentioned in 833 D. For Hesiod's counsel on this subject, see Opp. et Dies, 695 sqq.

[2] Plutarch (de Amore Prolis, c. 4) laments the fate of most fathers in dying before their children have done great deeds, or even attained their full moral stature—*ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐκτροφὴ πολύπονος, ἡ δὲ αὔξησις βραδεῖα· τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς μακρὰν οὔσης, προαποθνήσκουσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι πατέρες· οὐκ ἐπεῖδε τὴν Σαλαμῖνα Νεοκλῆς τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους, οὐδὲ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα Μιλτιάδης τὸν Κίμωνος, οὐδὲ ἤκουσε Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος δημηγοροῦντος, οὐδὲ Ἀρίστων Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφοῦντος, κ.τ.λ.*

beginning to need help when his children are ready to give it, and thus neither mutual helpfulness nor parental control will be sacrificed. The household will be firmly knit together by mutual needs and the interchange of service, and will be a scene of harmony instead of discord, for it will be based on the common advantage (*τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*). Another gain will be that the father will be well stricken in years and the sons just at the commencement of their prime (30 years of age, Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sq.), when the latter take the place of the former (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 32–35). Above all, these ages give the best prospect of well-developed offspring, likely to produce children of the male sex. The physical well-being of husband and wife is also thus consulted. It seems to have been a common opinion that, in the case of the male, over-early marriage was prejudicial to physical growth, while in that of the female, it added to the perils of labour and involved some moral risks besides (1335 a 22)[1].

We see that Aristotle, in dealing with this subject, keeps other aims in view, besides those which were present to the mind of Plato—the well-being of husband and wife, their full harmony, the establishment of a due relation of helpfulness and respect between the father and the child. His remarks are fresh and interesting; they call attention to points which often escape notice, and evidence a thoughtful study of the facts of household life. Montaigne says (Essais, Livre 2. ch. 8: vol. 2. p. 179, Charpentier): 'je me mariay à trente-trois ans, et loue l'opinion de trente-cinq, qu'on dict estre d'Aristote': and a little further on (p. 180), 'un gentilhomme qui a trente-cinq ans, il n'est pas temps qu'il face place à son fils qui en a vingt': and again, 'il ne nous fauldroit pas marier si jeunes, que nostre aage vienne quasi à se confondre avecques l'aage de nos enfants' (p. 178). We see that difficulties as to the succession (*διαδοχή*) of the children were familiar enough to him. All will approve

[1] We know from Aristoxenus (Fr. 20: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), that this was an opinion ascribed to Pythagoras in the Pythagorean school.

Aristotle's postponement of the female age of marriage to 18; but we shall hardly admit that the disparity of years between husband and wife need be as great as he thinks: obviously a man does not require to be nearly 40 years older than his eldest child to possess a due authority over his children. Lasaulx (Ehe bei den Griechen, p. 60, n. 190) quotes a vigorous utterance of W. von Humboldt to the effect that an ideal union begins for both husband and wife in comparative youth; that husband and wife should pass the days of their youth together and have common memories of the most enjoyable period of human life[1]. Still, even if we think that Aristotle has not hit upon the ideally best age for the husband and father, it remains true that he should neither be too near in age to his children nor too far removed from them. It was natural, that, resting as he does far the larger part of the weight of the household on the father's shoulders, Aristotle should attach special importance to his maturity in mind and body. According to him, the acme of man's physical development is reached between 30 and 35, the acme of mental development not till 49[2]. This accounts for his choosing a somewhat late age; but he may also have remembered that, till about the time he names, his citizens would be much occupied with military duties hardly perhaps compatible with married life.

Τεκνοποία to cease after 17 years of married life.

He is not, however, content with merely fixing an age for marriage. Like Plato, he sees that parents may be too old to give birth to a vigorous offspring[3], and he requires

[1] 'The freshness of youth is the true foundation of happy wedlock (die wahre Grundlage der Ehe). I do not for a moment say that the happiness of wedlock ceases with youth; what I say is that husband and wife should carry into later life the memory of a youth enjoyed together, if their happiness is to be perfect, and not to lose the distinguishing characteristic of wedded bliss' (Briefe an eine Freundin, 2. p. 176). We are conscious here of a touch of sentiment which is altogether modern.

[2] Aristot. Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq.: cp. Solon, Fragm. 27. Solon places marriage in the fifth septennial period of man's life (aet. 28–35), the physical acme in the fourth, the mental in the seventh and eighth (aet. 42–56). Plato (Rep. 460 E–461 A) makes the years between 25 and 55 the *ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως*.

[3] We are little accustomed to look at these things from Aris-

that after seventeen years of married life (when the husband is 54 years old and the wife 35), the married couple shall cease to become parents (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 26 sqq.). Plato had named in the Laws an even shorter term—ten years. Aristotle thus divides the period of marriage into two epochs—the epoch of τεκνοποιία and that in which no children are to be brought into the world.

Only a certain number of children to be begotten during the 17 years: means by which this rule is to be enforced.

Nor does he stop even here. He names, in conformity with Greek custom[1], the winter-season as the best for contracting marriage, and insists that a limit must be set to the begetting of children even during the seventeen years' term (1335 b 21 sq.), so that the begetting of more than a certain number shall be prohibited (2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq.). It may be thought, he hints (1335 b 21 sq.), that infractions of this rule will occur, and that the only possible remedy for them will be the exposure of the surplus children; but this is not so[2]: he apparently regards the exposure of living children as not 'holy' (ὅσιον)[3], and suggests in preference abortion at an early stage of pregnancy. The practice of abortion had already been sanctioned by Plato in the Republic (461 C) without this limitation, in the event of unions outside the legal limits of age proving fruitful; and in case of its failure, exposure. Aristotle appears to be more opposed to exposure and to abortion in advanced

totle's point of view, and I know not whether any physiologist has inquired statistically, what limits of age in the parents seem most favourable to vigorous offspring.

[1] Not Attic only, apparently, for he refers to the practice of οἱ πολλοί (1335 a 37). The month Gamelion (January–February) was the marriage-month at Athens. See Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 26–b 1. Plutarch is pleased with animals for pairing at one particular season only, and that the most favourable (de Amore Prolis c. 2). Pythagoras had prescribed the winter (Diog. Laert. 8. 9: Diod. 10. 9. 3).

[2] I follow the interpretation of 1335 b 21 sqq. given by C. F. Hermann (Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 11. 8):—'but not, on the ground of an over-great number of children, if there is a regulation against an over-great number, to expose children.'

[3] Except in the case of defective offspring (πεπηρωμένον, 1335 b 20). Compare with 1335 b 23–26, de Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 b 32 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 16. See Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la république athénienne, p. 258, on the question whether abortion was a crime by Attic law. It seems to have been common among slave-mothers (Dio Chrys. Or. 15. 237 M).

stages of pregnancy than Plato. On the other hand, Plato does not appear to authorize abortion, as Aristotle does, in the case of unions within the prescribed limits of age. It is also to be remarked that he drops these provisions in the Laws.

Aristotle's object evidently is to avoid both exposure and abortion, but he regards the latter, if effected at an early period of pregnancy, as unobjectionable in comparison with the former, which he prohibits in all cases but one, that of an imperfect growth. It would have been a great gain to the ancient world to be rid of infanticide, which Polybius 'specifies among the causes of the dwindling numbers of the Greeks[1],' but whether this result was not too dearly purchased at the cost of permitting abortion may well be doubted. It may easily be imagined how often the process prescribed by Aristotle would probably be resorted to in a State which delayed the marriage of all males till the age of 37, and which confined the begetting of children to a period of seventeen or eighteen years.

Aims of Aristotle in relation to these matters.

Aristotle evidently feels, even more strongly than Plato, the necessity of preventing the household from becoming a source of over-population and pauperism. He is not satisfied with the arrangements in the Laws on the subject of population (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 38 sqq.). Plato's plan of Unigeniture makes it more than ever essential that there shall not be too many sons in a household; and yet he takes insufficient means to secure this result. Hence the extraordinary strictness of Aristotle's regulations on the subject. He will not even trust to the remedy of founding a colony, which Plato keeps in view (Laws 740 E): the prevention of over-population is better than its cure. Yet the world has gained much by the foundation of Greek colonies, and these could not have existed if there had not been a surplus population to people them. Aristotle seems to forget, in his care for the internal harmony of his best State, that a large part even of the then known surface of the earth was unoccupied, and that, if

[1] Capes, Early Roman Empire, p. 205. See Polyb. 37. 9. 7.

it was not peopled in time from the civilized world, it might, as it afterwards did, receive immigrants likely to be formidable to civilization. He is familiar enough with the view that the State should be constituted for the advantage, not of a section of its citizens, but of the whole; that the Greek State and the Greek race had a duty to fulfil to the world outside, he is no more aware than any of his contemporaries.

Another aim which Aristotle has before him in dealing with the household, is that of making it the nursery of a race healthy and vigorous in mind and body. Much can be done within it to make or mar the physique of the future citizen (1334 b 29), and to render it what for the sake of the character (1334 b 25 sqq.) we should desire it to be, or the reverse. We know from the Nicomachean Ethics how closely moral virtue is connected with the passions, and these with the body (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 14). He also makes it his object (and here, as we have seen, he was in a less degree anticipated by Plato) to secure order, harmony, and mutual helpfulness within the household. But he no doubt also remembers that the city-State must not exceed a certain size, and desires to prevent its population outgrowing the limits imposed by him in the Fourth Book.

The head of the ideal household of Aristotle in his relation to his wife, children, and slaves.

We have already noticed some of the arrangements which he adopts with a view to the well-being of the household, but he evidently finds the main security for its well-being in the character of its head. The husband and father, in Aristotle's ideal household, is not only of mature age, but one whose happy natural endowment of an union of intelligence, spirit, and affectionateness (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 29 sqq.) has had full justice done to it by rearing and education, whose childhood and youth have been spent amid ennobling influences, and who has undergone both the rude discipline of a military life and the full scientific training of a philosopher. His wife will not have received the varied education which Plato designed for girls no less than boys, but she will have been trained in the virtues

which fit her to be his help-mate and right hand for household matters (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.), and he will make of her a not unequal comrade: to his children he will be a kind of god, a full head and shoulders above them, and rightly so, for the father is a king, not the elder brother of his children[1] (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 10–17). His life will not be what Montaigne calls 'une vie questuaire.' He will have learnt to obtain the commodities necessary for the use of his household from natural sources and in natural ways, and to rest content with just that amount of them which is the essential condition of a satisfactory life, counting the provision of inanimate property and the care for it a matter of less moment than the care of slaves, and this again a small matter in comparison with the rule over wife and children and the development of their virtue. He will entrust the education of his boys after the age of seven to the officers of the State, and will leave the full command of the internal affairs of the house to his wife, making this her province in which she is to be supreme, except so far as the moral training of children and slaves is concerned, for this is to be his own affair. We may doubt whether his frequent absence on public business and at the syssitia, where he will take his meals, would not make it difficult for him to watch over his family—whether it would not interfere with that closeness of the household relation, on which Aristotle himself remarks (1. 2. 1252 b 14, *οἶκος ... οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους*).

[1] Contrast the relation of Charles James Fox to his father. 'As long as Charles would treat him like an elder brother (a point on which the lad indulged him without infringing on the strictest filial respect, or abating an atom of that eager and minute dutifulness which he exhibited in all his personal relations) he was welcome to do as he pleased with his own time and his father's money' (G. O. Trevelyan, Early History of C. J. Fox, p. 289). The household as Carlyle knew it in his early years (Reminiscences, p. 55) comes nearer to the Aristotelian type, but is still very different. It is noticeable that Aristotle describes his *παμβασιλεία*, in which the king is of transcendent virtue and greatness in comparison with his willing subjects, as *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν* (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31).

His relation to his wife is the best relation in the household, and, except that between brothers and sisters, the least unequal one—the relation in which justice fills the largest place (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 15 sq.); for it is a weak point in the household that its relations are mostly so unequal as to rest less on right than on love. The head of the household will discriminate his relation to his wife from his relation to his children, and that again from his relation to his slaves. There are some things which the wife can do better than he can (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32 sqq.: cp. 8. 14. 1162 a 22 sq.), and which he will be wise to hand over to her: the advantage of wedlock lies in its making a common stock of contrasted aptitudes (1162 a 23): at least this is its utilitarian side, for it has another; it may become not only a friendship for utility and for pleasure, but also a friendship of the highest type—a friendship for virtue (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24 sqq.)[1]. It may not perhaps attain to the moral level of a friendship between two men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)—Aristotle would hardly be a Greek if he thought it did—but then it is a form of friendship and something more—a co-operative union of especial closeness and permanence for the highest ends. Man and wife are not only 'friends,' but sharers in a common work.

The wife, however, will be 'silent' before her husband, no less than the children before their father (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 28 sq.); in other words, will refrain from opposing him, so long, we conclude, as he does not encroach upon her domain. Plutarch, in whose time the wife counted for more in the household, still retains in his Conjugal Precepts the doctrine of conjugal silence (cc. 31, 32: c. 37), but makes it rather a silence to strangers, and a readiness to allow the husband to speak for her, than a silence before him. Adultery on the part of either husband or wife is

[1] There is nothing in the Politics inconsistent with this, though the use of the word *ὑπηρετική* of the virtue of the wife (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.) might seem to imply a general and not a partial subordination on her part. The division of spheres between husband and wife is, however, implied in Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 2.

to be visited with condign punishment during the period of τεκνοποιία, and to be treated as disgraceful throughout the whole term of marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq.). If the authenticity of the fragment on the relations of husband and wife, which we possess in a Latin translation, were less doubtful[1], a few touches might be added from that source. It makes the wife supreme over all that passes within the house, reserving to the husband the right of deciding who are to be allowed to cross its threshold, and even the right of conducting all negotiations for the marriage of the children[2]: it draws largely on Homer to show with what reverence and respect the husband should treat his wife; they will be rivals in working for the good of the household, each in a special sphere, and this will be the only rivalry between them.

The relation of a father to his child—that of mother and child is not counted among the three constituent relations of the household enumerated in Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 5 sq.—is, as has been said, regarded by Aristotle as resembling that of a king to his subjects. The language of Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 8 sqq., indeed, treats the child up to a certain age—ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ—as 'part and parcel' of his father, and, one would think, hardly distinct enough from him to be even his 'subject'; yet we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 8. 1158 b 21 sqq. that not only is their relation one of friendship, but that the friendship between them,

[1] 'Quid quod hunc ipsum librum ab Aristotele quidem quam maxime alienum, Perictionae autem libro περὶ γυναικὸς ἁρμονίας (Stob. flor. 85, 19, cui similes sunt Phintys et Pempelus, Platonis hic leges exscribens, cf. Ocellus c. 4) et methodo qui praeceptoris est et sententiis et ut credo aetate similem, latina versione servatum Aretinus videtur recepisse' (Val. Rose, de Aristot. librorum ordine et auctoritate, p. 61). L. Schmidt, on the other hand, accepts the Latin fragment as embodying 'important remains in a greatly altered form' of Aristotle's work on this subject (Ethik d. alten Griechen, 2. 187). The composition of the treatise from which this translation was made may well have been suggested to some follower of Aristotle by Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 29 sq., and Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq., just as that of the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics was probably suggested by Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 3.

[2] They are conducted by the two fathers in Terence's Andria, 3. 3. 6-42.

though unequal, may be 'durable and based on virtue, when the children render to their parents what is due to those who gave them being, and parents to sons what is due to children.' Aristotle's whole conception of youth perhaps accentuates its contrast with manhood; he does not follow out in detail the variations of the filial relation at different ages; he probably conceived it as ceasing to exist when the child attained years of discretion (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 26). In describing the relation of father and child as a kingly relation, his object is to contrast it, on the one hand, with the rule of the husband over the wife, which is like that of one citizen over another, except that there is no interchange of rule (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 1 sqq.)[1], and on the other with the despotic rule of the master over the slave. In the two former relations rule is exercised for the advantage of the ruled or of both parties, whereas in the last it is exercised primarily for the advantage of the ruler and accidentally only for the advantage of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 32–1279 a 8). The master is, however (Pol. 1. 13), to make his rule over the slave a source of moral improvement to him—a means of placing him in contact with that rationality which he does not himself possess (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 5: 1. 5. 1254 b 22). He must not, therefore, in his relations with his slaves, confine himself, as Plato would have him do, to the language of blank command, but must also use that of admonition. Slaves should be encouraged to behave well by the prospect of receiving their freedom as a reward for good conduct (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq.). Aristotle intended to deal fully with the subject of the treatment of slaves, but does not do so in what we have of the Politics (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31).

The differences between Aristotle's ideal household and

[1] Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32, *ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς (κοινωνία) ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν.*

The ideal household of Aristotle contrasted with the average Athenian household.

the average Athenian household seem to be mainly these. It would be endowed with an adequate, and not more than adequate, measure of worldly goods, and thus be equally removed from the over-wealthy type in which obedience was unknown (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295b 13–18), and from the over-poor type in which the wife and children had to supply the place of slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323a 5); its predominant aim would be the increase of virtue, not the increase of wealth; its head would be older and better prepared for his duties; his supremacy would not be usurped by his wife, while, on the other hand, his relation to her would be more equal and friendly than was often the case at Athens, and adultery on his part would be more severely dealt with; his married life would be largely controlled by the law in his own interest and in that of his wife and children, no less than in that of the State; his functions as head of the household would be exercised more or less under the control of the *γυναικονόμοι* and *παιδονόμοι* appointed by the State, just as they were probably exercised in the early days of Athens under some control from the Council of the Areopagus[1]; he would not be allowed to choose for himself what kind of education should be given to his sons, but would have to send them to the public schools of the State from the age of seven onwards. Lastly, he would be even more of an absentee from the home during the day-time than the average Attic husband, for he would take his meals at the public meal-tables[2].

[1] Gynaeconomi existed at Athens, their existence, however, dating in Boeckh's opinion from the administration of Demetrius Phalereus (Dict. of Antiquities s. v.: Gilbert, Griech. Staatsalterth. 1. 154): if this was so, their introduction may have been due to Aristotle's commendation of the institution, like other points in the *régime* of Demetrius Phalereus. Cicero disapproves of it: nec vero mulieribus praefectus praeponatur qui apud Graecos creari solet, sed sit censor qui viros doceat moderari uxoribus (Cic. de Rep. 4. 6. 6). Dionysius of Halicarnassus claims that the authority of the Roman censor, unlike that of any magistrate at Athens or Sparta, penetrated within the household. See the striking fragment from the Antiquitates Romanae (20. 13), where he depicts the way in which the household was controlled by this great office of State. Aristotle could not have asked more.

[2] Aristotle's remark at the close

Aristotle is evidently strongly impressed with the importance of the household. The children it brings into the world are the future citizens of the State, and it may easily saddle the State with an over-numerous or unsatisfactory progeny. It has to do with the future citizen in the earliest and most impressible years of life, years during which the character receives its permanent bent. Hence it is that Aristotle commits it to the charge of a head of mature age, worth, and capacity, and not content with that, subjects his rule to the supervision of State-officers. It is impossible to say that the course he takes is not a logical course, even if we may think that it would be better to leave the head of the household more freedom and responsibility.

Aristotle intends the household to be a reality.

The household, however, as he conceives it, is far from being a mere shadow, like that of the Laws; it is a real home, for though its head will often be absent, and though his action is in part regulated by the State, he is charged with the moral guidance of wife, child, and slave, and is evidently credited with the power to do much for their growth in virtue. The mere fact that the household needs to be adjusted to the constitution of the State shows that it is to be a reality.

Divorce.

On one important subject connected with the organization of the household, that of divorce, we have no express intimation of Aristotle's views. Plato in the Laws (929 E sqq.) allows of divorce for incompatibility of temper, though not without the intervention of the State, but his whole conception of the household implies the view that wedlock is normally a life-long union. This is still more true of Aristotle. Locke thinks that 'there is reason to inquire why the compact of marriage, where pro-

of the First Book that the virtue of husband and wife and father and child, and the way in which they should consort with each other, cannot be definitively depicted, nor the right standard in these things indicated, until they have been considered in connexion with the various political constitutions to which the household must be adjusted, prepares us for a systematic study of the organization of the household relations under each constitution, which we do not find undertaken in the Politics.

creation and education are secured and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable either by consent or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life[1].' Aristotle would probably reply, that the wife needs her husband's protecting care and affection to the last, that the relation of husband and wife is a relation of friendship, which deserves to be kept in being whether the interests of the children require its continuance or not, and that the husband and wife in their old age might, if parted, lose the aid of their grown-up children. The dissolution of an ill-matched or unsatisfactory union would, nevertheless, be probably recognized by him as occasionally necessary.

Aristotle and the clan, phratry, and tribe.

In modern communities the household has long come to be the only recognized society based on the tie of blood. Among ourselves even the 'conseil de famille' is unknown to the law. But there was once a time when the household was only one of a number of similar societies. The clan, the phratry, and the tribe stood at its side, larger, though less intimate, unities of the same type. It might be thought to rest on no surer basis than they. History has taught us otherwise. Time has spared the household, but the clan, tribe, and phratry have long passed away. They found themselves assailed both from within and from without. The individual outgrew them and shook himself free from them; armed with adoptive and testamentary power, men were able, if they chose, to defeat the succession-rights of the clan; the rise of classes and parties in the State tended to break them up; religious change was fatal to their religious basis. Nor was the State probably sorry to substitute purely local unions for societies which cherished immemorial traditions of independence and hierarchical pride[2]. Assailed by the individual and

[1] Civil Government, 2. § 81.

[2] We learn from Aristotle (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 35) that the tribe was sometimes a prime mover in

the State at the same time, it is no wonder that these societies succumbed, while the household, which went counter to neither, survived.

To Aristotle, however, the clan (*γένος*), phratry, and tribe were still indispensable elements in the State[1], though he says but little about them. The clan, indeed, with him assumes the local form of the village (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 16 sq.), just as at Athens it had passed into the deme in many cases; but in that form it is treated as existing by nature and as a permanent element in the State. If the household aids in the maintenance of good feeling and good fellowship among the members of the community, so do the tribe, phratry, and clan (2. 4. 1262 a 12: cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 33, 40). What other social functions these unities were to fulfil in Aristotle's State, we do not learn in what we have of the Politics.

Contrast between the Aristotelian conception of the household and modern conceptions of it.

We need not dwell on the many points of contrast which distinguish the household as Aristotle conceives it from the household of modern times. One remark, however, may be made on this subject. To Aristotle the head of the household is the one source from which all its spiritual influences appear to proceed. The wife contributes services which she is better fitted to render than any one else, but there is no sign that her husband is to derive any moral stimulus or guidance from her[2].

στάσις. He notices (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.) the bold and remarkable steps by which Cleisthenes at Athens put an end to the previously existing associations, and sought to bring men together and to break down the distinctions of worship and grouping which held them apart. In the Peloponnesus the clans seem to have been long the mainstay of oligarchy, and the only way to diminish their power was to gather a number of villages (i.e. clans) into a considerable city. The creation of Megalopolis, for instance, would tell, and was doubtless intended by Epaminondas to tell, in favour of democracy and against the Lacedaemonians.

[1] Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 6 sq.

[2] Even in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 25 sq. all that is said is that a friendship for virtue—the highest type of friendship—may exist between husband and wife, if they are good, for each has virtue and the husband may feel pleasure in the wife's virtue. But then we are told in the Politics (1. 13. 1260 a 21) that the wife's virtue is subordinate and minis-

Aristotle would hardly say with Trendelenburg[1] that 'the two parties (husband and wife) stand in need of each other, in order by their union to elevate and ennoble their individual lives.' The view of Comte that the function of the household is 'to cultivate to the highest point the influence of woman over man[2],' would of course be utterly incomprehensible to him.

Aristotle's teaching as to Property—its due amount and the true mode of acquiring and using it.

Just as, after defending the household, Aristotle sketches an ideal household which differs much from the household as it actually existed, so after defending the right of several property, he lays down principles as to the acquisition and use of property which leave proprietary right and proprietary duty, so far at least as the citizens of the State are concerned[3], a very different thing from what he found them.

The ideal household, as we have already seen, is not to be maintained in communistic fashion out of a public stock, but is to have a definite area of land assigned to it from which the householder is to win the means of subsistence for his household, or rather to have them won for him. Its extent will be such as to favour a mode of life at once temperate and liberal. A due supply of the goods of fortune—for Aristotle follows the traditional use of the Greek language in treating fortune as the source of wealth (e. g. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27)[4]—is a condition of some kinds of virtuous action and a condition of happiness (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10–29). Virtue must be possessed of an adequate supply

terial (ὑπηρετική), and that the deliberative element in her nature is unable to assert itself with effect (1260 a 13). Aristotle was well aware of the contrast of character in men and women (see, for instance, Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 35–b 16), whether we think that he draws the contrast correctly or not.

[1] Naturrecht, § 123.

[2] Social Statics, E.T., p. 171.

[3] The ownership of land is to be confined to citizens (Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.); but the artisans and day-labourers who are to find a place in the best State, must be intended to hold property, though we hear no more of their proprietary rights than we do of the organization of the households in which we must suppose them to live.

[4] Contrast the language used in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 40, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν, οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτός, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις.

of external and bodily goods, if it is to rise into happiness; it needs instruments (*ὄργανα*) just as a harpist needs a good lyre (1332 a 25). Plato had designed for his citizens in the Laws a simply 'temperate' life (737 D): Aristotle objects to this description as rather vague and open to misinterpretation (2. 6. 1265 a 28 sqq.); it might, he thinks, be construed to point to a pinched, hard existence, which is not what he would himself approve. He is not, like Milton, an encomiast of that 'spare Fast,' which, according to the poet,

> 'Oft with gods doth diet,
> And hears the Muses in a ring
> Aye round about God's altar sing':

but he is still less in sympathy with those who found in luxury a school of valour and greatness of mind[1]. Aristotle connected with extreme wealth and luxury unwillingness to submit to be ruled, or to rest content with anything short of absolute rule, just as he connected incapacity for ruling and for aught but servile subjection with extreme poverty (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13)[2]. The life of his citizens is to strike a happy mean between the two extremes. The ideal distribution of property is thus, in Aristotle's view, that in which every citizen has enough for virtue and happiness, and none have more[3]. His acceptance of the institu-

[1] Heracleides Ponticus appears to have said in his popular work on Pleasure—*ἅπαντες γοῦν οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν τιμῶντες καὶ τρυφᾶν προῃρημένοι μεγαλόψυχοί καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς εἰσιν, ὡς Πέρσαι καὶ Μῆδοι· μάλιστα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἡδονὴν οὗτοι καὶ τὸ τρυφᾶν τιμῶσιν, ἀνδρειότατοι καὶ μεγαλοψυχότατοι τῶν βαρβάρων ὄντες* (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 200 n.). The paradox is reproduced by Agatharchides, a Peripatetic of the second century before Christ, who says of the Aetolians — *Αἰτωλοὶ τοσούτῳ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑτοιμότερον ἔχουσι πρὸς θάνατον, ὅσῳπερ καὶ ζῆν πολυτελῶς [καὶ] ἐκτενέστερον ζητοῦσι τῶν ἄλλων* (ap. Athen. Deipn. 12. 33. 527 b).

[2] Luxury meant more to the Greeks than it means to us; it was in their view closely allied with *ὕβρις* and not unconnected with political untrustworthiness: cp. Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 13, *ὅπερ γὰρ ὕστερον Ἐπαμεινώνδαν εἰπεῖν λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τραπέζης, ὡς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄριστον οὐ χωρεῖ προδοσίαν, τοῦτο πρῶτος ἐνόησε Λυκοῦργος.* The Greeks always conceived the 'tyrant' to be not only fond of unlimited power, but generally unlimited in his desires (Plato, Rep. 573 A sqq.: Theopomp. Fr. 129, 204).

[3] Compare the saying of Gibbon (Decline and Fall, c. 2): 'It might perhaps be more conducive to the virtue as well as happiness of mankind, if all possessed the ne-

tion of several property is not indeed expressly coupled with this limitation and equalization of its amount; still we note that he deprecates those extremes of wealth and poverty which have in practice proved the almost inseparable concomitants of this institution. When he allows a place to wealth among the necessary elements of the State (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 22: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33), we must suppose that he has in his mind moderate, not great, wealth.

The virtues connected with property have to do both with its acquisition and with its use, but with the latter more than with the former (Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 8 sqq.). As we have seen, Aristotle accentuates the distinction between Household Science and the Science of Supply: it is the householder's duty rather to see that the commodities necessary or useful to the household are forthcoming, than himself to take part in acquiring them, just as it is his business to see that the members of his household enjoy health, though he leaves it to the physician to produce it. His householder is to be neither improvident nor a lover of gain. Aristotle seems, as we have noticed, scarcely to admit that the love of money is as primary an instinct of human nature as the love of pleasure; he sometimes resolves the former into the latter. He desires that the landowners of his ideal State shall be men whose main pre-occupation it will be to rule over their households, to rule and be ruled as citizens of the State, and to engage in philosophical speculation, and who will gladly delegate to others the task of acquiring the commodities necessary for the support of their households—men who, without forgetting to secure that these commodities shall be forthcoming, will count the care of property less noble than the exercise of rule over the members of the household, and who will make it in use available for others. Plato had already said in his Laws (740 A) that the possessors of the various lots are to feel that their lots are each of them the common

cessaries and none the superfluities of life.' Aristotle, however, speaks only of his ideal citizens, and allows them a good deal more than the bare 'necessaries of life.'

property of the whole State (κοινὴν τῆς πόλεως ξυμπάσης); but the expression κοινὴ χρῆσις is apparently adopted by Aristotle from Isocrates' ideal picture of Athens under the sway of the Areopagus (Areopag. § 35), and it gives increased definiteness to the doctrine[1]. Aristotle had in his mind the open-handed fellowship of Pythagorean friends, and, still more, the Communistic ideal of Plato, and he seeks while retaining in his State the right of several property, to ensure that it shall not imperil the 'public-heartedness' of his citizens or the sense of brotherhood in the community. The Xenophontic Cyrus, who recommends the acquisition by just means of as much as possible in order that the acquirer may have the more to use nobly[2], took a different view; but the stress which Xenophon, no less than Plato and Aristotle, lays on the duty of using property aright, deserves especial attention in these days, in which, as L. Schmidt says, 'one of the most important tasks the peoples of Europe have before them is to moralize in an increasing degree the institution of private property' (Ethik der alten Griechen, 2. 390)[3]. Gorgias had said of Cimon that he 'acquired in order to use and used in order to be honoured' (Plutarch, Cimon, c. 10): Aristotle's ideal householder is to value property for this, that it makes possible a life of virtuous activity and happiness, and to desire no more than contributes to this end; and he is to use it, not with the view of reaping honour, but in such a way as to give full expression to his virtue and friendliness of heart.

[1] Xenophon himself had, as we have seen, put into the mouth of his hero Cyrus words which express the Pythagorean doctrine κοινὰ τὰ φίλων—ταῦτα, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἅπαντα δεῖ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐμὰ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὑμέτερα (Cyrop. 8. 4. 36). He is addressing his friends. But to make what one has the common property of oneself and one's friends is not the same thing as making it the common property of all citizens.

[2] See L. Schmidt, 2. 380, who refers to Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20–23. Cp. also Plutarch, Cimon c. 10, Κριτίας δὲ τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενος ἐν ταῖς ἐλεγείαις εὔχεται

Πλοῦτον μὲν Σκοπαδῶν, μεγαλοφροσύνην δὲ Κίμωνος,
νίκας δ' Ἀρκεσίλα τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου.

[3] The readers of Comte's Positive Polity will be familiar with language to the same effect.

The Greeks were probably far more open-handed in their use of property than the Romans of the Republic. Polybius, at any rate, after describing the munificence of Scipio, adds (32. 12)—'now an act of this kind would be not unreasonably thought noble everywhere, but at Rome it was positively marvellous, for there no one of his free will gives any one anything whatever belonging to him.' Not every rich Athenian, indeed, like Cimon, threw his fields and gardens open to the passer-by, and allowed all men freely to take of their produce, or kept open house, or gave the garments from the backs of his slaves to poor men whom he met in the streets—far from it—but many gave dowries to the daughters of impoverished citizens, or paid funeral expenses, or ransomed captives, or subscribed to ἔρανοι for the relief of friends in distress[1]. Aristotle would probably find as much to amend in the methods of the private charity of his day as he did in those of its public charity (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.): still he gives high praise to the liberality with which the Spartans treated each other, and the rich of Tarentum treated the poor (1320 b 9 sqq.: 2. 5. 1263 a 30 sqq.). He demands, however, of his ideal proprietor far more than this. He expects him not only to be free-handed in giving, but also to allow others much freedom in using that which he does not give away[2].

We do not know even in outline what powers of dealing with his property were to be possessed by the proprietor in Aristotle's State. The lot of land, indeed, as Susemihl points out[3], he apparently intends to be inalienable and

[1] See Schmidt, 2. 387–8, from whom I take these facts.

[2] Friedländer points out (Sittengeschichte Roms 3. 98) that 'the rich and great of the Roman Empire were expected not only to use their surplus revenues for the relief of poverty—a purpose especially served by the institution of clientship—but also to allow the poor to share freely in their enjoyments, and to place within their reach advantages and gratifications of all kinds, from which they are for the most part excluded in the modern world.' It is not, however, the munificence and open-handedness of a *grand seigneur* that Aristotle asks of his ideal proprietor, but a readiness to place whatever he possesses at the disposal of others, whether equals or inferiors.

[3] Sus.², Einleitung, p. 26.

indivisible[1], and to descend to one son only. Would he allow the father to choose this son, as Plato did? Does he intend, again, like Plato, to abolish dowries? It would seem from 2. 9. 1270 a 25, that he would either abolish them or limit their amount. In default of children, is the proprietor to be allowed to adopt an heir? What powers, again, is he to possess over property other than the lot? Is the law, that property is to pass by inheritance and not by gift, which Aristotle recommends to oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23) as the best means of diffusing and equalizing property, to be adopted in the best State also? It would be easy to mention other points, as to which we are not fully informed.

Transition from the industrial and household life of the State to its political life.

So far we have had to do with preliminary matters. We have been sketching the organization of Supply and of the Household under the best constitution; we have not yet studied the central subject of Political Science, the political as distinguished from the industrial and household life of the best State. The constitution of the State, we started by saying, allots advantages and functions, and we have seen to whom the best constitution will allot the functions connected with the supply of necessaries and also those connected with the Household: we have not yet seen to whom it will allot the higher functions, and among them political functions.

The investigations of the First Book of the Politics have hitherto been our main guide, and the First Book treats the subjects with which it deals from the point of view of Nature, which cannot be far from that of the best constitution. It asks, who is the natural slave, what is the natural form of the Science of Supply, who is the true householder; and it is precisely under the guidance of Nature that Aristotle constructs the best constitution (see e. g. 4 (7). 14.

[1] We may probably infer this from the arrangements respecting the land made in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq. We also find that Aristotle approves (2. 9. 1270 a 19) of the discouragement by Lycurgus of the sale of land, and regrets that he did not impose some checks on gift and bequest.

1332 b 35 sq.). It is true of Political Science, as it is true of Art, that it 'partly brings the work of Nature to completion, partly imitates Nature' (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Preliminary lessons learnt in the Second Book.

The Second Book still keeps the ideal point of view in sight (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 27 sqq.), though, like the First Book and indeed the whole treatise, it seeks to draw attention, not only to 'that which is normal and correct,' but also to 'that which is useful' (cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.). Apparently critical and negative, it really is something more: it so conducts its review of constitutions as to suggest by its indication of their defects the true principles on which society should be organized. It thus forms a good introduction to the sketch of the best constitution in the Fourth Book, and its teaching is in full harmony with the teaching of that part of the Politics. A brief reference to its main conclusions will illustrate this.

The State, we learn, though a *κοινωνία*, is not a *κοινωνία* in everything that can be shared, but only in those things which can be shared with advantage to virtue and to friendship; self-completeness, not the maximum of unity, is the aim which should be kept in view in constructing it; its institutions should satisfy, not run counter to, that moderate and reasonable love of self which nature has implanted in man; education is the truest and most wholesome means of promoting harmony in the State, for it does not lessen, like some other specifics, the opportunities of virtuous action, but on the contrary produces virtue, which is the secret of concord; and again, if a State is to be happy, some part at any rate of its population must be in possession of happiness, for if no part of it is happy, it cannot be happy as a whole. Aristotle keeps this last principle in view in constituting his ideal citizen-body. He surrounds its members with the means of virtuous and happy activity, and makes their happiness give happiness to the State.

From the criticism on Phaleas of Chalcedon we learn not to expect too much from legislation equalizing landed property, apart from an improvement in the moral tone of

the community. The equalization of landed property, or even of property in general, which Phaleas forgot to equalize, is an insufficient preventive by itself of civil discord (στάσις). To make it effective for this purpose, a limit must be imposed on reproduction, properties must not only be equalized but made of that amount which is most favourable to virtue, and the laws of the State must secure to each man an education which will moderate his desires. Equality of property will not do much to prevent civil disturbance originating among the Many, but it will wholly fail to touch movements caused by a desire for superior distinction on the part of the Few. It will, at the utmost, only remove one cause for the commission of wrong (ἀδικία)—absolute want of the necessaries of life; but men commit wrong even when their immediate necessities are fully supplied, for the sake of the gratification which they derive from superfluities, and it is thus that the greatest wrongs come to be committed. If these wrongs are to be prevented, men must be taught to be temperate, and to seek even 'painless pleasure,' not in forms which presuppose power over their fellows, but in philosophy, which derives the pleasure it confers from sources lying wholly within ourselves. Nor must the amount of wealth which it is desirable that the members of the State should possess, be settled without reference to the security of the State from external perils. Phaleas confines his attention to dangers arising within the State. On the whole—it is thus that Aristotle sums up one of the most successful of his criticisms—equality of property will be of some avail in preventing civil discord, but not of much, for it will not pacify the more aspiring spirits, nor will it in the long run satisfy the Many, for these live for the satisfaction of desire, which is in its nature unlimited, and soon tire of the 'two obols,' which were enough for them at first. The only real security against internal perils is to make the better natures indisposed to commit injustice, and to see that the worse are at once too weak in numbers to do so, and are not provoked to it by wrong. The criticism on Phaleas, then,

like that on Plato, arrives at the conclusion that education is the best guarantee for concord in the State; and it points to an education favourable at once to morality and philosophical aptitude, coinciding fully with the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of the Fourth Book (compare, for instance, 1334 a 28–34).

Aristotle's division of the land of his ideal State into public and private land was perhaps suggested by a provision in the constitution of Hippodamus, though Aristotle does not use the public land for the maintenance of the soldiers of the State. He anticipated Aristotle also in the distinction of the military from the agricultural class.

From the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle learnt much, though rather in the way of warning than of example. He learnt the necessity of organizing the slave-system of his State with care; he learnt not to leave the life of the women unregulated, nor property very unequally distributed; the citizen's lot of land should be inalienable by sale or gift, and indivisible, and a check should be placed on the increase of population. The syssitia should be put on an improved footing, so that no citizen need cease to be a citizen for want of the means of paying his contribution to them. It was a good point in the Lacedaemonian constitution, that all elements of the State —kings, upper classes, and people—found something in it to satisfy them, and Aristotle would not disturb the popular basis of the ephorate, but he would reform the mode by which ephors were elected, so as to get better men, would not allow them to act as judges in important trials without any laws to guide them, and would make the supreme control which they exercised over other magistracies something different from what it was. Membership of the senate, again, should not be for life, for the mind grows old as well as the body. The arrangements respecting the senate are designedly such as to stimulate a love of distinction, which is unwise, for it is one of the main sources of wrong-doing. The way in which senators are selected is unsatisfactory, and the same thing may also be said of the

kings. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver aims at producing one kind of virtue only, military virtue, which finds no employment in leisure, and therefore was of little use to the community when victory had been won, and its wars were over (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 15–15. 1334 b 5); and, which is worse, he teaches his citizens to value virtue as a means to external goods, or in other words, to value these more than virtue.

The upshot of the whole chapter is, that in the Lacedaemonian State we find a small and dwindling body of citizens, surrounded by hostile Hellenic slaves; trained only for war, not for pacific rule, and taught to count wealth and distinction greater goods than even the military virtue they prize; organized ill both in State and in household, for not only are their rulers selected by an unsatisfactory method, and often superannuated or inferior, though charged with great responsibilities, but the hard life imposed on the citizens stands in strong contrast to the disorderly lives of their wives. We shall find that Aristotle takes pains in constructing his State to avoid every one of the defects which he here signalizes.

From Crete he learns less, but he learns the true use of the public land (2. 10. 1272 a 17 sq.: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 11 sq.), a better organization of the syssitia than the Lacedaemonian, and the necessity that law and not human caprice shall be supreme, if a real constitution, or indeed a real State, is to exist. In the Carthaginian as in the Lacedaemonian State he finds that all classes of society are content with their position—a rare circumstance in Greece—but that the contentment of the Carthaginian people with their political lot is based, not, like that of the Lacedaemonian, on a participation in one of the great offices of state, but on their share in the advantages derivable from the imperial position of Carthage, and consequently rests on a less secure basis. The Carthaginian constitution also was too ready to admit wealth to a share of the homage which is due to virtue, and thus tended to mislead the popular judgment and to teach it to give more

honour to external goods than they deserve. Besides, to make the two greatest magistracies purchaseable was to imperil the good government of the State.

We see, however, that under both the Carthaginian and the Lacedaemonian constitutions virtue tended to fill a larger place in the government and life of the State than under most others, and that it will be Aristotle's aim so to organize his best State and its education as completely to realize the ideal which these two constitutions vaguely and not very successfully 'felt after.'

Third Book of the Politics—distribution of rights of citizenship and of rule.

We pass at this point from the Second to the Third Book of the Politics, from the criticism of certain proposed or existing constitutions to an attempt to determine how the rights of citizenship and of rule—in other words, the higher social activities—should be distributed by the constitution; and Aristotle's plan appears to be, first to discuss how a normal (*ὀρθή*), or just, constitution will distribute them, next to set forth how they will be distributed in the best State[1]. The distribution of these functions, as distinguished from the lower or necessary ones, is, in fact, usually stated to be not merely the chief, but the only problem which the constitution has to solve. So we read (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15 sqq.: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq.)—*πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν.* It is the course taken by the constitution in this matter that determines its character: constitutions differ because they allot the right of ruling, or in other words supreme authority in the State, to different persons or groups of persons. It is evident, however, if we refer to passages such as 2. 6. 1264 b 31 sqq., that the constitution

[1] We seem to observe a similar transition in Plato's Republic, for at the beginning of the fifth book, Socrates, looking back at the State sketched in the second, third, and fourth, says: *ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, κ.τ.λ.* In the fifth and later books, on the other hand, we are conscious of some heightening of the ideal.

also regulates, or may regulate, the whole position of the classes concerned with 'necessary functions,' the position of women, and the educational organization of the State. It is thus that the little treatise of Xenophon which bears the title Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία, concerns itself as much with the 'pursuits of the Spartans' (c. 1. init.), their 'mode of life' (c. 5), their enforced abstinence from money-making (c. 7), as with the political organization of the State. Still the policy which a constitution follows in all these matters will be determined by the course it takes with regard to the central subject of its competence.

Here we commence that which was to a Greek the central inquiry of Political Science. The Greeks ascribed to the constitution a far-reaching ethical influence. Demosthenes repeats the saying of an earlier orator[1], that the laws are regarded by all good men as 'the mind and will of the State' (τρόποι τῆς πόλεως), and we have already seen (above, p. 94, note 2), how Isocrates speaks of the constitution. To Plato and Aristotle the constitution is a powerful influence for good or evil: it is only in the best State, says the latter, that the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the citizen coincide, whence it follows that constitutions other than the best require for their maintenance some other kind of virtue than that of the good man. In the vaster States of to-day opinion and manners are slower to reflect the tendency of the constitution: in the small city-States of ancient Greece they readily took its colour[2]. It was thus that in the view of the Greeks every

Importance attached by the Greeks to the constitution: the constitution the 'mode of life chosen by the State'—influence ascribed to it over the life and character of those living under it.

[1] Ὁ γὰρ εἰπεῖν τινά φασιν ἐν ὑμῖν, ἀληθὲς εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους ἅπαντες ὑπειλήφασιν, ὅσοι σωφρονοῦσι, τρόπους τῆς πόλεως εἶναι (Demosth. adv. Timocr. c. 210, quoted by A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 293. 1). Cp. Aeschin. adv. Timarch. § 4, and Plato, Rep. 544 D.

[2] Cases no doubt occurred in which the sentiments and habits of society were not adjusted to the constitution, as we learn from a remarkable passage of the Politics (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 11–21); but the language of Aristotle implies that this disharmony was commonly only temporary, and occurred for the most part when the authors of a revolution after effecting a constitutional change did not at once proceed to alter the pre-existing laws, but contented themselves for a time (τὰ πρῶτα) with the bare possession

constitution had an accompanying *ἦθος*, which made itself felt in all the relations of life. Each constitutional form exercised a moulding influence on virtue; the good citizen was a different being in an oligarchy, a democracy, and an aristocracy. Each constitution embodied a scheme of life, and tended, consciously or not, to bring the lives of those living under it into harmony with its particular scheme. If the law provides that the highest offices in the State shall be purchaseable or confines them to wealthy men, it inspires *ipso facto* a respect for wealth in the citizens (2. 11. 1273 a 35 sqq.). Thus Plato and Aristotle are true to Greek feeling when they speak of the constitution as a 'life' (*βίος*), or 'the imitation of a life' (*μίμησις βίου*)[1]. Expressions not very dissimilar have been used by modern writers who have studied the change produced in France and in Europe by the French Revolution. 'The plain fact is,' says a writer in the *Saturday Review* (July 8, 1882, p. 57), 'that the ideas of '89 involved not so much a new departure in politics—like (e. g.) the English Revolution of a century earlier, or the almost contemporary American one—as a new method of interpreting life altogether, or, as De Maistre expressed it "a new religion[2]."' Aristotle would trace a similar change

of power. Contrast the promptness with which Timoleon after his victory over the tyrants proceeded to recast the laws, even those relating to contracts, in a democratic sense (Diod. 16. 70).

[1] Cp. Plato, Laws 817 B, *πᾶσα . . . ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου*: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, *ἡ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως*: 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14, *περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον, τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος*: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο* (sc. *εὐδαιμονίαν*) *θηρεύοντες τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας*. Thus too the State, which is said to be a *κοινωνία* of citizens in a constitution in 3. 3. 1276 b 1 sq., is described in 3. 9. 1280 b 40 as *ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους*. Plato is made to say in Epist. 5. 321 D, *ἔστι γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης, καθαπερεί τινων ζῴων, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Compare Burke, Thoughts on French Affairs (Works 3. 350, Bohn): 'the present Revolution in France seems to me . . . to bear little resemblance or analogy to any of those which have been brought about in Europe upon principles merely political. *It is a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma.* It has a much greater resemblance to those changes which have been made upon religious grounds, in which a spirit of proselytism makes an essential part. The last revolution of doctrine and theory which has happened in Europe, is the Reformation.'

in every transition from one constitution to another. We are familiar enough with the fact that some homogeneity of opinion and character is essential in those who are to work harmoniously together as fellow-citizens of the same State. 'Our ideal of life is not the Irish ideal, our standard of duty is not theirs' (*Times*, Dec. 25, 1883); to this in part the friction between the two sections of the United Kingdom is sometimes set down. 'The mischief to be dealt with is that a nation united under one government and living on a narrow and strictly limited area is at this moment dangerously heterogeneous in its tastes, habits, and general ways of regarding life' (*Times*, May 29, 1884).

It is not surprising that Aristotle found the identity of the State in its constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 9). It was perhaps in part because changes of constitution meant so much, that they were so frequent in ancient Greece and so keenly fought over. To be an oligarch living under a democratic constitution, or *vice versa*, must have been a painful experience and one from which most men were glad to escape as soon as possible.

Plato and Aristotle may perhaps rate the influence of the constitution too high, but it is a merit in them, that they never lose sight, as many modern inquirers have done, of the full significance of the State and its organization. They see it to be an ethical influence for good or ill.

The popular classification of constitutions.

The question how many different ways there are of allotting supreme authority was one which popular opinion in Greece found no difficulty in answering. According to the prevailing view, there were only three possible constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—the rule of one man, or a few, or the many[1]. Under monarchy

[1] So Herodotus (3. 80–82); Aeschines (adv. Timarch. § 4), who reckons *τυραννίς* in the place of monarchy; the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution in Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.; Isocrates (Panath. § 132), who, however, admits two forms of each, a better and a worse; *οἱ πολλοί*, according to Plato, Laws 714 B; Plutarch, de Monarchia et Democratia et Oligarchia, c. 3. Kingship and Tyranny were probably often confounded in common parlance: cp. Philochor. fragm. 5 (Müller, Fragm. Hist.

would fall the two forms, Kingship and Tyranny: aristocracy, or the government of the best, would either be considered as identical with oligarchy (Thuc. 6. 39: cp. Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), or as a species of it (Isocr. Panath. § 132: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16). Some, however, made aristocracy a constitution by itself, thus counting four (Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 35 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 29), while others brought all constitutions under two heads, oligarchy and democracy. Others, again, made up four constitutions by adding to monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy a form compounded of all three, which they also held to be the best (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.). This was an idea which had a great future before it.

Principles of Socrates and Plato.

The philosophers were not content with a classification of constitutions resting on this numerical basis. A constitution was to them an ethical force, and it was by their ethical consequences that constitutions were to be classified. Thus the classification which Xenophon ascribes to Socrates implied that constitutions should be distinguished, not by the number of the depositaries of power, but by their attributes and by the character of their rule. He marked off Kingship from Tyranny, rule being exercised in the former constitution over willing subjects and in accordance with law, not so in the latter; he distinguished aristocracy as the form in which offices are filled 'from the ranks of those who fulfil the behests of the law' (ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων: cp. Aristot. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 34 sq.), plutocracy as that in which there is a property qualification for office, democracy as that in which office is open to all (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12). He also held that the true king or statesman is marked off from the counterfeit by the possession of knowledge, but he does not appear to have adjusted his classification of constitutions to this view.

Plato adopts different classifications in different dia-

Gr. 1. 385), οἱ οὖν Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες, ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι, ἔθος ἔχουσι τοὺς βασιλέας τυράννους καλεῖν.

logues. He seems in the Politicus, as Susemihl remarks[1], to be building on a Socratic foundation; his best State, according to this dialogue, is that in which a single sovereign possessed of Science rules: next below this come Monarchy governed by Law, Aristocracy (in other words, Oligarchy governed by Law), and Democracy governed by Law: below (in order of merit) stand Democracy unrestrained by Law, the corresponding Oligarchy, and Tyranny (Polit. 302 B sqq.).

In the Republic the Kingship and Aristocracy of philosophers ruling uncontrolled by Law stand together at the summit: next in order, we have a 'timocracy,' such as the Lacedaemonian or Cretan constitution: next come, ranged in order of demerit, Oligarchy, Democracy[2], and Tyranny: the intermediate stratum of constitutions governed by Law, which is so prominent in the Politicus, here disappears[3].

In the Laws, however, it reappears in the shape of the constitution of that dialogue, which takes its place next to the ideal State of the Republic and above the Lacedaemonian and Cretan forms. But in this constitution we trace not merely the element of legality, but the equally important principle of mixture. Restraint is exercised not only by law, but by the simultaneous representation in the government of various principles, which check each other and give law a chance of holding its own. It will be observed that Plato applies the term Aristocracy both to the ideal rule of philosophers and to the Oligarchy governed by Law—an use of the term which leaves traces of itself, as we shall see, in Aristotle's account of constitutions.

Plato, it is evident, worked out the view implied in Socrates' classification of constitutions, that they are to be distinguished, not so much by the number as by the

[1] Sus.[2], Note 533.

[2] Thus while in the Republic Democracy is ranked below Oligarchy, in the Politicus, when without law, it stands above Oligarchy without law.

[3] According to Aristotle (Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1), Plato in the Republic recognizes only four constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and aristocracy. Does Aristotle reckon Plato's 'timocracy' under the head of aristocracy?

character of the depositaries of power, or by the nature of their rule. Each constitution thus represents a different view with regard to the attributes which the ruler should possess: this was perhaps suggested to him by the analogy that he holds to exist between the soul of the individual and the State, which leads him to imagine five types of human character running parallel with the five constitutions. As each constitution corresponded, in his view, to a character, it was natural to conclude that the difference between constitutions is a moral difference, like the difference between characters.

Views of Aristotle as to the classification of constitutions: they developе progressively as we advance in the Third Book, and as we pass from the Third to the Sixth.

No subject is more frequently discussed by Aristotle than the question how it is that there are more constitutions than one and how many there are; and the views he expresses on this subject are by no means entirely self-consistent[1].

Plato had not distinctly asked himself what are the causes which determine the constitution of a State, but he would appear to hold that the main cause is a variation in the character of the citizens. The descent from the ideal Republic, at all events, down the scale of imperfect forms keeps pace with and is brought about by a deterioration of character. In the Politics this view survives side by side with others with which it is not explicitly reconciled.

We will take first the discussion of the question which we find in the Third Book. Aristotle begins by accepting provisionally the popular distinction between constitutions which give supreme authority to the One, the Few, or the Many; but each of these, we learn, may study the common good or the good of the depositary or depositaries of power only. We have thus six constitutions—Kingship, Aristocracy, Polity, in which the One, Few, or Many

[1] See Pol. 3. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq.: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.: 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sq.: 6 (4). 3–4: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. On Aristotle's classification of constitutions the interesting essay of Teichmüller, 'Die Aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen' (St. Petersburg, 1859), is well worth reading.

govern for the general advantage, and Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy[1], in which the One, Few, or Many govern for their own advantage. The three former are normal (*ὀρθαί*) constitutions: the three latter are deviation-forms (*παρεκβάσεις*). The deviation-forms contravene the aim with which the State was originally formed and for which it exists—the aim of the common advantage (3. 6. 1278 b 21). The kind of rule which obtains in all of them is similar to that which a master exercises over his slaves (*δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*)—in other words, rule is exercised in them, primarily at all events, for the good of the ruler.

The distinction thus drawn between normal constitutions and deviation-forms was not invented by Aristotle. It is evident from Pol. 3. 3. 1276 a 10–13 that the contrast between 'constitutions for the common good' and 'constitutions not for the common good, but based on force' was familiar enough to the Greeks, though the tendency (no doubt Athens is referred to) was to confine the latter designation to oligarchies and tyrannies, whereas Aristotle holds that democracies should also be brought under this head. Plato uses the very same term—'normal constitution' (*ὀρθὴ πολιτεία*)—in the Republic, Politicus, and Laws. In the Republic, he claims that the ideal State there described, whether it appears in the form of a Kingship or an Aristocracy, is the only truly normal constitution (Rep. 449 A); and so again in the Politicus he makes the possession of Science by the ruling authority the test of a normal constitution (292 A sqq.)[2]. In the Laws, however, we find the germ of the distinction drawn by Aristotle

[1] Aristotle, as a writer in the *Guardian* (Jan. 27, 1886) points out, always regards *δημοκρατία* as a *παρέκβασις*, and calls the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form by the name of *πολιτεία*, while Polybius, on the contrary, uses *δημοκρατία* in a favourable sense and calls its perversion *ὀχλοκρατία*. Aristotle seems to have found the term *πολιτεία* used in his own day to designate constitutions which were at one time known as 'democracies' (Pol. 6 (4.) 13. 1297 b 24).

[2] The question is here asked, *τί οὖν; οἰόμεθά τινα τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρισθεῖσαν, ἑνὶ καὶ ὀλίγοις καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ τῷ βιαίῳ καὶ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἄνευ νόμων ξυμβαίνουσαν γίγνεσθαι;*

between the two kinds of constitution: cp. Laws 715 B, *ταύτας δήπου φαμὲν ἡμεῖς νῦν οὔτ' εἶναι πολιτείας οὔτ' ὀρθοὺς νόμους, ὅσοι μὴ ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐτέθησαν· οἳ δ' ἕνεκα τινῶν, στασιωτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας*[1], *τούτους φαμέν, καὶ τὰ τούτων δίκαια ἃ φασιν εἶναι μάτην εἰρῆσθαι.* But Aristotle does not deny to the deviation-forms the name of constitutions, so far as they are governed by law (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq.), and he allows a partial validity to the notion of justice on which they rest (3. 9. 1280 a 9). Nor does he agree with the view of Plato in the Politicus (293 A) that 'normal rule' (*ὀρθὴ ἀρχή*) can only be looked for from one man or two, or at all events a very few. Thus he recognizes the Polity as a normal constitution. Plato's two tests of 'that which is normal'—science in the ruler and the aim of the common good—do not, we notice, lie far apart (cp. Polit. 296 E sqq., and especially the words *ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ τῆς νεὼς καὶ ναυτῶν ἀεὶ ξυμφέρον παραφυλάττων*), and thus Aristotle himself treats the rule exercised by science as exercised, in fact, for the advantage of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 40 sqq.). The distinction between governments which rule for the common good and governments which rule for the advantage of the rulers appears also in the De Pace of Isocrates (§ 91).

The principle involved in this distinction, however commonplace it may seem to us, was rightly made by these inquirers a cardinal point of Political Science[2]. Political

[1] Cicero goes perhaps a little further, and not only denies these constitutions the name of 'constitutions,' but denies the name of 'respublica' to States which do not aim at the common good, for his definition of 'respublica' (De Rep. 1. 25. 39) is 'res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.' But what name would he give to the States, if such there are, which are not 'respublicae'?

[2] It must be confessed that Aristotle goes far to mar the principle when he confines the 'common advantage' which the constitution is to study to the common advantage of the citizens (3. 13. 1283 b 40), for he thus makes his requirement one which any oligarchy that chose to limit the number of the citizens might satisfy. He probably, however, had a democracy in view, and there the principle even in this form would be valuable. We note that Xenophon makes Cambyses charge Cyrus not to rule his Persians *ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ*, as the nations dependent on Persia are ruled (Cyrop. 8. 5. 24).

controversialists have spent their efforts for centuries in the search for some indefeasible sovereign—Emperor, Pope, or People. Aristotle's doctrine is, that the true supreme authority is the One, the Few, or the Many, who can rule for the common good.

So far we have only the beginnings of a classification of constitutions: we have marked off the normal constitutions from the deviation-forms, but how are the three former, or again the three latter, to be distinguished from each other? As to the deviation-forms, Aristotle corrects at once the definitions of oligarchy and democracy which he has given: oligarchy is not the constitution in which the few rule for their own advantage, but that in which the rich rule for their own advantage; and so again in democracy it is not the many, but the poor, that hold sway and rule for their own advantage. The contrast between the holders of power in the two constitutions thus becomes, not a numerical, but a qualitative contrast. The account given of the remaining deviation-form (tyranny), however, remains unaltered; and as to the normal constitutions, we are allowed for the moment to conclude that the distinction between them is only a numerical one, except that we are warned (3. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.) that the many who rule in a polity will not possess full virtue. But the succeeding discussions of the Third Book add a new point of contrast between the two classes of constitution. That which is for the common good is identified by Aristotle at the commencement of the Twelfth Chapter (1282 b 17) with that which is just, and thus we find that the deviation-forms are not only wrong in the aim of their rule, but are the outcome of injustice, for they mistake that which is partially just for the absolutely just (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.). They sin not only against the common good but also against justice. We learn more clearly than ever that the difference between the two classes of constitution is a moral difference[1]. Even, indeed, within

[1] In Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 30 sqq., another point of contrast between ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι and παρεκβάσεις is noticed: in the latter there is

the normal constitutions a moral difference discloses itself: the Absolute Kingship (*παμβασιλεία*) and the ideal Aristocracy are found to represent the 'rule of virtue fully provided with external means with a view to the most perfect and desirable life' (3. 18. 1288 a 32–37 : cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32), and to be, in reality, a single form (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24), standing at the head of the list of constitutions as the 'most normal constitution' (*ὀρθοτάτη πολιτεία*, 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25), while the Polity is a deviation from this, and the deviation-forms hitherto so termed are deviations twice removed from the ideal original. This at least is the teaching of the Sixth Book. In that book the six constitutions are no longer ranged three against three, as in the Third: on the contrary, they succeed each other on a descending scale arranged on an ethical basis, very much like the descending scale in the Republic. Aristotle has here, in fact, apparently almost come round to the view of Plato, that the only really normal constitution is the Ideal Kingship or Aristocracy.

The best State in its two forms is thus not merely the best, but the most normal of the normal States: it is the State as Nature designed it to be. The others are failures. The earlier classification of constitutions into two contrasted groups of three has been reconsidered, with the result of clearing our views of the nature of each constitution, and also of placing the two ideal forms on a pinnacle by themselves.

We have gained fresh light as to the nature of the various constitutions as we have advanced from one chapter to another of the Third Book, and still more on passing from the Third to the Sixth.

As to Kingship, we learn that it is not enough to constitute a true Kingship that the single ruler should rule for the common good: he must possess a great superiority over those he rules in virtue and resources (*ἀρετὴ κεχορηγη-*

nothing common between ruler and ruled; they are not united by a common aim for the common good: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 sqq.

μένη)[1]. This is, in fact, the case in the Absolute Kingship (παμβασιλεία), and the Kingship which is subject to law is not really a separate constitution, for it may find a place in any and every constitution (3. 16. 1287 a 3 sqq.).

So again, Aristocracy is not simply a form in which a few rule for the common good, but one in which these few are men of full virtue (ἁπλῶς σπουδαῖοι), and possessed of a full complement of external means (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32), or in which the virtue of man and citizen coincide (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5). The name, however, is also applied to constitutions which combine a recognition of the claims of the people and of the rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 24), or of the people only (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16), with a recognition of the claims of virtue; or even, if the text is not corrupt or interpolated, to constitutions which, resembling a Polity, approach Oligarchy more nearly than the polity does (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20). It should be observed that in these less genuine Aristocracies the virtue recognized is not that recognized by the true Aristocracy (the virtue of the good man), but 'virtue relative to the constitution' (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sqq.).

So again, the Polity is not marked off merely by the aim with which its rulers rule: we learn, in fact, at the outset that the citizen-body in it will possess an imperfect type of virtue—military virtue[2]: the class which will be supreme in the Polity will be the hoplite class (3. 7. 1279 b 2), or, as we are told later, a mixture of the well-to-do and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 22), in which the 'moderately wealthy' (μέσοι) are strong (6 (4). 11).

We have already seen how much modification the original account of Democracy and Oligarchy receives immediately after it is given.

Thus the first description and classification of constitu-

[1] Cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 5: Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 (where for κληρωτὸς βασιλεύς, cp. Plato, Polit. 290 E, τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεῖ).

[2] The fact that virtue, though of an imperfect kind, is recognized in the Polity seems occasionally to be lost sight of, as for instance in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 10, where it is implied that in a Polity virtue will not be the deciding consideration in elections to office.

tions (3. 7) is not only a mere outline, but it is tentative and provisional. A closer study of them reveals to us that they differ among themselves, not only in the aim and nature of the rule exercised in them, but in the qualities of the rulers, or in other words, the attributes to which they award supreme power. When once we apply this standard, the ideal Kingship and Aristocracy present the aspect of a single constitution, for they both award power to 'virtue fully furnished with external means'; and below them, the so-called Aristocracies, the Polity, Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are readily distinguishable from each other.

We arrive, in fact, at the following list of constitutions, each finding the characteristic by which it is defined (*ὅρος*) in the attribute, or group of attributes, to which it awards power:—

παμβασιλεία, true *ἀριστοκρατία*	*ὅρος*	*ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη*
so-called *ἀριστοκρατία*	„	*ἀρετή, πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία,* or *ἀρετή, δῆμος*
πολιτεία	„	*πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία*
δημοκρατία	„	*ἐλευθερία*
ὀλιγαρχία	„	*πλοῦτος.*

What the *ὅρος* of Tyranny is, we do not learn, though its end is said to be, like that of oligarchy, wealth (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 10): it is, indeed, hardly a constitution.

Aristotle's account of the causes of constitutional diversity.

We naturally ask how it happens that all actually existing constitutions diverge more or less from the true type—how it is that the best constitution in its two forms is not also the only existing constitution. This is a question which Aristotle answers in more ways than one.

His first answer is that the character and ethical level of a community determine its constitution. Thus the best constitution presupposes a certain degree and kind of virtue: the life lived in it is one for which most men are not adapted (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.). Plato had already traced constitutions to character (Rep. 544 D), and Aristotle echoes this view (Pol. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14, *τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας*

ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιστον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας). The constitution expresses the creed of the community with regard to the life it should live, or, in other words, with regard to the sources of happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.). The laws embody the rule of life accepted by the State—a rule to which it may be unfaithful under pressure of temptation, just as the individual may (εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑνὸς ἀκρασία, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως, 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 18). Some constitutions admit to power classes which seek happiness in things not really productive of it (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.: cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sq.)[1]. This view, however, seems not to be fully worked out, and the existence of more constitutions than one is commonly traced by Aristotle to a mistake, not as to the sources of happiness, but as to what is just. The less satisfactory constitutions are regarded on either hypothesis as the result of error (ἁμάρτημα, 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq.: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq.), whether this error relates to the sources of happiness or to that which is just. If we take the latter view, the error is that of men, who, being judges in their own case (1280 a 14), not unnaturally err as to the extent of their claims: indeed, there is really some basis of justice for the claims they make. The claim of democracy is that those who are on an equality with the rest in one thing (ἐλευθερία) shall be accounted equal in all (i.e. shall receive an equal amount of the advantages distributable by the State)[2]: that of oligarchy is that those who are unequal in one respect (wealth) shall receive an unequal amount in the distribution.

So far the diversity of constitutions has been referred by

[1] The democratic classes would seek it in freedom, which they interpret as government by a majority and absence of control (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.): the oligarchical classes in wealth and birth.

[2] It does not seem to be quite true that Greek democracy expected absolute equality in all advantages distributable by the State; we do not find, for instance, that all offices were filled by lot even in the extreme democracy.

Aristotle to differences of ethical creed or varying versions of justice. But already in the foregoing, differences of creed have been connected with differences of class: some classes, we have been told, seek happiness in things not really productive of it, and their admission to power varies and vitiates the constitution.

In the Sixth and Eighth Books of the Politics constitutional variation is referred, not to ethical, but to social differences. It is referred to the preponderance in the community of a given social element (ποσόν or ποιόν, 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17 sqq.), or of particular classes or occupations, or to the distribution of property, or again to variations in the 'parts of the State' (μέρη πόλεως) and the combinations formed out of them. A populous city swarming with artisans and traders, and still more a populous seaport, full of fishermen like Tarentum and Byzantium, or of trireme-oarsmen like the Peiraeus, or of merchant-sailors like Aegina and Chios, was the natural home of democratic feeling (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 20 sqq.). The extreme oligarchy, on the other hand, found its natural home in communities seated in great levels suitable for the action of cavalry (like those of Thessaly), whose safety depended on their cavalry, and where the richest class were consequently held in especial honour, while the more moderate type of oligarchy would exist where the safety of the State depended on the hoplites, and where the moderately well-to-do class, to which the hoplites mostly belonged, was strong (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). The cause which ultimately determines the political organization of a community may thus often be the character of the territory, and we understand how it happens that much care is taken to secure a satisfactory territory for the best State (4 (7). cc. 5–6).

We see then that two distinct views of the causes of constitutional diversity find expression in different parts of the Politics, which Aristotle does not attempt to reconcile. They are not, however, perhaps irreconcileable, if we bear in mind the hints which we have already gathered from the Fourth Book that ethical and social differences

do not lie far apart. We can readily understand that in Aristotle's view the predominance in a society of a defective ethical creed or a wrong conception of justice is due to the predominance of classes which in the best State either do not exist or are relegated to obscurity.

Still the Sixth and Eighth Books place the sources of constitutional imperfection in a light in which they are not placed in other Books of the Politics. We learn from them that the excellence of a State may depend in the long run on accidents of its geography or history, or in other words, on the favour of Nature and Fortune, and that its ethical character does not depend wholly on itself, but in part on the social organization which circumstances dictate to it.

Aristotle the first clearly to recognize the truth that the constitution of a State reflects to some extent its social conditions.

In tracing the constitution to social conditions, Aristotle gives explicit recognition to an important truth, which Plato had certainly not recognized with equal clearness, though the facts which pointed to it were familiar enough. The genesis of the constitution of a State was perhaps studied by Aristotle more closely and more successfully than it has been studied till recent times, for the 'social contract' theory, so long dominant in political science, tended to disguise the circumstances under which a State comes by its constitution. The pictures drawn under its influence of a people meeting together and selecting its government, as a man might select a house or an article of furniture, were of course consciously ideal, but they obscure our recognition of the fact which Aristotle had long ago pointed out, that the constitution of a State has its roots in what moderns term its social system.

The question may, however, be asked—does a change of constitution, then, always imply a profound ethical or social change? Aristotle does not seem to have thought so. The book on Constitutional Change illustrates in every page, how misconduct on the part of the holders of power, or want of vigilance, or conduct arousing feelings of envy, panic, or contempt in the minds of those excluded

from power, or the presence of heterogeneous and incohesive elements in the citizen body, or even mere accident[1] may cause a change of constitution. Still these are only the occasions of change. They would be powerless for harm, if social contrasts, involving ethical ones, did not exist within the ranks of the community.

A conflict between the ideas of different classes of men as to what makes for happiness and is just—this is, in brief, Aristotle's account of the causes which have brought more constitutions than one into being. Each constitution has an ἦθος of its own and embodies a distinct view of life. The difference between them is not a mere numerical difference, but a difference of faith, a difference of character.

What is the value of Aristotle's classification?

If we ask what is the value of Aristotle's classification of constitutions, it must of course be at once conceded that its significance for us is impaired by the changes which have occurred since his day. He classifies the constitutions which he found existing in Greece and among the neighbouring barbarian peoples. He never ventures to imagine that other forms of Kingship or Oligarchy or Democracy than those he knows are possible, though of course this was the case. With the constitution of Rome he was, unfortunately, not acquainted. It is true that the cities of the Hellenic world, stretching as they did from Massalia to the Palus Maeotis, offered an immense variety of constitutions to the investigations of the political inquirer—a far greater variety, probably, than could be found in contemporary Italy—and that a distinct stimulus was thus imparted to the study of politics; but we feel that Plato and Aristotle deserved better constitutions to review and analyse than those of Greece.

And then again, the plan of classifying constitutions by their ὅρος—in other words, by the attribute or attributes which confer supreme power in each—stands and falls with

[1] Athens came to be an extreme democracy ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (2. 12. 1274 a 12).

the conception of the constitution as a 'life' (*βίος*)—as an ethical influence for good or evil. Aristotle's principle is—'things are made what they are by their function and their capability' (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 23). How can it be right, he would ask, to class Kingship and Tyranny together, because one man rules in each, when they differ so greatly in *ὅρος* and ethical influence, or to distinguish between the Absolute Kingship and the true Aristocracy, both of which rest on 'fully equipped virtue'? We hardly, indeed, understand how he was able to bring under the common head of Democracy or Oligarchy the strongly contrasted sub-forms of each which he enumerates in the Sixth Book.

The old classification of constitutions by the number of the rulers in each has, however, held its ground down to our own day, partly, no doubt, because the ethical significance of constitutions is no longer as prominent to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, partly because the numerical difference is at once a conspicuous, and a really important and instructive, difference between constitutions. Still the principle of classification adopted by Plato and Aristotle has the merit of directing attention to the *ἦθος* and aim of constitutions as distinguished from their letter: we learn from it to read the character of a State, not in the number of its rulers, but in its dominant principle, in the attribute —be it wealth, birth, virtue, or numbers, or a combination of two or more of these—to which it awards supreme authority, and ultimately in the structure of its social system and the mutual relation of its various social elements. If they erred in their principle of classification, it was from a wish to get to the heart of the matter[1].

The Third Book an introduc-

We now pass to Aristotle's treatment of the question what a State should be, and especially what its constitution

[1] Heracleides Ponticus seems to have applied the same principle to the classification of *ἁρμονίαι*, which Aristotle himself often regards as offering a parallel to constitutions (e.g. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 19 sqq.). Heracleides held that harmonies should be classified by *ἦθος* (Athen. Deipn. 624 c sqq., an interesting passage).

tion both to the inquiry as to the best constitution and to the study of constitutions generally. It traces the conditions of sound or normal government as a preliminary step to both these investigations.

should be; for this will determine what its citizen-body and its supreme authority will be. This is the main subject of the Third Book of the Politics (cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 32–41: 6. 1278 b 6 sq.: 10. 1281 a 11). There is much in the language of the First and Second Books to lead us to expect an immediate transition at the close of the Second to the subject of the best State and constitution, but Aristotle prefers to rise gradually to this subject through a series of discussions, which form, like the ἀπορίαι respecting music in the Fifth Book, a kind of prelude (ἐνδόσιμον, 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 13) striking the keynote of what is to follow, and which gradually conduct the inquirer from the study of the simplest element of the State, the citizen, upward to the study of the constitution, and through a variety of constitutions, first to the normal forms of constitution, and then to the best. The special task of the Third Book is thus to exhibit the broad conditions which every sound government must satisfy, and which the best constitution satisfies while it rises above them; to build a satisfactory platform, or pedestal, on which to rear the structure of the best State, and to depict at once the contrast of the normal constitutions and the deviation-forms, and the transition from the normal constitutions to the best. It includes, in fact, something more than this, for its closing chapters bring the best constitution before us in one of its two forms, the Absolute Kingship. The Third Book stands at the parting of the ways, where the ideal and the more practicable forms of political organization separate; it serves as an introduction to the study both of the more generally attainable constitutions described in the Sixth and Eighth Books and of the form of the best constitution described in the Fourth and Fifth.

The State consisting of citizens, the first question to be asked is —What is a citizen?

To learn what the State is, Aristotle resolves it into its component elements. He had done the same thing at the outset of the First Book, in order to discover the difference between the householder and the statesman. This time, however, the component elements of the State are taken to be, not households, but citizens: the State is a definite

number of citizens (*πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41, explained in 1275 b 20 as *πλῆθος πολιτῶν ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς*). The State proper is here meant to be defined; not that broader State which includes women, children, non-citizens, and slaves—all, in fact, who exchange within its borders any sort of service—the *πόλις* referred to in 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sq., and said in that passage to fall into two sections, men and women.

What, then, is a citizen[1]? An Athenian would probably answer by pointing to the enactment carried by Aristophon in the famous year of Eucleides' archonship, which confined Athenian citizenship, in full conformity with the traditions of Solon and Pericles, to the children of Athenian parents —an enactment deprived of its retrospective operation by a decree moved shortly after by Nicomenes, but otherwise undisturbed, so that the law ran to this effect—*μηδένα τῶν μετ' Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντα μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ἂν μὴ ἄμφω τοὺς γονέας ἀστοὺς ἐπιδείξηται, τοὺς δὲ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου ἀνεξετάστους ἀφεῖσθαι*[2]. Others went further, and denied the name of citizen to any one who could not prove descent from more generations than one of citizens. It was thus that citizen descent for three generations, both on the father's side and on that of the mother, was required in the case of archons and priests[3], and that in many colonies the descendants of

[1] One of the reasons which led Aristotle to make this question the starting-point of the inquiry as to the best constitution may well have been the fact that Plato had in the Republic made the *χρηματιστικοί* citizens of his ideal State. If he had studied the nature of the ideal citizen more closely, he might not have done so.

[2] See A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 122 sqq., who thus reconciles the data as to Aristophon and Nicomenes. See also C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 118.

[3] See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 149. 6. 'Men not only felt confidence in the devotion to the State which they held to be traditional in the old families, but also thought that the humiliations endured by non-citizens in consequence of the exclusiveness of the Attic law of citizenship could hardly fail to produce in their minds a bitter feeling, which was only too likely to be inherited by their descendants; we find, in fact, in an oration of Aeschines (3. 169) some expressions which are full of instruction on this subject' (L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 2. 228). The origin of the regulation, indeed, may perhaps be sought in religious sentiment. It is worthy of notice that in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 2. the reading of the MSS. is *οἱ πολῖται*

the earliest immigrants formed a class apart and long monopolized power (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11 sqq.)[1]. As the Greek citizen often found himself for a long time together resident in States to which he did not belong, and whose members did not possess rights of inter-marriage in his own —whether as a cleruch, or an exile, or a mercenary soldier, or for purposes of trade or business—and might contract marriage during these periods of absence from home, or indeed while a resident in his native State, with one who was neither a fellow-citizen nor possessed of rights of inter-marriage, it is easy to see how a class would arise not of full citizen descent (*τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26)—a class to which even extreme democracies, like that of Athens, were not always kind, and which sometimes did not possess full rights of succession to property, even when citizenship was accorded to it[2]. No doubt, a distinction would be drawn, in feeling, if not in law, between an union with an alien citizen and an union with a barbarian or slave[3]. Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic School, which was the first to lay stress on the unity of the human race and to start the doctrine of a World-State, was, like several other great Athenians, the son of a barbarian mother, and there are indications in Diogenes Laertius' biography of him that he was conscious of the slight put on his birth. It was thus that the ideas of *ἐλευθερία* (free, or perhaps citizen, birth) and *εὐγένεια* (noble birth) came to lie so near together in the view of the Greeks. The free-born citizen

καὶ οἱ γενναῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί, though the editors commonly (*ex coniectura*) read *οἱ ὁπλῖται κ.τ.λ.*

[1] 'It is possible that in the original formation of German society the eorl represented the first settler in the waste, while the ceorls sprang from descendants of the early settler who had in various ways forfeited their claim to a share in the original homestead, or more probably from incomers into the village, who had since settled round it and been admitted to a share in the land and freedom of the community' (Green, Making of England, p. 178).

[2] C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 118: 3. § 57. 2: 1. § 52. 5. They are called *ξένοι* in Pol. 3. 5. 1278a 26–28, but are distinguished in that passage from *νόθοι*.

[3] Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32.

and the noble were alike in this, that the circumstances of their birth made them what they were.

These strict views of citizenship were disposed of by the simple inquiry, how the citizen from whom descent was traced could be a citizen, if he was not descended from citizen ancestors; and a sharp saying of Gorgias was remembered, that the Demiurgi, or chief magistrates, of Larissa were 'demiurgi' (handicraftsmen) in every sense, for that they manufactured citizens of Larissa[1]. Aristotle, himself a resident alien, makes short work of these old-fashioned fancies, and defines citizenship by the possession of certain rights, not by extraction.

A citizen is one on whom the State has conferred rights of access to office, judicial or deliberative.

A citizen, according to him, is one on whom the State has conferred 'a right to share in office, deliberative or judicial' (*ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς*, 3. 1. 1275 b 18), whether he exercises this right singly as a magistrate of the State, or collectively as a member of a political body—an assembly, for example, or a dicastery. In popular parlance, probably, citizenship was not thus limited: see 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 33, where 'citizens who share in the constitution' are referred to, as though all citizens did not necessarily do so, and the passage continues—'and in our State all the citizens share in the constitution.' Plato had given the name of citizens to all comprised in the three classes of the Republic, though only the first of these classes possessed political authority[2]; but Aristotle's intention evidently is to connect citizenship, not with merely social functions, such as the supply of necessary com-

[1] See Sus.[2], Note 450, which explains the full proportions of the *bon mot*, unless, with Mr. Ridgeway (Camb. Philol. Trans., 2. 135 sqq.), we deny it to be 'double-barrelled.' The aim of Gorgias, in any case, was to make out that the citizen is the handiwork, not of nature, but of man.

[2] He sees, however, in the Laws (768 B), that *ὁ ἀκοινώνητος ὢν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι*: cp. Aristot. Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 15–18, where much the same thing is said of *τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν*, though, according to 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., something less than this sufficed the people in many States—indeed, if let alone and allowed to drudge and save, they would seem to have been commonly content with a merely nominal share of power (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sqq.).

modities, nor even with military functions, apart from political, but with 'office, deliberative or judicial[1].'

To Aristotle, then, what makes a citizen is not the right to own land or to sue and be sued, or the right of intermarriage, or other similar rights, the possession of which sufficed, in the view of the Greeks[2], to constitute a citizen, but the right to share, and opportunities of sharing, in the exercise of official authority. He who did not participate in the life of the State did not seem to him to deserve the name of a citizen, and the life of the State was political and speculative activity—'noble,' not 'necessary,' functions. Spinoza defines citizens as 'homines qui ex jure civili omnibus civitatis commodis gaudent' (Tractat. Pol. 3. 1). Aristotle defines them rather by their functions than their 'commoda.'

His principle that the State is a body of citizens, taken with his account of citizenship, evidently points to a more or less popular form of State. In an absolute monarchy, as Schömann remarks[3], the king would be the only person possessing an underived right to rule, and therefore, if we construe Aristotle's view strictly, the only citizen; and a narrow oligarchy, in which a body (*πλῆθος*) of men possessed of the right to rule could hardly be said to exist, would also offend against his account of the State.

Are we then to say, when a turn of the political wheel has

But then—Aristotle goes on to ask, after rapidly dismissing the account of citizenship which bases it on birth, and not on the grant of certain rights by the State—is it not an objection to this definition of it, that it obliges us

[1] The meaning of *κρίσις* (3. 1. 1275 a 23: cp. *κριτικῆς*, 1275 b 19), as Schömann has pointed out (Gr. Alterth. 1. 107. 3, ed. 2), must not be too strictly confined to judicial work, for not only does *τὸ κρίνειν* include the review of the official conduct of magistrates (3. 11. 1281 b 31 sqq.), but it seems sometimes to be used in a still wider sense, as in the phrase *κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων* (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 22): indeed in 6 (4). 15. 1299a 26 it is used of magistracies, and in 2. 11. 1273 a 11 of the popular assembly. Bernays, in fact, translates *ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς* in 3. 1. 1275 b 18, 'ein berathendes oder entscheidendes Amt' (see also Schömann, *ubi supra*). Perhaps, however, the work of the judge (cp. 1275 a 26: b 13–17) is mainly referred to in the phrase *ἀρχῆς κριτικῆς*, as here used.

[2] Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 107–8.

[3] Gr. Alterth. 1. 107.

to admit any one to be a citizen, on whom some momentary turn of the political wheel may confer citizenship? Are the aliens and slave metoeci[1], whom Cleisthenes introduced into the tribes after the expulsion of the Pisistratidae, to be accounted citizens? His first answer is that this *ἀπορία* raises a question, not of fact, but of justice: he sees, however, that a further question may be raised, whether one who is not justly a citizen is a citizen at all. But he insists that these persons must be accounted citizens, if they have the rights of citizens, and as to the question of justice, that runs up into the question already raised (3. 1. 1274 b 34), whether they owe their citizenship to an act of the State or not. For democrats would not always allow the act of a preceding oligarchy or tyranny to bind a democracy coming after it, or to be taken as an act of the State. Aristotle is probably referring, as Thirlwall has remarked (Hist. of Greece, 4. 235: cp. 204), to a well-known case of this at Athens, referred to also by Isocrates (Areopag. § 68) and Demosthenes (in Leptin.

conferred these rights on slaves and aliens, persons presumably unfit to possess them, that the State has conferred them and that these men are citizens?

[1] Δοῦλοι *μέτοικοι*, 1275 b 37. I take *μέτοικοι* to be the substantive, δοῦλοι the adjective. If I am right in this, Aristotle appears to intend to distinguish between free metoeci and slave metoeci—that is, metoeci of servile status or origin. There would probably be many such in the class of metoeci, and no doubt it would be felt to be a far stronger measure to admit metoeci of this type to citizenship than free metoeci like Aristotle himself (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32 sq.). The word δοῦλος, according to Chrysippus (Athen. Deipn. 267 b), was sometimes used in a sense inclusive of freedmen, and some of these 'slave metoeci' may possibly have been freedmen: runaway slaves or slaves attached to a foreign master may, however, also be referred to. It would have been a stronger measure still to give citizenship to slaves of Athenian masters. But to give citizenship to slaves of any kind stamped a man either as a tyrant (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8), or an extreme democrat (ibid. 2. 3. 48). If the true reading were, as has been suggested, *ξένους καὶ δούλους καὶ μετοίκους*, one would have expected the three substantives (as Thirlwall remarks, Hist. of Greece, 2. 74 n.) to be arranged in a different order (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 19). It is just possible that here, as elsewhere, two alternative readings (*δούλους* and *μετοίκους*) have together found their way into the text, but probably *δούλους μετοίκους* is correct. (Since the foregoing note was in print, I have observed that Bernays translates *πολλοὺς . . . ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους* 'many aliens and freedmen (viele Insassen und Freigelassene).' See his Translation, p. 135, and his note in Heraklit. Briefe, p. 155, where he explains his view of the passage.)

c. 11 sq.), in which money had been lent by the Lacedaemonians to the oligarchical College of Ten to aid it in its struggle against the democrats under Thrasybulus, and the question was raised in the popular assembly, whether its repayment could be claimed from the restored democracy —whether, in fact, the State of Athens had contracted the loan. In this instance the sum was repaid by the State. Many, however, were disposed to contend, that oligarchies and tyrannies rested on force, and were not, like democracy, governments for the common good, and thus that their acts were not the acts of the State. Aristotle (1276 a 13) hints that the acts of a democracy would be just as impeachable on that score; but he passes on to consider a cognate question, what are the grounds on which we are to pronounce a πόλις to be the same or to have changed its identity. It will be noticed that the democrats just referred to did not claim that democratically governed Athens was a different State from oligarchically governed Athens: it was not on that ground that they repudiated the debt contracted by the oligarchy, but on the ground that the oligarchy was not the State. Aristotle does not accept this contention, and therefore prefers to argue the matter on a new basis. Is the πόλις the same, he asks, when its inhabitants have moved from the old site, and some of them live on one site, and others on another? This, he says, is a question of language: the word πόλις is used in more senses than one. Is a πόλις the same, so long as it is surrounded by the same walls? Why, a space surrounded by walls may be, as we see in the case of Babylon, so large as to be the abode of an ἔθνος, rather than a πόλις. Or is it the same so long as the stock of its inhabitants remains the same? No, the very same inhabitants, if differently combined, may become a different State, just as the same individuals may be successively formed into two or more different choruses. It is to the πολιτεία—the synthesis, not the individuals—that we must mainly look when we pronounce on the identity of the πόλις. But it does not follow, that when one constitu-

This question leads to an inquiry as to the identity of the State, which is found to reside mainly in the constitution, the answer implied (but not given) being that these men are citizens by the act of the State, though hardly perhaps the same State as existed before.

tion takes the place of another, or, in other words, when one πόλις is replaced by another, the new πόλις should refuse to fulfil the contracts of the old: whether it should do so, is a matter for separate consideration.

The conclusion suggested, though not drawn, for Aristotle has lost sight of the origin of the discussion in the nice investigation to which it has led him, is that the aliens made citizens by Cleisthenes are citizens by the act of the State, though perhaps not the same State as existed before the change of constitution: whether the State acted rightly in making them citizens or not, is a question on which further light is thrown in the succeeding chapters, and especially in c. 5.

When Aristotle finds the identity of the State mainly in the πολιτεία, his view is quite in harmony with his general conception of the importance of the πολιτεία as the expression of the end for which the State lives (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15–18). Isocrates had said that the State is immortal (De Pace § 120, αἱ δὲ πόλεις διὰ τὴν ἀθανασίαν ὑπομένουσι καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίας). Cicero's view is not very different: 'itaque nullus interitus est reipublicae naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe: civitas autem, quum tollitur, deletur, exstinguitur, simile est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat' (de Rep. 3. 23. 34). Spinoza in his 'mortuo rege, obiit quodam modo civitas[1],' seems to go farther than Aristotle. Locke (on Civil Government, 2. § 211) distinguishes between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. 'The usual and almost the only way whereby this union' in one politic society 'is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them; for in that case, not being able to maintain and support themselves as one entire and independent body, the union belonging to that body, which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with

[1] Tractat. Pol. 7. 25.

a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society.' According to this, the Norman Conquest of England was the beginning of a new society. The question is more familiar to us in relation to the Church of England and the question of its continuity. A recent writer, whose book is reviewed in the *Saturday Review* for Dec. 9, 1882, holds that 'it is not either from Christ and his Apostles, nor yet from the period of the Reformation,' but from the passing of the Act of Uniformity in the reign of Charles the Second, 'that we must date the foundation of the present Established Church of England.' His reviewer dissents: 'the National Church no more ceased to exist when its bishops were expelled and its liturgy disused, a parochial church no more ceased to exist when a Presbyterian or an Anabaptist preacher was thrust upon it as its pastor, than the State or nation itself ceased to exist, when it was ruled by a Council of State or a Protector, instead of a King.' Whatever may be the merits of this controversy, we see that the question raised by Aristotle is still one on which debate is possible[1].

What is the virtue of the citizen? Is it the same as the virtue of the good man? Significance of this discussion.

Aristotle, however, passes on to discuss a more important question, to which the inquiries we have just noticed lead up. The question whether slaves and aliens are legitimate citizens naturally suggests the further question, what is the virtue of a citizen, and is it identical with the virtue of a good man? Aristotle will not deny the name of a citizen to any one whom the State has invested with certain powers, but he thinks it worth while to inquire what qualities the citizen ought to possess, and whether he is bound to possess all those which go to the making of a good man. The investigation as to the virtue of a citizen reminds us of the investigation in the First Book as to the virtue of women, children, and slaves; here as there the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue comes up for discussion.

[1] See De Witt's Jefferson, E. T. p. 154, where various passages of Jefferson's works bearing on questions of this kind are referred to.

There were many probably who thought that to be a good citizen (that is, an useful member of the State, whatever its constitution) was to be a good man (cp. Thuc. 2. 42. 2 sq.). On the other hand, Socrates had said that it was impossible to be a good citizen without moral goodness (Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 11, *οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι*: cp. 4. 6. 14). Teaching as he did the unity of the various virtues [1], it was natural that he should also identify the virtue of the good citizen and the good man, and thus we find Plato in the Gorgias (517 B–C) merging political in moral virtue, for he makes the virtue of a citizen consist in the moral improvement of his fellows, not in adding to the material defences of the State [2].

Aristotle's object is to show that neither of these views is correct, and also to put forth a third view, which combines all that is of value in them. He accepts the first of them to this extent, that he allows a kind of virtue even to the citizen of a deviation-form; on the other hand, he agrees with Socrates that the virtue of the good citizen is in one case (that of the 'ruling citizen' (*πολιτικός*) in the best constitution) identical with that of the good man. His wish is to do justice to all forms and degrees of citizen-virtue, and at the same time to show that its highest form is alone to be identified with that of the good man. Here, as elsewhere, he seeks to mediate between opposing views, and to extract from them whatever element of truth they contain.

He begins by asking in what the virtue of a citizen consists, and finds it, not in that in which it had commonly

[1] He was followed in this view by the Megarians (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 184. 4, ed. 2), the Cynics (ibid. 2. 1. 221. 3–4), and the Eretrian school (ibid. 2. 1. 200. 5). There was a standing feud between the Megarian school and Aristotle. This school struck at the root of Aristotle's system by disputing the distinction of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* (Grote, Plato 3. 490: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 183. 2, ed. 2). On Eubulides, one of the leaders of this school in Aristotle's time, see A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 295-6, who refers to Menage's note on Diog. Laert. 2. 109.

[2] Thucydides finds the characteristic of a good citizen in a desire to benefit his State (6. 9. 2: 6. 14. 1). Demosthenes speaks to somewhat the same effect (De Chers. cc. 68–72). Plato would quite approve, but then he would probably interpret this expression differently.

been taken to consist[1]—the qualities which win success or advantage for the State—but in those which contribute to the maintenance of the existing constitution, whatever it may be. Just as the virtue of the child is relative to his father (*πρὸς τὸν ἡγούμενον*), and that of the slave to his master (*πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην*), so the virtue of the citizen is relative to the constitution (*πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*). It follows that there must be many forms of the virtue of a citizen, for there are many constitutions, and the virtue which upholds one will not be the same as that which upholds another; but the virtue of a good man is always one and the same, for it is complete virtue. The virtue of a citizen cannot, therefore, in all constitutions be identical with the virtue of a good man.

Is it so even in the best constitution? No: for (1) the State even there cannot be wholly composed of men entirely alike; hence not of good men[2]. But it must be composed of good citizens: hence the virtue of the citizen and the good man are not identical. (2) The State is composed of unequals, and the virtue of the leader of a chorus is not identical with that of the member who stands beside him. (The first of these arguments appears to be based on considerations of what is possible, and to be designed to show that the identity of the virtue of the citizen and the good man is impossible: the second appears to be designed to show that as a matter of fact, looking to the nature of the State, this identity does not exist.)

We see then that the absolute identity of the virtue of the citizen with that of the good man, which Socrates asserted to exist, does not exist, even in the best constitution. Even there the virtue of all citizens will not be identical with the virtue of the good man. But will the virtue of some citizens be so?

We commonly call the good ruler good and morally

[1] Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 14: 4. 2. 11.

[2] Aristotle seems to think otherwise in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq.: see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 683. 4, who regards the view expressed in the passage of the Third Book before us as merely dialectical or aporetic, and not Aristotle's definitive view.

wise, and the man capable of ruling (πολιτικός) must needs be morally wise [for moral wisdom (φρόνησις) and political wisdom (πολιτική) are identical]. Then again, it is a common view that the very education of the ruler must be altogether different from that of the ruled. Are we to say then that the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of the good man? In that case we should have found what we have been seeking—some citizens whose virtue is the same as that of the good man. Perhaps Jason felt that the virtue of a ruler is one thing and the virtue of a citizen (who is both ruler and ruled) another, for he said that 'it was starvation to him not to be a tyrant,' implying that he did not know how to be a private individual [1]. But then we praise a man who is capable both of ruling and of being ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute is said to consist in a capacity for ruling and being ruled well. If then the virtue of the good man is that of a ruler only, and the virtue of a citizen includes both that of a ruler and that of one who is ruled, the two aptitudes which the citizen unites must be different in point of praiseworthiness (Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different kinds of virtue). Since then we sometimes hold that a ruler and a person ruled should learn two distinct things and not the same thing, but that the citizen should know both what the ruler knows and what he who is ruled knows, and share both in ruling and being ruled, what follows from that is plain enough. We must first make it clear what kind of rule it is that the citizen should learn through being ruled to exercise. It is not the kind of rule which is exercised over slaves, or that which is concerned with necessaries, but that which is exercised over

[1] It was Jason, probably, who used the argument referred to in 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 35, that a man ought to make himself supreme master of his State at any cost of evildoing, inasmuch as it is only in that position that it is possible to perform the greatest number of noble acts (cp. Rhet. 1. 12. 1373 a 25, and Plutarch, Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24: De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22). Anacreon had sung of a queen Callicrete as ἐπισταμένη τυραννικά ([Plato], Theages 125 E).

men like the ruler and free (*πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*)[1]. Having made this clear, we may draw the conclusion that the good citizen will possess two forms of virtue—the virtue which fits a man to rule as a citizen rules his fellow-citizens, and the virtue which fits a man to be ruled as citizens are ruled by their fellow-citizens. And we may go on and say the same of the virtue of the good man. This also will have two forms—the one that of the ruler, the other that of the ruled. The former is the complete form, for it alone includes *φρόνησις*.

Thus the virtue of the citizen in its fulness is identical with the virtue of the man in its fulness: so far Socrates was right in identifying the two, but he was not right in denying that there is such a thing as the virtue of a citizen apart from that of a man. On the contrary, the virtue of the citizen in many constitutions is distinct from that of the man, and even in the best it is only in some of the citizens—those who are capable of ruling—that the two coincide. How far the subordinate forms of the virtue of a citizen and of a man coincide in the best constitution, Aristotle does not say. In other constitutions they evidently will not coincide.

Aristotle perhaps has before him in this inquiry a passage in the Laws (643 D–644 B), where Plato asks what is the true aim of education, and finds that it is to produce a desire to become a 'perfect citizen, knowing how both to rule and to be ruled with justice,' or, in other words, to produce good men, for 'those who are rightly educated may be said to become good men' (644 A: compare also Laws 942 C). Aristotle quite agrees that this is the aim of education in the best State, but then he allows the existence of a form of citizen-virtue in the deviation-forms

[1] Aristotle perhaps wishes tacitly to correct the strong expressions of Plato, Laws 762 E, *δεῖ δὴ πάντ' ἄνδρα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ' ἂν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίνου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι* κ.τ.λ. Plutarch repeats Plato's language in Praecepta Reip. Gerend. c. 12, *ὡς οὐδ' ἄρξαι καλῶς τοὺς μὴ πρότερον ὀρθῶς δουλεύσαντας, ἧ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, δυναμένους.*

of State: thus he frequently insists that in them the citizens should receive an education suitable to the constitution.

These are the central lessons of the chapter, but its incidental teaching also is important. There were evidently those who regarded the virtue of the good man as concerned only with ruling. Themistocles had said, in his haughty letter of defence to the people of Athens, that 'he neither wished nor was fitted by nature to be ruled[1]'; and Gorgias is made in the Meno of Plato to identify virtue with the ability to rule[2]. But Aristotle insists that one form, though not the highest, of the virtue of the good man is concerned with being ruled, and that it is by learning how to be ruled (after the fashion of freemen) that the good man learns how to rule. Aristotle's conception of a good man is thus quite different from that of Gorgias. To obey is the beginning of virtue. Aristotle is here preparing the ground for the institutions of his best State, where this rule is followed (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sq.).

On the other hand, there were those to whom political activity, and even political capacity, seemed no essential elements of virtue (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 18). This view also is tacitly corrected by Aristotle. He will not allow full virtue to exist where there is no capacity for rule. Thus the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*) and the true statesman or king (*πολιτικὸς καὶ βασιλικός*) are identified (3. 18. 1288 b 1). *Φρόνησις* is a virtue peculiar to the ruler[3]. Already the Cynics and Cyrenaics—later on, other schools[4]—refused

[1] Plutarch, Themist. c. 23, *διαβαλλόμενος γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ἔγραφεν, ὡς ἄρχειν μὲν ἀεὶ ζητῶν, ἄρχεσθαι δὲ μὴ πεφυκὼς μηδὲ βουλόμενος, οὐκ ἄν ποτε βαρβάροις καὶ πολεμίοις αὐτὸν ἀποδόσθαι μετὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.*

[2] Meno 73 C: ΣΩΚΡ. *Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστί, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου.* ΜΕΝ. *Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων*;—cp. ibid. 71 E, *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν* (the answer of Meno), and 73 A.

[3] Cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 17, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.*

[4] The Stoics held that 'a philosopher who teaches and improves

to make governing or the capacity for governing a condition of virtue. Aristotle so far disconnects the two things as to allow the existence of a lower form of virtue in the case of persons who neither govern nor are capable of governing, but he makes *φρόνησις*, which includes a capacity for governing, essential to full virtue. Thus while he declines to deny all virtue whatever to those who are capable only of being ruled, he places the virtue of the good ruler on a pinnacle, as the characteristic excellence of the good man.

The whole inquiry illustrates the dependence of virtue on the constitution. The deviation-forms presuppose in their citizens a type of citizen-virtue, but an inferior type, and it is only in the best constitution that citizen-virtue rises into the full virtue of the good man. Here the ruling citizen, or statesman (*πολιτικός*), is identical with the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*). The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics take this identification as the starting-point of their inquiries on the subject of education (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11–16), and ask what education will produce men of full virtue, as the best way of discovering how to produce true statesmen.

Thus this chapter of the Third Book forms an important link in the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for the arrangement in the Fourth by which the younger men of the best State are not allowed to rule till they have learnt to obey, and have acquired the virtues of rulers through such subordination as befits freemen. How far its teaching agrees with that of 4 (7). 3, where it seems to be implied that a purely speculative life is an ideally complete one, is another question[1].

Are *βάναυσοι* (who do not share in office) citizens?

Aristotle has now nearly done with the subject of the citizen, but before he leaves it, he notices and discusses one other *ἀπορία* with regard to it, arising out of the

his fellow-men benefits the State quite as much as a warrior, an administrator, or a civil functionary' (Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, E. T. p. 305).

[1] See Appendix B as to some further points connected with this chapter.

account just given of the virtue of the citizen—partly, in all probability, because its discussion enables him to show that there are more forms of the citizen than one, and that the varieties of the citizen point to varieties of constitution, and thus leads up to the inquiries that follow: partly because he desires to draw attention to the fact that his definition of the citizen and of citizen-virtue does not hold good universally.

They are so in some constitutions, but not in others.

The *ἀπορία* is thus stated (3. 5. 1277 b 34)—*πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον*; The *βάναυσοι* have been said in the preceding chapter to be 'persons ruled as slaves are ruled,' and here it is assumed that they do not share in office[1]. Hence they will not possess the virtue of a citizen, which consists of being capable both of ruling and being ruled as citizens rule citizens. Are they then citizens?

An inquiry on this subject discloses that some constitutions admit those concerned with 'necessary work' to citizenship, while others do not. The *βάναυσος* is so far a citizen that he is a citizen 'under particular forms of constitution' (*ἔν τινι πολιτείᾳ*)[2]. He is often a citizen in oligarchies; and in many democracies not only is the *βάναυσος* a citizen, but even the alien and the bastard. This, however, occurs only in States in which genuine citizens have run short, and then only for a time, so that even these democracies recognize that some types of citizen are less authentic than others[3].

The whole discussion makes it manifest that there are various types of citizen, and that the truest citizen (*ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης*) is he who shares in office. The account given in c. 4 of the virtue of a citizen is thus shown to be maintainable, even if it does not hold good of all who are anywhere made citizens, and the close connexion of cc. 4

[1] Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 21, *τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.*

[2] Cp. *ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, 3. 14. 1285 a 9.

[3] It is quite in Aristotle's manner to distinguish between different kinds of citizens; he distinguishes in the First Book (1. 7. 1255 b 27 sqq.) between different kinds of slaves.

and 5 is evidenced by a recapitulation of the result of c. 4 added at the end of c. 5, the inquiries of the latter chapter having confirmed the conclusions of the former.

Aristotle had stated at the outset of the whole discussion (3. 1. 1275 a 34 sq.), that things which have to do with (or stand in relation to) objects differing in kind and in priority have little or nothing in common, and that constitutions, the object-matter to which the citizen is related, differ in kind and in priority; whence it follows that the citizen under one constitution is different from the citizen under another, and that we must not expect to find the various types of citizen possessing much in common[1]. Wherever this is the case, no definition can be made to suit all the types of the thing equally well (1275 a 33).

The nature of citizenship proving to depend on the constitution, we naturally pass on to the constitution.

Throughout the inquiry as to the nature of the citizen, our attention has constantly been drawn to the importance of the constitution: the citizen, we are told, varies with the constitution—the identity of the State is mainly to be sought in the constitution; and the transition is natural from the subject of the citizen to that of the constitution. Aristotle, who is seldom content with incidental solutions

[1] Bernays (Aristoteles' Politik, p. 132) and Bonitz (Ind. 799 a 15 sqq.) differ as to the interpretation of the passage, 3. 1. 1275 a 34 sqq. The interpretation of the latter, who explains *τὰ ὑποκείμενα* (35) as 'singulae *πολιτεῖαι*, ad quas refertur *πολίτου* notio,' would seem to be in all probability the correct one, and has been followed in the text. What is said here of constitutions, is also, apparently, true of *χρηματιστική* and its forms (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 20, *τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα*), and of *βασιλεία* (3. 14. 1284 b 40 sqq.), and also of the *ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός* (3. 4. 1277 b 18). We must bear in mind the caution given to the reader of treatises dealing with *πολιτική* at the commencement of the Nicomachean Ethics (1. 1. 1094 b 19 sqq.). But indeed in dealing with all subjects Aristotle has little confidence in broad general definitions: cp. De An. 2. 1. 412 b 4, *εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*: 2. 3. 414 b 22, *γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς· διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν τοιοῦτον . . . ὥστε καθ' ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου.*

of important questions, raises for discussion (c. 6) the question whether there are more constitutions than one, though in every one of the preceding chapters of the Third Book an affirmative answer had been implied. 'We must inquire,' he says, 'whether there are more than one, and if there are, how many and what they are, and what distinctions exist between them' (c. 6. 1278 b 6). A constitution, he goes on to say, is 'an ordering of the magistracies of a State, and especially of the supreme authority'[1]; for in every State the governing individual or class (*πολίτευμα*) is supreme, and the constitution varies as this varies[2].

Distinction between normal constitutions and deviation-forms: Aristotle shows by a reference to the end of the State and by an inquiry as to the kind of rule which should be exercised over free persons, that normally government is for the common good.

The first broad distinction between constitutions—that between normal constitutions and deviation-forms—comes into view, when we ask what is the purpose for which the State exists, and what is the kind of rule which should be exercised in a State. In answering the first of these two questions, Aristotle—though he repeats his previous assertion (1. 2. 1253 a 7), that man is a social being and seeks to live in society with his fellows[3], even if he stands in no need of help from them—holds nevertheless that the State is formed to secure the general advantage, and to win for each individual as large a share of good life as he is capable of enjoying: not that men will not hold together in political society even if they gain from it less than this—if, for instance, they merely secure the continuance of a life not overladen with suffering and annoyances. The State, we see, is a *κοινωνία* not only or chiefly designed for social

[1] This seems to be the meaning of the words—*ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων* (3. 6. 1278 b 8): cp. *τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς* (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15): *ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις* (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7): *τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων τάξις τις* (3. 1. 1274 b 38).

[2] 3. 6. 1278 b 10, *κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία*: cp. 3. 7. 1279 a 25, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς*—from which passage it would seem that the *πολίτευμα* may be a single individual as well as a class, such as the Few or the Many.

[3] See Cic. de Amicitia 23. 87; but Aristotle claims that man is not only a *συνδυαστικόν* but a *πολιτικὸν ζῷον*.

pleasure, like such unions as those of *θιασῶται* or *ἐρανισταί* (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19: cp. Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35–1281 a 4), but if in some degree for pleasure, in a higher degree for advantage, and advantage not of a passing kind but extending over the whole life (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21 sqq.). It combines in itself, like the conjugal relation, but in a higher degree, pleasure and advantage (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24).

Aristotle answers the second question—what kind of rule should be exercised in a State—by distinguishing, as he had already done in c. 4 (1277 a 33 sqq.), the rule exercised over slaves from the rule exercised over free persons. Of the latter he takes as types the rule of the head of a household over wife and children, or that of the master of an art—a gymnastic-master or a ship-captain—over those whom he directs[1]. This kind of rule is exercised primarily for the good of the ruled, for if the ruler has a share of the advantage, this comes to him accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*); whereas the rule exercised by a master of slaves (*δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*) is exercised primarily for the good of the ruler, and accidentally only for the good of the ruled[2]. That the rule exercised in a State belongs of right to the former category, may be inferred from the fact that when rulers and ruled are placed on a level, the former deriving no special benefit from ruling, men regard office as a public burden (*λειτουργία*, 1279 a 11) and claim to pass it from one to the other[3]. The mere fact of an interchange of rule being looked for under these circumstances shows that the State is normally for the common advantage, for if no interchange took place, and the rulers were always the same and ruled for the good of the ruled, they would be losers[4]. The general feeling that an inter-

[1] Compare the reasoning in Plato, Rep. 342 C.

[2] Plato, Rep. 343 B. Plato seems hardly to make this distinction as to *δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*, Rep. 345 D–E (*πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή*).

[3] Susemihl seems right in thinking that Aristotle has here Isocr. Areopag. § 24 sqq. in view.

[4] Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 35 sqq., *διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος· ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν αὐτῷ*

change of rule is just where government is for the benefit of the governed, implies that the State exists for the common good.

The parallel between politics and the arts which Aristotle inherited from Socrates and Plato here suggests the inference that the relation between rulers and ruled so far resembles that between the master of an art and his pupils or assistants, as to be a relation primarily for the benefit of the side which receives, not that which gives, direction (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 29 sq., *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας*); it serves here, therefore, as it also does in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 10 sqq. and 3. 12. 1282 b 30, as the basis of an important doctrine, notwithstanding that elsewhere Aristotle is careful to point out some differences between politics and the arts; he holds *πολιτική*, in fact, to be a Practical Science, not a Productive Science or Art. Thus he recognizes that written rule, or law, is more in place in the practice of Politics than in the practice of an art (3. 16. 1287 a 33 sqq.), and that the parallel of the arts must not be used to justify a frequent change of laws (2. 8. 1269 a 19 sqq.). Nor is government to him a mere matter of scientific knowledge; it presupposes virtue and correct moral choice (3. 13. 1284 a 1 sq.).

Both of the questions raised have thus been answered in a way to show that rule such as that exercised by a master over his slaves (*δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*) is out of place in relation to the citizens of a State; it offends against the

πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 345 E. In the passage of the Politics before us, however, the *μισθός* is conceived to come in the shape of a period of private life, during which some one else governs for the *quondam* ruler's advantage. It should be noticed that Aristotle does not necessarily accept as correct the popular impression that one who rules for the benefit of the ruled is a loser and needs compensation. The popular view is not his own, but it serves the purpose of his argument.

aim with which the State was instituted, and against the nature of all rule which rests on knowledge. Rule in the State should be for the common advantage of all the citizens, whether rulers or ruled; and thus we arrive at the conclusion that those constitutions which aim at the common advantage are normal (*ὀρθαί*), and those which aim at the advantage of the rulers only are deviation-forms. The State is a *κοινωνία* of freemen, and must be governed as such. It does not necessarily follow that in all normal forms of it there will be an interchange of rule, the ruled becoming rulers, and the rulers becoming the ruled, from time to time: this is so in most forms of the rule which citizens exercise over citizens (cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 4), and particularly in the 'like and equal' type of society which was becoming increasingly common in the Greece of Aristotle's day, but not in the Kingship. Democratic opinion held this interchange to be essential to freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40–b 3), but Aristotle's view is that the governed are free when the government is exercised for their benefit. A freeman, according to him, is 'one who exists for his own sake and not for that of another' (Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25: cp. Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 5: 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). A man may thus be a freeman without having a share in ruling. The true characteristic of a freeman is that his interest counts as a thing to be studied—that his life is lived for himself, not for another. He who is the instrument (*ὄργανον*) of another and fit for nothing better, and yet a man, is a slave (1. 4. 1254 a 14, *ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὑτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου, ἄνθρωπος δέ, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν*).

Six constitutions—three normal, three the reverse.

Aristotle thus obtains the broad classification of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and taking also into account the fact that the supreme authority in a State must needs be a single individual, or a few, or many[1],

[1] Aristotle is not careful at the outset of a discussion, when everything he says is tentative and provisional, to study absolute accuracy. See Ramsauer on Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 15. So here he does not pause to remember that he means eventually to decide for the supremacy, not of any person or persons, but of *νόμοι κείμενοι*

he arrives at the conclusion that there are six constitutions, three for the common advantage (ὀρθαί) and three for the advantage of the rulers (παρεκβάσεις). It will be noticed, however, that at the end of the chapter (c. 7), the Few and Many in whose interest the oligarchy and democracy are said respectively to be ruled are identified with the rich and the poor (3. 7. 1279 b 7–9); and a chapter, the Eighth, necessarily follows, dealing with objections that may fairly be made to the definition given of oligarchy and democracy. The first is that if we take the numerical difference to be the essential thing, it follows that States in which many rich rule a few poor are democracies, and that States in which a few poor rule many rich are oligarchies, which is not a satisfactory conclusion. Then, if we make both differences essential, and refuse to consider that an oligarchy exists anywhere except where a few rich rule many poor, or a democracy except where many poor rule a few rich, we leave the forms of State to which reference has just been made altogether undescribed and unclassified. This is the second objection. It follows that the qualitative, not the numerical, difference is the essential one. The numerical difference between oligarchy and democracy is only accidental and may be reversed. It is the rule of the rich in their own interest that makes an oligarchy, and the rule of the poor in their own interest that makes a democracy.

Nature of Democracy and Oligarchy—their claims to be just constitutions analyzed, and rejected by a reference to the end of the State.

It was necessary to ascertain correctly what democracy and oligarchy are, before taking the next step, which is to state and examine the claims put forward on behalf of either constitution, and thus to win for the first time (c. 9) a closer view of what constitutes a State, and of the end for which the State exists.

Both oligarchs and democrats allege a basis in justice for the forms of constitution which they respectively favour, and not untruly; they take their stand on a principle which is in a degree just (δίκαιόν τι); but then they forget that it

ὀρθῶς (3. 11. 1282 b 1: cp. 3. 10. 1281 a 34), and that the supremacy of Law is a possible alternative.

falls short of absolute justice (*τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον*). 'They know in part and prophesy in part' (1281 a 8). There is, indeed, a difference between them, for while they agree in claiming that the things awarded by the State shall be awarded equally, they differ as to the persons to whom this equal award is to be made—the one side wishing to confine the benefit of it to those who are equal in wealth, the other claiming it for all who are equal in respect of free birth (*ἐλευθερία*)[1].

It has been already said (c. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq.) that the deviation-forms go counter to the end for which the State was originally formed, and this is now (1280 a 25) again brought up against them. Their advocates leave the decisive point untouched—they do not inquire for what end the State exists, yet this inquiry is really decisive of the whole matter. Aristotle proceeds to investigate this question, and here, as everywhere else, we must bear in mind that the subject of his investigations is the *πόλις*, or City-

[1] This appears to be the meaning of c. 9. 1280 a 9–25. In 3. 12. 1282 b 18 sqq. every one is said to agree that the just is the equal for the equal, but no one remembers to inquire, in what things men must be equal and unequal, if they are justly to claim equality and inequality in a distribution of power. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq. both sides are said to agree that *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον* is *ἁπλῶς δίκαιον*, but to differ as to what constitutes *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον*—democrats holding that equality in a single thing constitutes absolute equality, and oligarchs, that inequality in a single thing constitutes absolute inequality. The three passages are not absolutely accordant, but they agree in laying stress on the importance of the question whether the claimants are really equal and unequal as they claim to be.

The word *ἐλευθερία* is commonly translated 'freedom' in 3. 9. 1280 a 24, but Bernays perhaps comes nearer to its meaning in his translation 'free birth.' *Ἐλεύθερος* and *ἐλευθερία* seem often to be used in relation to the circumstances of birth; cp. 3. 9. 1281 a 6, *κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις*: 3. 13. 1283 a 33, *οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων*: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq. *Ἐλευθερία* may indeed occasionally mean something more than 'free birth'—in fact 'citizen birth'; cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26, *τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*, and 1290 b 9, *οὔτ' ἂν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἄρχωσι* (where *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι* are explained a little later to be *οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας*). *Ἐλεύθερος* is sometimes used in contradistinction to *ξένος* (Plato Com., *Ὑπέρβολος*, fr. 3, 4: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 670). Antisthenes is said by Diogenes Laertius in one passage not to have been *ἐκ δυοῖν Ἀθηναίοιν* (6. 1), and in another not to have been *ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων* (6. 4).

State. The πόλις exists not for the sake of the property of the participants, nor for the sake of bare life, nor, like an alliance, for protection from wrong, nor for protection in traffic and mutual dealings, but for the sake of good life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν). Our use of language, Aristotle urges, implies that a State exists only where there is a mutual care for virtue[1], where the character of each individual is no indifferent matter to the rest, or, in words used elsewhere, where men live with a view to the common advantage. The State, he implies, means a society where the individual lives for the whole. It involves something more than relations of exchange, or alliance, or co-operation against outrage; something more than residence in one and the same spot; something more than the links of marriage, of the phratry, of common sacrifices and gatherings for social intercourse[2]; it involves that to which these latter things are merely a means, an associated participation in a fully developed and complete existence, in a happy and noble life.

The farther inference is drawn, to clinch the case against oligarchy and democracy, that those who contribute more to a life of this nature have a better claim to political power than the representatives of wealth or free birth, the partisans, that is to say, of oligarchy and democracy (cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 23 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sq.: Plato, Laws 757 C). A comparative conclusion only, be it observed, for we shall find in the sequel that Aristotle does not concede even to a superiority in virtue, unless it is combined with an adequate provision of external goods, a right to predominance in the State.

Aristotle's account of the principle on which political

We note here the first use of an expression—that of 'contributing to a κοινωνία' (ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, 1281 a 4)—which somewhat varies the account elsewhere given of the procedure of the State in

[1] Cp. Plato, Gorgias 517 B, ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου: Protag. 327 A sq.

[2] Plato is perhaps not really quite content with the life of his 'healthy State' (Rep. 372 B, ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις).

power is to be distributed not always quite the same.

distributing political power. Sometimes we gather that the State will give 'instruments' in proportion to capacity (c. 12. 1282 b 33, τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι: cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι); sometimes that it gives them in proportion to the contribution made to the κοινωνία. The two principles do not lie far apart, but from the one point of view the grant of power is the payment of a debt, or rather resembles the distribution of a commercial company's dividend, the amount of which in the case of each recipient is proportionate to the funds contributed [1], so that power comes as a reward rather than as a burden, while from the other point of view power is given, like a tool, to him who can use it best. Aristotle seems sometimes to pass almost unconsciously from the one view to the other. His paramount doctrine, notwithstanding occasional deviations (e. g. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.), probably is, that to the good man political power, just like any other external good, is a good (cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq.), and affords great opportunities of noble action, if only it is fairly won and earned by adequate desert (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sq.). We naturally infer that he will confine political power to the good, to whom it is alone a good, and give it to them in the degree which makes best for virtue; and, in fact, we find power in the hands of the good in both the forms of the best State (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην). But then the question arose—are wealth and free birth, which, as we shall see, he allows to be, as well as virtue, elements contributing to the end of the State, to be denied any share of power, if their possessors do not also possess virtue? This is the question discussed in 3. 13. 1283 a 42 sqq. Considerations of justice force from Aristotle the admission that a share of power must be conceded to them even under those circumstances. But what if the possession of power be detrimental to its holders in the absence of virtue? This difficulty seems not to have

[1] This view of the State, it appears from c. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq., had been put forward, as was natural, by partisans of oligarchy.

occurred to Aristotle. He usually approaches the question of the award of political power rather from the side of justice than from that of the ethical interest of the State or the individual, though, as has been said, the best State satisfies all these criteria[1]. At all events, the point of view of justice is far the more prominent in the Third Book. In the book on Revolutions it is also especially prominent, for justice is the best security against revolution (*μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτῶν*, 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). Even in the Fourth Book, where the other point of view naturally comes more to the front, it is not absent. For instance, the assignment of military functions to the younger men and of political functions to the elder, rests in some degree on considerations of justice (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, *οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν*). The just, in fact, and that which is for the common good are said to be identical (3. 12. 1282 b 17). But then, is the State sketched in 3. 13. 1283 a 42 sqq., or indeed any State but the best, truly just or for the common good? This question receives an answer, when we are told (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25) that all constitutions but the best are deviations from the most normal constitution (*διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας*).

Summary of the conclusions so far arrived at as to the nature of a State.

If we now gather together the conclusions with regard to the nature of the State to which the preceding inquiries have led us, they seem to be the following:—the State is a body of men, not too large or small (*πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41), collected in one spot (1280 b 30–1), possessing and exercising rights of trade and inter-marriage, joining in common festivals[2] and other forms of sociability (*τὸ συζῆν*), but above all, able and purposed to rule and be

[1] Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν*: 4. (7). 9. 1328 b 33, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.*

[2] This recognition of festivals as an essential element in the State is characteristic enough. Perhaps the modern State has lost something in losing this bond of union.

ruled as freemen should rule and be ruled, i. e. with a view to the common advantage[1]—or, in other words, so as to aid each other in the realization of a life, as Aristotle puts it, complete in every way[2]—and held together by participation in a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 1–2) devised to make possible and promote an existence of this kind.

It is evidently no easy thing, in Aristotle's view, to be in a true sense a member of a State. Society truly so-called makes a great demand on human nature. The instinct of sociability, which man shares with some other animals, rises in him to a higher level than in them, for it rests on a perception of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous (1. 2. 1253 a 15), but, even in the form in which man has it, it goes only a little way towards the making of a State. An aim for the common good must be added, then an intelligent comprehension of what is noble developed by a long course of training from childhood upward (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 25 sq.), then a steady purpose to live for this oneself and to promote a similar life in others; above all, the capacity, under which term is included not only adequate skill but adequate external means (*χορηγία*), to rule and be ruled, as freemen should rule and be ruled, for the attainment of these ends. It is plain that to be a true citizen one must be a man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*).

We see also that Aristotle's account of the State implies that there must exist within it a body (*πλῆθος*) of men competent to take, and taking, an active part in its government. Mere '*administrés*' are not citizens: the State is

[1] Aristotle does not appear to notice that rule must be exercised not merely for the common advantage of the existing generation, but for the advantage also of the unborn of future generations.

[2] Aristotle, as has been noticed already, distinguishes between *αὐτάρκεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, which even an *ἔθνος* possesses (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), and *αὐτάρκεια τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*. A *πόλις* must possess an adequate number of citizens for both these ends (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq., esp. 1326 b 7, though *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς* is the expression used in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24: 3. 1. 1275 b 20). Even virtue will not make up for inadequate numbers, unless it is of a transcendent kind: cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 11, *ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.*

a scene of collective effort, it is an union of co-operating equals, whose numbers must not, indeed, be over-great, but yet also must not be too small. It is only later that he reminds us that the appearance of a παμβασιλεύς on the scene, though most unlikely, is nevertheless possible, and that he finds a place in his theory for the παμβασιλεία, without, however, altering his original account of the State, which is not strictly wide enough to admit it. It was, indeed, hardly necessary for him to do so, for though, as we shall see, he holds that the best form of the State is that in which virtue fully provided with external means is possessed in an overwhelming degree by one or a few persons, and rule always remains in his or their hands, the conditions of this form were wholly unlikely to occur.

His account of the State also implies that it consists of those who can live its full life. Outside the citizen-body we find a fringe of dependents, necessary, indeed, to the existence of the State, but not brought within its inner circle, some free (women, children, artisans, labourers for hire) and others slaves. These are not, in strictness, a part of the State.

The question as to the place of Law in the State has so far not emerged: it emerges in connexion with the inquiry, what is to be the supreme authority of the State?

As yet the further characteristic of the State, that in every case save one—and this so rare as to be merely hypothetical—its working will be governed by Law, has not been added; the discussion of the next question, however, brings it under our notice. This question is, what is to be the supreme authority of the community (τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως)? Aristotle does not mean by τὸ κύριον what Austin means by 'sovereign,' for the supreme authority may, in the view of the former, be vested in law, not in any given 'persons'; he does not go behind law to the men who make it. To answer this question, he rapidly discusses (c. 10) the claims of a number of competitors for power, with the result that the supreme authority must be just [1], if only because otherwise the community will perish; yet

[1] Compare the saying of St. Augustine—'quid civitates sine iustitia nisi magna latrocinia?'

if supremacy is given to men of worth, who are usually but a few, or to one man of supreme worth, we are still met by the difficulty of reconciling the rest to their exclusion from power; and Aristotle falls back on the supremacy of law, as distinguished from that of a person or persons, who cannot be expected to be free, like law, from infirmities of character. But then, if the law be that of a deviation-form, an oligarchy or a democracy, its rule may be as bad as that of any person. 'Bad laws,' says Burke, 'are the worst sort of tyranny.'

The answer to this inquiry is—laws normally constituted.

At this point Aristotle pauses to draw a lesson from the inquiry, before the moment for insisting on it has passed. He has already (c. 9) laid stress on the claims of virtue to power in the State, as against those of wealth or free birth, and his readers may well have gathered that he must favour a rule of the few Good (*ἐπιεικεῖς*). It is precisely this impression that he now wishes to correct. Even on the score of virtue the many, if they are not too degraded, have something to say for themselves. Plato had severely censured in the Laws (700 A–701 B) the tendency to what he terms a 'theatrocracy' (*θεατροκρατία*). It was, he says, in the theatre—

Parenthetical recognition of the claims of the many, if not below a certain level of excellence, to a share in certain political rights which they can exercise collectively.

> 'When all its throats the gallery extends,
> And all the thunder of the pit ascends'—

that the people first learnt to believe itself infallible, and to despise the judgment of the wise few (*τοῖς γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν*, 700 C)—a lesson which they soon applied in matters of State. He rejects this popular supremacy both in the sphere of music and poetry[1] and in that of politics[2]. It is evident from 1281 b 7 sq. and from the whole course of c. 11, that Aristotle does not agree with Plato in this.

[1] See Laws 670 B and the references given in Stallbaum's note.

[2] Plato's principle, in the Gorgias at all events, is 'cuique in sua arte credendum.' Cp. Gorg. 455 B, quoted by Engelhardt, Loci Platonici quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse, p. 15: *ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἡ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.*

He did not hold that the rise of the drama or of Rhetoric[1] was to be deplored, or that neither deserved a place in a well-ordered State: tragedy is to him the highest form of poetry, and a boon to man; Rhetoric is necessary because the minds of the many are less easily influenced by strict philosophical reasoning than by arguments drawn from common opinion. In this matter, as in others, things had not gone so completely wrong as Plato thought. On the contrary, the views of men have a tendency to gravitate to the truth (Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15 sq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3). The wiser advocates of democracy had not claimed for popular gatherings an equal aptitude for all kinds of work. This is true, for instance, of Athenagoras, the leader of the popular party in the 'polity' (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27) or 'aristocracy' (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 6–9), which existed at Syracuse till the defeat and capture of the Athenian armament led to its conversion into a democracy (1304 a 27). The utterance of Athenagoras on this subject (Thuc. 6. 39) apparently set the keynote of this Eleventh Chapter. *Φήσει τις* (he says) *δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεῦσαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρῖναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν.* Aristotle is inclined to agree with the view here taken of the capabilities of the many, so far at all events as some subjects are concerned. It is interesting to find him expressing the view that the many are better judges of music and poetry than the few (1281 b 7)[2]; he is not, however, here speaking of an audience of artisans and day-labourers, whose defects of taste he recognizes (5 (8). 7. 1342 a 18 sq.), but of one

[1] As to Rhetoric, contrast Plato, Laws 937 D sqq. with Aristot. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 20–b 7.

[2] It should be noticed, however, that in the Fifth Book (5 (8). 6. 1340 b 23) he says that it is out of the question, or at all events not easy, for those who have not learnt to play and sing to become good judges of music.

not below a certain social level[1]. Whether he would praise the judgment of the Athenian people in these matters, many of whom were artisans and day-labourers, we do not know. Nowhere else were audiences so frequently gathered together to sit in judgment on dramas and choruses[2]. When Goethe says[3], 'Es bleibt immer gewiss, dieses so geehrte und verachtete Publikum betrügt sich über das Einzelne fast immer und über das Ganze fast nie,' he perhaps has rather the reading public in view than a theatre audience. Aristotle, however, goes on to admit that the people—always supposing them to be not below a certain level of merit—are capable critics of public service, when brought together in a body. A man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*), he says, may be surpassed by others in respect of each of the excellences whose combination makes him what he is[4]; his strength lies in his combination of virtues not necessarily singly present in a superlative degree. And something similar may be said of a large gathering of men. It is like a single individual possessed of many hands and feet and organs of sense, and many moral and intellectual faculties[5]. Aristotle forgets that bad qualities will

[1] He guards himself thus, possibly remembering a saying of Socrates—*πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκεν ὅμοιον εἶ τις τετράδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο* (Diog. Laert. 2. 34). We see from the use of *πλῆθος* in this passage what Aristotle probably means by *πάντα δῆμον . . . πᾶν πλῆθος* in 1281 b 16. He is not thinking so much of national differences, like that which existed between Boeotians and Athenians, as of differences of occupation (like that which distinguished the *γεωργικὸς δῆμος* from the *βάναυσος* or *ἀγοραῖος δῆμος*), or of social position (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38, *τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους*: 1319 b 1, *τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν*).

[2] If the popular judgment in music prevailed, and was responsible for the degeneracy of the art which Aristoxenus deplores in a charming passage (Fr. 90: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291), it can hardly have deserved much credit. Aristoxenus compares his own contemporaries, so far as the art of music is concerned, to the barbarized Paestans, who met once a year at a festival to mourn their loss of Hellenism, and to recall for a moment their old way of life.

[3] Quoted by Henkel, Studien, p. 80 n. 'It is quite certain, that the Public, which we are so ready both to honour and to despise, is almost always under a delusion in its judgments as to particular points, but hardly ever as to the total result.'

[4] This glimpse of the *σπουδαῖος* is interesting, and prepares us for the many-sidedness of the citizens of Aristotle's ideal State.

[5] Aristotle evidently has Geryon

be thrown into the common stock no less than good ones; he forgets also the special liability of great gatherings of men to be mastered by feeling, especially in the discussion of political questions, which are far more provocative of feeling than artistic ones. His principle, again, would justify the inference that the larger the gathering is, the greater its capacity will be[1].

Aristotle is led, partly by these considerations, partly by considerations of political safety (*οὐκ ἀσφαλές*, 1281 b 26: *φοβερόν*, 29), to the conclusion that there is good ground for a compromise between the rich and the good on the one hand, and the many—in the sense of *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι* (1281 b 23)—on the other. The many are not fit to hold the highest magistracies; they are only fit for collective political functions, such as those of deliberating and judging (*τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν*, 1281 b 31). To these they may be admitted with advantage. Hence it is that some constitutions, that of Solon for instance, concede to the people the right of choosing magistrates and reviewing their official conduct, but not the right of holding office singly[2].

There were those, we know—for example, Socrates[3]—who held the master of an art to be the best hand both at judging how a work has been done and selecting the man to do it, but with this view—even taking the term 'master of an art' in its widest sense, so as to include not only the man of science (*ὁ εἰδώς*) and the practical worker (*ὁ δημιουργός*), but also the man who has had a general training on the subject (*ὁ πεπαιδευμένος*)—Aristotle does not agree. He feels, however, that the case of the many need not be wholly rested on the broad ground which he has

in his mind: cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 26, *οὕτω γὰρ ἦν ὁ Γηρυόνης ζηλωτός, ἔχων σκέλη πολλὰ καὶ χεῖρας καὶ ὀφθαλμούς, εἰ πάντα μία ψυχὴ διώκει.*

[1] See as to Aristotle's view on this subject Henkel, p. 80 n.: Sus.[2], Note 565 [b].

[2] 1281 b 34, *ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν*, where Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 42) compares Hist. An. 9. 43. 629 a 33, *λίχνον δ' ὂν καὶ πρὸς τὰ μαγειρεῖα καὶ τοὺς ἰχθύας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόλαυσιν κατὰ μόνας προσπέταται.*

[3] Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 49–50: 3. 5. 21 sqq.: 3. 9. 10 sqq. 'Credendum cuique in sua arte.'

taken up; they have another ground of claim, for they are the 'wearers of the shoe' and know best where it pinches. There are subjects on which the man who uses the product (ὁ χρώμενος) has more claim to be a good judge than the master of an art—subjects on which a mastery of the art is not essential to a right decision: the best critic of a banquet, for instance, is not the cook, but the guest[1]. It is implied that the decision as to the merits of a statesman is one of these.

After this objection has been dealt with, however, another remains. Plato had insisted in the Laws (945 B sqq.) that the reviewing authority must be better than the magistracy reviewed[2], and had accordingly given the right of review in the State of the Laws to a specially constituted body, the priests of Apollo, not to the people. Aristotle probably has this arrangement in view in his defence (1282 a 32 sqq.) of the Solonian distribution of power. His reply is that under it the reviewing authority *is* better than the magistracy reviewed, for the reviewing authority is the collective whole, not the individuals, mostly of little worth, of whom it is composed, and this, if in the given instance the people is not below a certain level, will be better, and indeed richer, than the One or Few to whom high offices are entrusted.

Having followed this line of inquiry thus far, Aristotle recurs to the discussion from which he had diverged, and recognizes that it had led to the result that law must be supreme—law not conceived in the interest of a section, but normal and correct (*νόμοι ὀρθῶς κείμενοι*, 3. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq.), adding that where owing to its necessary generality it cannot give detailed guidance, the ruler, whether one or many, must in these matters be supreme. The question, however, what 'laws normal and correct' are, still remains

[1] This saying, which was perhaps already proverbial, is echoed by Martial, Epigr. 9. 81, as is noticed by Sir G. C. Lewis (Authority in Matters of Opinion, pp. 184-5).

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1143 b 33, *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα [ἡ φρόνησις] κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται.*

for solution. To answer it, Aristotle calls to mind that 'good and just laws and good and just constitutions go together, but that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, not the constitution to the laws[1]: hence we may say that laws adjusted to the normal constitutions will be just, and those adjusted to the deviation-forms unjust.' With these words c. 11 closes.

What are normally constituted laws? Laws adjusted to the normal constitutions.

Arrived at this point, we expect that the next question for discussion will be, what 'laws adjusted to the normal constitutions' are, but instead of distinctly raising this question, Aristotle proceeds to discuss a question which, as he says, 'affords an opportunity for aporetic inquiry, and is not without instructiveness for the political philosopher.' The question he refers to is one relating to the nature of Political Justice[2]. The Twelfth Chapter, in fact, begins as follows—'but since in all sciences and arts the end is a good, and in the most sovereign of sciences—the Political Science—the greatest of goods is in an especial degree made the end, and since the just is the political good, and the just is no other than that which is for the common advantage[3] [we shall do well to inquire what the just is]. Now all say that the just is the equal: yes, and all agree up to a certain point with the conclusion arrived at in the philosophical discussions in which ethical questions have been treated in detail, that justice implies not only a thing awarded, but also persons to whom it is awarded, and say that justice means the award of that which is equal to equals. But then comes the question—equals in what?' Equals in respect of any good thing we may chance to select—complexion, for instance, or size of body? The Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (3. 20), made the biggest and strongest man among them their king, and Plato had seemed to imply in a hasty sentence that such

Transition to the question, what the just is?—what attributes confer a just claim to a share in political power?

[1] Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289a 13 sq.

[2] Bernays (Aristoteles' Politik, p. 172 n.) has expressed the opinion that the contents of cc. 12 and 13 were placed where we find them, not by the hand of Aristotle, but by that of some later editor. On this question, see Appendix C.

[3] Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 35.

things might be taken into consideration[1]. Aristotle, on the contrary, says that in any distribution of 'instruments' (ὄργανα) the work to be done must be kept in view—that in a distribution of flutes, for instance, the best flute must be given not to the best-born or the handsomest, but to the most skilful flute-player. The contrary view, he says, would imply that all things which we call good are sufficiently one in kind to be reducible to a common measure and comparable the one with the other[2]. Goods are really only comparable in respect of their contribution to a given work (ἔργον), and only goods which contribute to the same work can be compared with each other. 'The competitors for power must base their claims on the possession of things which really go to the making of a State' (1283 a 14). So that, if we draw up a rough list of competitors for political power, we shall find on it the well-born, the free-born, and the wealthy[3], and to these we shall have to add those possessed of justice and of military excellence. All these possess attributes contributing either to the being or well-being of the State. Each of these groups has a certain claim, none of them an absolutely just or exclusive claim, to power. Even a constitution which gave exclusive supremacy to the virtuous would not be just, for it would give exclusive supremacy to one only of the elements which contribute to the work of the State[4].

The normal constitution will recognize all elements

[1] Cp. Laws 744 B, where Plato enumerates not only ἀρετὴν ἥ τε προγόνων καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ and πλούτου χρῆσις καὶ πενίας, but also σωμάτων ἰσχύες καὶ εὐμορφίαι, as entitling to a larger share of honours and offices. In Laws 757 B–C, however, true, or geometrical, justice is said to take account only of virtue in its distribution of honours. But then we must remember that the State of the Laws is avowedly a second-best State, and not constructed wholly on ideal principles.

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133b 18, τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς: and Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 b 2 sqq.

[3] In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124a 20 sqq. there is an account of the competing claimants for honour, which reminds us of this passage of the Politics. We gather that those who combine the three ἀγαθά—wealth, nobility, and virtue—have the best claim. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3, where the βασιλεύς is said to be ὁ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων.

[4] Plato's language, Laws 757 C, is far more favourable to the claims of virtue. Geometrical (or true) justice, he says, τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ

The same would have to be said of one which gave exclusive supremacy to the many (οἱ πλείους) on the grounds developed in the Eleventh Chapter.

which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, not one of them only.

What then must be done, supposing all these elements—the good, the rich, the noble, the many—to co-exist in one and the same community? Are we to give power to the good, supposing only that they are sufficient in number to form, or at least to govern, a State[1]? But then there is a difficulty which affects all exclusive awards on the ground of superiority in this or that attribute. Each of the elements before us—the rich, the noble, the good, the many—is liable to have its claims defeated by those of a single individual richer or nobler or better than all the rest, or indeed by those of a mass of men of which this can be said. Our review of facts shows that none of these exclusive claims to supremacy on the ground of a bare superiority in one of the elements which contribute to the life of the State deserve to be accounted 'normal' (ὀρθός), or to find recognition in a normal constitution. We thus obtain an answer to the question raised at the end of c. 11 (1282 b 6), what are normally constituted laws, and whether they will be conceived in the interest of the better sort or the many (1283 b 35). They are, we find, laws designed for the common good of both; though there is one case in which all laws are out of place—that of the appearance of a παμβασιλεύς. When the good are not so superior as to outweigh in virtue the collective merit of the mass (ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν, 1283 b 39), then they must share power with the many. Some mixed constitution must be adopted, which will give to the good and to the many a proportionate share of power; and in determining the proportion which is to fall to the lot of

A bare superiority in one only does not confer an exclusive right to supremacy.

Unless the virtue of the Good is so transcendent as to outweigh the collective merit of the Many, the Good,

τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

[1] This question is left unanswered, but the answer intended to be given to it may probably be gathered from the sentences which succeed. It is that, given a sufficient superiority in virtue, no deficiency in the numbers of the virtuous is a bar to their claims: even a single individual, if more virtuous than all the rest of the community, has an irresistible claim to rule.

the Rich, and the Many must divide power between them in the way most conducive to the common good.

each, regard must be had to the advantage of the whole State and the common advantage of the citizens[1]; 'and a citizen is, broadly, one who shares in ruling and being ruled, but he differs according to the particular constitution; under the best constitution he is one who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life of virtue' (1283 b 42 sqq.). We infer, then, that the best constitution will be so designed as to favour his pursuit of this end, and this we find to be the case if we compare the Fourth Book (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν*).

If, however, one man, or a small group of men not numerous enough to constitute a city, is forthcoming, possessing this transcendent amount of virtue, then a case for the Absolute Kingship arises.

'But if,' Aristotle continues, 'there is in the community some one man, or some group of men not numerous enough to constitute a city, so pre-eminent in virtue that the virtue and political capacity of all the rest put together is not commensurable with theirs'—in other words, *ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν*—'this man or men,' notwithstanding their numerical paucity, 'must not be treated as a mere part of the State,' or called upon to share power with the rest and to submit to law, for to do so would be to do them injustice, and indeed would be ridiculous. This is shown to be the case by an appeal to the practice of the deviation-forms, which either put to death or ostracize any citizen who by reason of disproportionate wealth, or a disproportionate number of friends and adherents, or for any other cause, is formidable to the State. They do not expect such persons to obey the law; they get rid of them in one way or another. The normal constitutions have to face the same difficulty, and though they will try to prevent the case for the ostracism arising[2], they also may nevertheless be forced to resort to it; but then they will use the ostracism for the common good,

[1] 1283 b 40, *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν.* It is not clear whether Aristotle conceives any difference to exist between the advantage of the whole State and the common advantage of the citizens.

[2] Cp. 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 19: and Aristoph. Ran. 1357 sqq. as to Alcibiades.

not for the good of a section[1]. But what is the best constitution to do, if an individual makes his appearance, transcendent, not in respect of wealth or the number of his friends, but in respect of virtue? Virtue is everything to the best constitution, and as it cannot expel such a being[2] or exercise rule over him, the only possible course, and also the natural course, is to make him a life-long king. This is extended (3. 17. 1288 a 15) to the case of a whole family (*γένος*) of such persons appearing in a State. The whole family will then become royal.

The case, we observe, in which the good are sufficient in number to constitute a city is not here considered: this is the case assumed to exist in the Fourth Book, where all citizens are men of virtue.

It will be noticed that the alternatives considered in this chapter do not exhaust the list of possible alternatives. The cases considered are only those in which a Few Good and the Many, or one pre-eminently good man and the Many, coexist in the same community, and the purpose of the inquiry is to show how in such cases power must be allotted. The One and the Few have an exclusive right to supremacy only when their excess of virtue is very great; in all other cases power must be shared. The case in which the good are sufficient in number to form a full complement of citizens is not considered; and this is the case which is assumed to exist in that form of the best State which is described in the Fourth Book. In this the good, the well-to-do, and the free-born are the same persons—in other words, the citizen-body is composed of men

[1] Cp. Plato Polit. 293 D, *καὶ ἐάν τέ γε ἀποκτιννύντες τινὰς ἢ καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες καθαίρωσιν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ ἀποικίας οἷον σμήνη μελιττῶν ἐκπέμποντές ποι σμικροτέραν ποιῶσιν, ἤ τινας ἐπεισαγόμενοί ποθεν ἄλλους ἔξωθεν, πολίτας ποιοῦντες, αὐτὴν αὔξωσιν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσχρώμενοι, σώζοντες, ἐκ χείρονος βελτίω ποιῶσι κατὰ δύναμιν, ταύτην τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ὅρους ἡμῖν μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον.*

[2] Aristotle evidently remembers Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus: cp. Diog. Laert. 9. 2, *καθάπτεται δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν ἑταῖρον ἐκβαλεῖν Ἑρμόδωρον, ἐν οἷς φησιν· Ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀποθανεῖν πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνήβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἵτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἑωυτῶν ὀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον λέγοντες· ἡμέων μηδὲ εἷς ὀνήιστος ἔστω· εἰ δέ τις τοιοῦτος, ἄλλῃ τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων*, and Cicero's translation of the passage, Tusc. Disp. 5. 36. 105. See Bywater, Heraclitii Ephesii Reliquiae, fragm. cxiv.

possessing virtue fully furnished with external means (ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη).

General conclusion—the normal constitution is not one and the same everywhere: it varies with the circumstances of the given case.

The conclusion, however, to which the whole discussion leads us is, that the decision what is the just or normal constitution in any given case must depend on the circumstances of that case—on the distribution of attributes conducive to the life of the State, and especially on the distribution of virtue—but that whatever allotment of power it makes will be for the common good, and that it will not give exclusive supremacy to One individual or a Few, except in the very rare case of their possessing an overwhelming superiority in virtue.

Far more often we shall find a small body of the better sort (βελτίους) confronted by a large body of the free-born, the former individually, the latter collectively superior, and in this case the normal constitution will be one which recognizes and rallies round it all elements conducive to the life of the State—wealth, free birth, virtue—and finds a place for each. All of them have claims: the State has need of all.

Already then we find a firm logical basis laid for that mixed constitution whose organization and nature will be more fully depicted in the Sixth Book. The mention of wealth, free birth, and virtue as the elements to be combined points perhaps rather to an aristocracy of the kind described in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 than to a polity, for in a polity only wealth and free birth find recognition (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.). The mixed constitution of Aristotle, it is interesting to notice, is not necessarily a combination of all constitutions, like that mentioned in 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq., or that which his disciple Dicaearchus[1] and the Stoics of the third century before Christ[2], followed by Cicero and a host of others down to our own day, have agreed in extolling. It is not an union of Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy, for a King has no necessary place in it; it is rather a combination

[1] See Dicaearch. fragm. 23 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. 242): Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892.
[2] Diog. Laert. 7. 131.

of social elements—virtue, wealth, free birth—than a combination of constitutions; it is a constitution which finds a place in the State for the good, the wealthy, and the many, and which rallies them all round it. It does justice to everything that contributes to the life of the State. Under its shadow the good, the wealthy, and the free-born work happily together, ruling and being ruled for the common good[1].

This is Aristotle's conception of the normal (not the best) State in the form which it most commonly assumes, and the pattern was one which Greece in his day especially needed to have held up for imitation. It has its value, however, even in our own times.

Plato had said in the Politicus (297 B), that 'no large body of persons, whoever they may be, can acquire the political science and govern a State with reason (*μετὰ νοῦ*), and that it is in connexion with a small and scanty body, or even a single individual, that we must look for the one normal constitution.' Even in the Laws, where he concedes a certain share of power to the people, he constantly surrounds his concession with safeguards which greatly reduce its value. The classes in which he places most faith are evidently those comprised in the first and second property-classes. Aristotle has somewhat more confidence in the judgment, on some political subjects at all events, of some, though not all, kinds of demos[2].

[1] We notice that Aristotle does not rest the claims of mixed government on the ground that a system of 'checks and balances' is necessary, but on grounds of justice: all elements contributing to the being and well-being of the State should receive due recognition in the award of supreme authority. Considerations of expediency, however, reinforce those of justice. A constitution of this kind is the safest, inasmuch as all elements of the State gladly combine to give it support. We see also that if Aristotle does not believe in the divine right of the One or the Few, neither would he accept the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, even in the limited sense of the sovereignty of the *ἐλεύθεροι*. Sovereignty rightfully rests with those who, contributing elements of importance to the life of the State, can and will rule for the general good.

[2] He strongly deprecates a pauper demos (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32), and he much prefers an agricultural or pastoral demos to a demos of artisans or day-labourers or *ἀγοραῖοι* (8 (6). 4).

We see how great a part justice, and its equivalent the common good, play in determining the structure of the Aristotelian State. If the slave is a slave, it is because it is just and well for him and every one else, that he should be so. The same principle governs the assignment of citizen-rights and of supreme authority in the State. A State in which the best should rule by force would not satisfy Aristotle, even if they ruled for the best ends; there must be a willing co-operation of all, whether rulers or ruled, and this can only be secured through an universal conviction that an adequate place is found for everybody, and that no one's just claims are overlooked. Aristotle's principle is a salutary one, whatever we may think of his application of it. It is—let every element that contributes to the being and well-being of the State receive due recognition in its award of rights. The permanent value of this principle will best be seen if we study some instance of its infraction—for example, the *ancien régime* in France.

Justice and the common good the two-fold clue to the normal constitution.

We note also that the just being, in Aristotle's view, identical with that which is for the common good, he has both these clues to guide him in the construction of the State. Τὸ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν (1283 b 40). Rights, it would seem, are to be measured by the common good.

It is, however, mainly by considerations of justice that Aristotle is guided in his construction of the State. Justice was to him the key to all constitutional problems; varying views of justice lay at the root of constitutional diversity and constitutional change. He saw that all the competing claimants for political power—democrats no less than oligarchs—appealed to justice in support of their claims. The champions of oligarchy seem occasionally to have used the argument that those who contribute ninety-nine hundredths of a common fund should not be placed on the same footing as those who contribute the remaining hundredth (3. 9. 1280 b 27 sqq.), and it was apparently from them that Aristotle learnt the view that political

power should be distributed among the members of a State in proportion to contribution. He holds, indeed, that account should be taken in the distribution of power, not of property only, but of everything that contributes to the being and well-being of a State. The free-born and the virtuous have as good a claim to a share of power as the wealthy. Still, though he amends the contention of the champions of oligarchy, he adopts it in the amended form.

Is Aristotle's account of the principle on which political power should be distributed correct?

It is an interesting question, whether his account of the principle on which political power should be distributed is correct. It places the matter at any rate in a distinct light, whereas, when similar questions arise among ourselves, and an appeal is made to considerations of justice, there is often a good deal of vagueness about the arguments used. Aristotle's view is that those who contribute to the common stock the attributes, material moral and intellectual, which are essential to the being and well-being of the State—whether (like the citizens of the best State) they individually possess the whole of them, or whether some possess one of them and others another, the rich, the free-born, and the virtuous forming distinct classes—ought in fairness, as a requital for their contribution, to be the citizens and rulers of the State. It is evident, however, that the award of supreme power to men thus endowed may be rested on another ground. The State may give it to them, not in requital for their contribution, but because it is for the common good that 'the tools' should be in the hands of 'those who can use them.' It may well be that the Common Good is a safer standard in questions of this kind than the Distributive Justice of Aristotle, and that the State is more likely to be successful in attaining the ends for which it exists, if it abstains from attempting to balance contribution and recompense, and is guided in its distribution of power simply by considerations of the Common Good. We may test the soundness of Aristotle's theory in some degree by the view which it leads him to take of Kingship. He finds himself, as we shall shortly

see, obliged to deny the legitimacy of Absolute Kingship in all cases but one—the case in which the Absolute King is an overwhelmingly important contributor to the State. Would it not have been better to say that the Absolute Kingship is only in place where it is essential to the well-being of the community?

We may, indeed, go further and ask whether the recognition of contribution, or even of capacity, is really justice—whether justice is not rather the recognition of desert. On this point some remarks of Mr. J. S. Mill (Political Economy, Book ii. c. 1. § 4) deserve to be quoted. 'The proportioning of remuneration to work done,' he says, 'is really just, only in so far as the more or less of the work is a matter of choice: when it depends on natural difference of strength or capacity, this principle of remuneration is in itself an injustice: it is giving to those who have—assigning most to those who are already most favoured by nature.' But is it possible for the State to sound the depths of human desert? And if it were possible, would it be well that the State should award the advantages at its disposal in accordance with desert? A man's extraction, his training, or other circumstances beyond his control may be so bad that he deserves more credit for being only a thief and not a murderer, than another man deserves for being an useful member of society. Yet would not the State be acting a suicidal part, if it gave power to a man of this kind? It would seem that the only sort of justice which is capable of affording a basis to society is that which is recognized by Aristotle; yet is this really justice?

Transition to Kingship, which is examined first as being one of the normal constitutions. Its true form,

Aristotle has now answered the question raised at the commencement of c. 10—what ought to be the supreme authority of the State—and he passes on in c. 14 to examine the subject of Kingship, 'for we say that this is one of the normal constitutions.' His plan seems to be to study the normal constitutions first, perhaps on the principle mentioned in c. 7. 1279 a 23, where he says that 'when

these have been described, the deviation-forms will be evident.' He reserves an examination of the polity, however, till he has analysed democracy and oligarchy, 'for its nature will be more evident, after these constitutions have been described' (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 22–33). There is no such reason for postponing the study of Kingship and the true Aristocracy.

the Absolute Kingship, distinguished from the rest.

The question is asked whether a State and country (*καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ*, c. 14. 1284 b 38) which is to be well constituted may be placed with advantage under a Kingship, or whether some other constitution will be better for it, or whether again in some cases a Kingship will be in place and in others not. It is evident from 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sq. (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq.), that the question of the naturalness of Kingship had given rise to discussion. Isocrates, for instance, had spoken of it in one passage (Philip. § 107) as an institution uncongenial to Greeks, but indispensable to barbarians.

Aristotle evidently feels that this question cannot be discussed till the various forms of Kingship have been distinguished, and those which do not really come into consideration eliminated. He accordingly distinguishes five forms of Kingship, the extreme form at one end of the scale being the Laconian (*ἡ Λακωνική*)—a mere Generalship for life—and that at the other being the form in which one man is 'supreme over everything, just as a nation (*ἔθνος*) or City-State is supreme over all public affairs—a form which agrees in type with household rule[1], for as household rule is a sort of Kingship over a household, so this type of Kingship is household rule over a City-State or over one or more nations.' We observe that the Absolute Kingship (*παμβασιλεία*) is evidently conceived by Aristotle as applicable not only to a City-State but also to an *ἔθνος* or a collection of *ἔθνη*. Of these two forms he dismisses the first-named as being rather an institution which may exist in

[1] 3. 14. 1285 b 31, *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν*: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, *ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία*: Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, *ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*: and other references given in Bon. Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.

connexion with a variety of constitutions, than a distinct form of constitution. The other form, accordingly, remains for consideration.

Question of the expediency of Kingship discussed—is the rule of the best man or the rule of the best laws the more expedient?

As to this, the first question to be considered is, he says, whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. This question had been already discussed by Plato in the Politicus (294 A–296 A) and in the Laws (874 E–875 D)[1]. In the former passage Plato thus states his doctrine:—'the legislative art is certainly in some sense an element in the art of kingly rule [and legislation is therefore a function of the king], but the best thing is that supreme authority should rest, not with the laws, but with the man who having wisdom is capable of kingly rule' (294 A). No art (he urges) can lay down anything 'simple and universal' (*ἁπλοῦν*) as to things so shifting as men and their doings, at all events if it is to ordain what is best; yet this is what law tries to do, 'like a stupid and wilful man, resolved not to allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment or any question to be asked, even if some fresh thing different from what he commanded should happen to be better for some individual[2].' Then why (Plato asks) make laws at all? For just the same reason for which gymnastic trainers draw up a general rule for the exercises of those whom they are training. They do this, because they cannot possibly be at everybody's elbow at every moment, ready to indicate the best thing to do. Imagine, for instance, a trainer going abroad and expecting to be a long time away—he will leave behind him written instructions for his pupils; but if he should happen to come back sooner than he

[1] This is pointed out by Mr. Jackson in his note on Eth. Nic. 5. 6. § 5. The comparative merits of the rule of law and the rule of an autocrat are discussed in a well-known passage of the Supplices of Euripides (389 sqq.) with an obvious intention to give the victory to Theseus, the representative of the former. Compare also Eurip. fr. 600 (Nauck),

τρόπος ἐστὶ χρηστὸς ἀσφαλέστερος νόμου

with 3. 16. 1287 b 6, *ὥστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα [νόμων] ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος.*

[2] See Prof. Campbell, Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, p. 137–8, whose renderings I have mainly followed here.

intended, would he feel bound to follow those written instructions in his management of them, supposing some change were desirable? Undoubtedly not. The moral is that law is only a make-shift, that the best thing is the unceasing guidance and supervision of a true King, and that if law exists, it is essential that the King should be free to depart from it, wherever he can do so with advantage.

In the Laws (874 E sqq.) the same view is implied, but Plato is here more conscious how impossible it is for any mortal man to see that it is to his own interest, no less than to that of others, to study the common advantage rather than his own private advantage, or if he did so, to abide by this principle and to act on it throughout his life. Of genuine Reason, designed by nature to be free, there is not a particle anywhere, or, at least, not much (875 D); hence it is that we have to call on law to rule, though it looks only to that which is for the most part and cannot discern that which holds universally. Mankind must have laws and live in accordance with them—otherwise they will be no better than the most savage beasts (874 E)—but Law is only the second-best thing.

Aristotle evidently has the teaching of the Politicus in view in the aporetic analysis which he brings to bear on the question (1286 a 9 sqq.). Those who are for Kingship, he says, will object to law that it gives merely a general rule, and does not adjust its directions to the circumstances of the particular case. To exercise any art by written rule is foolish: even in Egypt, where the physicians are expected to treat their patients by stereotyped written rules, they are allowed to change the treatment after four days, if desirable. But then, if it is made an objection to law that it embodies a general principle, we must remember that the ruler also must possess the general principle, so that he is open to the same objection; indeed, in him it is exposed to the disturbing influence of emotion and passion, from which no human breast is free; it will consequently be less pure and less potent. It may, however, be rejoined that in

compensation for this the individual ruler will be able to deal better with the particular case than law could do.

Provisional conclusion arrived at in favour of a Law-giver-King, who makes laws, but reserves to himself the power to break them, where they deviate from the right.

These considerations evidently point to the advisability of adopting some arrangement, by which the One Best Man will promulgate laws which will be supreme except where they deviate from what is right[1]. But then comes the question, is it better that these cases with which the law fails to deal aright should be dealt with by a single individual of surpassing excellence, and not by the whole body of citizens or by a less numerous body of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)? The subject is discussed with a leaning to a conclusion in favour of these *σπουδαῖοι*. The reason why Kingship prevailed in early times was perhaps merely this, that in those days only a very few possessed virtue; when more came to do so, Aristocracy took its place[2]. Besides, there is a special difficulty connected with the probability of the King, who is assumed to possess supreme power, passing his Kingship on to an unworthy child. There is also the difficulty that the King, being, not a body of men, but a solitary individual, and therefore needing to be supplied with the means of enforcing his will, must of necessity be supplied with a guard. This, however, may be got over.

But the subject which Aristotle intended to investigate was the King, who is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases, not he who is in part checked by law.

But Aristotle now awakes to the consciousness, or makes believe to do so, that in all this discussion of the rule of a Lawgiver-King he has been treating of a Kingship governed by Law—a *βασιλεία κατὰ νόμον*—for he has been criticising a Kingship in which law is supreme, at all events till it deviates from right (1286 a 23). The subject to be considered, however, is in reality the King who 'is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases' (c. 16. 1287 a 1), not he who is in part checked by law. What is to be said of his claims?

[1] Compare the provisional conclusion as to the relation of law to the ruler thrown out in c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq.

[2] The theory of the succession of constitutions put forward here occurs in an entirely aporetic passage and does not necessarily represent Aristotle's definitive view on the subject. In 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. the changes in constitutions are connected less with changes in the distribution of virtue than with changes in the art of war.

To this subject Aristotle addresses himself afresh, and the polemic against the rule of the One Best Man begins again with increased intensity, and in such a way as to disturb some arguments in favour of a ruler of this type, which had passed without objection in the previous discussion. Among men who are like each other it is contrary to nature and unjust to make one man supreme over everything; the proper arrangement in such a case is interchange of rule, which involves the existence of law. Then, again, no human being would be able to take cognisance of the details which the law is unable to regulate; hence the objection commonly made to the rule of the law applies also to the rule of the One Best Man: the law, however, does all that can be done to meet this difficulty, for it purposely trains the rulers to deal fairly and justly with these matters[1]. The law has this merit, that it not only regulates but educates—educates men to supply its own inevitable defects[2]. Besides, it permits and makes possible its own amendment. The rule of law is the rule of God and reason[3]: the rule of a man involves a part-rule of the brute which is present in every man, inasmuch as desire and anger are present in him. The parallel of the arts (which had been accepted before) does not hold. The master of an art—a physician, for instance—is seldom drawn by passion or partiality in a direction contrary to that which reason dictates, whereas the ruler has to deal with matters in which he may have a personal interest,

law. Is a King of this type an expedient institution?

[1] In 1287 a 25, ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, the terms of the Athenian juror's oath (περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσί, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσί, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ, Poll. 8. 122, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 134. 10) are evidently present to Aristotle's recollection.

[2] Ἀλλὰ μήν (1287 a 23: cp. 1287 a 41, b 8) appears to introduce a fresh objection made by the advocate of law to the rule of a human being (ἄνθρωπος), even if he be the best of men (cp. ἄνθρωπον, 30). Some high authorities, however, and Bernays among them, take it as introducing an objection to the rule of law made by the advocate of the rule of an ἄριστος ἀνήρ, to the effect that magistrates are of no use in supplying the deficiencies of law. The point is doubtful.

[3] Aristotle probably has in his mind Plato's language, Laws 713 E–714 A.

and about which he is not dispassionate; to him, therefore, the law may be useful as a standard representing the mean, by which he can shape his course. The argument against curing men by written rule and governing by written rule also applies only to one sort of law—written law; unwritten law, which is the more authoritative sort, remains untouched by it. Then, again, the One Man cannot supervise everything; he must therefore employ others; and if he does so, why should not supreme authority be given to the whole number at once? Besides, 'several heads are better than one,' especially after they have had the training of intellect and character which only law can give. Lastly, a king must govern with the help of friends[1], but friends are like and equal to each other; supreme authority should therefore be given to the whole body.

Throughout this prolonged series of arguments against the rule of the One Best Man, Aristotle has remained quietly in the background. He has perhaps been not unwilling to have the considerations fully stated, which from a popular point of view (for this is naturally the prevailing point of view in an aporetic discussion) make against the absolute rule of the best man, unchecked by law—partly because the arguments of the Politicus needed to be met, though abandoned, or apparently abandoned, by Plato in the Laws, partly because he holds, unlike Plato, that one form of the best State is a State governed by law; but now he steps in and closes the discussion by saying that all these arguments against the substitution of the rule of the One Best Man for that of law only hold good in certain cases; they do not hold good where he is a man of transcendent excellence, and one whose excellence outweighs that of all the other persons in the State put together. 'It is clear from what has been said,' he remarks (3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.), 'that, among those at any rate who are alike and equal, it is

The Absolute Kingship is in place under given circumstances—i. e. if the King's virtue is so transcendent as to exceed the collective virtue of all the rest.

[1] As to the φίλοι or ἑταῖροι of the Macedonian Kings—an important and recognized body of men—see P. Spitta, De Amicorum qui vocantur in Macedonum regno condicione, who refers among other passages to the following in Diodorus—16. 54. 4: 17. 2. 5: 17. 16. 1: 17. 52. 7: 17. 54. 3: 17. 57. 1: 17. 112. 3.

neither expedient nor just that a single individual should be supreme over all, whether laws do not exist and he himself is supreme, as being a law, or whether they do' (the hypothesis dealt with in 1286 a 21–b 40), 'and whether he is a good man ruling over good men, or a man not good ruling over not good men—aye, and even if he is superior to his subjects in virtue' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37), 'unless indeed he is superior in a certain degree' (i.e. to such an extent, that 'his virtue exceeds the virtue of all the rest put together,' 1288 a 17).

Aristotle's first object in this long inquiry is to show that the normal constitution, though always just and for the common advantage, is not in all cases the same, but varies according to the distribution in the given society of the elements which contribute to the being of the State, and especially of virtue. We learn from it that the principle provisionally laid down in c. 11 (1282 b 1)—that supreme authority in the State should be given to 'laws normally constituted,' or, in other words, to laws adjusted to the normal constitutions—is subject to one important exception; it only holds good when the State consists of men alike and equal or of those who are approximately alike and equal. It does not hold in cases where its observance would work injustice, and would be hostile to the general good, and indeed impossible and ridiculous. If a man of transcendent excellence[1] should appear in a State, one

In one case, then (that of the Absolute Kingship) the conclusion arrived at in the earlier part of the book that normally constituted laws are the true supreme authority, does not hold good.

[1] In 3. 13. 1284 a 6 the transcendent superiority referred to is said to be in virtue and *πολιτικὴ δύναμις* (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10–14); but in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 Kingship and the true Aristocracy are said *βούλεσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην*, and in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 we find a superiority not only in virtue but 'in all goods' ascribed to the king (*οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων*). In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 18 a transcendent superiority in bodily endowments is added to the picture—a characteristically Greek thought inherited from Plato (Polit. 301 D–E)—for otherwise men's doubts of the transcendent qualities of the One Man might not be silenced and overpowered (cp. Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.). It was the custom of the Ethiopian race, which the Greeks loved to imagine as especially noble (Maspero, Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient, p. 535, ed. 2) to make the biggest and strongest man among them king (Hdt. 3. 20,

whose excellence outweighs that of all the rest put together, then the only thing that is right or expedient or possible is that his will should be gladly obeyed and that all other law should disappear. He must be the living law of the State; he must be what a father is in a household or Zeus in the universe. For the moment the State becomes all that the most ardent of hero-worshippers could wish it to be, only that Aristotle requires his Absolute King to possess, not merely transcendent capacity, but transcendent moral excellence. He does not seem to hold, with Plato in the Laws, that no mortal nature is fit to be invested with these immense powers; nor does he concede them to a man possessed of true knowledge and virtue, irrespectively of the extent of his superiority to his fellows: the Absolute King must not only be a man of transcendent virtue, but there must be an immense disparity between his virtue and that of his subjects. Plato had not dwelt with equal emphasis in the Politicus on the extent of this necessary disparity, though he undoubtedly implies that it will be great.

Aristotle's object in making this reservation in favour of the Absolute Kingship is to prevent the claims of Law clashing with those of justice and reason.

It is evident from the Fourth Book[1] that if Aristotle makes an exception to the supremacy of law in favour of the Absolute King, it is rather because his account of the State would otherwise be incomplete and open to objection, than because the appearance on the scene of such a being is at all probable. To have said that the supreme authority in every community must always be 'laws normally constituted' would have exposed him to a fatal rejoinder from the followers of Antisthenes[2]. 'What,' they would have asked, 'do you really mean to claim obedience to law from a Heracles?' A scene or two from the Bacchae of Euripides would have been at once quoted, in

τὸν ἂν τῶν ἀστῶν κρίνωσι μέγιστόν τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγαθος ἔχειν τὴν ἰσχύν, τοῦτον ἀξιοῦσι βασιλεύειν).

[1] C. 14. 1332 b 23, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 3 sqq., where Aristotle in noticing the circumstance that no new kingships arose in his own day accounts for it by remarking that men were rarely then forthcoming who towered above their fellows sufficiently to deserve an 'office' so great and exalted.

[2] Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 15 sqq.

which the fruitless attempt of the misguided King Pentheus to control and imprison the god Dionysus, and the fate which his folly brought upon him, are described in glorious verse.

His doctrine of the Absolute Kingship, however, also implies that it is not in place in the absence of transcendent virtue. Salutary tendency of this teaching.

But the object of Aristotle, or at all events the effect of his teaching on this subject, was not perhaps solely to prevent the infringement of the claims of a hypothetical παμβασιλεύς or Absolute King. The rights of the natural παμβασιλεύς were to be respected, but no one was a natural παμβασιλεύς who did not possess transcendent virtue and an immense superiority to everyone else belonging to the State. Only a man of this type could claim to be above law.

The age of Aristotle was one which needed this lesson. Kingship had grown in credit during the fourth century before Christ, in proportion as the defects of the free constitutions of Greece had become more apparent. Both Xenophon and Isocrates had sketched an ideal King as well as an ideal constitution[1]. Xenophon describes with enthusiasm the born King whom men instinctively and willingly follow, as bees follow the queen-bee—who rules to make his subjects as virtuous as possible, and makes them so partly by example, partly by rewarding virtue and stimulating emulation, partly by close personal superintendence, like a 'seeing Law[2]'; and we derive the impression from his writings, that though he had learnt from the Lacedaemonian State how much Law could do, especially in maintaining and enforcing a public system of education, not ending with youth but carried on to maturer years, he is, nevertheless, still more interested in the personal agencies which make for virtue, as indeed a disciple of Socrates might naturally be. Xenophon seems, in fact,

[1] 'Isocrates, like Xenophon, depicted not only a perfect constitution, but also a perfect Prince, and described the qualities of a true ruler and king in his address to Nicocles and in his Evagoras, partly in a hortatory form, partly in the form of an encomium' (Henkel, Studien, p. 155).

[2] See the references in Henkel, Studien, p. 142 sqq., and cp. Cyrop. 8. 1. 22, *αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐδόκει καὶ διὰ τοὺς γραφομένους νόμους βελτίους γιγνομένους ἀνθρώπους· τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανός ἐστι καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν.*

to be divided between the respect for law which he inherited from Socrates and his enthusiasm for born rulers of men.

Isocrates, again, though he recognizes the educating influence of law[1], and allows it to be the source of the greatest benefits to human life[2], yet holds that there are other things better—Rhetoric, for example, which does not, like law, concern itself only with the internal condition of a State, but teaches men how to deal with problems affecting Greece as a whole[3]. In this spirit he tells Philip of Macedon[4], that while other descendants of Heracles, men fast bound in the fetters of a constitution and of laws—he probably refers to the Lacedaemonian kings—will love only the city to which they belong, Philip should count the whole of Hellas as his country, and work for its advantage no less than for that of Macedon.

The Macedonian kingship under Philip, and still more under Alexander, was tending to outgrow its old constitutional limits[5], and to pass into a form in which the king possessed almost divine prerogatives. A saying is ascribed to Philip by Stobaeus[6], which shows how high a view he took of the rights of the throne. 'The king,' he said, 'ought to remember that he is at once a man and the depositary of power godlike in extent, in order that he may aim at all things noble and divine, and yet speak with the voice of a human being.' So again, Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, in the famous words which he addressed to Alexander after the murder of Cleitus, told him that the Great King could no more do wrong than Zeus himself[7]—we know not whether before or after the composition of the Politics. Aristotle felt quite differently. He had perhaps already, in his dialogue entitled Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων (or ἀποικιῶν), advised Alexander to exercise despotic sway only over the 'bar-

[1] Ad Nicocl. §§ 2–3.
[2] De Antid. § 79.
[3] De Antid. § 79: cp. §§ 271–280.
[4] Philip. § 127.
[5] See O. Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 123 sqq.
[6] Floril. 48. 21.
[7] Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4. 9. 7.

barians,' and to deal with the Greeks as freemen deserving to be led (ἡγεμονικῶς)[1], and his advice was echoed in Alexander's presence by his imprudent relative and disciple Callisthenes[2]. His effort to inculcate moderation of rule in relation to Greeks on the omnipotent Macedonian Monarchy is quite in harmony with the general tendency of his political teaching[3], and was a real service to mankind. It was a time when the intoxication of empire and power, which seems to have mastered men's minds in antiquity more often than in modern days, and always with fatal results, was especially strong, and needed to be firmly checked[4].

Naturalness of the idea that men should be ruled by beings higher than themselves.

The thought which underlay both the conception of the Single Ruler in the Politicus and Aristotle's conception of the παμβασιλεύς was a natural one. It was this—was not the true type of human society that in which men surrender themselves to the guidance of some being or beings of superior race? 'We do not,' says Plato (Laws, 713 D), 'set oxen to rule over oxen, or goats over goats; a superior race rules them, that of men'; and so in the golden age of the reign of Cronus, demigods (δαίμονες) were set by him to rule over man, 'and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us

[1] Fragm. Aristot. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.

[2] Arrian, Exped. Alex. 4. 11. 8. The whole of this eleventh chapter shows how little Callisthenes (and Aristotle also in all probability) was prepared to concede divine honours to Alexander; and in Aristotle's conception the παμβασιλεύς is little less than a god (3. 13. 1284 a 10). Theophrastus spoke of Callisthenes as having 'fallen in the way of a man of colossal power and good fortune, but one who knew not how to use prosperity aright' (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 3. 10. 21). There is no sign that Aristotle was at all more prepared than Theophrastus to find a παμβασιλεύς in Alexander.

[3] Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11, καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον.

[4] Demetrius of Phalerum is said, not on very good authority however, to have advised Ptolemy King of Egypt to purchase and read the books written 'on the subject of Kingship and Government' (περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας): ἃ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὐ θαρροῦσι παραινεῖν, ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται (Plutarch (?), Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata —Demetr. Phaler., p. 189 D).

and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing[1],' secured a life of concord and happiness to the tribes of men. 'This tradition,' he continues, 'tells us, and tells us truly, that for cities of which some mortal and not God is the ruler, there is no escape from evils and toils' (Laws, 713 E).

How natural this thought is, appears from its perhaps unconscious repetition in modern literature. 'Here,' says a reviewer, speaking of a work by Sir H. Holland[2], 'we find the remark that whereas some of the lower animals are tamed and educated by man, man himself has no higher animal to educate him. "He alone is submitted to no superior being on the earth capable of thus controlling or perfecting his natural instincts, of cultivating his reason, or of creating new capacities or modes of action." This is strictly true; yet in all organized communities the individual man is submitted to a superior control—namely, that of society and of social, as distinct from individual, ends of action; and the education of man in his individual character by man in his corporate or political character is really a far greater and more wonderful thing than the development of the half-human intelligence, wonderful as that is, of a well-bred and well-trained dog[3].' It is to this education by society that Plato points, when he goes on, in the same passage, to say that man must imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronus, and hearken to what we have of immortality within us, to the voice of Reason expressed in law (Laws, 714 A), seeing that the demigod rulers of Cronus are no longer forthcoming.

Aristotle, however, declines to say that the appearance on the scene of a ruler of this kind, or even of a family of such rulers, is impossible. Nay more, he holds that

[1] Prof. Jowett's translation, 4. 234.

[2] 'Fragmentary Papers on Science and other subjects,' by Sir H. Holland, Bart. (Longmans, 1875), reviewed in the *Saturday Review* for March 20, 1875. The book itself is not known to me.

[3] Compare the saying 'homo homini deus.' It should be noticed, however, that one race of men educates another, and that mankind owes at least as much to this source of civilization as to the action of a society on its members.

if this event happened, the 'truest and most divine' form of the State would be realized[1]. But he also holds that its occurrence is in the highest degree improbable, and thus the best State which we find depicted in the Fourth Book is a State consisting of equal citizens. Occasionally, indeed, he speaks as if the State of free and equal citizens, whose relations are regulated not by the will of men but by law, were the true form of the State[2]; and in all probability his mind was under the influence of two conflicting views, that which he inherited from the Politicus and the Republic of Plato, and that which was more especially his own—the view that there is nothing in the supremacy of law which should make it out of place even in the best constitution.

Aristotle's view that the Absolute Kingship is the only real form of Kingship criticised.

It is questionable whether Aristotle is right in holding that there is but one form of real Kingship—the Absolute Kingship—and that Kingship governed by law is not, as Plato had made it in the Politicus, a separate form of constitution, but merely a great magistracy, such as might find a place in a variety of constitutions (3. 16. 1287 a 3 sqq.).

Some non-hereditary forms of Kingship according to law noticed by him—among them, that of the aesymnete[3]—may have in some degree resembled great offices like that to which Aristotle refers, when he speaks of a single individual being often made 'supreme over the administration' (*κύριος τῆς διοικήσεως*, 1287 a 6), and may perhaps

[1] Cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, *τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης*. The same view is expressed in 2. 2. 1261 a 29 sqq., where the State of free and equal citizens, interchanging rule, is said to reproduce approximately in its temporary distinction of rulers and ruled the deeper and permanent distinction of nature which prevails where, as is better, the same men constantly rule: cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 21. Perhaps the epithet *θειοτάτη* conveys a delicate hint that the *παμβασιλεία* is hardly an institution for men: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 19, *τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν*.

[2] Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα*: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32, *ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία*: 2. 10. 1272 b 5, *ταῦτα δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βούλησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανών*.

[3] 3. 14. 1285 b 25: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10, *ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις*.

have been not absolutely incompatible with democracy, in some at least of its forms, though it is hard to imagine their co-existence. But this cannot have been true of hereditary Kingships. Aristotle himself does not distinctly assert the contrary, but his attempt to confine the inquiry to two representative forms only, the Lacedaemonian and the Absolute Kingship (c. 15. 1285 b 33 sq.), evidently misleads him[1].

A King, and especially a hereditary King, even if he rules according to law, is a very different being from a magistrate with a wide competence. Our modern terminology, which counts as a Monarchy any government in which a King exists, however limited his powers, would seem to be more correct. The mere fact that a King finds a place in a constitution is sufficient to give it a special colour and to make it quite different from what it would otherwise have been. In the Lacedaemonian constitution, indeed, the powers of the King were so limited that it was perhaps rightly classed, not as a Kingship, but as an Aristocracy; and the so-called Kings at Carthage were hardly Kings in any real sense. But Kingship in accordance with law, in many of the forms in which it existed in Aristotle's day, fully deserved to be accounted a distinct form of Kingship and to find a place among varieties of constitution.

Aristotle's real feeling about Kingship apparently is, that in the absence of an immense disparity in excellence between the King and his subjects, it is not a just institution, nor can the willing obedience, which is its characteristic, exist. *Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἱρετώτατον· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων* (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 41 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 3–10). But if this immense disparity exists,

[1] In calling the Lacedaemonian Kingship a 'generalship for life' (*στρατηγία ἀϊδιος*) and arguing (1287 a 4) that a 'generalship for life' may exist in all forms of constitution, he seems to forget the hereditariness of the Lacedaemonian Kingship.

then law cannot exist. Aristotle, in fact, approaches the question of the structure of the State from the point of view of justice. Power must be proportioned to contribution.

'Kingship,' says Henkel[1], 'was in the whole Political Theory of antiquity only a form of Aristocracy, resting on no separate and independent basis of its own.' Erdmann expresses the modern view of the subject, when he says[2]: 'When men expect talent in a King, they forget that a King is not a high official: a high official, no doubt, cannot discharge his functions without the particular kind of talent required for their discharge. The things which a King chiefly needs to possess are love for his people, and the conscientiousness which will beget in him doubts of his own omniscience, and lead him to choose virtuous and capable ministers. When, as in the instance of Frederick the Second, these two characteristics are combined with a great mental superiority—a thing which occurs only once in a century — the highest standard is unquestionably attained.' Expediency, interpreted by experience, is a better guide in questions of constitutional organization than justice, as Aristotle understands it. Not a few Kings have received enthusiastic support from their subjects, and have made their rule a blessing to mankind, though they could claim no such transcendent superiority to those over whom they ruled as that which Aristotle requires in a King.

Retrospective summary of the conclusions of the Third Book as to the nature of the State.

When we put together the various data as to the nature of the State with which the Third Book furnishes us, we shall find them somewhat contradictory. The State is 'a community of citizens sharing in a common constitution' (*κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας*, 3. 3. 1276 b 1): it is also 'a certain number of citizens' (*πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41): is then the *κοινωνία* identical with the *κοινωνοί*? Then again, its identity is especially to be sought in the constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 10): this seems to imply that the State

[1] Studien, p. 57. [2] Vorlesungen über den Staat, p. 167.

is rather to be sought in the σύνθεσις than in the citizens, the σύνθετα; so that if the constitution lasts for centuries, the life of the State will far outlast that of the body of citizens (πλῆθος πολιτῶν) with which it is occasionally identified[1], and if it lasts only a few months, the reverse will be the case. Elsewhere again (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 29–2. 1324 a 13), the State is described as a moral agent capable of virtue and happiness. Must it not, then, be a Person, as well as an aggregate or a σύνθεσις of persons[2]?

Still further, as we have already seen, the State is occasionally described as including not only citizens, but also women, children, and slaves (e.g. 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sqq.: cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sqq.); but here the term is used in a broader and more inclusive sense than elsewhere. Thus in the Fourth Book (c. 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.) only those are allowed to be 'parts of the State' who can live its full life and be κοινωνοί, and these are its citizens; so that we come back to the view that the State is to be identified with its citizens, or rather with the κοινωνία which they form, and does not include those who are not citizens, or (to use the words of the Fourth Book) that it is a κοινωνία of men like each other, existing for the sake of the best life to which they can attain (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35).

The State at its best is thus, in Aristotle's view, under ordinary conditions, a company or brotherhood of equal comrades, enjoying that 'leisure from the quest of necessaries' (σχολὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων) without which full virtue cannot exist, 'able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life in accordance with virtue'; not necessarily equal absolutely, but proportionally equal — sufficiently equal to be commensurable, to live

[1] Unless indeed the word πλῆθος contains the notion of perpetual renewal.

[2] As to these unreconciled contradictions, a plentiful crop of which usually comes to light whenever we make a careful study of Aristotle's teaching on any subject, see Heyder's remarks (Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegel'schen Dialektik, p. 179), quoted by Eucken, Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 43 n. They arise in part from Aristotle's desire to do justice to all points of view.

for the same end, and to accept the control of a common body of law. At first sight the State, as Aristotle conceives it, presents the aspect of a body of friends, exceptionally numerous indeed, but tending as friends do, to be like and equal, and engaged in one and the same scheme of life—'one equal temper of heroic hearts.' Virtue, which is the secret of unity in friendship, is also the secret of unity in the State (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 sqq.). A body of friends, however, is not an unity in the same degree as a State; it need not, like the State, be composed of diverse elements; its members are not, like those of the State, divided into rulers and ruled, nor are their relations regulated by law; the essential characteristic of State-life is exchange of service, that of friendship common life and accordant feeling; the aim of friendship is especially 'living together' (τὸ συζῆν), an aim which, though presupposed in the State, is less its aim than 'advantage' (τὸ συμφέρον)[1]; above all, in the case of the State, a Whole is formed which reacts upon its members and imparts completeness to them, and which is itself a moral agent, a Person, dealing with those outside it as well as with those within. The State, we see, is something more than a body of friends. It is also to be distinguished from a school, if only because in a school there is no interchange of service. It is not a Church, again, for its aims are more varied than those of a Church; it does not exist for the worship of God alone, or for the promotion of spiritual, as distinguished from intellectual, growth; its objects range from the provision of commodities to the full development of the whole man; it has a military force at its disposal; its ultimate aim is not, as Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had said, the production of virtue, but rather the efflux of virtue in virtuous action, unimpeded and happy. So far from the State ceasing to be necessary, as the view of these inquirers might be construed to imply, when full virtue is already possessed by the citizens, it is not

[1] Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2: and compare Eth. Nic. 9. 12. with Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35–40. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8–30.

at its best except when all of them are men of full virtue. If it is itself the source of their virtue, partly through the material conditions with which it surrounds them, partly through the training and guidance which it imparts, it must nevertheless go further and develope their virtue in action; it must set on foot an exchange of mutual service rendered with a view to the common good; it must offer its citizens a Whole in which they can merge themselves as parts, rising thus to a nobler level and type of action than they could singly realize; it must be to them a sort of God[1], less remote, more helpful, more akin to them than the God of Aristotle—a Being in whom they lose themselves only to find themselves again.

Aristotle has not learnt that the State does not exist exclusively for the advantage of its members, but in part for that of the world outside it. To him it is a natural Whole, which in all normal cases grows up, as it were, round the individual, raising him to the full level of humanity and satisfying all his wants from the lowest to the highest; it exists for the sake of those within it, not for the sake of those outside. Its task is especially to satisfy man's highest needs, and we expect him to say that supreme power in it must be allotted to those who can so rule as to secure this result. He is led, however, by considerations of justice to award supreme power to those who contribute to its life in proportion to their contributions, and especially to those who possess 'virtue fully furnished with external means.'

It is because the State is so high a thing, that there are many who, in their own interest no less than in that of the whole, had better have nothing to do with its management. They cannot live its full life, and are rather in it than of it.

If Aristotle had said that the State exists not only for

[1] Aristotle, it is true, nowhere says this: still there is much in the Politics to suggest the idea to which Hobbes gave definite expression, when he spoke of the State as 'that "mortal god," to whom we owe under the "immortal God" our peace and defence' (Leviathan, part 2, c. 17).

the realization of the highest quality of life, but also for the development in all within it of the best type of life of which they are capable, he would have made the elevation of the mass of men one of its ends. But this he hardly seems to do. It is true that the head of the household is charged with the moral improvement of the slave, but then we are elsewhere told that the slave is ruled for his own good only accidentally—primarily for that of his master. Still less is the State expected to concern itself with the moral interests of the artisan and day-labourer: this class seems to be wholly uncared for. If Aristotle's view of the office of the State is defective in this respect, it has, however, the merit, that it brings into prominence a truth which in our own day is often forgotten—that one of the aims of the State should be to aid in the realization of the highest type of life, and that this should be fully as much its aim as to help those who cannot attain to the highest type to advance as far towards it as they can. Civilization should grow in height as well as in breadth.

It is evident that to Aristotle the State is far less than it is to us an abstraction apart from, and distinguishable from, the individuals who belong to it[1]; it is not a system of institutions, which, however it may change, retains its identity, while one generation after another finds shelter under it and passes away; it is not the house, but the human beings who live in it[2]. From the modern point of

[1] Compare Lucian, Anacharsis c. 20, *πόλιν γὰρ ἡμεῖς οὐ τὰ οἰκοδομήματα ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, οἷον τείχη καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ νεωσοίκους, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὥσπερ σῶμά τι ἔδραῖον καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑπάρχειν ἐς ὑποδοχὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν τῶν πολιτευομένων, τὸ δὲ πᾶν κῦρος ἐν τοῖς πολίταις τιθέμεθα· τούτους γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀναπληροῦντας καὶ διατάττοντας καὶ ἐπιτελοῦντας ἕκαστα καὶ φυλάττοντας, οἷόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. τοῦτο δὴ τοίνυν κατανοήσαντες ἐπιμελούμεθα μέν, ὡς ὁρᾷς, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τῆς πόλεως κατακοσμοῦντες αὐτό, ὡς κάλλιστον ἡμῖν εἴη . . . μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦτο προνοοῦμεν, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ἀγαθοὶ μὲν τὰς ψυχάς, ἰσχυροὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίγνοιντο κ.τ.λ.*

[2] The nineteenth Article of the Church of England defines 'the visible Church of Christ' as 'a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached and the Sacraments duly ministered.' With regard to all definitions of a State or a Church as a number of individuals, it may be asked whether the notion of a succession of individuals does not enter into our conception of a State or Church. Would a mere aggregate of individuals, even

view it is rather a 'fabric,' and to a large extent an inherited fabric. Aristotle regards it as a Whole consisting of its citizens as parts, and if in one passage he finds its identity mainly in the constitution, he follows this thought no further. The view of Isocrates that the State is immortal he evidently does not hold. The notion of the historic continuity of the State belongs to a later time, though Aristotle is aware that the past of a State influences its present[1]. The constitution of a State is to him less an outcome of its past than a reflection of contemporary facts —of the moral level and social composition of the community. In reality it is both.

Conflict of the Absolute Kingship with Aristotle's general account of the State.

To one form, indeed, of the best State of Aristotle the foregoing account of the State does not apply. In the Absolute Kingship, the highest but also the least realizable of its forms, many of its usual features seem to disappear. The State in this form seems to fall into two sections, the Absolute King, and those he rules, one of which, the Absolute King, is not a part of the State at all (3. 13. 1284a 8). Is he then outside the State, and is the State constituted by his subjects alone? Or is he rather to be regarded as himself the State? But then the State will apparently cease to be a *κοινωνία*, for there will be only one *κοινωνός*. And on that hypothesis, what becomes of the principle that the State consists of persons differing in kind? or of the principle that it is an aggregate of individuals? If, on the other hand, the State is composed of the Absolute King and his subjects[2], what is his or their

though animated by a common aim, possessed of a common creed, and living the same kind of life, constitute a State or a Church, if some provision were not made for the perpetuation of the society by the admission of fresh members?

[1] Cp. Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 12 sqq., where the existence of an extreme democracy at Athens is traced to the circumstance that the maritime empire of Athens was originally won by the demos.

[2] This would seem to be Aristotle's view, if we examine the reasoning in 2. 2. 1261a 29 sqq., where the State is said to be composed of persons differing in kind —i.e. rulers and ruled—both when the same persons always rule and when, in consequence of the equality of the members of the State, rule is interchanged.

relation to it, if he is not a part of the State? Aristotle's admission of the Absolute Kingship as a possible form of the State seems altogether to conflict with his general account of the State. We do not learn why, if he is 'complete in himself' (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 sq.), the Absolute King should trouble himself to rule or to live in society at all.

Strongly, however, as the Absolute Kingship contrasts with what we may call the typical form of the State, one paramount feature of the latter still survives in it. It is a means of placing the individual in constant contact and connexion with Reason, here indeed represented not by Law but by the Absolute King—a means of realizing the highest and most complete human life. Thus, however altered the structure of the State may be, its end remains the same; and this would seem to be enough for Aristotle. The State may exist without Law[1], if only it secures to its members the highest quality of life. Plato had already allowed the ideal State sketched in his 'Republic' freely to assume the form either of a Kingship or of an Aristocracy[2], but then in neither form were the rulers to be fettered by Law. Aristotle finds room for the Absolute Kingship at some cost of consistency. He makes room for it, as he tells us (3. 13. 1284 b 32: 3. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.), because he has no choice: not only would no other course be just, but no other course is possible.

Under what circumstances are Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity respectively in place?

Aristotle had said towards the close of the discussion on Kingship (3. 17. 1287 b 37), that there are those who are marked out by nature and by considerations of justice and advantage to be ruled as a master rules his slaves, and others marked out for subjection to a king, and others for membership of a polity; and even in the midst of his

[1] The view that a constitution implies the rule of Law is perhaps only said to be εὔλογος, and not absolutely adopted, in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq. The words are—εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία.

[2] Rep. 445 D, ἐπονομασθείη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῇ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος, βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη· πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία.

anxiety to establish the necessity and justice of the Absolute Kingship under certain circumstances, he pauses to seize the opportunity of explaining (1288 a 6 sqq.) under what circumstances each of the normal constitutions is in place.

A people is a fit subject for Kingship, if it is so constituted as to produce (*πέφυκε φέρειν*[1], 1288 a 8) a family excelling in virtue and in capacity for political leadership. This is shortly after amended to the effect that if even a single individual of this character makes his appearance, he is deserving of Kingship.

A people is a fit subject for Aristocracy, if it is so constituted as to produce a body of individuals capable of being ruled as freemen should be ruled by men qualified for political leadership by virtue. It appears from c. 18. 1288 a 35, that under this form both rulers and ruled will be 'men excelling in virtue,' the former having the virtue which qualifies for rule tending to the highest quality of life, the latter having the virtue which qualifies for being ruled to that end.

A people is a fit subject for Polity, in which a body of individuals naturally springs up (*πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι*[2]), possessed of military excellence and capable of ruling and being ruled in accordance with a law distributing offices among the well-to-do in accordance with desert[3].

The Third Book has mainly concerned itself with the normal constitutions, but we gain from it

So far—that is to say, down to the end of its last chapter but one—the Third Book has concerned itself mainly with the varieties of the 'normal constitution.' The normal constitution, we gather from it, is in all cases just and for the common advantage, and precisely because it is so, it is not in all cases the same. It varies as the social conditions vary; it awards supreme power accord-

[1] For *φέρειν* in this sense, cp. Plutarch, Dion c. 58, *ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἀληθῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ τὴν πόλιν ἐκείνην* (Athens) *φέρειν ἄνδρας ἀρετῇ τε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ κακίᾳ τοὺς φαύλους πονηροτάτους*: Plato, Tim. 24 C–D: Damox. Inc. Fab. Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 536)—

Κῶος· *θεοὺς γὰρ φαίνεθ' ἡ νῆσος φέρειν.*

[2] For this expression, cp. Aristot. Fragm. 85. 1491 a 1, *σπουδαῖον δ' ἐστὶ γένος ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ σπουδαῖοι πεφύκασιν ἐγγίνεσθαι.*

[3] See Appendix D.

ing to the distribution in the given community of the elements which contribute to the life of the State; here it will be a Kingship, there an Aristocracy, there a Polity.

occasional glimpses of the best constitution.

But though the normal constitution is the main subject of the book, we catch, as it advances, clearer and clearer glimpses of the best constitution also. It may be well to note these indications and to bring them together.

The best State, we are told (c. 5. 1278 a 8), will not give citizenship to the *βάναυσος*. In the best State, again, a part at all events of the citizens—those of them who are 'statesmen and who are charged, or fit to be charged, with the management of public affairs'—will possess the full virtue of the good man (*σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ*, c. 5. 1278 b 2 sqq.: cp. c. 18. 1288 a 37 sq.); and thus the best State is apparently referred to as a State in the hands of men of full virtue (*διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν*, c. 13. 1283 b 6), and in the same chapter the citizen of the best State is defined as 'he who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life of virtue' (1284 a 1). So far all the indications given us of the nature of the best State point to a State of equal *σπουδαῖοι* ruling and ruled by turns, but later in this chapter (the thirteenth) we learn that under certain circumstances the best State may be forced to assume the form of an Absolute Kingship, and the succeeding chapters even go on to inquire whether the Absolute Kingship is not really the best form of constitution (c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.: cp. 1286 b 22, *εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν*). The answer is that the best constitution will assume the form of an Absolute Kingship or the more equal form of an Aristocracy of *σπουδαῖοι*, according to circumstances. It will be the former, if an individual or a family of surpassing excellence exists in the State; it will be the latter, if this surpassing excellence is possessed by a body of citizens capable of ruling or being ruled with a view to the most desirable life (c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.)[1].

[1] Not simply *πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν*, as we had been told in c. 13. 1284 a 1 sqq.: however, even as far back as the ninth

We are thus gradually led in the Third Book to form a conception in outline of the nature of the best constitution in its two forms, Kingship and Aristocracy; it remains for the Fourth Book to work this out in detail, and to show how the best State is to be brought into being and instituted (*τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς*, 3. 18. 1288 b 4). The Third Book forms an introduction to the study of all constitutions, but especially to the study of the best [1]. The broad principles which it lays down with regard to the recognition of all elements contributing to the being and well-being of the State prepare us to find the books on the best State placing supremacy in the hands of a citizen-body possessing not only the intellectual and moral qualities necessary for rule, but also an adequate provision of external goods.

This book of the Politics, however, would have lost much of its interest and importance, if it had thrown light only on the best constitution. Perhaps its most marked characteristic is the prominence which it gives to the conception of justice. A sound constitution, it insists, is one which makes those supreme in the State whose supremacy is in the particular case just and for the common good.

Closing chapter of the Third Book—how far is it in har-

It is time, however, to examine the last chapter of the Third Book (c. 18), in which a transition is made from the 'normal constitutions' to the best constitution and to the question, how the latter is to be brought into existence.

chapter (1280 b 34), the life of the true State is described as *ζωὴ τελεία καὶ αὐτάρκης*, a phrase which includes *αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις* as well as in higher things.

[1] Krohn remarks (Zur Kritik Aristotelischer Schriften 1. p. 30 n.): 'If one sought to bring what is cognate together, the Seventh and Eighth Books (old order) would have to follow the Second: the contents of the Third Book have no bearing on the fragmentary sketches which find a place in the Seventh.' It is quite true that there is a close connexion between the Second and the old Seventh Book, but the contents of the Third Book have also a real bearing on the old Seventh. The fourth chapter of the Third Book, which establishes the fact that in the best State the virtue of the citizen and the man coincide, is, indeed, expressly recognized as the starting-point of the inquiry respecting the best State in the old Seventh (see 3. 18. 1288 a 37 and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11).

'The normal constitutions'—so it begins—'are three in number,' but which is the best of them? The best is that which is absolutely in the hands of the best men (*οἰκονομουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων*, 1288 a 33: cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 31, *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν*): it will therefore be either an Absolute Kingship, in which an individual or a family exists of surpassing virtue, or an Aristocracy, in which a body (*πλῆθος*) of men of surpassing virtue exists, some of whom are capable of ruling and others of being ruled with a view to the most desirable life (*τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωήν*, 1288 a 37). And how are these two forms, Absolute Kingship and Aristocracy, to be brought into existence? Aristotle appears to treat this question as identical with the question how men are to be produced fit for kingship or for the rule of citizens over fellow-citizens (*πολιτικοί*). He recalls the fact that he has shown that the citizen of the best State is identical with the good man; hence the education and habits which produce a good man will produce a man equal to these positions. (It is hardly necessary to interpose the remark, that the term 'good man' is an altogether inadequate equivalent for the Greek *σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ*, by which is meant a man possessing that many-sided excellence, practical, speculative, and aesthetic, on which Aristotle has already dwelt in the Third Book (c. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.)—above all, possessing *φρόνησις* and the virtues of leisure (4 (7). cc. 14, 15). Not an impeccable man, but a man mature and happily developed in character, mind, and body[1].)

mony with the opening of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book and with the Fourth Book generally?

We might expect that Aristotle would pass on at once to the question what institutions and education produce a *σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ*, but this question is not actually entered on till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth Book (1332 a 28 sqq.). He perhaps remembers that he has just said that the best State is that in which an Absolute King rules, or a 'body of men of surpassing virtue' rules and is ruled,

[1] Cp. Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 10. 28: quos dicam bonos, perspicuum est; omnibus enim virtutibus instructos et ornatos tum sapientes tum viros bonos dicimus.

πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωήν (3. 18. 1288 a 37), and that he must not leave the problem of the 'most desirable life' unsolved behind him. To this question, at any rate, he passes in the sentences with which the Third Book closes and the Fourth begins, and in the following way:

'The education and habits which produce a good man and those which produce a citizen-ruler and a king will be the same. And now that we have treated in detail of these matters (διωρισθέντων δὲ τούτων, 1288 b 2), we must attempt to speak about the best constitution, in what way it comes into being and how it is instituted[1]. It is necessary, then, for any one who is to investigate the subject of the best constitution in an adequate way first to determine, what is the most desirable life' (αἱρετώτατος βίος, 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 15: cp. αἱρετωτάτην ζωήν, 3. 18. 1288 a 37). 'For,' he continues, 'while this is unknown to us, the best constitution must also be unknown to us, since those who enjoy the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain will naturally fare best, unless things turn out quite contrary to expectation[2].'

Now, however we may explain it, there is certainly a want of 'callida junctura' here, to say the least. The reason which we expect to be given for the treatment of the question, what is the most desirable life, is that the best constitution has already been said to exist for the realization of the most desirable life (1288 a 37), but no reference is made to this; on the contrary, a fresh reason is given and the continuity of the investigation seems need-

[1] This is the question with which the Fourth and Fifth Books are to deal, and the answer they give to it is, that some of the conditions of the best constitution must be asked of Fortune and Nature, but that for others the lawgiver is responsible (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 28 sqq.). It is especially the lawgiver's business to see that the education and institutions of the State are such as to produce σπουδαῖοι (1332 a 31 sqq.). We may note, as showing a certain similarity of handling, the fact that in the Sixth Book the nature of the polity is first sketched, and then the question is asked—τίνα τρόπον γίνεται ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν δεῖ καθιστάναι (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30).

[2] The English language cannot fully express the reasoning latent in the Greek words—ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους κ.τ.λ. It is a short step in the Greek from πολιτεύεσθαι to πράττειν.

lessly broken. We notice also that the last chapter of the Third Book prepares us for an inquiry not only into the mode in which a man fit to be a citizen-ruler over citizens (*πολιτικός*) is to be produced, but also into the mode in which a man capable of Kingship (*βασιλικός*) is to be produced, whereas in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. true kings are said to be no longer obtainable, and in default of them an arrangement is adopted by which the ruled become rulers after a certain age, the education of the State being expressly so planned as to be suitable for men who are to be for the first part of their lives ruled and afterwards rulers, not for kings or men capable of Kingship who do nothing but rule. The Third Book also seems to imply that the education which produces the one type of ruler is the same as that which produces the other. If so, the Fourth Book appears to speak differently (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15).

In addition to these discrepancies[1], of which it would be easy to make too much, we are undoubtedly conscious in entering on the Fourth Book of a certain change of tone, however we may account for it. Not only do expressions occur, such as *ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν* (c. 1. 1323 a 38)—*λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς* (c. 3. 1325 a 17), for which we should vainly look in the Third Book[2], but the whole

[1] Another is, that while we are promised in the Third Book (c. 3. 1276 a 32) a discussion not only of the question of the proper size of the State, but also of the question whether it should be composed of one race (*ἔθνος*) or more than one, the latter subject appears to escape treatment in the Fourth Book, where we might naturally expect to find it dealt with, unless indeed we consider the promise to be fulfilled, or fulfilled in part, in the recommendations with respect to the slaves or serfs who are to till the soil (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 25 sq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). Aristotle, however, probably refers in the Third Book rather to the citizens; the interesting discussion of the subject in Plato's Laws (707 E–708 D) was no doubt present to his mind. Plato had there decided that not only Cretans, but also Peloponnesians (some of whom had once settled in Crete), would be welcome as settlers in the new Cretan city which he is founding. What Aristotle thinks on the subject may perhaps be gathered from Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq.

[2] Similar expressions, however, occur here and there in the Politics (e.g. 2. 9. 1270 a 9, *ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν*) : cp. also de An. 1. 3. 406 b 22, *ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν.*

conduct of the inquiry is different. This results, no doubt, in part from the temporary abandonment of the aporetic method of investigation which prevails throughout the Third Book; we have to do now, not with an inquirer on a level with others and joining with them in a tedious and circuitous search for truth, but with one who has sought and found, and if he still inquires, is never, even in appearance, far from a solution. The questions successively raised in the Fourth Book are discussed with a promptness and conciseness which carries us over a good deal of ground in a short space; digressions are frequently avoided by the postponement to another opportunity of discussions which might have led to them (e. g. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 32 sqq.: 10. 1330 a 4, 1330 a 31 sq.: 16. 1335 b 2 sqq.: 17. 1336 b 24 sqq.). The object evidently is to carry on the construction of the best State rapidly and without interruption. Perhaps, however, there is nothing in this change of handling, which need create any difficulty, nor need we again make too much of certain apparent novelties of doctrine which attract our attention in the Fourth and Fifth Books. The most important of these is the account of *θεωρία* as a kind of *πρᾶξις* (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 16 sqq.), for the recognition of the four cardinal virtues, which we seem to trace in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 28 sq. and in 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22 sqq., may perhaps be paralleled from other books of the Politics (see, for instance, 3. 4. 1277 b 16–27), while the account of *εὐδαιμονία* as a combination of *τὸ καλόν* and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19 is supported by more passages than one of the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics[1]. The view of the Third Book that a 'good man,' and therefore a full citizen of the best State, must be capable of ruling (3. 5. 1278 b 3 sq.) can also perhaps be reconciled with the permission appa-

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1098 b 23 sqq. We find the two aims of *τὸ καλόν* and *ἡδονή* ascribed together to the *σπουδαῖος* in Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1169 a 20–25, and *εὐδαιμονία* is said to be accompanied with pleasure in Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 6: 7. 14. 1153 b 14 sqq.: Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 5. See also the quotation from the comic poet Hegesippus in Athen. Deipn. 279 d.

rently given him in the Fourth Book (c. 3) to live a contemplative life, but Aristotle does not notice the discrepancy, and we are left to harmonize the two doctrines as best we can.

A high authority, Dr. F. Blass[1], has remarked on the rarity of *hiatus* in the Fifth Book. He observes that it is also of rare occurrence in the scanty fragments we possess of the dialogues of Aristotle, which were in all probability composed with a view to publication, and not merely for use within the School, and he argues that wherever we note this avoidance of *hiatus* in conjunction with a style of writing somewhat more popular and less technical than that of the extant productions of Aristotle usually is, we may reasonably suspect that we have to do with a composition intended for publication, or with one which includes matter derived from a work of that nature. He does not extend his remark to the Fourth Book, and we notice, in fact, more frequent instances of *hiatus* in it than in the Fifth. *Hiatus*, however, would appear to be rarer in the Fourth Book than in some other books of the Politics[2], and it may certainly be said that this book and the Fifth deal with subjects of especial interest to Aristotle's contemporaries, and deal

[1] See *Rhein. Mus.* 30, p. 481. '*Hiatus* is avoided in the Eighth' (i.e. Fifth) 'Book of the Politics with a strictness almost worthy of Isocrates. For though Aristotle allows of its occurrence, not only after *καί*, *ἤ*, and *εἰ*, but also after *μή* and after the article in its various forms—the latter being a laxity which is altogether at variance with the practice of Isocrates—he scarcely ever allows *hiatus* to occur in respect of short and elisible vowels, except in the case of pronouns, conjunctions, prepositions, and other small and frequently used words (herein following the very same rule as the most studied orations of Isocrates), nor does he regard a pause as a justification for *hiatus*. We need hardly alter more than six passages in this book of the Politics, in order to make its conformity to these rules complete.' It deserves notice that there is a difference between the two families of the MSS. of the Politics in this matter of *hiatus*, the second family occasionally avoiding it where the first do not; but the avoidance of *hiatus* in the Fifth Book is perhaps too general to be accounted for by the supposition that it is due to transcribers.

[2] I am indebted to an unpublished essay by Mr. R. Shute of Christ Church, Oxford, for this remark, and for the suggestion that the Fourth and Fifth Books may well have been an independent treatise designed for publication.

with them in a not over-technical way. It is very possible that materials derived from works intended for publication have been used more freely in these two books than in others; it is also possible, though less likely, that they were themselves written with a view to publication. The facts to which attention has been drawn may be accounted for in various ways, and some will attach more importance to them than others, but in any case there seems to be little reason for doubting that the two books were intended by Aristotle to form a part of the Politics. The relation in which they stand to the Second and Third Books appears to be too close to allow of any other supposition.

In constructing a best constitution—the task to which we now pass—the first step to be taken is to ascertain what is the most desirable life, for the best constitution must realize the most desirable life. What then is the most desirable life?

The opening words of the Fourth Book announce, in effect, that the end of the State—good life, or happiness, or (as in this passage) 'the most desirable life'—is the clue to its structure. Aristotle, we see, is a teleologist in politics. He adds that nothing less than the most desirable life must be realized by the best State. Aristotle insists on this, because he held that Plato had failed in the Republic to realize the most desirable life (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.)—nay, failed even to realize a life liveable by man (2. 5. 1263 b 29). Yet, in Aristotle's view, the test of a constitution is to be found in the 'life' which it secures to its citizens. A constitution which does not secure them the most desirable life is not the best.

The first problem, therefore, to be solved is, what is the most desirable life. The opening chapters of the Fourth Book deal with this problem, and the solution here given serves as a guide throughout the whole process of constructing the best State. It is a life spent in the exercise of 'virtue fully furnished with the external conditions of virtuous action' (*ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη*). *Χορηγία* and *ἀρετή* are the two pillars on which the best State rests. Fortune, Nature, and a good lawgiver—these are the conditions of its realization (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25–31).

If we ask, says Aristotle, what is the most desirable life, the first step to an answer is obvious enough. No one

would say that external goods and goods of the body are sufficient in the entire absence of goods of the soul[1]. A man so devoid of courage that he fears the flies that pass him in the air, or so fond of eating and drinking as to be ready to eat and drink anything whatsoever, or so fond of money that he will kill his dearest friend for a farthing, or endowed with no more intelligence than a child or a lunatic, would not be pronounced happy by anybody. It is only when the question is raised, how much virtue, or how much wealth, or power, or renown is desirable, that a difference of opinion arises. Some will affirm that any quantity of virtue, however small, is sufficient. But 'we will tell them' that mere observation of the facts of human life will lead them to a different view. We see that men acquire and retain external goods by virtue, not virtue by external goods, and that those who are as well endowed as possible in respect of mind and character, and have only a moderate share of external goods[2], live a hap-

[1] This classification of goods was inherited by Aristotle from Plato, whether it originated with him or not (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 618. 1, ed. 2). Isocrates refers to *τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγαθά* in de Pace, § 32. It is evidently open to much criticism, as a classification. Friends, we remark, are included among external goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 9); yet external goods are the product of Accident and Fortune (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27).

When Aristotle indicates that he 'uses' *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* in giving the account which he here gives of the most desirable life, he may be referring to some non-scientific writings or teachings either of his own (cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 33) or of others. In the latter case, he may be referring to Plato, Laws 726–9 : 743 E sqq. : 697 B : Rep. 591 C sqq. : or to Isocrates de Pace, §§ 31–35 : or even to Sappho, Fragm. 80 Bergk. Perhaps, however, it is more likely that he is referring to teaching of his own, possibly to the teaching of the *περὶ πλούτου*, which seems to have been somewhat similar (see Fragm. 89. 1491 b 35 sqq.). We have already seen that in 1323 a 28 the virtues referred to are the four cardinal virtues, which, according to Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 567, ed. 2), 'seem first to have been definitely marked out by Plato and by him only in his later years'; but this also holds of a later passage of the Fourth Book (c. 15. 1334 a 22 sqq.). It is not clear where the use of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* ceases; it may possibly do so in 1323 b 29, with the words *διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστίν*. On this opening chapter of the Fourth Book the remarks of Bernays in his 'Dialoge des Aristoteles' (p. 69 sqq.) should be consulted, and also Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze, 2.

[2] Aristotle probably has external goods such as 'wealth and power and renown' (1323 a 37) mainly in view, but *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ τῆς ψυχῆς* (1323 b 27) include

pier life than those who are in the opposite case. And reasoning leads us to the same conclusion; for the goods of the soul, unlike external goods, increase in utility with every increase in their amount—which shows that they are not means, but ends; then again, virtue, which is the excellence of the soul, is as much more precious than wealth, which is the excellence of property (cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 20), as the soul is more precious than property; lastly, external goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external goods. Hence, the more a man has of virtue and of virtuous action, the larger is his share of the highest and most perfect goods, and the greater is his happiness. These arguments receive a final confirmation from a reference to the Divine Nature: God is happy because he is so constituted as to be happy; his happiness does not flow from external goods. It is in this that happiness differs from prosperity; the latter is the gift of fortune, but not the former, so far at least as it springs from virtue.

A life of 'virtue fully furnished with external means'—the 'external means' being adjusted in amount to the requirements of virtuous action—is the most desirable both for individuals and for States.

So far we have been concerned with the individual, and have proved that his happiness is proportioned to the amount of his virtue and virtuous action. Similar arguments show that the same thing is true of a State. A State cannot fare well unless it acts well, and it cannot act well without virtue and moral prudence, and its courage and justice and prudence will be the same as those of the individual. So that we may state the result of our inquiry thus—'the best life both for individual and State is one of virtue conjoined with a sufficient amount of external and bodily goods to make virtuous action possible.' If any one questions this conclusion and does not agree with what has been said, Aristotle will go into the matter afterwards; he cannot stay to do so now.

But though we have said that virtue is a necessary ingredient of the best life in the case both of the individual and

bodily goods also, and to him, no less than to Plato (Laws 728 E sqq.), the latter may be in excess: a man may be too handsome or too strong (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6 sqq.).

of the State, we have not yet determined whether happiness is the same in the two cases, or in other words, springs from the same source. The happiness of the individual, we have seen, springs from virtue, but is this true also of that of the State? This is an easily answered question, for however various may be men's views as to what constitutes happiness, all agree that its source is the same for State and individual.

The most desirable life, says Aristotle, is not that of a morally and intellectually feeble race living in the unlimited enjoyment of external and bodily goods, but that of a 'wise and understanding people,' endowed with them adequately for the practice of virtue, but not with more than is necessary for that end [1]. The passage is interesting, if only from its evident sincerity; its vigour of expression is probably in part due to the fact that in that outspoken age and race there were many who not only practised but preached a life of pleasure or of money-getting, in addition to those who lived for power and distinction. In one of the tragedies which were ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic, the line

Θέλω τύχης σταλαγμὸν ἢ φρενῶν πίθον

was put into the mouth of a votary of wealth, the other interlocutor, it would seem, rejoining—

Ῥανὶς φρενῶν μοι μᾶλλον ἢ βυθὸς τύχης[2]*:*

and Aristoxenus brings home to us the intolerant strength of conviction, with which an advocate of luxury from the court of Dionysius the Younger of Syracuse, admitted into the *τέμενος* or garden-precinct used by the Pytha-

[1] Compare the expression ascribed to him in Rutilius Lupus' abridged translation of a work by the later Gorgias—*σχῆμα διανοίας καὶ λέξεως*—'item Aristoteles dicitur dixisse: eius esse vitam beatissimam, cuius et fortunae sapientia et sapientiae fortuna suppeditet' (quoted by Heitz, die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 159). The teaching of Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 1 sqq. is substantially the same as that of this passage of the Politics, and corrects the somewhat different language of Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 1.

[2] Nauck, Trag. Graec. Fragm. pp. 628–9.

gorean Archytas and his disciples for their philosophic perambulations, insisted that a life of bodily pleasure was the only natural one, and that the virtues, from justice onward, were mere artificial conventions, conjured-up products of legislative skill. The King of Persia in his palace was to him the type of felicity[1].

We observe that Aristotle takes no notice here of those who, like the Cynics, held that external goods were not necessary to happiness[2]. The antagonists whom he seeks to confute are evidently those who found happiness mainly in external and bodily goods. It should also be noted that, as the inquiry into the best State advances, the supply of external and bodily goods which it is held to need seems hardly to be limited to the bare amount 'necessary for a share in virtuous action': its citizens are spoken of, at all events, later on, as 'living in the enjoyment of every blessing,' and 'spending their leisure amidst an abundance of goods,' not otherwise than 'those who dwell, if the poets speak truly, in the islands of the Blest' (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 30, 33)[3].

So far, the inquiry proceeds, we see our way without difficulty, but now two questions arise which call for consideration. One is whether for the individual a citizen's life spent in political relations with others, or the life of a non-citizen forming no active part of a State, is the more desirable. The other is, what constitution and organization of the State is the best, whether it is desirable for all, or only for most men, to take an active part in the State. The former question is beside the purpose of a political treatise, inasmuch as it relates to what is best for the individual: with the latter, on the contrary, we are directly concerned. Taking up this question, then, for consideration,

[1] Aristox. Fragm. 15 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. 276). Men of his feather were common enough in the luxurious cities of Italy and Sicily (Plato, Rep. 404 D: Ep. 7. 326 B sq.). Archytas' answer is not given, but may be divined from Cic. de Senect. c. 12.

[2] Compare also the view of Aristotle's contemporary, Xenocrates (Xenocr. Fragm. 60–63: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 3. 127).

[3] Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.

we see at once that the best constitution is that under which anyone, be he who he may, would act and fare best and live happily—that it is, in fact, the constitution under which a life accompanied with virtue can best be lived; but then a question arises as to the concrete activities in which such a life should be spent. Thus the question which we have just discarded as ethical rather than political comes back upon us as one which the political inquirer cannot really avoid answering.

The further question, however, arises, in what activities such a life should be spent.

Is the political and practical life the more desirable, or one which is quit of all concern with external things (1324 a 27: cp. ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος, 1325 a 19)—a contemplative life, for instance, which some say is the only philosophic life? Our answer to this question is of importance, inasmuch as it must determine not only the direction we give to the life of the individual, but also the nature of the constitution. If we prefer the contemplative life, we may have to adjust the constitution to that end. Two views, as has been said, exist on the subject. Some object to the exercise of any rule over others as being, if despotic[1], unjust, and, if such as one citizen may exercise over another, involving hindrances to the ruler's felicity[2]. Others hold that the political and practical life is alone worthy of a man, and that it gives scope to the exercise of all the virtues in an equal degree with the other. So far we have

Is a political and practical life the best or a life detached from affairs—a contemplative life, for example? An examination of conflicting views on this subject results in a conclusion in favour of a life of practical activity, but then this term

[1] It must be remembered that δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή properly means, not merely 'despotic' rule, but the kind of rule which a master exercises over his slaves. It is not, however, always possible to express this double meaning in English.

[2] Aristotle takes no account here of the view of the political life referred to in the Nicomachean Ethics (1. 3. 1095 b 23), according to which its aim was honour. Even in the Nicomachean Ethics, indeed, he tacitly dismisses this view and frequently implies that the statesman exists for the promotion of virtuous action and happiness (e.g. 10. 7. 1177 b 14). Aristotle's object in the passage of the Politics before us seems to be to represent the political and the contemplative life as akin, both being rich in καλαὶ πράξεις, whereas in the Nicomachean Ethics he had sharply distinguished αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεις from ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια or θεωρητική (10. 7. 1177 b 19 sqq.). In both discussions, however, the contemplative life is viewed as αὐτοτελής in comparison with the political. The nature of the contemplative life at its best is depicted in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics (c. 7).

must be understood to include not only political but also speculative activity.

to do with men who accept a life of virtue as the true life; but then there are those who say that a constitution adjusted to a career of despotic and tyrannical sway over others, whether with their good will or not, is the only happy one; and they can plead that many States and nations in practice take their view. It is, however, assailable on many grounds, on that of legality, on the ground that it does not agree with the principles which govern the practice of other arts than that of politics, and on the ground that its supporters are for applying the principle only to others, not to themselves. Despotic sway should be exercised only over those who are destined by nature to be so ruled; and it is possible for a State, if well constituted, to be perfectly happy which occupies an isolated situation, and whose constitution consequently cannot be designed for war or empire. War is noble (*καλόν*), but it is not the ultimate end; the ultimate end is good life, to which war is but a means. The business of a lawgiver is to secure good life to his citizens, not empire, though the means by which he secures it will no doubt differ in different cases. If a State has neighbours, it will have to be constituted otherwise than if it has none (e.g. it will possess a fleet, c. 6. 1327 b 3 sqq.). Again, it may have neighbours who are fit subjects for despotic rule (like most States in Asia); or it may have neighbours who are fit subjects for hegemony (the usual case in Greece)[1].

Having disposed of this contention, Aristotle reverts to the two conflicting views previously mentioned, and says that each side is partially right. The life spent apart from politics is better than the despotic life, but it is an error to suppose that all rule is despotic, or to set inaction above action. Happiness is action, and the active exercise of justice and temperance is 'noble' (*καλόν*). To infer from this that

[1] Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 5, *εἰ σὺ μὲν πεισθείης πλείονος ἀξίαν ἔσεσθαί σοι τὴν τῆς πόλεως φιλίαν ἢ τὰς προσόδους τὰς ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως γιγνομένας, ἡ δὲ πόλις δυνηθείη καταμαθεῖν ὡς χρὴ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας φεύγειν ἀποικίας αἵ τινες τετράκις ἢ πεντάκις ἀπολωλέκασι τοὺς ἐμπολιτευθέντας, ζητεῖν δ' ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους τοὺς πόρρω μὲν κειμένους τῶν ἄρχειν δυναμένων, ἐγγὺς δὲ τῶν δουλεύειν εἰθισμένων, εἰς οἷόν περ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κυρηναίους ἀπῴκισαν.*

any one and every one should set to work to get possession of supreme power in the State would, however, be altogether mistaken. The exercise of supreme power is only 'noble' in the hands of those who have a just claim to rule, both on the ground of virtue and on that of political capacity. The best life, then, both for State and individual is the practical life; but the practical life need not be in relation to others. Mental processes, which are complete in themselves, and an end in themselves (*αἱ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αἱ αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίαι καὶ διανοήσεις*, 1325 b 20), are more truly practical (*πρακτικαί*) than those which aim at something beyond, for well-doing (*εὐπραξία*) is the end[1], whence it follows that action of some kind is the end, and even in the case of action directed to a result external to itself, we commonly say that those act in the truest and fullest sense whose mental processes are those of a directing authority, and therefore most purely mental[2]. Nay further, States situated by themselves and purposed to live in isolation need not live an inactive life (*ἀπρακτεῖν*)[3] even in the ordinary sense of the word, for there will be a mutual interaction of their parts; and the same thing holds good of the individual[4]. Neither God nor the Universe, indeed, exercise any activities external to themselves (*ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις*).

If we ask who were the disputants, between whom Aris-

[1] This was a Socratic tradition (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 14–15).

[2] Contrast the language of Plato, Polit. 259 C–E; and compare the comments of Ulysses in Shakspeare's Troilus and Cressida (Act i, Scene 3) on those who 'esteem no act, but that of hand,' and undervalue

'the still and mental parts,
That do contrive how many hands shall strike,
When fitness calls them on . . .
So that the ram that batters down the wall,
For the great swing and rudeness of his poise,
They place before his hand that made the engine,
Or those that with the fineness of their souls
By reason guide his execution.'

[3] *Τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου* is said in Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 33 to be incompatible with happiness.

[4] Compare Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 5, *μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον*: and 10. 7. 1177 a 32 sqq., where the *σοφός* is said to be better able to energise by himself than the just or temperate or brave man.

Who were the disputants between whom Aristotle here adjudicates?

totle arbitrates in the passage of which we have just stated the drift, we shall find it easy to identify the eulogists of 'the despotic and tyrannical type of constitution[1].' Many of that tribe were to be found throughout Greece. The advocates of a life spent in constitutional rule, such as citizens may exercise over fellow-citizens, would also be numerous[2]. But who were those who praised a life 'detached from all concern with external things—a contemplative life, which some say is the only philosophic life' (1324 a 27 sq.)? They seem to be the same with those mentioned in 1324 a 35 sq. as holding any rule exercised over others to be unjust, if despotic, and unfavourable to felicity, if constitutional, and also with those mentioned in 1325 a 18 sq. as pronouncing against the holding of political offices, and distinguishing the life of the 'free man' (ἐλεύθερος) from the political life. The description would in some respects apply to Aristippus, who made a point of withdrawal from political life, and this for the sake of εὐημερία—a word used by the school (Diog. Laert. 2. 89)—or as he expressed it, because he wished 'to live as easily and pleasantly as possible' (Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 9)[3]; but we do not know that he condemned all despotic rule as unjust[4]. Aristotle probably refers, among others, to Isocrates, who had not only discussed in the Ad Nicoclem (§ 4 sq.), 'whether the life of one who, though occupying a private station, acts like a man of worth, or the life of a

[1] Cp. Plato, Laws 890 A, *ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δικαιότατον ὅ τί τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος· ὅθεν ἀσέβειαί τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσι νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἵους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα, ἑλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον.*

[2] Theages, in the dialogue of that name ascribed to Plato, would 'wish' (εὐξαίμην ἄν) to be a tyrant as he would 'wish' to be a god, but all he seriously 'desires' is the wisdom which Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon possessed, who ruled their fellow-citizens not by force, like tyrants, but with their willing consent (125 E sq.).

[3] Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 11, *ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω, ἀλλ' εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει.*

[4] We hear of Democritus also that he withdrew from magistracies to private life (Cic. de Oratore 3. 15. 56), but did he condemn despotic rule over others as unjust?

tyrant is to be preferred,' but had, in his Letter to the sons of the tyrant Jason (§ 11), declared for the former against the latter[1], and for office in states possessing constitutions (*ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις*) rather than in monarchies, just as in the De Antidosi (§§ 145, 150) he admits and explains his own abstinence from office: *ταῦτα γὰρ συνεταξάμην οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον οὐδὲ δι' ὑπερηφανίαν οὐδὲ καταφρονῶν τῶν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐμοὶ ζώντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν, μάλιστα δ' ὁρῶν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας, ἔπειτα τὸν βίον ἡδίω νομίσας εἶναι τοῦτον ἢ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πραττόντων, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς διατριβαῖς ταῖς ἐμαῖς πρεπωδέστερον, αἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεστησάμην* (§ 151: cp. §§ 227–9). We see from the charming sketch in the Republic (Rep. 549 B sqq.), how much a head of a household who took this view of life was usually despised for his want of ambition by his wife and slaves, and the speech of Callicles in the Gorgias (485 C sq.) expresses the same opinion in a more aggressive way—*ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ· ὃ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι.* A recent editor of Euripides remarks that he uses the word *ἡσυχαῖος* to denote the character of a man of learning, and almost as equivalent to *σοφός*[2]; and thus in the Supplices of the same poet we find the soft life of a follower of the Muses contrasted with the hard outdoor life of riding and hunting, which makes men physically capable of doing good service to the State (Suppl. 855 sqq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 410 D). The fact that Pericles is represented by Thucydides as praising the Athenians for being seekers after knowledge without softness shows that the two characteristics were commonly thought to go

[1] Cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 24.
[2] See Mr. Verrall's notes on Eurip. Med. 304, 808.

together. We might have expected that the careers of Epaminondas, Archytas, and Dion would have taught a different lesson, and have proved that an active life of political service was quite compatible with philosophical study; but the popular mind noted the general rule without taking sufficient account of these brilliant exceptions.

Aristotle seeks as usual to mediate between the rival doctrines and to arrive at a conclusion embodying all the truth contained in them without the error. He is for a many-sided life.

The rival views had this in common, that they each declared in favour of one kind of existence as the most desirable, and were for adjusting the institutions of the State exclusively to it. Aristotle is always glad, when he can find something to accept in all the opinions before him, and it is in this spirit that he does justice between the views which he examines here. Despotic empire is not to be made the aim of the constitution; but it is not, as Isocrates had implied in the De Pace [1], always out of place and bad; on the contrary, there are those who are designed by nature to be so ruled. There is, however, nothing great or glorious in thus ruling over them, and the indiscriminate exercise of despotic rule is simply wicked. To hold aloof from office and political activity and to spend one's life in pure contemplation is not the only course worthy of a philosopher, nor is it, on the other hand, to devote oneself to an inactive life. For those whose minds are busy with thoughts that are an end in themselves are active in the truest sense, and besides a life of this kind involves an internal inter-action of parts, which is in itself sufficient to exclude the idea of inactivity. We may therefore come to the conclusion that the best life is the practical life—the life of activity in accordance with virtue and the capacity for the highest kind of action (ἡ πρακτικὴ δύναμις τῶν ἀρίστων, 1325 b 11)—and yet hold that the truest form of it is the life which is spent in mental activity of the kind that is an end in itself—such a life, for instance, as the life of contemplation. It is in a life of this kind that the State finds its culmination—indeed, we infer that a speculative life suffices for

[1] § 142 sqq.

happiness without any admixture of political activity (1325 b 27)—but not a word is said by Aristotle against an union of the two lives. On the contrary, we gather later on that if a fit use of leisure is the supreme end of the State, the virtues which a fit use of leisure presupposes are not only those which find employment in leisure, but also those which find employment in periods of activity[1], so that both, it would seem, should be possessed by the citizens of the ideal State.

We see already that the life which Aristotle designs for his State is more many-sided than that life of arms and military exercise, the inadequacy of which had been proved by the successive failures of the Lacedaemonian and Theban States[2], and better ordered and more philosophic than that lived by the higher classes at Athens.

A passage in Plato's Laws compared.

If we compare the passage in Plato's Laws on which Aristotle has modelled his own enumeration of the aims pursued by different States, we shall find both resemblances and differences. It is as follows (Laws 962 D–963 A):

ΑΘ. Νῦν δὴ μαθησόμεθα, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πλανᾶσθαι τὰ τῶν πόλεων νόμιμα, ὅτι πρὸς ἄλλο ἄλλη βλέπει τῶν νομοθεσιῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστῃ· καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τὸ τοῖς μὲν τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τῶν δικαίων, ὅπως ἄρξουσί τινες ἐν τῇ πόλει, εἴτ' οὖν βελτίους εἴτε χείρους τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· τοῖς δ' ὅπως πλουτήσουσιν, εἴτ' οὖν δοῦλοί τινων ὄντες εἴτε καὶ μή· τῶν δ' ἡ προθυμία πρὸς τὸν ἐλεύθερον δὴ βίον ὡρμημένη· οἱ δὲ καὶ ξύνδυο νομοθετοῦνται πρὸς ἄμφω βλέποντες, ἐλεύθεροί τε ὅπως ἄλλων τε πόλεων ἔσονται δεσπόται· οἱ δὲ σοφώτατοι ὡς οἴονται πρὸς

[1] Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16, χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγήν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ.

[2] A striking passage quoted by Strabo from Ephorus (Ephor. Fragm. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 254) will illustrate this: τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν (Boeotia) ἐπαινεῖ (Ἔφορος) διὰ ταῦτα, καί φησι πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν εὐφυῶς ἔχειν· ἀγωγῇ δὲ καὶ παιδείᾳ μὴ χρησαμένους, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τοὺς ἀεὶ προισταμένους αὐτῆς, εἰ καί ποτε κατώρθωσαν, ἐπὶ μακρὸν τὸν χρόνον συμμεῖναι· καθάπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἔδειξε· τελευτήσαντος γὰρ ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους συνέβη, γευσαμένους αὐτῆς μόνον· αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς. The history of the Ottoman Turks explains what Ephorus and Aristotle mean, though both Lacedaemonians and Thebans were very different from Turks.

ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ξύμπαντα, εἰς ἓν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράζειν, εἰς ὃ τἄλλ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ βλέπειν.

ΚΛ. *Οὐκοῦν τό γ' ἡμέτερον, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη πάλαι τιθέμενον; πρὸς γὰρ ἓν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθ' ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέπουτ' εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἀρετήν που ξυνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι*[1].

Aristotle, we see, takes no notice of the view according to which wealth was the end of the State, to be secured even at the cost of freedom, if necessary, nor of that which saw everything in freedom[2], nor again of that which aimed at a combination of wealth, freedom, and empire; and his solution differs from that of Plato in substituting for virtue as the true aim of the State virtuous action and happiness. It is not surprising that in reference to a second-best State like that of the Laws, the question between the political life and the speculative life does not come up for solution: Plato had already dealt with this question in the Gorgias (500 sqq.) and the Republic. In the latter dialogue he asserts even more strongly than Aristotle the inferiority of the political to the philosophical life (519 D)—he seems almost to speak of the former as a necessary rather than a noble life (540 B)—but he will not hear of his philosophic guardians abjuring politics for philosophy (540 B). On this point he speaks more clearly than Aristotle.

Thucydides sets more store by empire than Aristotle.

Aristotle's indifference to empire and hegemony contrasts significantly with the language of Thucydides in his Introduction. To Thucydides the interest and the greatness of Greek History increase *pari passu* with the rise of great

[1] Isocrates had said (De Pace, § 19)—*ἆρ' οὖν ἂν ἐξαρκέσειεν ἡμῖν, εἰ τήν τε πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῖμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορώτεροι γιγνοίμεθα καὶ τά τε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμονοοῖμεν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὐδοκιμοῖμεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι τούτων ὑπαρξάντων τελέως τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμονήσειν.* Dr. Johnson seems rather to have felt with Aristotle. '"Sir, the happiness of London is not to be conceived but by those who have been in it. I will venture to say there is more learning and science within the circumference of ten miles from where we sit, than in all the rest of the kingdom." Such was the dictum of Dr. Johnson, when he was seated with Boswell in the Mitre Tavern near Temple Bar' (Hare's Walks in London, I. xiii).

[2] Plato appears to use the words *ὁ ἐλεύθερος βίος* in this passage in a different sense from that in which Aristotle uses the phrase *ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος* (1325 a 19).

hegemonies in Greece. One would almost say that it seems to him to be the mission of the State to stand at the head of a league and to be the mistress of the seas; at all events, States interest him most when they are massed in great groups and set huge armaments afloat. To Aristotle, on the contrary, a State without a dependent ally may be as fully all that a State should be as a State with a thousand (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.: 3. 1325 b 23 sqq.). If the life which a State lives is of the due quality, it matters not whether it has relations with a single other State. It is obvious that the teaching of Aristotle on this point had a special applicability, whether he intended it or not, to the circumstances of Athens after the Social War, and especially after Chaeroneia. Her loss of dependent allies was no reason why she should cease to be a great State.

Remarks on this discussion.

Aristotle's treatment of the subject would have been more satisfactory if he had not mixed together the questions, what is the best life for the individual and what is the best life for the State. The quest of empire by a State is hardly the same thing as the quest of tyrannical authority by an individual, and it is one thing for an individual to abstain from active political life and quite another for a State to stand aloof from all relations with other communities. Even if we hold his conclusions to be right, they are reached in a wrong way. But his object was to insist on the parallel between the State and the individual: both are moral agents and the rule of duty is the same for both. He even goes so far as to say that the virtues of both are the same, though it is obviously impossible that the account given in the Nicomachean Ethics of the temperance (σωφροσύνη) of the individual can hold in all respects of that of the State.

This is, however, a less important matter than the assertion that the State is no less bound than the individual human being to the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue. Aristotle's view is that, though the State

is a greater and nobler and completer thing than the individual, it is, like him, a subject of virtue and happiness, and marked out by the facts of its nature for a life devoted to the attainment of both; it must be brave, just, temperate, prudent, and philosophic, because otherwise it will not fulfil its nature or its appointed end. Its obligation to practise virtue in all its forms is based, not on its duty to its members or to mankind, but rather on its intrinsic nature and destination to be happy.

No difference between the circumstances of the individual and the State is taken into consideration. The State is not to Aristotle, as to some later inquirers, under natural right, while the individual is under civil right. Civil right at its best is, on the contrary, in his view, identical with natural right. He does not even consider whether the fact that the State is the Whole, the individual a part of that Whole, affects the moral obligations under which they respectively rest—whether the Whole, having no larger unity to protect and care for it, and being a thing less easy to replace than the individuals composing it, may not reasonably take more account of its own preservation. We must bear in mind that Aristotle held the State bound to express in its constitution an ethical creed, and to bring the convictions of each of its members as far as possible into harmony with that creed. In fact, though he tacitly abandons the parallel which Plato draws in the Republic between the State and the soul of the individual human being, he still believes firmly in an analogy between individual and State and presses it too far.

We have now clearly before us the life which the best State is to live—a varied life of arms, politics, and philosophy—and the next question is, what preliminary equipment must be asked of Fortune on its behalf, in order that the efforts of the legislator in his special work, the production of virtue by laws and education (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 28–32), may not be wasted on ungenial soil or nullified by defects in the population and territory. For the States-

man, like the weaver or the shipbuilder or the master of any other art, must be furnished at the outset with appropriate material to work upon (4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). 'Under the head of the preliminary equipment of the State, we come first to the question, what should be the number and character of the individuals constituting it, and what should be the extent and character of the territory' (1326 a 5 sqq.).

The preliminary conditions of the State: 1. a people neither too scanty nor too numerous.

We must ask of Fortune in the first place a people neither too scanty nor too numerous. Many will say that a State to be happy must be large, but, if so, it must be large in respect not of the merely instrumental and subsidiary classes—those concerned with necessary work—but in respect of those which are true parts of the State. It must be 'short in the stalk and full in the ear,' to put Aristotle's meaning briefly, if it is to be really a 'large State,' and not merely a populous one. And then again, experience tells us that exceedingly populous States can hardly be well-governed States, and this is confirmed by reasoning, for the ordering of an overwhelming multitude is work for God, not man, and what cannot be ordered well and beautifully cannot be so governed: beauty, in fact, is seldom found apart from a definite size and number. The most beautiful State is that which, while possessing magnitude, is not too large to be susceptible of order. Nay more, independently of all considerations of beauty, the very nature and function of the State imposes on it certain maximum and minimum limits of size[1]. It needs to be self-complete, not only in respect of necessaries, as is a nation (*ἔθνος*), but also in respect of things which contribute to the higher life; it needs to have a constitution;

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29 sqq., *τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν.* The size of the State also, we note, is settled by fixing certain maximum and minimum limits.

and yet, if its population is excessively great, where will a general be found capable of acting as its commander[1], or a herald capable of reaching it with his voice? Thus, while the name of State is deserved by any community numerous enough for good life[2], and a State which transcends this limit may deserve to be called a larger State, there is a maximum which it must not overpass, on pain of ceasing to be a State altogether. This maximum is fixed by considerations of good government. The citizens must not be too numerous to be acquainted with each other, or how will they be able to fill the magistracies aright or to arrive at correct judicial decisions[3]? Besides, in an over-large citizen-body it is easy for the names of aliens to slip unobserved into the list of citizens. Aristotle accordingly fixes the ideal size of the State thus: 'the number of its citizens should be the largest possible with a view to completeness of life, provided only that it is not too large to be easily taken in at a view.' The phrase reminds us of the well-known passage in the Poetics, in which the plot of a tragedy is required to conform to certain limits of length, just as a beautiful animal must neither be too small nor too large—*ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τοῦτο δ' εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι* (Poet. 7. 1450 b 34–1451 a 15); and the same requirement of 'magnitude that can be taken in at a view' is made with respect to a 'period' in composition (Rhet. 3. 9. 1409 a 36).

Plato had already said that the many would expect the happy State to be as large and rich as possible, and to possess as great an extent of empire as possible, but would also desire it to be as good as possible—herein demanding things mutually incompatible, for a State cannot be at once exceedingly rich and exceedingly good (Laws 742 D–

[1] Epaminondas, however, according to one account commanded in the Peloponnesus an army of 70,000 men (Plutarch, Ages. c. 31: Thirlwall, 5. 95).

[2] Plato had said (Rep. 369 D) *—εἴη δ' ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν.* This Aristotle intends tacitly to correct.

[3] A similar idea underlay the early conception of jury-trial (see Hallam, Middle Ages, c. 8, note 8).

743 A); he had also said that there is nothing better for a State than that its citizens should be known to one another, for otherwise men will not get their due either in respect of offices or justice (738 D–E); he had said, further, that the citizens must not be too numerous for the territory, or too few to repel the attacks of neighbouring States, and to help them when wronged (737 C–D). These passages contain the germ, though only the germ, of Aristotle's chapter; he has, however, also before him two passages from orations of Isocrates; one in which the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus recalls that the greatness of his State rests not on the size of the city or its populousness, but on the strict obedience rendered by the citizens to their rulers (Archid. § 81); the other, in which after allowing the vast services rendered by Athens both to its own citizens and to the Greeks generally, and the manifold pleasures of which it is the source, he dwells on one great drawback—*διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐσύνοπτός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀκριβής, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ χειμάρρους, ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστον ὑπολαβοῦσα τύχῃ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὕτω κατήνεγκε, καὶ δόξαν ἐνίοις τὴν ἐναντίαν τῆς προσηκούσης περιέθηκεν* (De Antid. §§ 171–2). Phocylides had already said, not without wisdom :—

> *Καὶ τόδε Φωκυλίδου· πόλις ἐν σκοπέλῳ κατὰ κόσμον*
> *οἰκεῦσα σμικρὴ κρέσσων Νίνου ἀφραινούσης*[1].

2. A territory of a given character.

In selecting an ideal territory, again, no less than in determining the size of the State, Aristotle keeps Plato's views before him (Laws 704 sqq.).

He asks for a territory, not rugged indeed, like that of Plato, but, like his, of varied character, capable of raising produce of all kinds[2], and thus complete in itself, so that

[1] Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. fr. 5.

[2] Cp. Plato, Laws 704 C, and the description of Egypt in the Busiris of Isocrates (§§ 12–14), which may well have suggested to Aristotle many of the characteristics he desires the territory of his best State to possess. How much the word *παντοφόρος* implies will best be seen if we read in the Antiquitates Romanae of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1. 36–37) the interesting passage in which he enumerates the immense variety of advantages possessed by the soil of Italy and the manifold services which it was capable of rendering to man. Dionysius, like Aristotle,

there shall be as little need as possible of imports or exports or of the classes occupied in importing or exporting. We may imagine it to comprise sunny slopes for the cultivation of the vine and olive, and rich levels for the production of corn. It must be sufficient in extent to support the citizen-population in a liberal, yet temperate mode of life, without their needing to sacrifice the leisure designed for them—a mode of life as far removed from the 'wassailing' ways of many Greek cities [1] as from the ascetic severity of Sparta. The territory must also be compact and well under the eye of the authorities, hard of entrance to foes [2], though easy of exit for the forces of the State; and the city, which, unlike that of Plato's Laws [3], is to be situated not very far from the sea-coast, must be placed so

prefers this variety of aptitude to the more monotonous merits of Egypt, Libya, and the Babylonian plain. Whether he was acquainted with this chapter of the Politics, we can hardly say. As to Italy, cp. Columella de Re Rustica 3. 8. 5. (quoted by Hehn, Kulturpflanzen, p. 394): his tamen exemplis nimirum admonemur curae mortalium obsequentissimam esse Italiam, quae paene totius orbis fruges adhibito studio colonorum ferre didicerit. It was precisely because most of the regions occupied by the Greek race were better suited for certain crops than for others, that it came to be the sea-faring and commercial race which it to a large extent was. Aristotle and Plato, wishing to make their ideal communities as little commercial as possible, asked for a territory capable of raising produce of all kinds.

[1] See Theopompus' descriptions of life in the Chalcidian cities of the Thrace-ward region (Fr. 149): at Tarentum (Fr. 259, 260): at Athens (Fr. 238). Theopompus, however, is perhaps somewhat prejudiced. The reference in the seventh of the letters ascribed to Plato to the luxury of Italian and Sicilian life has already been noted. Philip of Macedon, according to Theopompus, won his hold of Thessaly by nothing so much as by his readiness to fall in with the taste of the race for loose jovial revels and coarse riotous fun (Fr. 178). See also Timaeus' description of life at Sybaris (Fr. 60: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 205).

[2] Compare Strabo's account of Egypt (p. 819, cp. p. 803, *ταύτῃ δὲ καὶ δυσείσβολός ἐστιν ἡ Αἴγυπτος ἐκ τῶν ἐωθινῶν τόπων τῶν κατὰ Φοινίκην καὶ τὴν Ἰουδαίαν*). The same merit is ascribed by Socrates to Attica (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 25, *τοῦτο δ', ἔφη, ὦ Περίκλεις, κατανενόηκας, ὅτι πρόκειται τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν ὄρη μεγάλα καθήκοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν, δι' ὧν εἰς τὴν χώραν εἴσοδοι στεναί τε καὶ προσάντεις εἰσί, καὶ ὅτι μέση διέζωσται ὄρεσιν ἐρυμνοῖς; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη*). As to Laconia, see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24.

[3] The central city of the State founded by Plato in the Laws was to be ten miles from the sea. More than one of the chief cities of Crete, in which island this State is supposed to be founded, were situate at about this distance from the sea (Strabo, p. 476).

favourably in relation both to the sea and to the territory[1], and also to the continent (1330 a 34) on or near which it lies, that the State will at once be well supplied with necessaries, and also have all parts of its territory within easy reach of its forces. Security and plenty are the two objects to be kept in view (*ἀσφάλεια καὶ εὐπορία τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, 1327 a 19). Plato had withdrawn his city from the sea and set it down in the centre of the territory (Laws 745 B), because, though not unaware that a fleet is of value as a protection from foreign attack, he deliberately preferred that his State should take its chance of destruction, rather than that it should incur the moral degeneracy and constitutional deterioration which he held to be inseparable from strength at sea (Laws 707 A–D). Isocrates also had traced how maritime empire had corrupted and ruined not only the Athenian but also the Lacedaemonian State (De Pace, §§ 75–105), and had helped to set afloat the famous saying—*ἀρχὴ θαλάσσης ἀρχὴ κακῶν*[2]. Aristotle, on the contrary, desires to be near the sea. He feels strongly—more strongly than Plato—the value of a maritime position both for the supply of commodities and for military strength, defensive and offensive—the fate of Plataea, Orchomenus, and Thebes, inland cities, and the narrow escape of Sparta (1330 b 34) were perhaps present to his mind, contrasted with the successful resistance of Byzantium and Perinthus to Philip[3]—and he also holds that the moral and constitutional drawbacks of nearness to the sea can be readily obviated. His city is to be placed at a short distance from the coast, like Athens, and to possess, not indeed a Peiraeus, an emporium for all

[1] Strabo notices the excellence of the communications of Alexandria with the interior of Egypt as well as with other countries; the Mareotic lake behind it brought it a far larger mass of imports than the sea in its front (p. 793).

[2] De Pace, § 101. On the other side of the question—the value of a *θαλασσοκρατία*—see Wilamowitz, Philolog. Untersuchungen 4. 222, who refers to Athen. Deipn. 8. 334.

[3] Compare also the remark of Dercyllidas to the partisans of the Lacedaemonians at Sestos (Xen. Hell. 4. 8. 5)—*καίτοι, ἔφη, ποῖον μὲν ἂν ἰσχυρότερον Σηστοῦ λάβοιτε χωρίον, ποῖον δὲ δυσπολιορκητότερον; ὃ καὶ νεῶν καὶ πεζῶν δεῖται, εἰ μέλλει πολιορκηθήσεσθαι.*

surrounding States, swarming with alien traffickers, but a modest port, adequate for the transmission of commodities from the territory or from other States, well guarded by walls to prevent its being seized by foes and used against the capital, and serving as a residence for the few alien merchants needed by the community, who might be, if necessary, strictly prohibited from entering the city[1]. His State was to have, indeed, not only a port but a fleet, whose magnitude would depend on the nature of its policy; it would not, however, need on this account to have a mob of sailor-citizens (*ναυτικὸς ὄχλος*), as Plato supposed, to dominate and ruin its constitutional life (Laws 707 A), for the fleet could be manned by slaves or serfs, like that of Heracleia on the Euxine[2]. Aristotle is evidently quite willing, on this understanding, to allow of even a large fleet.

3. A people of a given character.

As to the character which those who are to be the citizens (*τὸ πολιτικὸν πλῆθος*, 1327 b 18) of the best State should inherit from Nature, he asks, not for a population resembling in character the barbarous races of Europe[3] and those of chilly regions generally[4]—full of spirit (*θυμός*)

[1] We may perhaps gather from Theopompus' account of Byzantium (Fr. 65), what democracy was like in a busy Greek seaport, thronged with traders, though we must bear in mind that his sympathies were the reverse of democratic. Rhodes, though a seaport, seems to have been a well-ordered State, and Massalia also. But Aristotle is probably thinking of the Peiraeus, the home of many foreign worships and the channel through which they found their way into Attica (Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 189).

[2] According to Isocrates, indeed (De Pace, §§ 48, 79), the Athenian fleet at the time of the Peloponnesian War was manned by aliens gathered from the whole of Greece and by slaves. The idea of Aristotle had already occurred to Jason of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 11).

[3] A distinction appears to be drawn in the passage referred to in the text (c. 7. 1327 b 20 sqq.) between *τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην ἔθνη* and *τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος*, which would seem to imply that Hellas was not regarded by its author as forming part of Europe. In Phys. 5. 1. 224 b 21, *καὶ εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὅτι μέρος αἱ Ἀθῆναι τῆς Εὐρώπης*, we find the contrary view expressed, but Prantl is inclined to consider these words as an interpolation, for reasons connected with the interpretation of the passage (see his critical note on it, p. 236 of his edition of the Physics).

[4] So Plato (Rep. 435 E) ascribes the spirited type of character to 'the inhabitants of Thrace and Scythia, and generally to those who live in the Northward regions.'

and courage, but defective in intelligence and contriving skill (*διανοίας καὶ τέχνης*, 1327 b 24[1]), and hence though free, for spirit is the source of independence (*ἀρχικὸν καὶ ἀήττητον*, 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 7: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 b 1), destitute of constitutional organization (*ἀπολίτευτα*), and unequal to the exercise of supremacy over their neighbours[2]; nor again for an Asiatic population possessed of intelligence and ingenuity but wanting in spirit, and therefore tending to lose their freedom[3]; but for a Greek population with qualities answering to the midway geographical position of Greece, on the edge of Europe, yet bordering on Asia, and combining the two essential characteristics, spirit and intelligence. For though all Greek stocks did not possess this completeness of endowment, some falling short in the one direction and others in the other, it was, so Aristotle held, a general characteristic of the race to be strong in both ways[4], with

[1] Grote (History of Greece, 12. 358 n.) explains the word *τέχνης* by 'powers of political combination,' but perhaps its meaning is wider (cp. *τεχνικώτερον*, Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 4). Still the political art (3. 12. 1282 b 14–16) is one of the many which these races do not possess, and it is probably present among others to Aristotle's mind in this passage. The view is put forward in Probl. 14. 15. 910 a 26 sqq. that timid natures are more given to investigate, and therefore are wiser, than those of an opposite character (*διὰ τί οἱ ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς τόποις σοφώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς; . . . πανταχοῦ δὲ οἱ φοβούμενοι τῶν θαρρούντων μᾶλλον ἐπιχειροῦσι ζητεῖν, ὥστε καὶ εὑρίσκουσι μᾶλλον*: cp. also Probl. 14. 8. 909 b 9 sqq.: and 14. 16. 910 a 38). We learn from the De Partibus Animalium, that the same thinness and wateriness of the blood, which in moderation was thought to produce intelligence, in excess produces cowardice (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 18 sqq.).

[2] For it is intelligence (*διάνοια*) that confers the right to rule and the capacity to rule aright (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 31 sq.).

[3] Plato's view of the Egyptian and Phoenician character is much the same (Laws 747 C). Compare also Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 10, *πάντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἐνὶ δουλεύουσιν ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰπεῖν τὴν Οὐ συλλαβήν*. Strabo repeats Nearchus' praises of the *φιλοτεχνία* of the Indians (p. 717) and, following Homer, ascribes a similar aptitude to the Phoenicians (p. 757). The Greek conception of the barbarians of the North, on the other hand, is illustrated by statues such as that of the dying Gaul (miscalled the dying Gladiator), and by heads of barbarians such as the well-known one in the British Museum. See also Seneca de Ira, 1. 11: 3. 3.

[4] A similar *εὐκρασία* is traced by Aristotle in man as compared with the lower animals (De Gen. An. 2. 6. 744 a 30). So the west wind is pleasantest, partly because it is well-tempered (*εὔκρατος*): cp.

the result that it was not only free but under better political institutions than any other, and would even be competent to rule all other races, if amalgamated under one constitution. Unlike Plato, who had allowed spirit to find expression in one class of his Republic and intelligence in another, and had trusted for success to the co-operation of three classes, each possessed of only partial excellence[1], Aristotle holds that spirit and intelligence must meet in each individual citizen, if the State is to be the 'best State.' To make this requirement is indeed, in Aristotle's view, merely to insist on a type of character already realized by the Hellenic race.

We note, first, in reference to this interesting review of the varieties of national character as they broadly presented themselves to the mind of Aristotle, the fixity he ascribes to the main outlines of European and Asiatic character. This is quite in harmony with his general impression that the future has few new developments in store. In just the same way he is convinced that the hexameter is the only metre for an epic or any long poem (Poet. 24. 1459 b 31–1460 a 5). Isocrates, who had said in his Panegyric Oration (§ 50) that the name of Hellene had come to indicate a form of culture rather than extraction, could have taught him better. Aristotle's language appears, on the contrary, to imply that no race but the Hellenic has any chance of realizing the best State. We see, however, that if the division of mankind into Greeks and bar-

Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 23, *ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος κρᾶσιν; οὔτε γὰρ θερμὸς . . . οὔτε ψυχρός . . . ἀλλ' ἐν μεθορίῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ θερμῶν πνευμάτων· γειτνιῶν δὲ ἀμφοῖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν κοινωνεῖ, διὸ καὶ εὔκρατός ἐστι καὶ πνεῖ ἔαρος μάλιστα* (Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 21 sqq.). The *μέση ἁρμονία* (the Dorian) is Greek (Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14 sqq.).

[1] It should be noticed, however, that the highest class in the Republic consists of men who are not singled out and distinguished from the second (or soldier) class, till they have attained the age of twenty, and have shown themselves worthy of further education and of advancement to the highest class (see Plato, Rep. 537 A sqq., and Sus.[2], Note 182). They also, like Aristotle's citizens, will have begun by being *θυμοειδεῖς* and have left that stage behind. Still they commence their special education at the early age of twenty, and therefore are severed from the soldier-class much sooner than the citizens of Aristotle.

barians still holds its ground, notwithstanding Plato's censure of it in the Politicus (262 C sqq.), the barbarian world is falling apart (cp. Plato, Rep. 435 E) into two strongly contrasted halves—the barbarians of Europe and those of Asia, or perhaps more exactly, those of cold and those of hot climates—marked off from each other by profound differences of character. Something, therefore, has been gained, though justice has hardly been done to nations of Asiatic origin, such as the Carthaginian, which were certainly not wanting in 'spirit' and love of independence, and whose form of government is praised by Aristotle, or again to European races like the Itali of the tenth chapter, which possessed at least one institution valued by Aristotle (c. 10. 1329 b 5 sqq.)—to say nothing of the Romans and the Jews, with whom Aristotle was probably only imperfectly acquainted, if at all. The contrast of Europe and Asia still exists, though, thanks, in part, to Greece, we should no longer be correct in drawing it as Aristotle draws it. Europe has become the chief home of 'thought and contriving skill,' and, if Asia has fallen into the rear, the element of 'spirit' in its character has certainly been strengthened by Mahometanism.

Aristotle, knowing little of Rome and perhaps underrating Carthage, overestimated the strength of the Greek race in comparison with that of others. Could the Greek race, united in one State, have conquered even Italy and Carthage, to say nothing of ruling them? Aristotle thought that it was equal to this task (1327 b 32)[1]; and

[1] Mr. Eaton compares Hdt. 9. 2, where the Thebans advise Mardonius to create disunion in Greece by bribing its leading men —*κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, οἵπερ καὶ πάρος ταὐτὰ ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασι ἀνθρώποισι.* Justin, epitomising Trogus Pompeius, who here, no doubt, reproduced some Greek historian —Ephorus or Theopompus, very probably — speaks of Greece in the earlier days of Philip of Macedon as 'etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem' (Hist. Phil. Epit. 8. 4. 7)—an expression less strong than Aristotle's, but in the same vein. Aristotle may have derived the idea of 'the union of Greece under one constitution' from the policy of Philip at the Congress of Corinth, of which Justin thus speaks: 'ibi pacis legem universae Graeciae pro meritis singularum civitatium

as to Macedon, he probably shared the opinion which his relative and disciple, Callisthenes, was imprudent enough to express, when, at a banquet of Macedonian leaders and in the presence of Alexander, he ascribed the victory of Macedon to the discords of Greece (Hermipp. Fragm. 49: Müller, Fr. Hist. Graec. 3. 47). Aristotle may have overestimated the strength of the Greek race, yet we must not forget that it was a great thing once for all to break, as he did, with the traditions of the popular ethnology of the day[1], which tended to idealize the races lying at the extreme limits of the known world—Hyperboreans, Scythians, Indians, Ethiopians, and the like—and boldly to say that the central race, the Greek, was in reality the noblest.

Distribution of social functions (πράξεις).

Aristotle has now determined what initial equipment (χορηγία) or Matter (ὕλη) to ask of Fortune for the best State, and his next step is (c. 8) to enumerate and place in the right hands the various πράξεις, or activities, the due discharge and exchange of which is essential to the life of a State.

He begins by drawing a strong distinction between what we may call the nucleus and the appendages of the State. In all natural wholes (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα), and therefore in the State, not all those things without which the whole cannot exist are parts of it. Parts must have some one thing in common, and so must κοινωνοί, whether their shares are equal or not. But when one element is the means and another the end—as, for instance, the art of the builder is the means, and the house the end—they cannot have the one thing in common which is necessary to make them parts of a single Whole. The house cannot exist without the art of the builder, but the house and the art of the builder do not form parts of a single Whole; they have nothing in common except that

statuit, consiliumque omnium veluti unum senatum ex omnibus legit' (Hist. Phil. Epit. 9. 5. 2).

[1] See Ephor. Fragm. 76 *sub fin.*: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 257.

the builder makes and the house is made; they are only so far related to each other as that which acts upon a thing is related to the thing upon which it acts[1]. So property, animate or inanimate, is necessary to the State, but no part of it, for the State is a society of men like to each other, and the one thing in common which holds them together is a common pursuit of the best attainable life. But as the best attainable life is the life of happiness, and happiness is an actualization and complete exercise of virtue, and as many cannot fully share in this life and others cannot share in it at all, we see how varieties of constitution necessarily arise. Aristotle perhaps remembers that some constitutions admitted to power not only those who could live the life of happiness, but in larger or smaller numbers those who could not live it. We infer, though Aristotle does not go on to draw this moral, that the best State will be careful not to admit to power any but those who can attain to virtue and happiness. A human being, for instance, who is fit for nothing higher than to be an animate article of property, must not be made a part of the best State.

List of necessary *γένη*: deliberative and judicial functions not to be given to artisans, traders, or cultivators, nor even to those who serve the State in war.

After these introductory remarks, Aristotle proceeds to obtain (1328 b 2 sqq.) by a rapid review of society the list of elements or *γένη* necessary to a State to which reference has already been made (above, p. 97). He includes in his enumeration cultivators, handicraftsmen, a fighting class, a well-to-do class, priests, and men capable of deciding questions relating to things necessary and expedient for the State (*κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων*)[2]. We have already seen that he refuses to adopt the

[1] How far this is, may be gathered from De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 323 b 29 sqq., *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον κ.τ.λ.*

[2] For the distinction between things necessary and expedient, cp. Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 22 : 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 32 : Polyb. 5. 49. 6, *δόξαντος δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς Ἐπιγένους ἀναγκαιότερα καὶ συμφορώτερα λέγειν.* Compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 13, *ἀλλ' ἐκείνου γέ τοι, ἔφη, οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἠμέλησας, ἀλλ' ἔσκεψαι, πόσον χρόνον ἱκανός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σῖτος διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πόσου εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προσδεῖται, ἵνα μὴ τούτου γε λάθῃ σέ ποτε ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς*

democratic plan of allowing cultivators, traders, and handicraftsmen a share in deliberative and judicial functions. We pass, then, to the next class, the fighting class (*τὸ μάχιμον*). Are soldiers to be accorded these functions, or, in other words, are the functions of soldiering, on the one hand, and of deliberating and judging, on the other, to be placed in the same hands? Not at the same time: the same persons are to discharge both sets of functions, but successively. This is the course which justice and expediency and a regard for the safety of the State dictate. It would seem, however, from c. 9. 1329 a 30—*ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν*—that the military order is accounted part of the citizen-body [1], not quite consistently with the definition of citizenship in the Third Book, which makes a share in deliberative and judicial office the note of the citizen.

Τὸ εὔπορον to be the citizen-class.

Then we come to the well-to-do class (*τὸ εὔπορον*). Wealth is for the citizens, so that this class and the citizen-body must coincide. Plato in the Republic had not only included his third, or business, class (*τὸ χρηματιστικόν*) in the citizen-body, but had made this section of the citizen-body the owners of all the land. Aristotle insists that the citizens must be owners of the land, and that none must be citizens, or consequently own land, save those who possess virtue [2].

Priestly functions to be given to ex-rulers.

Lastly, as to the priests. We must employ citizens to pay honour to the gods, and if we assign the priesthoods of the State to citizens who are too old for political service,

γενομένη, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ἔχῃς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καὶ σώζειν αὐτήν: and Strabo, p. 235, *οἱ παλαιοὶ μὲν τοῦ κάλλους τῆς Ῥώμης ὠλιγώρουν, πρὸς ἄλλοις μείζοσι καὶ ἀναγκαιοτέροις ὄντες.*

[1] Yet we are told in c. 12. 1331 b 4, that 'the body of individuals composing the State (*τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως*) is divided into priests and magistrates,' and in c. 13. 1332 a 34 it is said that in the best State of Aristotle 'all the citizens share in the constitution,' which the soldiers can hardly be said to do.

[2] It was a common saying in Greece that Plutus was blind, and Demetrius the Phalerean had added that his guide Fortune was blind also (Diog. Laert. 5. 82). In Aristotle's best State this would not be the case, for wealth would go to those who would use it aright.

we shall fitly provide both for the worship of the gods and for the repose of the aged.

The distinction between some classes permanent, between others temporary.

Aristotle, then, decides in favour of dividing the State into *γένη*, and not only gives the functions of cultivators, handicraftsmen, and day-labourers to a class marked off from the military and governing classes, but also marks off the last-named class from the military class and the holders of priesthoods.

Advantages of this arrangement.

In all this he intentionally departs from the practice of the Athenian and other democracies, which made over deliberative and judicial functions not only to men concerned with necessary work, but also to men whose age, he held, unfitted them for their proper discharge. Aristotle's desire, on the contrary, is to reserve these functions for those who are unfitted for them neither by occupation nor by age—for men in the prime of their powers, neither too old nor too young. He has before him, on the one hand, the examples of Egypt and Crete (c. 10), where the tillers of the soil were marked off from the soldiers of the State; on the other, such utterances of popular wisdom as the line—

> *Ἔργα νέων, βουλαὶ δὲ μέσων, εὐχαὶ δὲ γερόντων*[1],

or the verses of Ion of Chios in praise of the Laconian State:—

> *Οὐ γὰρ λόγοις Λάκαινα πυργοῦται πόλις,*
> *ἀλλ' εὖτ' Ἄρης νεοχμὸς ἐμπέσῃ στράτῳ,*
> *βουλὴ μὲν ἄρχει, χεὶρ δ' ἐπεξεργάζεται*[2].

The powers of the popular assembly at Athens, it must be remembered, were not confined, like those of the people in most modern democracies, to the selection of the legislators and rulers of the State; it held in its hands the whole administration of affairs. It was no doubt largely made up of the persons whom Aristotle would disqualify

[1] See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 1. p. 436: 2. pp. 167, 419: and cp. Strabo, p. 675.

[2] Ion Chius, Fragm. 11 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 49).

on grounds of occupation or of age. The contrast of the older and younger citizens, again, is one that often comes to the surface in Greek history[1].

Aristotle, who holds with Plato (Laws, 653 A) that *φρόνησις* comes only with years[2], wishes to reserve deliberative and judicial work for mature minds. Even, indeed, at Athens, though men became members of the assembly at the age of 20, they could not be elected to the Boulê or placed on dicasteries till they were 30, nor could they act as public arbitrators (*διαιτηταί*) if they were under 50. At Sparta membership of the assembly was withheld till 30 years of age were attained. On the other hand, the tenure of office by men in extreme old age, to which Aristotle and Plato both object, probably seldom occurred in democracies; it would be far more frequent in oligarchies, or in constitutions like the Lacedaemonian, under which many important positions were held for life.

To expect the military class—a class which has the power to maintain or overthrow at will the institutions of the State (1329 a 11)—to accept a position of permanent subjection, as Plato in the Republic expects it to do, is in Aristotle's opinion to expect too much: he provides, therefore, that it shall be transferred to the work of governing, when years and experience of being ruled have developed the virtues of the ruler. We shall thus, he holds, not only content a formidable class, but also secure good soldiers and good rulers. Youth is the age for war, deliberation is work for mature men[3]. In saying

[1] See the interesting story of the conflict between the older and younger citizens of Termessus in Pisidia (Diod. 18. 45–47: Thirlwall, 7. 233 sq.). The younger men forgot the interest of their city in their generous devotion to their leader, Alexander's general Alcetas; Aristotle would say that they showed *θυμός*, not *φρόνησις*. Thirlwall refers to a similar feud at Gortyna in Crete between the *πρεσβύτεροι* and *νεώτεροι* (Polyb. 4. 53), and adds—'In the siege of Florence in 1530 we find the *giovani* and *vecchi* taking opposite sides'—referring to Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, l. xii. princ. The same division of opinion appears at Sparta (Thirlwall, 8. 142, 226).

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15 sqq.

[3] Charicles, one of the Thirty Tyrants, in reply to an inquiry of Socrates, up to what age men were to be accounted young, said—*Ὅσουπερ χρόνου βουλεύειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὡς οὕπω φρονίμοις οὖσι· μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου νεωτέροις τριάκοντα*

this, Aristotle does not, like those whom Ulysses criticises in the passage of Shakspeare's Troilus and Cressida to which we have already referred (above, p. 305, note), 'count wisdom as no member of the war,' if we understand by 'wisdom' military skill: what he denies to his 'younger men' is *φρόνησις*, a totally different thing. He wishes the citizen-rulers of his State to have been soldiers, but to be so no longer. Rule is not for the soldier. 'Cedant arma togae.' The capacity for ruling is a totally different thing from the capacity for fighting. On the other hand, the State must place its soldiers in a position that will content them; otherwise its peace will be in peril.

The military organization of Aristotle's State would, however, apparently, be on a small scale. The number of his citizens cannot, it would seem from his language in 2. 6. 1265 a 13 sqq., be intended nearly to reach that of the citizens in the State of the Laws (5040); yet even if we take their number to be 5000 and allow two sons to each, we should hardly obtain more than a moderate number within the military age. Plato and Aristotle, however, agree in this, that they desire their citizens to possess military aptitude and experience, and yet refuse to make military service the crowning pursuit of their life. They neither approve a State whose citizens shrink from military service and hand it over to mercenaries, like some States of the day (Isocr. de Pace, § 43 sqq.), nor yet a State like the Lacedaemonian, where military prowess was everything.

The employment of this force is subject to the limitations imposed by Aristotle on War. War, he says[1], adopting the view expressed by Plato in the Laws (628 E), is 'for the sake of peace'; but a little later,

ἐτῶν (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 35). But Plato counts men of 40 among *νέοι* (Laws 951 E); and Aristotle speaks not of *νέοι* but *νεώτεροι*. Susemihl, indeed, seems to think that Aristotle intended military service to be rendered up to the fiftieth year (Sus.[2], Einleitung, p. 50), and it is true that in the Republic (539 E) men seem to be accounted *νέοι* up to that age. According to a writer in the *Times* (June 26, 1882) 'the age of 50 in a Turk is not far removed from dotage.'

[1] 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 35.

consciously or not, he seems somewhat to relax this limitation (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38–1334 a 2), for he now allows of three aims in war: — 1. self-defence against subjugation by others; 2. hegemony exercised for the benefit of the ruled, not indiscriminate despotic empire exercised over others, whether deservedly or not; 3. despotic authority over those who deserve to be so ruled[1]. This enumeration omits wars waged in defence of allies, but it is wide enough to be accepted by any conqueror, however ambitious, who might be willing to adjust his methods of rule to the claims of the States subjugated by him.

As to the financial organization of his State, Aristotle says nothing in what we have of the Politics, though it is evident that the maintenance of a fleet would be impossible without a considerable revenue. A large revenue, indeed, was becoming every day more essential for military strength of any kind. States depending, as the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States had done and as Aristotle's State was to do, on purely citizen troops were coming to be out of date. Syracuse fought Carthage, and Carthage Syracuse, with forces partly citizen and partly mercenary. Macedon employed mercenaries as well as Macedonians. But the employment of mercenaries was costly. The relations of the leading States of Greece Proper with Persia in the fourth century B.C. illustrate the financial weakness of these States, but neither Plato nor Aristotle seem quite to have recognized their significance, though Aristotle shows by his remarks in the eleventh chapter of the First Book of the Politics that he was not unaware of the importance of the subject.

[1] Compare Cicero's account of the just causes of war (de Rep. 3. 23. 34–5): 'nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute.' A little further on, he adds—'extra ulciscendi aut propulsandorum hostium causam bellum geri iustum nullum potest,' which seems to give a somewhat wider scope to war. As the remark immediately follows—'noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus est'—he is apparently ready to justify the wars which resulted in the world-wide rule of Rome.

The control of the State, we see, will rest in the hands of the citizens of mature age. These will also for the most part own the land and rule the households of the State, for the male citizen is not to marry till 37 years of age. They will be qualified to rule over freemen, for they will have had a long experience of being ruled. Their education and their period of military service will also have prepared them to fill their position aright. They will pass their years of maturity in political activity and philosophical speculation, after the fashion of Archytas at Tarentum; and when the vigour of their years is over, they will be withdrawn from these occupations, for the State might suffer from their infirmities, and they will then be eligible for the priesthood. Thus in Aristotle's scheme, one and the same individual is to take on himself successively the functions of soldier, statesman, and priest. We observe that both Plato and Aristotle fear to trust very old men with political power. The history of the Papacy may be quoted against them, perhaps not altogether conclusively; at any rate they are right as to the general rule.

Remarks on Aristotle's singular arrangement with respect to the priesthood.

The selection of superannuated citizens to serve as priests will be less surprising to us, if we bear in mind not only that priesthoods were commonly regarded in Greece in the light of dignified sinecures[1], but also that advanced age was held to be a recommendation for the office. 'The service of the gods was supposed to demand clean hands and in some degree a pure heart . . . Even celibacy was frequently required; but in many instances the same end was more wisely pursued by the selection either of the age in which the passions are yet dormant, or that in which they have subsided[2].' Aristotle chose the latter,

[1] Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 6, *ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας καὶ τῆς ταραχῆς αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὴν βασιλείαν ὥσπερ ἱερωσύνην παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι νομίζουσιν, ὃ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ πλείστης προνοίας δεόμενον.* Aristotle also connects the sacrificial worship of the gods with relaxation (*ἀνάπαυσις*, Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 32: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24), and none have a better right to repose and relaxation than those whom he makes priests.

[2] Thirlwall, History of Greece, I. 204.

herein following the example of Plato in the Laws (759), where priests and priestesses are required to be not less than sixty years of age[1]. Plutarch, on the other hand, wrote a treatise (An Seni sit gerenda respublica) in favour of old statesmen dying in harness, like Cato the Censor, one reason which weighs with him being the fear of their needing to descend from politics to less noble employments. He does not seem to be aware of Aristotle's suggestion, which would at all events have met this particular difficulty. Aristotle had perhaps noticed that in many cases the heroic kingship of Greece had subsided into a priesthood (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 16), and thought that the life of his magistrates might well close in the same way. His plan appears to imply a priesthood dedicated to priestly duties exclusively, not one adding to them, as was often the case in Greece[2], other occupations and interests. He did not probably intend to abolish priestesses: in Greece there were commonly as many female as male ministers of religion[3]. Priests would not in Aristotle's State possess as great an influence or occupy as paramount a position as that which Plato gives in the Laws to some members of the order (especially the priests of Apollo): in the Politicus, on the contrary, he is very decided in marking off their functions from those of statesmen (Polit. 290 C sqq.).

Principle underlying Aristotle's distribution of functions in his best State.

It must be remembered that in all this Aristotle has the ideal State in view. The principle which underlies his scheme of social and political organization is the adjustment of function to capacity[4] and of 'instruments' to both. It is a sound one, whatever we may think of his application of it.

[1] Compare Dionysius of Halicarnassus' commendation of the regulations of Romulus with respect to the Roman priesthood (Antiqq. Rom. 2. 21). In the Republic (498 C) Plato recommends that men should make philosophy the main occupation of the last years of life, when there is no longer strength for political activity.

[2] Thirlwall, 1. 203.

[3] Thirlwall, 1. 204.

[4] In the Fourth Book functions appear to be distributed rather according to capacity than according to 'contribution' (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 8 sq.). The two things, however, do not lie far apart.

The happiest State, he holds, is that in which the highest things are willingly left to the highest and best prepared natures, in which a body of men exists in a position to live, and living, for all that is best and noblest in human life, and in which natures unable to live that life ask nothing better than to grow in virtue by aiding others to live it and accepting their rule[1]. A body of citizens living the highest life that man can live, the source to those around them who cannot live that life of all the virtue of which they are capable—this is Aristotle's ideal of human society. It cannot, in his view, be realized unless Fortune and Nature second the efforts of the lawgiver, but the essential condition of the ideal State is 'a wise and understanding people,' and the best means of producing such a people is, subject to the favour of Fortune and Nature, a correct regulation of marriage, of the rearing of children, of education and social habits generally. The office of law and institutions and organization is to breed a virtuous people, not to supply its place, which indeed these agencies cannot do[2].

Arrangements for the division of the territory and its cultivation.

The tenth chapter falls into two parts (1329 a 40–b 35 and b 36–1330 a 33), the former of which will be considered in an Appendix[3]. The latter completes the subject of the territory and need not detain us long. That the land is to belong to the citizens, but that they are not to be its cultivators, we know already; we also know what should be its

[1] Some points of resemblance are traceable between this view, which is however put forward by Aristotle only as an ideal, and Carlyle's far more absolutely stated doctrine. '"Well also," says Teufelsdröckh, "was it written by Theologians: a King rules by divine right. He carries in him an authority from God, or man will never give it him. Can I choose my own King? I can choose my own King Popinjay, and play what farce or tragedy I may with him: but he who is to be my Ruler, whose will is to be higher than my will, was chosen for me in Heaven. Neither except in such Obedience to the Heaven-chosen is Freedom so much as conceivable"' (Sartor Resartus, book 3, c. 7). But the differences between the two views far out-number the resemblances.

[2] Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 33, σπουδαία πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους: and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 24.

[3] See Appendix E.

extent and character: it remains to settle how it is to be divided and what is to be the character of those who are to cultivate it.

Before any award of land is made to individuals, two public objects must be provided for—the due support of the worship of the gods[1], and the supply of the syssitia or common meals. There was nothing new in the assignment of land in a newly founded State for the former object, but it was only in Crete, so far as we know, that public land was employed for the support of the syssitia (2. 10. 1272 a 12–21). In the Lacedaemonian State each citizen was compelled to pay a contribution to the syssitia, on pain of ceasing to be a citizen, and this arrangement was found to thin the numbers of the citizen-body. For this reason, and perhaps for others, Aristotle prefers to employ public land for the purpose.

The remainder of the territory is to be made the property of individuals. Plato had already provided in the Laws that the lot assigned to each citizen should be in part on the frontier of the State, in part near its centre, and that each part of the lot should have a house upon it[2]; Aristotle takes up the suggestion, except as to the two houses (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sq.), and gives each of his citizens a

[1] Aristotle's full provision for the worship of the gods in his best State is deserving of notice. His own theology was far removed from the popular theology of Greece, and as Bernays thinks (Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 12), barely left room for the practice of sacrifice; but the Politics takes for granted the maintenance even in the best State of the popular faith and the traditional worship. The temples are not only well endowed, but placed in a conspicuous position at the centre of the city; the priests who officiate in them are men who have grown old in the service of the State; the sacrifices they offer form rallying-points for the social life of the State (τὸ συζῆν, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 37: cp. Athen. Deipn. 36 c, 40 c–d), and means by which the citizens become known to each other. Even expiatory rites for homicide seem to be recognized by Aristotle (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 31); and the scoffs and jeers (τωθασμός) traditional in certain worships are not interfered with (4 (7). 17. 1336 b 16). On all this see the remarks of Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 796–7). No interpretation, indeed, of the Aristotelian theology, however rigid it might be, need exclude the kind of sacrifice in which honour is rendered to the Deity, whatever fate might befal those of prayer, thanksgiving, or expiation.

[2] Laws 745 E: 775 E.

piece of land on the frontier together with another piece nearer the city, in order that there may neither be those in his State who will hold the hostility of neighbouring States too cheap nor those who will dread it overmuch.

The cultivators are to be, if possible, slaves submissive in character and belonging to more than one stock[1], or else non-Hellenic serfs resembling them in nature. The danger arising from Hellenic serfs had been made evident by the experience of the Lacedaemonians, and it would seem that in Aristotle's opinion serfs should be sought elsewhere than among the barbarians of Europe, who are said to be 'full of spirit' (c. 7. 1327 b 24).

The institution of syssitia adopted by Aristotle in its complete form—its recommendations.

Aristotle, we note, though he is strongly in favour of the household, is also strongly in favour of syssitia or public meal-tables[2], perhaps a somewhat antagonistic institution. His syssitia are not merely syssitia of magistrates such as existed commonly throughout Greece[3], but syssitia of citizens and the sons of citizens, from an early age upward—how early, we are not distinctly told—syssitia of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan type. We hear of 'syssitia of priests' (1331 b 5), 'syssitia of the most important magis-

[1] Like the Callicyrii, who at one time formed the slave-class at Syracuse, and whose name, according to Aristotle, signified the variety of their extraction (cp. Timaeus, Fragm. 56 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 204).

[2] Cp. c. 10. 1330 a 3 sq., *περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.* The reasons for his view would have been interesting, but they are not given in what we possess of the Politics.

[3] 'The practice of bringing the highest magistrates of the State together at a common meal in the Prytaneum, and of inviting also any guest whom the community might desire to honour is not specially Attic, but one which existed in all Greek States.' Athens retained this custom down to a late period of the Empire, 'though her citizens always remained strangers to the stiff and one-sided exaggeration of it, fatal in its tendencies to the household relation, which is exemplified in the syssitia of Dorian States' (R. Schoell, die Speisung im Prytaneion zu Athen, *Hermes* 6. 14 sqq.). Syssitia in this latter form, however, were not apparently confined to Doric States, for even if the Cretan syssitia were of Doric origin, which hardly seems to be Aristotle's opinion (2. 10. 1271 b 28 sq.), we hear of syssitia also in Boeotia (Plato, Laws 636 B : C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 180. 10).

tracies' (1331 a 25), syssitia of the soldiers or of the younger men (1331 a 22). It is not impossible that in Aristotle's State, unlike the Lacedaemonian, men of different ages were to belong to different syssitia, just as the gymnasia of the older men were to be distinct from those of the younger men (1331 a 37 sqq.). Some evils connected with the syssitia as organized at Sparta and elsewhere (Plato, Laws 636 A–B) would thus be avoided, but something also would be lost, for the young would lose an opportunity of learning from their elders. Still the main outlines of the Cretan and Lacedaemonian institution would be retained. A Lacedaemonian mess-table (*φιδίτιον*) consisted of fifteen[1] messmates, who filled vacancies in their number by choice. Each of these groups of fifteen, was, as may easily be conceived, a group of close friends, especially as they not only gathered at the same board, but fought side by side in war, so that their friendship was often tested, and its value proved, on the battlefield. They formed, in fact, a kind of military brotherhood, or household, and, as Aristotle points out (2. 5. 1264 a 6 sqq.), it was of little use for Plato to abolish the household and retain the syssition, as he does in the Republic (416 E: 458 C), if he wished to make all the citizens of his State equally dear to each other. The Spartan Megillus claims in the Laws (636 A) that the institution of syssitia was favourable both to courage and temperance. It must have given men a knowledge of one another and a confidence in one another which would hardly have existed without it; a generous rivalry no doubt sprang up both within the mess and between one mess and another; the State was better served, and there was a gain of pleasure to the individual. The mess-system also enabled the authorities to enforce frugality and sim-

[1] When Agis IV in his scheme of reform made the *φιδίτια* created by him large bodies comprising on an average 300 members, he would seem to have departed from the ancient model, though he may very probably have subdivided these large unities into small messes. See Schömann, Antiquitates Iuris Publici Graecorum, p. 140. 10.

plicity at table, and it would be equally useful in maintaining Aristotle's more liberal standard of living.

Ancient societies were far richer in these minor organized groups than modern. Amongst ourselves, a man belongs to his family, his town, his party, his State; but a Greek belonged not only to these, but to a clan, a phratry, a deme, and in many States to a *συσσίτιον*, to say nothing of voluntary associations such as a *θίασος* or a philosophical school. The Greek race was more social, and social in a simpler and less elaborate way, than most modern races, and this was at once the cause and the effect of its defective development of the household. Greek States were full of enjoyable little gatherings, which tyrants feared and sought to put down (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 41 sqq.), thus earning the undying hatred of a race which found the main charm of life rather in friendship than in the household relations.

Picture of Aristotle's ideal city.

Aristotle has now done with the territory and its cultivators, and his next step is to complete his picture of the city in the same way. His city is, we know already (p. 316 sq.), to be situate not too far from the sea, yet within easy reach of its territory and the continent generally; but these are not the only matters to be attended to in the choice of its site and its laying out. Health, military strength, suitability for the purposes of political life, and beauty [1], must all be kept in view. The secret of health is to be well circumstanced in respect of those things to whose influence we are most constantly exposed—water and air; and thus the city must not only be situate in a healthy region, but have a healthy aspect, and it must be well supplied with water [2]. A good and unfailing supply of water is also

[1] Aristotle mentions (4 (7). 11. 1330 a 36 sqq.) four points to be kept in view with respect to the internal arrangements of the city, but, characteristically enough, in his eager haste omits to specify the fourth, which would, however, seem to be beauty (*κόσμος*).

[2] 'The water-supply of Greek towns was probably' often 'scanty enough' (Mahaffy, Old Greek Education, p. 31), so that this was an important suggestion. How far it was acted on, we know not; but Strabo tells us that Rome was the first city to set the example of a profuse provision of water (Strabo, p. 235, *τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς*

a condition of military strength, and Aristotle evidently holds that military strength is to be studied as much as anything. His city reminds us in some respects of Athens, but Athens, though strong and defensible, can hardly be said to have been difficult of approach for foes (*δυσπρόσοδος*, 1330 b 3). It is to possess walls as skilfully built and as impregnable as the science of the day could make them[1], and within them the city is to be only in certain parts laid out with broad straight streets: parts of it are to be an intricate tangle of lanes, so that it may be defensible even after its walls have been penetrated[2], or else the houses are to be disposed in the fashion of a quincunx. The younger citizens will also be required to hold their syssitia, or some of them, on the walls.

Still Aristotle asks for something more than a 'maiden city,' impregnably strong. His city must be so laid out as to favour a rational political life, and to enable the ruling citizens to gather for work or converse without being jostled by an uncongenial throng of traffickers and artisans, or even coming into too close contact with the youth, whose place, as soldiers, will be upon the walls. Beauty again must not be lost sight of, and Aristotle's city will not fail in this respect. The houses must be disposed with sufficient regularity to satisfy the Greek idea of beauty in architecture, and the taste both of ancients and moderns would be gratified by the choice of a site near the citizens' agora for the foliage and shade and flowing streams of a gymnasium[3]. Aristotle's idea, in fact, seems to be to bring

κτίσεις εὐστοχῆσαι μάλιστα δοξάντων, ὅτι κάλλους ἐστοχάζοντο καὶ ἐρυμνότητος καὶ λιμένων καὶ χώρας εὐφυοῦς, οὗτοι (the Romans) *προὐνόησαν μάλιστα ὧν ὠλιγώρησαν ἐκεῖνοι, στρώσεως ὁδῶν καὶ ὑδάτων εἰσαγωγῆς καὶ ὑπονόμων τῶν δυναμένων ἐκκλύζειν τὰ λύματα τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν Τίβεριν*). As to the water-supply of Antioch, see Mommsen, Röm. Geschichte, 5. 458.

[1] Aristotle discusses and rejects the opposite advice of Plato, Laws 778 D sqq.

[2] Aristotle here probably has in view the experience of Perinthus, when besieged by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall, but only to find himself in face of a close array of houses rising tier over tier up the slope of the hill, and parted by narrow lanes, across which the besieged carried walls from house to house (Diod. 16. 76).

[3] A statue of Eros near the Academy was thus inscribed

agora and gymnasium together, the haunts of politics and those of philosophy[1].

We must imagine, then, a city at about the same distance from the sea as Athens, and perhaps (though this we are not distinctly told[2]) linked like Athens by long walls to its port, a miniature Peiraeus; the city itself facing eastward like the centres of the worship of Aesculapius, Epidaurus and Cos, and like Croton, whose healthiness was proverbial[3], for the sake, we are surprised to read, of a full exposure to the easterly winds[4], or else sheltered from the north wind, so that it may have a mild climate in winter[5]; not placed by the side of a river, like Sparta and many Roman cities, but including in its site one or more strong positions (1330 b 21), and especially a conspicuous hill, perhaps scarped or precipitous like the Acropolis at

(Athen. Deipn. 609 d):

ποικιλομήχαν' Ἔρως, σοὶ τόνδ' ἱδρύσατο βωμὸν
Χάρμος ἐπὶ σκιεροῖς τέρμασι γυμνασίου.

We are reminded of Waller's lines in his poem on St. James' Park:

In such green palaces the first Kings reigned,
Slept in their shades and angels entertained;
With such old counsellors they did advise,
And by frequenting sacred groves grew wise.

[1] For in Aristotle's day the philosophic schools were commonly situated in or near gymnasia: cp. Quintil. 12. 2. 8 (quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 36. 22): studia sapientiae ... in porticus et gymnasia primum, mox in conventus scholarum secesserunt.

[2] Cp. c. 6. 1327 a 32–35. According to von Wilamowitz (Philolog. Untersuchungen, Heft 4. p. 200), the long walls between Athens and Peiraeus had wholly lost their defensive value by the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes, owing to the improvements in siege-artillery.

[3] Aristotle, indeed, appears to desire his city not only to face, but to slope Eastward (4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38 sq.): how far the cities referred to in the text did so, I will not undertake to say. Strabo (p. 374) describes Epidaurus as 'facing the point at which the sun rises in summer': *ὑγιέστερον Κρότωνος* was a familiar proverb (Strabo, p. 262). Syracuse, though it also faced east, was more famous for wealth than health (Strabo, p. 269), probably because there were marshes near it. Alexandria was happily circumstanced in both respects (Strabo, p. 793).

[4] See Sus.[2], Note 845, and the references there given, to which may be added Plutarch de Curiositate c. 1, *ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ζέφυρον ἄνεμον κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐρείδοντα δείλης ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρνασσοῦ δεχομένην, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαίρωνος.* The east wind is spoken of as warm in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24.

[5] Athens lay *πρὸς μεσημβρίαν* (Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R). So did Gortyna in Crete (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland 2. 564).

Athens, on which such temples as the law of the State or the Delphic oracle did not relegate elsewhere might be grouped, so as to be visible from afar [1], and beside them the halls for the common meals of the priests and the chief magistrates. Like every Greek city, it was to have a central open-air gathering-place for converse and discussion—a kind of 'sensorium,' the like of which does not exist in modern cities. Immediately beneath the hill just described will lie an agora for the use of citizens only, kept sacred not only from all buying and selling, but from the very presence of cultivators, traders, and artisans; and close beside it, as has already been noticed, not, as in the Athens of Aristotle's day, in the outskirts of the city [2], a gymnasium —the gymnasium of the older men, which is to be distinct and separate from the gymnasium for the younger men. Aristotle evidently felt that it was necessary to place the gymnasia under strict supervision, for while magistrates are to be present in the gymnasium for the younger men, the gymnasium for the older men is to be situate in the very heart of the city, close beneath its central temples. It is interesting to notice that the gymnasium, which was a public playground combined with public baths—indeed, something more than this, for it was a place of preparation for the military service of the State—is viewed both by Plato and Aristotle as an indispensable adjunct to a city. Neither makes mention of a public library, an institution

[1] Cp. Paus. 9. 22, *εὖ δέ μοι Ταναγραῖοι νομίσαι τὰ ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γὰρ αἱ οἰκίαι σφίσι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν καθαρῷ τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπων*: and Vitruv. 1. 7. (both quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 2. § 15. 3–4). See also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, and note the epithet *ἀπόψιον* in the encomium on the Parthenon at Athens in Dicaearch. (?) de Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254). 'A visitor to the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk must be struck alike by the number, the beauty, and the conspicuous positions of the church-towers. They answer one another, so to speak, from hill to hill' (Letter in *Times*, Oct. 13, 1881).

[2] This important change is adopted from Plato, Laws 804 C. In Nicaea, built by Antigonus in B.C. 316, the gymnasium appears to have been situated in the centre of the city (Strabo, pp. 565–6). It seems to be within the walls in the city described by Dio Chrysostom in Or. 7. 233 R. See also 2 Macc. 4. 12.

reserved for the next generation. In a quite distinct situation, selected for its easiness of access both from the sea and from the territory, a market for buying and selling should be laid out, and here should be gathered the minor magistracies—those which have to do with men's business relations with one another and with certain formal matters in relation to law-suits, and also those of the agoranomi and astynomi. Thus, even in their leisure-hours, by a plan adopted from Thessaly and already recommended by Xenophon (Cyrop. 1. 2. 3: 7. 5. 85[1]), the citizens would be kept as much as possible apart from the classes concerned with production and trade. Each class would have, in fact, its appointed region: the citizens of full age would haunt the neighbourhood of the Acropolis, and the region near it; the younger men would keep watch and ward upon the walls, where many of them would even take their meals, or else be in their own gymnasium, which would not, probably, be far from the walls; the women would be at home, secluded somewhat more strictly than in democracies; the boys would be at school or in their gymnasia, the peasants on their farms, the traders and artisans at their places of business in the port or in the commercial quarter of the city. The various classes of society were each of them to have room to live their own life; the higher ones especially were not to be mixed up with or jostled by the lower. Aristotle's State is like his Kosmos, in which every element is assigned a place of its own, earth at the bottom, fire at the top, and water and air between them, as the relatively heavy and the relatively light[2]. We are sensible of a reaction from the confusion of ranks, sexes, and ages, which is vividly described

[1] The Romans had two kinds of 'fora': 'some were exclusively devoted to commercial purposes and were real market-places, while others were places of meeting for the popular assembly and for the courts of justice: mercantile business, however, was not altogether excluded from the latter,' which were sometimes called 'fora judicialia' (Smith, Dict. of Antiquities, art. Forum). Henkel (Studien 141. 22), following E. Curtius, remarks that the gathering-place (Versammlungsraum) of the Spartans was from the first quite distinct from the market.

[2] Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 908.

by Plato (Rep. 562–3) as characteristic of an extreme democracy, where boys, he says, are prematurely old, and old men affect to be young. The people of Aristotle's State would be like the Spaniards of Clarendon, a people of 'honour and punctuality,' 'bred up in the observation of distances and order[1].' Similar arrangements, Aristotle continues, are to be made throughout the territory. Just as the towers on the city-wall are to be places of watch and ward for the protection of the city, so there must be places of watch and ward for the Wardens of the Woods (ὑλωροί) and the Overseers of the country districts (ἀγρονόμοι), where they may hold their common meals; and there must also be temples dedicated to gods and heroes.

So far we have been dealing with matters in respect of which the favour of Fortune counts for almost everything: now we come to a matter in which more depends on the legislator—what is the citizen-body of the best State to be in character and circumstances?

At this point (end of c. 12. 1331 b 18) Aristotle turns with some impatience from details, the realization of which he feels after all depends on Fortune, to the constitution[2], and asks what should be the character of those who are to form the citizen-body of a happy and well-constituted State, just as he had already asked and answered (c. 10. 1329 b 39 sqq.) the same question as to the cultivators of the soil. It is here that the inquiry as to education begins, which extends to the close of the Fifth Book, and is not indeed completed in that book, as it has come down to us. No direct and immediate answer is given to the question now raised as to the citizen-body, but we gather from what follows that they must be men who are not debarred by any defect of nature or fortune from attaining happiness and who have received a correct training both of habit and of reason. It is best, however, to follow Aristotle's own treatment of the question he raises.

To win success in any enterprise, he says, it is necessary

[1] History of the Rebellion, Book xiii (vol. 6, p. 443, ed. 1839).

[2] C. 13. 1331 b 24, περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. Here πολιτεία is probably used in its usual sense of 'constitution' (cp. 1332 a 4), and not in the sense which it sometimes bears of 'universitas civium' (Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.), but the passage shows that the two meanings do not lie far apart.

both to aim at the true end, and to have at one's command the means to its attainment, for men fail of success by missing the one or the other or both; and this holds of the arts and sciences, for in practising them both the end and the course of action which leads to its attainment must be grasped (*κρατεῖσθαι*)[1]. All agree in making happiness the end, but some are incapacitated for attaining it by defects of nature or fortune[2], and others, not being thus incapacitated, do not seek it aright. Now, as the business before us is to discover the best constitution, and the best constitution is that under which the State is as happy as possible, we are bound to understand what happiness is. In tracing its nature we are not in the least diverging from the path which a political treatise should follow. It is, as we have already said in the Ethics (*ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς*)[3], *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία*—a complete actualization and exercise of virtue—and this not 'conditionally' (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*), but 'absolutely' (*ἁπλῶς*): it is not an exercise of virtue under pressure of necessity, like that of the judge when he inflicts just punishment, for such an exercise of virtue is conversant with what is in itself an evil, though in the particular case and to the criminal it becomes a good, and it is only 'conditionally noble' or 'noble in a necessary way': the criminal who is punished and the State which punishes would be happier if nothing of the kind was necessary. Nor, again, is it such an exercise of virtue as occurs when a man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*) has to

The citizens must be happy, and if they are to be happy in the fullest sense, their exercise of virtue must be 'complete'—i.e. it must be in relation to things absolutely good, not to things conditionally good (that is, good under given circumstances, like punishment.)

[1] There is some ambiguity about the word *κρατεῖσθαι*, which is probably designed to mean something more than is expressed by *εὑρίσκειν* (1331 b 29)—not merely 'known,' but 'possessed'; so that the transition may be easy to a recognition of the fact that defects of nature or fortune, no less than an ignorance of the end and the means of attaining it, may make the attainment of happiness impossible. This fact is recognized in 1331 b 40 sq. The logical sequence of this part of the chapter would have been better if the word *κρατεῖν* had been used in place of *εὑρίσκειν* in 1331 b 29.

[2] Cp. Plato, Laws 747 C, *εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν καλουμένην ἄν τις πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας ἀπεργασάμενος λάθοι, καθάπερ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ Φοίνικας καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα ἀπειργασμένα γένη νῦν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ κτημάτων ἀνελευθερίας, εἴτε τις νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς φαῦλος ἂν γενόμενος ἐξειργάσατο τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτε χαλεπὴ τύχη προσπεσοῦσα εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη.*

[3] See Appendix F.

deal with poverty or disease or ill-fortune of any kind: on the contrary, it is an exercise of virtue in relation to 'things absolutely good' (*τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*)—the goods of fortune[1]. The actions by which happiness is secured —those which are 'absolutely virtuous and noble'—are such as are conversant with 'absolute goods'; they are actions which 'create and generate goods[2].'

We now therefore know both the end and the course of action by which it is secured. The end is *εὐδαιμονία*—a word very imperfectly rendered by happiness—and the actions by which it is secured[3] are virtuous actions conversant with absolute goods, and therefore absolutely virtuous and noble. The citizens of Aristotle's best State are to be at once actively virtuous and in the enjoyment of the goods of fortune. We had been told at the beginning of the book that a certain *quantum* of external and bodily goods, not a large one, is essential to happiness, because essential to the exercise of virtue: we learn now the further lesson that virtuous action does not become happy action, or even become 'absolutely virtuous and noble' (*σπουδαία καὶ καλὴ ἁπλῶς*), unless it is exercised on a certain object-matter, external and bodily goods—in other words, the goods of fortune. Fortune, therefore, is doubly a source of happiness, making virtuous action possible, and being the condition of its attaining its highest level, that of happy action. Both in the earlier part of the book and here Aristotle insists that there are two factors of happiness—virtuous action, and *χορηγία* which is the gift of fortune; but while in the earlier passage his aim is to

[1] This seems to be the meaning of the term here: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 2. 1129 b 1 sqq. In Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 16 sqq., however, the virtue of *ἀνδρεία* seems to be included among *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*. Other passages will be found referred to, together with these, in Bon. Ind. 4 a 2 sqq.

[2] It appears from Seneca's Seventy-first Epistle, that even the followers of Plato denied full happiness to the good man enduring tortures. 'Academici veteres beatum quidem esse etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum nec ad plenum: quod nullo modo potest recipi. Nisi beatus est, in summo bono non est.' Aristotle declines to say that he is happy at all.

[3] *Αἱ πρὸς τὸ τέλος φέρουσαι πράξεις* (1331 b 28).

magnify the share of virtue and virtuous action in the result at the expense of that of fortune, here he acknowledges more fully the importance of the other factor. Later on, indeed, he finds in the fact that happiness implies the exercise of virtue in relation to things absolutely good, the strongest ground for making the education of the citizens of the best State such as to call forth in them all the virtues, especially the highest, and to develope the whole man. *Πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταί φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν* (c. 15. 1334 a 28–34).

Two things, then, are necessary for the attainment of happiness—the aid of fortune, and the science and correct moral judgment (*ἐπιστήμη καὶ προαίρεσις*) of a lawgiver who knows how virtue is produced. It is by making the citizens who share in the constitution—in our case, all the citizens—virtuous, that the State is made virtuous. And, if we take up again the question on the threshold of which we stood at the close of the Third Book (3. 18. 1288 a 39 sqq.) and ask how men are made virtuous, the answer is, by nature, habit, and reason[1]. A man must be born (*φῦναι*, whence *φύσις*) as a man and not any other animal, and with certain bodily and psychical qualities. What these are, Aristotle has described elsewhere. But nature often counts for little, for in the case of some animals it may easily be made better or worse by habit. Of the lower animals, indeed, most live as nature made them to live; a very few live by habit also; only man lives by reason in addition, for he alone possesses reason. So that in him nature, habit, and reason must harmonize, for reason is powerful enough to overrule both nature and habit. We see, then, nature,

Two things then are necessary for the realization of a happy State—'absolute goods' and virtue. The first we must ask of Fortune: for the second the legislator is responsible. How then are men made virtuous? We return here to the question with which the Third Book closed. By

[1] This was a view inherited by Aristotle from previous inquirers, and especially from Protagoras (Fr. 8: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 1), and Plato (Phaedrus 269 D).

habit, and reason, acting in harmony.

that if a man is to be made virtuous and happy, he must not only be favoured both by fortune and by nature, but be educated both through habit and through his reason.

But is our education to be such as to produce men fitted only for ruling, or such as to produce men fitted first to be ruled and then to rule? We must aim at the latter result.

But is our education to be such as will produce men fitted only to rule, or is it to be such as will produce men fitted first to be ruled and then to rule? It is better that the same men should always rule, but then, if they are to do so justly and if their supremacy is to be willingly accepted and to last, they must be as different in body and soul from those they rule as we imagine gods or heroes to be from men, or as Scylax says that the kings in India are from their subjects. But such men are not forthcoming. Hence, we must fall back on an interchange of rule. The ruled must be quieted by a prospect of ruling some day. It has been already mentioned how this is to be arranged. The distinction of rulers and ruled must be based on age: the ruled must be younger than the rulers, and must be able to look forward to succeeding them. The education we give our citizens must, therefore, be adjusted to this arrangement; it must be suitable for men who are first to be ruled and afterwards to rule. Not indeed to be ruled otherwise than freemen should be ruled—that is, for their benefit—for if it is true that they may probably sometimes be called on to render service which may seem to be of a humble kind, such service will be redeemed and made worthy of freemen by the end for which it is rendered.

But since he who is first to be a good subject and then a good ruler must, as we have seen, be a good man, we must seek to produce good men.

'But since we affirm that the virtue of him who is at once citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same man ought to be ruled first and a ruler afterwards [so that all our citizens will be rulers sooner or later], the lawgiver's business is to inquire how they are to be made good men and by practising what pursuits, and what is the end of the best life'—that is, what kind of action is the end, that connected with which part of the soul, with work or with leisure, with things necessary and useful or with things noble? The lawgiver, in fact, must get a clear view of the true aim (σκοπός, 1333 b 3), to the attainment of which his legislation is to be directed (cp.

Plato, Laws 962 A sqq.). He must ask what is the life of the 'best man,' what is the 'end of the best life,' for this is precisely what the framers of the constitutions most in repute and many writers on the subject of constitutions since their time have omitted to do, resting content with something short of the best (1333 b 5 sqq.).

In order to answer this question, Aristotle recalls, first, his accustomed division of the soul, so far as it is the seat of virtues in respect of which a good man is so denominated[1]. One part of the soul possesses reason in itself, the other does not possess it in itself, but is capable of listening to reason: each has its own appropriate virtues. If we ask in which part the end is rather to be found, the answer is easy; it is to be found in the former. But this part, again, is divided into two—a part possessing practical, and a part possessing speculative reason; and these two parts must also be held to be of unequal worth, the latter having more to do with the end than the former; and the activities with which they are respectively concerned stand in the same relative order of desirability. Next, Aristotle recalls a division of 'life' (*βίος*)[2] into work (*ἀσχολία*) and leisure, war and peace[3], and of things done (*τὰ πρακτά*) into things necessary and useful and things noble (*καλά*). Here, again, war is not the end but peace, work not the end but leisure, things necessary and useful not the end but things noble. The legislator must legislate with a view to call forth the activities of all the parts of the soul, but especially those which have most of the nature of ends; he must encourage the life of work and that of war, but still more the life of peace and leisure: things necessary and useful need to be attended to, but things noble still more. Education must seek to produce all the virtues, to fit men both for active work and for leisure, and to bring within their reach all kinds of goods, but the higher virtues, the higher life, and the nobler goods are to be made

Our education must develope the whole man, physical, moral, and intellectual, but the development of the lower element in man is to be adjusted to the ultimate development of that which is highest in him—the virtues moral and intellectual, which are essential to a right use of leisure.

[1] The nutritive part of the soul is omitted for the reason for which it is dismissed in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 12—*ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν.*

[2] This is explained by *τοὺς βίους*, 1333 a 40.

[3] Cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 31.

its supreme end. It must be broad and must develope the whole man, but in its breadth it must not lose sight of the highest things.

It was because the State, which notwithstanding all its reverses was still held in most repute, followed an entirely different path, that Aristotle is careful to insist on this principle. The Lacedaemonian State had lived not for civilization, but for victory and empire, just as some modern communities live less for civilization than for wealth. It had sought happiness in empire, and empire in military virtue, and had found that it had missed even the path to empire. It had cultivated only one form of virtue, and that not only a low and utilitarian form, but one which, according to Aristotle, needs to be allied with the virtues which fit men to make a right use of leisure, if it is not to dissolve in time of peace. Leisure is the true end; but then the virtues necessary for a right use of leisure are not only those which find exercise in leisure, but also those which find exercise in active work. If necessaries are to be forthcoming—and without them leisure is impossible—the qualities which win them, courage, endurance, temperance, must be forthcoming. Leisure, says the proverb, is not for slaves, and without these virtues men are no better than slaves. Courage and endurance, then, are demanded for active work, but intellectual aptitude (*φιλοσοφία*) for leisure, and temperance and justice both for work and leisure; and the State that is to be happy must possess all these virtues[1]—the more so, as it is surrounded with the goods of fortune; for if

[1] If we bear in mind that the citizens of Aristotle's ideal State are to be *ἁπλῶς σπουδαῖοι*, and that the *σπουδαῖος* is one who unites in himself many different gifts and good qualities (3. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.), we shall see reason to conclude, that when he speaks of the State possessing all the virtues, he means each citizen to do so as far as possible. This account of the true aim of education is intended, of course, to correct the one-sidedness of the Lacedaemonian training, but it tells just as much against all systems which, like Stoicism and Puritanism, tend to develope something less than the whole man. The best test of civilization, however, is, in Aristotle's view, the degree in which the capability exists of making a right use of leisure, the 'leisure' of Aristotle being, it must be remembered, distinguished both from work and recreation (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 31: 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 33 sqq.).

there is any time when it is especially discreditable not to be able to make a fit use of the goods of fortune, it is during leisure: our State, therefore, must, unlike the Lacedaemonian, seek happiness in the development, not of one virtue, but of all. A habit of intellectual inquiry, if so we may translate *φιλοσοφία*, must be present in its citizens, if only to give them occupation in leisure and to save them from rusting at such times.

A remark of Lotze's quoted.

A remark of Lotze's may be quoted to illustrate the contrast between this conception of education and that of our own day. 'The difference between the principles of this ancient education and our modern principles of education is rightly found in this, that to it the development of the aptitude (Fertigkeit) and the possession of it counted for more than the work for which it was used and the fruitfulness of that work in result. Every individual was to be made a model example of his species: the species itself had nothing else to do but to exist (dazusein) and to enjoy the use of its powers. . . . To this many-sided development, finding an end in itself (in sich geschlossenen), the spirit of modern education is no doubt less kind; it sets a higher value than it justly should on range of concrete knowledge in comparison with a general aptitude for knowing—on productive specialized labour in comparison with the free exercise of all the powers—on professional effort working in a groove (die Enge des bestimmten Berufs-strebens) in comparison with an interest in human relations generally[1].' There is much truth in this; but it should be borne in mind that if Aristotle insists on this combination of qualities in his citizens, he does so not so much for its own sake as because in its absence the State will suffer. If they have the energy and endurance which are needed for active work without the intellectual interests and aptitudes which are the 'salt of society' in days of peace and leisure, or without the justice and temperance

[1] Mikrokosmos, 3. 254, ed. 2. The whole passage from which the extract translated in the text is taken well deserves perusal.

which are of use both at the one time and the other, the State will fail of happiness; and it will do so no less, if, while possessing high intellectual qualities, they are without the minor gifts which are called for in active work. We hardly, however, hold it necessary, as Aristotle seems to do, that each citizen should unite in himself all these qualities, and be 'totus teres atque rotundus' —that the wheel should 'come full-circle' in each individual. But to Aristotle the σπουδαῖος is essentially a many-sided being. Just as he had demanded a happy combination of qualities (εὐκρασία) in the raw material of which his citizens are to be made, so he demands it in the finished product [1].

How then are men such as we have described to be produced? We must follow the order of development—train the body first, then the appetites, then the reason: but the body must be trained as is best for

The question started at the commencement of c. 13 has now been answered. We know 'what should be the character of those who are to form the citizen-body of a happy and well-constituted State'; and all that remains is to discover how men of this type are to be produced. They are produced, as has been already said, by nature, habit, and reason. We have already sketched in outline, what nature must do for us, and the next question is, should education by habit precede or follow education by reason? The first process of human life, that of generation, is merely introductory to a further process, the development of mind and reason [2]. Both generation and education through habit must therefore be adjusted to the development of reason. We notice further that the body developes

[1] This many-sidedness and versatility was perhaps more often realized in antiquity than among ourselves. Roman generals of the best time were often lawyers, orators, and statesmen also: occasionally they were writers: sometimes they belonged to a philosophical school. On the other hand, poets seem to have been less often prose-writers also in antiquity than in modern times.

[2] Much light is thrown on the difficult passage 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 12–15 by de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 a 30, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον ἔκ τινος καὶ εἴς τι ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κινούσης καὶ ἐχούσης ἤδη τινὰ φύσιν ἐπί τινα μορφὴν ἢ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο τέλος. Cp. also de Anima 1. 3. 407 a 26, αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἔχουσί πως τέλος τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα: and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 18.

before the soul, and the irrational part of the soul before the rational part: spirit (*θυμός*), the power to will (*βούλησις*), and desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) exist in the infant as soon as it is born, but deliberation (*λογισμός*) and reason (*νοῦς*) are of later growth. Education must follow the order of development: we must train the body first; then the appetites (*ὀρέξεις*), that is, the irrational part of the soul; then the rational part. But our training of the body must be adjusted to the development of correct appetites, and our training of the appetites to the development of reason (1334 b 27: cp. 15 sq.).

the correct development of the appetites, and the appetites as is best for the development of reason.

To train the whole nature, but to train each part of it successively and in the order of its emergence, and to train each part with a view to the higher element which emerges next, and all with a view to the development of reason—this is the broad scheme of education which Aristotle lays down here. The lesson that in training the body our aims should be to develope the soul (that is, the likings and the reason), is still of value[1]; and so is the lesson that the education of boyhood should be addressed rather to the likings and character than to the reason. Aristotle seems to hold that what can reasonably be expected of a boy is that he shall love and admire what is good and feel a distaste for what is bad—that is, that he shall feel rightly about persons and things. He sees that right feeling is not permanently an adequate guide in life, but he holds it to be the beginning of goodness. It needs to become reasoned, but this further step

[1] The athletic training given to boys in many Greek States was unfavourable to physical growth and beauty of form, while the Lacedaemonian training, though not open to this objection, was so severe and laborious as to be brutalizing (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq.). Aristotle hopes to avoid both these errors. He forbids all laborious gymnastic exercise till three years after puberty (1339 a 4 sqq.). It is easy to imagine a sort of physical training which would not only form a bad preparation for the hardships of war, but would also enfeeble the character and give a wrong direction to the likings. Plato had already spoken to the same effect as to the true aim of *γυμναστική* (Rep. 410 B–D: 591 C–D). Greece turned a deaf ear to the teaching of Plato and Aristotle on this subject, and became eventually a land in which athletes were everywhere to be found and soldiers nowhere (Mommsen, Röm. Gesch. 5. 264–6, 324).

is only possible later on. Some germ of the deliberative faculty (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*) is to be found in boys (1. 13. 1260 a 13), but it is imperfect, and in education we should appeal to taste and feeling long before we appeal to reason. It is perhaps true, as has been said already, that Aristotle draws too sharp a contrast between boyhood and maturity; in this view, however, of the true aim of boyish education he is following Plato (Laws 653 A–C), who did not like the precocious boys and the juvenile old men of a democracy (Rep. 563 A).

The first step in education is the regulation of marriage. The rearing of infancy.

Quite in harmony with the principles just laid down, Aristotle's scheme of education begins with marriage. The regulation of marriage by the State is to him, as to Plato, the first step in education[1]. He pays close attention to the management of pregnancy, to the rearing of the child, and to the earliest years of life, for he holds with Plato[2] that these earliest years go far to fix the character of the human being. The food of the infant, the movements which it is to be encouraged to make, the importance, on grounds both of health and of future military efficiency, of gently and gradually habituating it from the very first to bear cold—these are matters which can be attended to even during the earliest period of life. During the ensuing period closing with the age of five, movement is to be still more encouraged, especially by means of games which must not be vulgar (*ἀνελευθέρους*), or too laborious, or on the other hand too slack and easy, and should be imitative of the pursuits of later life[3].

The management of children up to the age of five and from five to seven.

[1] Critias had already said (Fragm. 1 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 68)—*ἄρχομαι δέ τοι ἀπὸ γενετῆς ἀνθρώπου, πῶς ἂν βέλτιστος τὸ σῶμα γένοιτο καὶ ἰσχυρότατος, εἰ ὁ φυτεύων γυμνάζοιτο καὶ ἐσθίοι ἐρρωμένως καὶ ταλαιπωροίη τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τοῦ παιδίου τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ἰσχύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμνάζοιτο.* Critias would seem to have adopted the views which prevailed among the Lacedaemonians on this subject (see the references in Müller's note)—views which Aristotle apparently intends to combat in Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 5 sqq.

[2] Laws 765 E. They perhaps set down to faulty training in infancy much that was really due to heredity.

[3] Plato had anticipated Aristotle in this (Laws 643 B). The heroes of Homer are described by Athenaeus (Deipn. 10 a) as 'preparing themselves in their sports for serious work.'

The stories and talk[1] which children are to hear at this age are to be such as to lead their thoughts in the direction of the work of after-years: the *παιδονόμοι* of the State are charged to see to this. It is a mistake to try, as some would do, to keep young children from struggling and crying: these things give them strength and aid the growth of the body; they are to infants what physical exercises are to those of less tender years. In all this, bodily growth has been a prominent consideration, but it is not the only one to be kept in view. Children are to be trained at home till seven years of age, not in the public infant-schools of Plato's Laws; but Aristotle requires his Superintendents of the youth (*παιδονόμοι*) to see that they are as little as possible in the company of slaves[2]. He goes on to eliminate other corrupting influences to which Greek children were often exposed[3]; he banishes indecent language from his State, and especially from the presence of children[4]; he banishes also indecent pictures, statues, and tales, and forbids all below a certain age to witness 'iambi' or comedy. He seeks to make the young strangers to everything bad, and especially to everything that savours of vice or malice. He holds, with Plato (Rep. 378 E), that both in relation to men and things, we like that best with which we first come in contact (*πάντα στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον*)—our likes and dislikes are largely formed in infancy. The first five years of life are those in which not only the physical health and strength, but

[1] *Λόγων καὶ μύθων*, 1336 a 30. The latter word suggests a religious element in infant education, and perhaps a revision of the myths used, similar to that which Plato undertakes in Rep. 377 A sqq.

[2] Aristotle seems to imply (1336 a 41) that, when from seven onwards they come to be educated away from the home, they will run less risk of contact with slaves. Plato regards the slave *παιδαγωγός*, who accompanied the Greek youth out of doors, as a necessary appendage (Laws 808 D): it is possible that Aristotle intends, with Lycurgus (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 1), to prohibit *παιδαγωγοί*.

[3] Cp. Plato, Laws 729 B, a passage which is perhaps the source of the saying 'maxima debetur pueris reverentia.'

[4] This was a point on which Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, especially insisted. He said that children needed ear-protectors more than pugilists did (Plutarch, de Recta Ratione Audiendi, c. 2).

also the tastes and character are apt to be made or marred. At five a step in advance is taken, and from this age to seven boys are encouraged to be spectators of the training of the older boys, and to familiarise themselves with the look of the exercises which they will shortly have to practise themselves [1].

At seven direct instruction is to begin. Education from seven to puberty and from puberty to twenty-one.

The age of seven, we see, marked in Aristotle's educational scheme the point at which direct instruction should begin—a view expressed in poems commonly attributed to Hesiod, but one which was much disputed after Aristotle's day [2]—and many Greeks, remembering Solon's division of human life into periods of seven years [3], would expect to find him, in conformity with it, making the next educational period extend from seven to fourteen. Aristotle, however, prefers to follow 'the dividing-line which nature has drawn,' and to make, not any particular age, but the attainment of puberty [4], which was commonly reckoned to fall about the sixteenth year [5], the term of the next period, though the period after that is to close at twenty-one.

Commencement of the Fifth Book. Recurrence to the aporetic method. Three questions asked: 1. Should any systematic arrangements be adopted with respect to

Here at the threshold of the subject of education as distinguished from rearing (*τροφή*), Aristotle, conscious perhaps of its magnitude and of the need of starting from the level of popular impressions if he is to carry his readers with him, reverts to that full use of the aporetic method which marks the Third Book. He asks, first, whether any systematic arrangements are to be adopted respecting the education of the young: next, whether education should be managed by the State, or, as in most Greek States, left in private hands: lastly, what scheme of education should be adopted.

[1] Cp. Plato, Rep. 466 E sq.

[2] See Quinctilian. Inst. El. 1. 1, who mentions that Chrysippus would begin at three. The great Eratosthenes, however, agreed with Aristotle (Quinctil. ibid.).

[3] Solon, Fragm. 27.

[4] So the law of Gortyna distinguished between the *ἄνηβος* and the *ἡβίων*. 'The distinction between them seems to rest, not on any fixed limit of age, but on the physical development of the individual' (Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 60).

[5] C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 121: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 2, 22 sqq.

The first question is easily answered. The existing absence of system is injurious to the constitutions of Greek States, for it not only leaves them without the formed national character (ἦθος) which they need to support them, but precludes all chance of that improvement of the national character which is the beginning of constitutional improvement. Besides, some preparation is necessary for the practice of virtue, no less than for the exercise of an art. As to the second question, if the end of the State is one and the same for all its members, their education ought to be one and the same [1], and if so, both the management of this education and the pursuit of the studies it comprises should be 'public' (κοινήν); or, in other words, the management should be in the hands of the State, and the studies should be carried on, not privately and in independent groups, but in a public fashion and in common. Nor is it only because the studies will be the same that this should be so, but also because thus a public aim will be impressed on the education of the individual. The individual is a part of his State and belongs to his State, and this fact should be recognized in the organization of education [2].

the education of the young? 2. Should education be managed by the State? 3. What scheme of education should be adopted? The two former questions are answered in the affirmative: the discussion of the third extends over the whole of the Fifth Book and is not completed in it.

[1] Aristotle's language both in the Politics (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24) and in the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1180 a 28) seems to imply that, notwithstanding the general acceptance of three or four studies, the nature of the education which a boy received depended to a large extent on his father's caprice: one father might be all for utilitarianism in education, another might be more ambitious and send his son to some teacher of τὰ περιττά: one might count the development of the character a more important thing than that of the intellect, while another might take the opposite view. Aristotle's object is that those who are to work together as members of the same State should be educated in the same way and educated together. We are reminded of the aim of the framers of the Book of Common Prayer, who say — 'and whereas heretofore there hath been great diversity in saying and singing in Churches within this realm, some following Salisbury use, some Hereford use, and some the use of Bangor, some of York, some of Lincoln; now from henceforth all the whole realm shall have but one use.'

[2] This argument for placing education in the hands of the State is interesting and not without force, though perhaps education in a large school is sufficient to give a boy that sense of being part of a whole which Aristotle wishes to develope in him. The rejoinder, however, is possible that it would not accustom him to the feeling that he is part of *the State*.

Conflict of opinion as to the true aim of education and the subjects to be taught.

The third question is one which will occupy us longer[1]. 'There is no agreement as to the subjects to be taught: people are not agreed what studies are best either with a view to virtue or to the best life; and then there is a further question whether the aim should be the development of the character or the intellect[2]. A reference to the actually prevailing system of education is highly suggestive of doubts, and it is by no means clear whether things useful for everyday life should be taught, or that which makes for virtue, or more out-of-the-way things[3], for each of these courses has its advocates; and then again, there is no agreement as to what makes for virtue, since different persons understand virtue differently.'

This being the state of opinion, a good opportunity offered itself for a recourse to the aporetic method, and Aristotle's first step is to look about him for any firm bit of ground he can find. Everybody, he says, agrees that, of things useful for life, all such as are necessary must be taught, and also whatever does not produce *βαναυσία*, or, in other words, unfit the body or the mind for free pursuits. He adds, with an evident reference to the limitations which he intends to place on the study of music and gymnastic, that the risk of *βαναυσία* is not incurred only in the study of useful things: there are also liberal studies which may produce *βαναυσία*, if pursued in an over-exact way. It is

[1] It is one which it is the special function of *πολιτική* to settle. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 28, *τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, [ἡ πολιτικὴ] διατάσσει.*

[2] Aristotle has already settled that the ultimate aim in education is to be the development of the reason (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 15), but the point he wishes to bring out is the unsettled state of common opinion on the subject of education, and he does not pause to remember that he has already done something towards the solution of the problem.

[3] *Τὰ περιττά*, 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 42, which may include a variety of things from the 'marvels of musical execution' (*τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν*, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 11) to the *κομψά* referred to by Euripides (3. 4. 1277 a 19), among which philosophy was perhaps included. Socrates had imposed limits on the study of geometry (Xen. Mem. 4. 7. 2, *γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τούτου δεῖν μανθάνειν ἔφη, ἕως ἱκανός τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσειε, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι*).

the aim with which things are done, rather than the things themselves, that makes the difference. To do work not in itself liberal for one's own sake, or for the sake of friends, or with a view to virtue[1] brings no *βαναυσία* with it. We have got then as far as this, that whatever is necessary for life must be studied, and that we must steer clear of *βαναυσία*.

Things necessary for life must be taught, but not so as to produce *βαναυσία*.

At this point Aristotle recalls to remembrance the studies generally accepted in Greece in the hope of gaining some further guidance in the construction of a scheme of education. There are, he says, three or four of them—*γράμματα* (reading and writing—Plato, Laws 810 B), *γυμναστική*, *μουσική*: to these some would add drawing[2]. The study of the first and last of these may easily be defended on the ground of usefulness: reading, writing, and drawing are useful for many purposes; *γυμναστική*, again, helps to make men brave.

Four subjects commonly accepted—*γράμματα*, *γυμναστική*, *μουσική*, *γραφική*.

But what are we to say of *μουσική*? Nowadays most who study it do so for pleasure, but the aim of those who originally made it a part of education was to satisfy the striving of nature to find a means of spending leisure-time nobly[3]. And in this they were right, for if men should know both how to work and how to enjoy leisure aright, and leisure is closely connected with the end of life, while work is only a means to the end—so that leisure is more desirable than work—and if again it is easy to

Aristotle learns from an inquiry why *μουσική* was made a part of education by the ancients, that it is legitimate to employ

[1] Δι' *ἀρετήν*, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19: cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10, *ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ* (i.e. *ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ*) *ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.*

[2] The Athenian Stranger in the Laws is indifferent to the study of drawing (769 B).

[3] Ephorus had said in the introduction to his history, that *μουσική* had been introduced *ἐπ' ἀπάτῃ καὶ γοητείᾳ* (Fragm. 1: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 234). Aristotle tacitly controverts this view here, just as he tacitly controverts later on (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 13) a view current among the Lacedaemonians as to the best way of developing courage which Ephorus had commended (cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480, *πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δειλίαν ἀλλ' ἀνδρείαν κρατεῖν ἐκ παίδων ὅπλοις καὶ πόνοις συντρέφειν*). That the motive with which the authors of the current scheme of Greek education had included *μουσική* in it was much discussed, we see from Athen. Deipn. 14. 626 f sqq.: Plutarch de Musica, c. 26: Polyb. 4. 20 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 410 B sqq.

studies in education which are not strictly necessary, but conduce to a right use of leisure.

spend leisure-time in the wrong pleasures, then it is evident that education tending to a right use of leisure is even more requisite than education preparatory to work, and that education of the former kind is an end in itself, while education of the latter kind is merely necessary and a means to something further. We have, then, the authority of these ancient and venerated sages for the conclusion that it is legitimate to go beyond the limit of mere necessity in the choice of subjects of education. One, at all events, of the recognized subjects was introduced, not because it was necessary or useful [1], but because it was liberal and noble (*ἐλευθερία καὶ καλή*)[2]. We shall see later on, Aristotle adds, whether there are others on the same footing, and what they are, and how they are to be studied. He points out, however, at once, that even the more strictly useful studies, such as reading, writing, and drawing, deserve to be pursued on other grounds than those of mere utility.

Γυμναστική, however, must come first, for training must begin with the body: hence the boys of seven must be handed

The subject of *γυμναστική* naturally comes up next, and now Aristotle reverts to the boys of seven, the settlement of whose fate has been thrust aside pending the new inquiry. 'As the education of habit must precede that of reason, and the education of the body that of the mind, they must be handed over to *γυμναστική* and the sister art *παιδοτριβική*—to the former, in order that a certain habit of body may be developed in them; to the latter, in order that

[1] Democritus (Philodem. de Musica, 4. col. 36 : Kemke, p. 108) had insisted that music did not owe its origin to necessity, but came in as a superfluity (*ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος*, cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27 sqq.), and argued from this that it was of recent origin, things necessary being discovered first. The Cynics rejected the study of music as not only unnecessary but useless (Diog. Laert. 6. 73 : 6. 104) : good musicians, they said, often had souls out of tune (Diog. Laert. 6. 27). Aristotle agrees that it is not necessary, but holds that it is useful (5 (8). 5. 1339b 30).

[2] It is easy to see how a reader, starting from the average level of Greek prejudice, would find himself gradually led on by this inquiry to more enlightened views of education, and how much of the traditional skill of a Socratic dialogue, though not its grace, has passed into Aristotle's handling of aporetic discussion. Antipater praised him for his persuasiveness (Plutarch, Alcib. et Coriol. compar. c. 3, *πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ τὸ πείθειν εἶχεν*). To a Greek the appeal to *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* would be as convincing as it is the reverse to ourselves.

they may learn the needful physical exercises and accomplishments.'

over first to *γυμναστική* and *παιδοτριβική*. Γυμναστική, however, must be reformed.

Aristotle would, however, reform *γυμναστική*. Some, he says, of the States which paid most attention to the education of the young gave them a physical training fit rather for professional athletes than for future citizens, fatal to beauty of form[1] and physical growth—fatal also, if we look back to another passage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 5 sqq.), to fitness for political activity and to health and vigour[2]. The Lacedaemonians also erred, though in a different way: their system produced, not gluttonous, sleepy athletes, but fierce, wild, wolf-like men, for courage, they held, went with this temper, which Aristotle denies[3]: the bravest men are not, he says, fierce but gentle; true courage, we learn in the Nicomachean Ethics (3. 11), goes with that love of *τὸ καλόν*, which marks the best type of manhood. Thus, even if the production of this one virtue, courage, were fit to be made the sole or chief end of *γυμναστική*, the Lacedaemonian State did not practise *γυμναστική* in the right way to produce it. In fact, by giving its sons an excessive gymnastic training and adding no sufficient instruction in necessary attainments, this State did that which it least wished to do—it made them *βάναυσοι*[4], for

[1] De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29–33.

[2] Euripides had said the same thing in the well-known fragment of his Autolycus (Fr. 284 Nauck), and Plato (Rep. 404 A): Epaminondas also (Plutarch, Reg. et Imperat. Apophth. p. 192 C–D, *τῶν δὲ ὁπλιτῶν δεῖν ἀπέφαινεν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα γεγυμνασμένον οὐκ ἀθλητικῶς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατιωτικῶς· διὸ καὶ τοῖς πολυσάρκοις ἐπολέμει*). Philip of Macedon is reported to have compared the speeches of Demosthenes to soldiers and those of Isocrates to athletes ([Plutarch], Decem Oratorum Vitae, p. 845 D: see A. Schäfer's note, Demosthenes 1. 293, and Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, art. Cleochares). Thebes was as famous for its devotion to *γυμναστική* as Athens was the reverse (Diod. 17. 11. 4: Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 15), and it is perhaps to it that Aristotle here refers. The Thebans, however, were splendid soldiers, as may be seen from Diodorus' striking narrative of their ill-advised and fatal, but noble resistance to Alexander (Diod. 17. cc. 9–14).

[3] Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 b 24, where the courage of a wounded animal is distinguished from true courage, and Plato, Rep. 430 B.

[4] Cp. [Plato], Erastae, 136 A–B. There was a proverb, *ἐλευθεριώτερος Σπάρτης* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi Graeci, 1. 246: 2. 393).

it fitted them for the discharge of only one political function, and for that less well than other States, if we may judge by the defeats which the Lacedaemonians have suffered in the field, since they have had to contend with antagonists equally devoted to gymnastic training.

Thus Aristotle accepts *γυμναστική* on condition of being allowed to reform it. It must learn to take a truer view of its social function; it must increase men's physical strength without unfitting them for the public labours of a citizen or injuring the health; it must be so regulated as to be productive, not of mere fierceness, but of true courage, and not of courage only, for it must lay the foundation of a generalized excellence culminating in reason.

With this aim Aristotle refuses to impose on boys who have not yet arrived at puberty any but light and easy forms of physical training[1], and postpones apparently all other studies till after this epoch, at which *γυμναστική* is to be abandoned for three years, and the studies of reading and writing, drawing and music to be begun[2]. These studies are to be dropped in their turn at the expiration of the three years' term, and now for the first time *γυμναστική* is to be studied in its sterner form with its accompaniments of severe labour and a special diet. As

[1] Contrast the view of Plato, Rep. 536 E: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε.* Aristotle says on the contrary (5. (8). 4. 1338 b 40)—*μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφώτερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.*

[2] Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4, *ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται.* It is not distinctly said in this passage that other studies than that of gymnastic are to be delayed till puberty, but we learn in 1338 b 40 that boys are to be trained in gymnastic in the period preceding puberty, and Aristotle's principle is that the simultaneous exaction of mental and bodily labour is a mistake (1339 a 7 sqq.). Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 737. 4) thinks that philosophical (wissenschaftlich) teaching is included among the studies referred to in 1339 a 5, but perhaps we can hardly infer so much from the use of the word *διάνοια* in 1339 a 7, and Aristotle's principle seems rather to be to postpone the education of the reason, and to devote the years of youth to physical training and the training of the *ὀρέξεις*, though, no doubt, the *ὀρέξεις* are to be trained with a view to the ultimate development of reason.

before, so now, it is to be studied by itself, for the simultaneous exaction of mental and physical effort must be studiously avoided (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.)[1].

We note in Aristotle's reform of *γυμναστική* the same aim as we shall trace in his reform of the musical education of the citizen. Neither *γυμναστική* nor *μουσική* should be cultivated with a view to the attainment of technical skill or an one-sided excellence; the aim should rather be to lay the foundations of the broad excellence of the *σπουδαῖος*, a many-sided and evenly developed being, healthy and undistorted in body and mind.

Aristotle passes on to Music (*μουσική*). What is its exact value, and why should we concern ourselves with it?

At this point Aristotle recurs to the subject of music, with respect to which all that he has discovered is that those who first made a place for it in education did so to supply the evident need of mankind to possess a means of using leisure nobly (1337 b 29 sqq.). He will now push his inquiries about it a little farther, and the first question that arises is, what is its exact function or value, and with what view should we concern ourselves with it? It naturally occurs to us that he has already answered this question, and that it is with a view to occupation in leisure that music should be studied; but in fact all that he has said is that this was the aim of those who first introduced its study; we shall find as we go on that this is far from being the only purpose answered by music.

Is it, he asks, to be studied as a source of relaxation and recreation? Is it, like sleep or the convivial use of wine (*μέθη*), a thing not in itself connected with virtue[2] (*τῶν σπουδαίων*), but pleasant and a balm for care? Or

[1] Cp. Plato, Rep. 537 B. Yet a different view seems to be ascribed to Plato by Plutarch (de Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta, c. 25)—*ὀρθῶς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων παρήνεσε, Μήτε σῶμα κινεῖν ἄνευ ψυχῆς μήτε ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος, ἀλλ' οἷόν τινα συνωρίδος ἰσορροπίαν διαφυλάττειν.*

[2] *Σπουδαῖα* are connected with *ἐπαινετά* in Eth. Nic. 7.2. 1145 b 8: Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a 40: cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 7, *ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη.* The tests of *τὸ σπουδαῖον*, however, appear best from Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 a 31 sqq.: 10. 6. 1177 a 3. In Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14 the word is used in a broader and less technical sense.

does it act on the character, and contribute to virtue by creating through habituation the power of finding pleasure in the things in which we ought to find pleasure? Or is it good for the rational use of leisure and for intellectual aptitude (*διαγωγὴν καὶ φρόνησιν*)?

Its use in education can hardly be justified on the first and third grounds, for learning music is not recreation to boys, and the rational use of leisure is not for them. But it may be said that they learn in youth, in order to provide a recreation for themselves in manhood. But then why should they learn to sing and play themselves, for there is more recreation to be gained from following the king of Persia's example, and listening to first-rate professional players, than from playing and singing oneself, necessarily in a less excellent manner? If we can only get recreation from music by learning to play and sing in youth, must we not learn to cook in youth, in order to enjoy cookery in after-years? The same difficulty arises, if we take the view that music improves the character and tends to virtue, for the Lacedaemonians claim to be able to distinguish noble music from music of an opposite kind without having learned to sing or play in youth. And so again, if we account music a liberal occupation for leisure, we fail to discover why boys should be taught to sing or play, for Zeus, we know, finds employment in leisure in *listening to* music; he is never made by the poets to sing or play himself[1]. In fact, we call men who sing and play *βάναυσοι*, and hold that the performance of music is unworthy of a man, unless he is in his cups or in sport.

Later on, we shall find that Aristotle sees a way of escape from these perplexities, and is able to clear away the doubts which he has started with regard to the Greek custom of learning in youth to sing and to play on some musical instrument[2]. Boys, he will discover, are to learn

[1] An early poet, however, seems to have represented him as dancing: cp. Athen. Deipn. 22 C, *Εὔμηλος δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος ἢ Ἀρκτῖνος τὸν Δία ὀρχούμενόν που παράγει, λέγων μέσσοισιν δ' ὠρχεῖτο πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.*

[2] It was not universal. As we see, the Spartans did not commonly learn in youth to sing or play.

singing and playing, not in order to sing and play when they are men, but in order that, as boys, they may experience the full educating power of music—which cannot be experienced without practice in youth (1340 b 23), let the Lacedaemonians say what they may—and as men, may get all the good from music that it is capable of giving, by using it not only for recreation, but also for the purgation of the emotions (*κάθαρσις*) and for the employment of leisure (*διαγωγή*).

But, for all that appears at present, Aristotle's discussion of the question whether boys should be taught to sing and play has led only to the negative conclusion, that whatever the function of music may be, the practice seems hard of defence; and he drops the subject—he had slipped, indeed, into a discussion of it unawares—foreseeing that he will be in a better position to deal with it, when he has considered another question, started at the beginning of the fifth chapter (1339 a 14), what the function of music exactly is, and whether it is a means of education or recreation, or an intellectual occupation for leisure (*διαγωγή*).

It is pleasant and a source of refreshment and recreation:

There are plausible grounds, he says, for assigning to it all three functions. It is pleasure-giving, and therefore suitable both for recreation and for the rational use of leisure, for such an use of leisure should have in it something of pleasure, if

The sons of kings were taught riding and the art of war (3. 4. 1277 a 18), and in this spirit Themistocles prided himself on his ignorance of the lyre (Plutarch, Themist. c. 2: Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4), and had his son Cleophantus made a 'famous horseman' (Plato, Meno 93 D). Pericles, on the contrary, learnt music of Damon (Plutarch, Pericl. c. 4). The Arcadians, as Polybius tells us in an interesting passage of his history (4. 20 sqq.), almost universally learnt to sing, which probably implies that they learnt also to play. The Thebans generally were devoted to the *αὐλός* (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 19), but Epaminondas used the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). The Cynics discountenanced all the generally accepted studies: cp. Diog. Laert. 6. 103–4, *παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα· γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μανθάνειν ἔφασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης τοὺς σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφοιντο τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις· περιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . Πρὸς τὸν ἐπιδεικνύντα αὐτῷ μουσικὴν ἔφη (ὁ Διογένης),*

γνώμαις γὰρ ἀνδρῶν εὖ μὲν οἰκοῦνται πόλεις,
εὖ δ' οἶκος, οὐ ψαλμοῖσι καὶ τερετίσμασιν.

Aristotle also wishes to develope *γνώμη*, but he holds that in youth this is best accomplished indirectly through a training in *μουσική*.

it is both noble and pleasant, hence suitable for a rational use of leisure. It would be well, therefore, to teach the young music, if only for the sake of its future use in recreation and leisure.

also something of nobility. So that one might find in its pleasurableness alone without going any further, a reason for teaching music to the young. For it is one of those harmlessly pleasurable things which not only contribute to the end of life (*εὐδαιμονία*), but also afford recreation after labour. And as men take recreation often, but are rarely in fruition of the end, there is utility in having the pleasures of music at our command for recreation. Indeed, men often make recreation the end of life, for the end has a kind of pleasure connected with it and so has recreation, and men in their quest of the pleasure of the end mistake the pleasure of recreation for it: there is, in fact, really a resemblance between the pleasure of recreation and the end, for both are desirable for nothing subsequent and beyond them; the pleasures of recreation are desirable by reason of past toil[1]. Music then may be resorted to as affording the pleasures of recreation, and also for its utility as a means of refreshment after toil, but may it not be merely an accident of music to be serviceable in these ways? May not its essential nature be something higher[2], and ought we not to look for something more from it than that widely shared kind of pleasure, of which human beings of all ages and characters are susceptible? Is it not capable of acting on the character (*ἦθος*) and the soul? This would clearly be the case, if under its influence we assume this or that variety of character. That we do so, may be proved by pointing to the effect of the melodies of Olympus, the (perhaps mythical) Phrygian musician, in producing enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιασμός*), or even to the effect of mere imitative sounds without tune or rhythm[3]. That music

Its use, however, as a source of pleasure and recreation is, perhaps, subordinate and accidental: its essential value lies rather in its power to influence the character.

[1] See Sus.[2], Note 1038, who notices that in Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 27 sqq., as Döring had remarked, a somewhat different view is expressed, and offers a reconciliation of the two passages.

[2] Just as in the Nicomachean Ethics the true nature of Friendship is found neither in its pleasurableness nor in its utility, but in the fact that it stands in a close relation to virtue, so here the same thing is shown to be true of Music.

[3] 'Ut si quis voce etiam sine cantu et rythmis iratum, exempli gratia, aut miserescentem imitetur, audientes solent eisdem affectibus commoveri' (Sepulveda, p. 253).

possesses the accidental quality of being pleasurable, is an additional argument in favour of its use in education, for virtue has to do with taking pleasure in the right things, and hence the very thing the youthful mind needs to be taught and habituated to do is to distinguish, and take pleasure in, noble characters and action[1]. Now music brings before us in its melodies and rhythms more vividly than anything else can, images (*ὁμοιώματα*) of anger and gentleness, of courage and temperance and their opposites, and of every ethical state. To learn to feel pain and pleasure in reference to the musical image is to learn to feel in the same way about the original of which it is a reproduction. In things which appeal to other senses than the ear ethical suggestion is either entirely absent, as in the case of things we touch or taste[2], or it is not largely present, as in the case of objects of sight—I say not largely (Aristotle continues), for figures and colours are suggestive in this way, but not to any great extent, and all men possess a perception of their significance, whatever their age or worth or character[3]. They are also rather indications than images of ethical states, and indeed they are not so much indications of ethical states (*τῶν ἠθῶν*) or of anything connected with the soul, as indications given by the bodily frame under the influence of emotion (*ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*)[4]. Still we need not deny statues and pictures all ethical influence[5],

[1] Plato had said the same thing, as Aristotle remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics (2. 2. 1104 b 11 sq.). Ramsauer refers to Laws 653 A: Rep. 401, adding—'nec tamen ideo negandum brevius eiusdem dictum fortasse e scholis eius inter discipulos notum fuisse.'

[2] This solves the difficulty raised in 1339 a 39, why cookery has not just as good a claim to be studied in youth as music.

[3] It is implied that a perception shared by slaves and children and worthless men cannot be one of a very elevated character (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 2 sqq. : c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.).

[4] This would seem to be the meaning of 1340 a 34, *καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ* (or *ἀπὸ*) *τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*, but these words have been interpreted in many different ways.

[5] Plato probably agreed with Aristotle in 'estimating the practical influence of sculptors and architects upon the national character as less important than that of poets and musicians' (Mr. R. L. Nettleship, Hellenica, p. 117). He had, however, in the Republic (400 D–401 D) found images (*μιμήματα*) of ethical characteristics, not only in music, but in the products of painting, weaving, building, and other arts. Aristotle

and so far as they possess any, it will be well for the young to be brought into contact rather with the works of artists who express moral character in their productions, such as Polygnotus, than with those of Pauson. But melodies need no help from anything else to reproduce, not merely to indicate, varieties of character, and this is clear from the impression they make on us, for melodies are connected with harmonies, and one harmony makes us feel quite differently from another: the mixo-Lydian harmony winds us up to a high-strung mood of lamentation, the more relaxed ones let us down to an easier state of mind, while the Doric harmony stands midway between these two extremes, and the Phrygian produces strong excitation of feeling. So too as to rhythms: some are quiet, others are suggestive of movement, and of the latter some are suggestive of vulgar, others of more noble movement. If music has this power, it must be used in the education of youth. It is indeed especially suitable for youth, for at that age we take willingly to nothing that has not sweetness. The soul seems also to have some kinship with harmonies and rhythms: many wise men call the soul a harmony, and others say that it possesses harmony.

As to learning to sing and play, it is not easy to become a good judge of music without having done so,

But should music be learnt by learning oneself to play and sing? It is not easy, whatever the Lacedaemonians may say (1339 b 2), to become a good judge of music[1] in any other way. The study of music will not make men *βάναυσοι*—on the contrary, it will be an aid to virtue—if they practise it only up to a certain point and up to a certain age, and use the right kind of instruments.

perhaps intends tacitly to correct this view in the passage analysed in the text. He seems to us hardly to do full justice to the capabilities of formative art, or indeed of stage-acting, to say nothing of gestures, looks, and the like, in respect of ethical influence. L. Schmidt holds (Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. 207), that the Greek mind and heart received its strongest impressions through the eye, and perhaps he is right in this, but ethical influence, in Aristotle's view, finds its way rather through the channel of the ear.

[1] Aristotle means by a good judge of music a man who adds to technical knowledge, or at all events the knowledge of the *πεπαιδευμένος*, a capability of recognizing ennobling music and of distinguishing it from music of an opposite kind.

Anything like a professional study of music (τεχνικὴ παιδεία) must be avoided by those who are to become fit soldiers and citizens of the best State. They must carry the practice of music far enough to get above the level of that undeveloped musical taste which is common to all men and even to some of the lower animals[1]; far enough to learn to take pleasure in noble—by which Aristotle means ennobling—music, but yet not to the point attained in professional competitions or to that of attempting the mechanical achievements, the fashion of which has passed from those competitions to education[2]. We can have nothing to do with any form of musical study that will interfere with the military and political activity which is to come later in the lives of our citizens, or that will make the physique unfit for such work. As to the instruments to be used, pipes (αὐλοί) and all instruments suitable to professional *virtuosi*, such as the cithara, are to be prohibited. The αὐλός is not an ethical agent for the development of the character, but orgiastic for the excitation and purgation of emotion; it excludes the use of the voice[3], and thus involves the loss of an element of education.

but the practice of music and singing must be confined to the years of youth, and must not be carried beyond a certain point: the instruments used must also be the right ones.

[1] Stags, mares, dolphins (Plutarch, Symposiaca, 7. 5. 2. 704 F). When Aristotle is said in this passage of Plutarch to have regarded the pleasures of sight and hearing as peculiar to man (*δοκεῖ δέ μοι μηδὲ Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίᾳ δικαίᾳ τὰς περὶ θέαν καὶ ἀκρόασιν εὐπαθείας ἀπολύειν ἀκρασίας, ὡς μόνας ἀνθρωπικὰς οὔσας· ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις καὶ τὰ θηρία φύσιν ἔχοντα χρῆσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν*), we must suppose that, if his opinion is correctly stated, he is speaking of their higher forms.

[2] This resembles the view expressed by one of the interlocutors in the Erastae ascribed to Plato (135 C–136 B). Here also we find how much reluctance there was to connect liberal education with anything approaching χειρουργία (135 B). The Cynic Diogenes had spoken of the contests at the festivals of Dionysus as *μεγάλα θαύματα μωροῖς* (Diog. Laert. 6. 24).

[3] This was one of Alcibiades' objections to the use of the αὐλός; he objected to it also on account of its distortion of the face and its consequent unsuitableness for a man of breeding. Cp. Plut. Alcib. c. 2, *ἔτι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύραν τῷ χρωμένῳ συμφθέγγεσθαι καὶ συνᾴδειν, τὸν δ' αὐλὸν ἐπιστομίζειν καὶ ἀποφράττειν ἕκαστον τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἀφαιρούμενον. "Αὐλείτωσαν οὖν," ἔφη, "Θηβαίων παῖδες, οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι· ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὡς οἱ πατέρες λέγουσιν, ἀρχηγέτις Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ πατρῷος Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἔρριψε τὸν αὐλόν, ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐλητὴν ἐξέδειρε.*" Aristotle hints that the objection of Athene to the αὐλός was based

We have not yet, however, said (Aristotle continues, c. 7. 1341 b 19) whether all harmonies and rhythms should be used with a view to education or only some of them, nor whether the answer we give to this question will hold also for those who are learning to sing and play with an educational object, or, on the other hand, whether in their case the further question will not have to be considered, what is the relative educational value of rhythm and of melody, and whether music good in rhythm or good in melody should be preferred[1]. Those who desire a full treatment of these questions must be referred to the works of those musicians and philosophical inquirers on the subject of musical education who have dealt with them: we can only treat of them in outline.

The melodies (*μέλη*) used in education must also be correctly chosen. Melodies are ethical, connected with action, or enthusiastic, each sort having an appropriate harmony of its own. With a view to education those harmonies which are most ethical are to be preferred,

Philosophers have divided melodies into three classes—ethical melodies (*ἠθικά*), those connected with action (*πρακτικά*), and those which stir enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιαστικά*)—and have allotted a particular kind of harmony to each; and we have recognized that music should be used for many purposes—for education, for the purging of the emotions (*κάθαρσις*), for the intellectual use of leisure (*διαγωγή*), and for recreation. We shall accordingly find an use for all three kinds of harmonies, but we shall use with a view to education only those which are most ethical, and reserve the two other kinds for occasions when we listen to the performances of others, instead of playing ourselves. For though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-fraught spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it[2]. The melodies also which

on graver grounds than its incidental distortion of a handsome face (1341 b 4 sqq.).

[1] It would seem, in fact, from the close of c. 7 (1342 b 29 sqq.), that boys learning to sing and play should practise harmonies like the Lydian, which are at once suitable to their tender age and valuable for their educational effect, so that the educational value of a harmony is not the only thing to be considered in the choice of music to be practised by those learning to sing and play.

[2] Contrast Plato's view of the effect of poetry which calls forth

purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure. Melodies and harmonies of this nature may therefore be allowed to professional show-performers. Nay more, we must make provision for the inferior type of auditor which cannot fail to be found in a State in which artisans and day-labourers will have to exist; we must not leave these classes without musical entertainments and competitions suitable for their moments of recreation. For audiences of this kind the use of an inferior kind of music is allowable, but only for them. With a view to education the Doric harmony is to be used, and any other which those who have studied both philosophy and music may recommend. The Doric harmony is at once the quietest and the most expressive of manliness; it is also a mean between extremes, neither too high-strung in feeling nor too relaxed. The Phrygian harmony, which had met with approval from Plato in the Republic, is held by Aristotle to be unfit for use in education, as being nearly akin to the *αὐλός* and the dithyramb, and expressive of Bacchic excitement.

such as the Doric, though for the other purposes for which Music is useful—the purging of the emotions, the intellectual use of leisure, and recreation—the other kinds of harmony may be used.

A few other remarks follow, and then the Fifth Book breaks off without entering on the subject of rhythms, which had been announced for treatment.

The whole discussion shows how powerful was the influence of music on the Greek mind, and how closely its influence had been studied; 'ethical' melodies had been parted off from those which stimulated to action[1] and from those again which at once excited and purged

On Aristotle's view of Music and its uses.

strong emotion (Rep. 605 C sqq.). He regards it as simply weakening to the character, whereas Aristotle sees that both it (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27) and music of a similar kind have their use. On the other hand, in Laws 790 C–791 B, Plato goes far to anticipate the view of Aristotle, though it is rather to physical movement, or physical movement accompanied by music, than to music alone, that he appears to ascribe the soothing and calming influences of which he speaks. If we may trust Aristoxenus, the notion of *κάθαρσις* by music originated with the Pythagoreans (Aristox. Fr. 24: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 280, *οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, ὡς ἔφη Ἀριστόξενος, καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς*).

[1] Oarsmen, reapers, and vine-dressers (Philodem. de Musica, 4. 8. 6 sqq.) found encouragement, when at work, in music, no doubt of this kind.

emotion, with a distinctness quite unfamiliar to ourselves. 'We only want a closer analysis to detect the same qualities in our own composers. Much of the best music we now hear is unduly exciting; it feeds vain longings, indefinite desires, sensuous regrets[1].' Aristotle, we see, is careful to keep the minds of the young out of the way of exciting or enervating music, and to use in their education quiet airs expressive of manly feeling. Not all the tunes, perhaps not all the hymn-tunes we use in the education of the young, would be approved by him.

He differs from Plato in recognizing a variety of legitimate uses for music. Plato had tolerated it in the Republic only so far as it contributes to virtue. Aristotle tries to see it in its whole relation to human life. It is a source of harmless pleasure and has legitimate claims to recognition on this ground[2]. It is 'sweet after toil'—a pleasurable and restful recreation for the wearied. It is, like tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27), a means of freeing the 'o'erfraught heart' from an excessive accumulation of emotion. In it, again, we have a means of making an intellectual use of leisure. It is, lastly, of use in forming the character. It brings before us, more vividly than the 'hints' (*σημεῖα*) of painting and sculpture, 'images' (*ὁμοιώματα*) of character and action, and if care is taken in the early years of life that the character and action reproduced in the music practised are good, it habituates the mind to the love of that which is good and noble and to a distaste for that which is not so. In order fully to understand the importance of the part assigned by Aristotle to music in the development of the *σπουδαῖος*, we must bear in mind that to him, unlike some modern moralists, a man is not really virtuous unless he finds pleasure in the exercise of virtue. It is precisely this identification of the good and the pleasurable that music is the earliest means of producing.

[1] See Mr. Mahaffy, Old Greek Education, p. 73.

[2] He had said the same thing of the institution of several property (2. 5. 1263 a 40 sqq.).

For each of these purposes Music has appropriate melodies, harmonies, and instruments. For education we must use only the most 'ethical' melodies, the Dorian harmony[1], and the lyre. But it does not follow that we must with Plato expel from the State all melodies, harmonies, and instruments, that are not fit for educational use. Aristotle goes so far as to allow, even in his best State, of the use, in public entertainments and competitions, of music suitable to the taste of auditors of an inferior type, feeling quite secure that his citizens will not be corrupted by it, for they will find it repulsive and not attractive to their well-trained taste. The music that will please them will be ennobling music; they will not need to be guarded as if they were children from every possibility of harm (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 21–23). Aristotle desires to give music, as he also desires to give tragedy and even comedy, its full natural verge and scope. He is more careful than Plato had been not to impoverish the life of his State, or to curtail its opportunities of making a rational use of leisure; he wishes its enjoyment of the goods of civilized existence to be full and complete.

On Aristotle's scheme of education.

Aristotle's scheme of education, in the form in which it has come down to us, closes abruptly without even completing the subject of music, for as to the rhythms which are to be used and as to the relative educational value of rhythm and tune we are left altogether in the dark, though we look for some treatment of both these subjects (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 24 sqq.). We hear nothing with regard to the use of poetry or dancing in education—subjects which Plato had considered at length—nor is anything said with regard to the use of prose-recitation, which Plato had recommended in the Laws. When the subject of Poetry comes to be treated in the Poetics, we find it treated not from a social or educational, but from a

[1] This rule appears to be so far modified in c. 7. 1342 b 29 sqq., that the Lydian harmony is recommended in the case of boys learning to sing and play.

literary point of view. Above all, the inquiry breaks off before the culminating epoch of education is reached—that in which the reason is developed, not indirectly through the likings, but directly. Our latest glimpse of the youthful object of Aristotle's care is obtained at the moment when at the age of 19 or thereabouts he is committed for the first time to the tender mercies of the sterner form of γυμναστική, and left, we do not exactly know for what period, but probably till the age of 21, in the hands of the gymnastic trainer. We cannot tell whether Aristotle was about to follow the example of Plato[1] and to crown his scheme of early education with a long course of philosophical study, but some direct training of the reason was probably intended to begin at 21[2].

The main novelty in Aristotle's treatment of the subject of education, if we compare it with Plato's, seems to be his fuller and more reasoned adoption of the principle that its successive stages are to be adjusted to those of the physical and psychological development of the individual[3]—that the body, the appetites, and the reason are to be successively taken in hand as they successively develope, but that the training of the body should be such as to develope healthy appetites, and the training of the appetites such as to develope the reason. His scheme consequently differs from those of Plato[4] in making gymnastic training of the right kind the main business of the earlier years of life, in

[1] Rep. 537 sqq.

[2] As Aristotle does not, like Plato, find the root of right conduct in speculative insight, but distinguishes the sources of φρόνησις and σοφία, it would have been interesting to know by what training of the reason he proposed to develope φρόνησις. Perhaps, if we were in possession of his views on this subject, we might find that in relation to it, no less than in his treatment of practical philosophy generally, he would adhere less closely than we might expect to the principle laid down in the Nicomachean Ethics.

[3] Plato had already said (Laws 653) that the tastes and disposition of boys must be trained before their reason is trained.

[4] See Sus.[2], Note 970, for a sketch of the schemes of education set forth by Plato in the Republic and Laws. Plato's scheme of education in the Republic is, it should be observed, intended for φύλακες and ἄρχοντες—Aristotle's for citizens generally.

beginning other training later—at puberty instead of the age of 10, as in the State of the Laws (809 E)—and in devoting only three years instead of six or more to 'studies other than that of gymnastics' (*τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι*, 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.).

They both, however, agree in the important view that school is a place for forming the tastes and giving a right direction to the appetites and likings, for inspiring a love of all that is noble and a distaste for that which is the reverse, rather than for pouring in knowledge or directly developing the reason, though Plato finds room before the age of 18 (which Aristotle cannot positively be said to do) for the beginnings of mathematical education. Hence it is that gymnastic and music are accepted by them as the main means of education in youth. Looking forward as they both perhaps did to a long course of education carried on till middle life[1], they did not need to make youth a time for the rapid acquisition of a mass of positive knowledge. They held that the main business of school-education is the formation of the tastes and character, and that the studies which are in place at school are studies adapted to this end[2]. Music was pre-eminently such a study[3]. The Greek youth was evidently unused to

[1] This cannot be proved as to Aristotle, but it is very probable. If we feel instinctively inclined to reject the idea of an education such as that designed by Plato, which did not close, at any rate for the *élite*, till 35, we must bear in mind that the ancients not unfrequently became the pupils of instructors in rhetoric and philosophy at a ripe age, that Plato and Aristotle held years and experience to be needed for the study of some of the sciences, and that oral instruction came more naturally to many Greeks than the reading of books, all the more so that it was usually conjoined with conversational discussion.

[2] Plato speaks in one passage (Rep. 498 B) as if the main thing in the case of boys were to secure a sound and healthy body—*μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μειρακιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν* [*δεῖ*] *μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελείσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους· προιούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἡ ψυχὴ τελεοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια.* Plutarch, unlike Aristotle, would have children 'accustomed from their earliest years to receive their lessons and instruction mingled with philosophic reason, that so they may come at last as kind and familiar friends to philosophy' (de Recta Ratione Audiendi, c. 2).

[3] The argument is occasionally used at the present day, that literature is preferable to physical

the hard intellectual efforts, which later ages with more or less success have sought to impose upon boys, and the attractiveness of music was a fact in its favour. It was attractive, and yet powerful as a means of imperceptibly winning the mind to virtue. A boy needs to be won to the side of virtue long before his reason can be appealed to, and this can be done through music. Music reproduces character, and one who has learnt in youth to love noble music will have learnt with the help of the musical image (*ὁμοίωμα*) to love all that is noble in character and action. Premature attempts to make a boy understand why this or that is right are out of place: let him learn to love what is right first and wait till later to learn why it is so. Enough will have been done, if at twenty-one years of age he turns out to possess a robust, agile, and healthy physique, correct likings, and a disposition to which all that is ignoble is distasteful.

Aristotle's scheme of youthful education stands in marked contrast to that plan of encyclopaedic study which Milton sketches in his treatise on Education, and still more to the training which the late Mr. J. S. Mill appears to have received from his father. As its outcome at the age of twenty-one, we may imagine a bronzed and hardy youth, healthy in body and mind, lithe and active, able to bear hunger and hard physical labour, skilled in wrestling, running, and leaping, but also able to sing and play the lyre, not untouched by studies which awake in men the interests of civilized beings and prepare them for a right use of leisure in after-years, and though burdened with little knowledge, possessed of an educated sense of beauty and an ingrained love of what is noble and hatred of all that is the reverse. He would be more cultured and human than the best type of young Spartan, more physically vigorous and more reverential, though less intellectually developed, than the best type of young Athenian—a nascent soldier and servant of the State,

science and mathematics as a subject of youthful education, because of its influence on the character. Plato and Aristotle use this argument in favour of music.

not, like most young Athenians of ability, a nascent orator. And as he would only be half-way through his education at an age at which many Greeks had finished theirs, he would be more conscious of his own immaturity. We feel at once how different he would be from the clever lads who swarmed at Athens, youths with an infinite capacity for picking holes and capable of saying something plausible on every subject under the sun.

The aim of Aristotle is to produce a man who will be capable of playing successively a number of different parts —of being first a soldier, and then a ruler or judge or philosopher, in his best State. He does not educate with a view to private life, or in the way most likely to develope one-sided genius, but rather with the aim of building up an *ensemble* of character suited to the ideal society and to the duties which it successively imposes on the citizen.

Education with us is so inseparable from instruction and the communication of knowledge, that we can hardly enter into a scheme which finds so little time in youth for serious intellectual study, and makes its main aim till the age of twenty-one the formation of the tastes and character—a matter which we deal with only indirectly. Aristotle declines to give a direct training to the intellect, till he has first laid a solid foundation of character. In his view the object of youthful education is to produce a being who will find his happiness in the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues—to whom not only vice, but an over-estimate of external and bodily goods, will be distasteful—who will live for the noblest things that men can live for, simply because to do otherwise would be painful to him. No higher conception of the aim of education could well be formed, and we see every day how much character has to do even with purely intellectual achievements. Yet perhaps Aristotle delays unduly the cultivation of the intellect. We may doubt whether the youths who gathered round Socrates would have been content with a diet of γυμναστική and μουσική, till they reached the due official age —content to postpone all deeper problems and to silence

for a time the stirrings of reason. It has already been remarked that Aristotle seems occasionally to overrate the immaturity of youth and its contrast with manhood. But if he postpones the appeal to reason, it is in order that it may be all the more effectual when it is made. His view that no education is good which does not culminate in rationality—in a reasoned perception of truth, goodness, and beauty—that to be educated is to be in the best sense rational, is one which possesses permanent value.

To him as to Plato, the production of a fully and harmoniously developed man (σπουδαῖος) is the work of years, and the final result of a laborious and long-continued system of habituation[1], commencing in the regulation of marriage, and culminating in the development of the reason. Hence his sense of the importance of the social and political environment of the individual.

Sketch of the history of Greek political philosophy.

Our attempt to sketch the ideal State of Aristotle, so far as it is known to us, is now complete, but it remains to trace its genesis, and to view it in relation to previous ideals and to the results of earlier inquiry.

The aims of early Greek legislators and political inquirers.

The actual State, whether Greek or barbarian, Aristotle tells us, was little conscious of a distinct aim, but so far as an aim was impressed on its institutions, it was commonly that of supremacy and empire (τὸ κρατεῖν, 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5 sqq.). He traced written laws or unwritten customs tending to this end at Carthage no less than in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States—among the Persians of Asia no less than the Thracians, Macedonians, Scythians, Celts, and Iberians of Europe. We hear of writers on politics who took the same view, and glorified Lycurgus because he had taught those for whom he legislated 'to win empire over many by teaching them how to face perils' (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 16–21).

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23, οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

Most authors of 'best constitutions,' however, appear to have followed a different path. They concerned themselves especially with questions relating to the distribution of property, holding that civil discord always arose in relation to property (2. 7. 1266 a 36 sqq.). They thus seem to have made the avoidance of civil discord (*στάσις*) their aim. It is true, of course, that internal harmony is a main condition of success in war, so that the two aims did not lie far apart[1].

They probably inherited their view of the importance of a due regulation of property from some of the earliest legislators of Greece—men, for instance, like Pheidon of Corinth (2. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.). One main object of early legislation seems to have been the maintenance of the original number of lots of land. It is probable that the citizen-body in many early States, and especially in colonies and States founded on conquest, consisted only of those who owned one or more of the lots into which the territory was at the outset divided. We gather, at all events, that the plan followed at Aphytis, a city of the Thrace-ward region (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq.), by which the owner of a fraction of one of the original lots was accounted a citizen, was an exceptional one. It is easy to see that a citizen-body thus composed was in a somewhat dangerous position. A large body of non-citizens was likely to grow up around this nucleus of privileged persons, and if, as no doubt frequently happened, the numbers of the privileged dwindled through the union of more lots than one in the same hands, the state of things which we find existing at an early date in many Greek States could hardly fail to arise. Power would be in the hands of a few families, girt round by a 'hungry people' creeping ever nigher. To keep power in their hands it was essential to maintain their numbers, and with this aim the owners of the lots were often forbidden to

[1] Another characteristic of ordinary speculation about law was its fragmentary character (Plato, Laws 630 E, *οὐδ' ἅπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἴδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν· οὗ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐν χρείᾳ γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖ νῦν παραθέμενος, ὁ μὲν τὰ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ὁ δὲ τῆς αἰκίας πέρι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλα ἄττα μυρία τοιαῦτα*).

alienate or mortgage them[1], the giving of dowries and the marriage of heiresses were strictly regulated, the possession of land in excess of a certain amount was made illegal, and power to adopt a son was often conceded. If war and famine and pestilence did not sufficiently reduce the numbers of the unenfranchised population, it was usually possible to fall back on the resource of founding a colony, or perhaps the perils of the governing class might be opportunely lessened by the growth of commerce and manufactures. We can readily understand how it happened that many States were glad to have a number of colonies connected with them, which served as outlets not only for their produce and their manufactures, but also for their surplus population. A further danger arose from the circumstance that the lots do not seem to have been necessarily, or perhaps even commonly, equal. Phaleas of Chalcedon is said to have been the first to propose legislation for the purpose of making them equal (2. 7. 1266a 39). His views were apparently put forth in the form of a 'best constitution,' but he trod in the steps of the early legislators to whom we have referred; at all events he hoped everything from the plan of giving every one the same amount of land.

Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism.

Pythagoras[2] saw deeper and devised a remedy which proved, for a time at least, effectual. He seems to have been a citizen of Samos in the days when Samos was mistress of the seas, and is said, not improbably, to have emigrated to escape from the rule of Polycrates. Tyrants were foes to ἑταιρίαι (7 (5). 11. 1313a 41), and an ἑταιρία was precisely what Pythagoras aimed at founding[3]. He

[1] According to Plato (Rep. 552 A sq.: cp. 556 A), this wholesome measure, as he considers it, was not commonly adopted in oligarchies, for the rich oligarchs in power would be unwilling to lose the chance of stripping spendthrifts of their possessions and thus growing richer themselves. He seems to regard it rather as congenial to a constitution like the Lacedaemonian, which, as we know from Aristotle (Pol. 2. 9. 1270a 19), put a stigma both on the sale and on the purchase of patrimonies.

[2] It is not intended to suggest that Phaleas was prior in date to Pythagoras, which is far from likely. Nothing is known of the date of Phaleas.

[3] Besides, the rule of a tyrant

carried his ascetic aims to a region which lived for material enjoyments. 'Among the Achaeans of South Italy,' says Mommsen[1], 'the spit was for ever turning on the hearth[2].' He appears to have found Croton in the hands of a limited body of citizens, whose power was waning, and to have given a new lease of life to the oligarchical constitution, not by methods such as those we have noticed, but by breathing a new and more ethical spirit into the rule of the Few. He sought out the best of the young nobles of Croton and other cities, taught them to live an ascetic life of temperance and friendship, and formed them into a brotherhood which ultimately brought not only Croton but several other cities of South Italy under its direction.

His originality consisted in this, that he was at once a philosopher, the founder of a religion, and the head of a brotherhood. No one quite like him appears ever to have existed in Greece. More lessons than one were to be learnt from his career. It proved, in the first place, that philosophers could 'be kings,' and that the dream of Plato was a dream that had once come true. Philosophy had once upon a time established her competence to rule, and would not easily forget that she had done so, or cease to make her voice heard in the politics of Greece. Occasionally, in fact, we find philosophers actually ruling in Greece. The saying ran that Thebes never flourished till it was ruled by philosophers (Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 18). The careers of Epaminondas, Archytas, Dion, and others showed that philosophers sometimes made noble rulers. More usually, however, we find philosophers the advisers of rulers, and this perhaps was their true function. In the

would be especially hateful to an ascetic like Pythagoras, if only because tyrants commonly lived luxurious lives.

[1] History of Rome, 1. 143 E. T.

[2] His appearance at Croton may be compared to the appearance of Calvin at Geneva. When Calvin came to Geneva, it 'was apparently in a state of political, ecclesiastical, and moral decay . . . An unbridled love of pleasure, a reckless wantonness, a licentious frivolity had taken possession of Genevan life, while the State was the plaything of intestine and foreign feuds . . . It was a commonwealth torn to pieces by party spirit, the independence of which was endangered' (Häusser, Period of the Reformation, 1. 314 E.T.).

one way or the other, Greek philosophers found means of exercising political influence, and their influence was commonly an ennobling and moderating influence. It is, perhaps, because the spheres of philosophy and politics were so little held apart, that Plato and Aristotle conceive the problem of political philosophy in the practical way they do—that their aim is to come to the rescue of the Greek State, and to make it as much as possible what it ought to be.

The career of Pythagoras also showed how much could be done by education and by regulating men's habits of life. A whole group of States had been mastered by a handful of carefully trained nobles. If a sect could do so much, what might not a State do, which set to work in the same way!

Nor was this all. Plato was greatly influenced by the Pythagorean doctrines[1], and if Aristoxenus' account of them is not unduly coloured by his Peripateticism[2], we can trace their influence even in the Politics of Aristotle. We do not learn from Aristoxenus how the Pythagoreans connected their ethical and social teaching with the numerical basis of their Ontology, though a connexion may often be conjectured. They taught that 'there was no greater evil than the absence of rule (*ἀναρχία*): the secret of safety for man is to have somebody over him[3].' Here we are reminded of a well-known passage of Plato's Laws (942 A sqq.). 'Men were to be full of reverence for gods and *δαίμονες*, and, after them, for their parents and the laws' (Aristox. Fragm. 19: cp. Plato, Laws 917 A). 'It was right to adhere to the ancestral laws of the State, even if they were a little inferior to others[4].' Here they went even beyond Plato, whose desire for fixity of law did not induce him absolutely to prohibit all change (Laws 769 D: cp. 772 A–D). Aristotle perhaps has the Pythagorean

[1] See Prof. Lewis Campbell, Introduction to the Politicus of Plato, p. xx. sqq.

[2] He seems to have been acquainted with some still surviving members of the sect (Fragm. 12: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. 275).

[3] Aristox. Fr. 18.

[4] Aristox. Fr. 19.

doctrine in his mind in a passage of the Politics (2. 8. 1269 a 14 sqq.). 'The relation between rulers and ruled was thus conceived by them:—the rulers were not only to be men of knowledge, but loving to those they ruled, and the ruled were not only to be obedient but fond of their rulers[1].' There was, it would seem, to be a 'harmony of contraries' in the State as in the Universe[2]. Rulers and ruled were to be friends, and when Aristotle tells us that some found in 'good-will' the true basis of the relation between master and slave, he may be referring to the Pythagoreans. Order and proportion, limit and measure were to them the life-breath of virtue, and also of the State: here again was a doctrine which profoundly influenced later speculation. They had their views as to the begetting and education of children (Aristox. Fr. 18, 20); they commended a sparing diet; their enthusiasm for mathematics passed to Plato, their high estimate of gymnastic, and still higher estimate of music, passed not only to Plato but to Aristotle; their ascetic brotherhood was a brotherhood of close friends who freely shared all they had with each other, and may have served as the model for the class of guardians in Plato's Republic, besides helping to suggest to Aristotle that 'common use' of property which he recommends (cp. Diod. 10. 3. 5: 10. 4. 1). A saying ascribed by Aristoxenus to Pythagoras ran: *φυγαδευτέον πάσῃ μηχανῇ καὶ περικοπτέον πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ μηχαναῖς παντοίαις ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμαθίαν, κοιλίας δὲ πολυτέλειαν, πόλεως δὲ στάσιν, οἴκου δὲ διχοφροσύνην, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ἀμετρίαν* (Fragm. 8: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 273). Compare the turn of Plato's language in Laws 942 C, *τὴν δ' ἀναρχίαν ἐξαιρετέον ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἁπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ τῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπους θηρίων*, and 739 C, *καὶ πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸ λεγόμενον ἴδιον παντα-χόθεν ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἅπαν ἐξῄρηται.* Their dogma of the metempsychosis seems to be unconnected with the rest of their tenets, but it supplied a fresh motive for virtue.

[1] Aristox. Fr. 18.
[2] Cp. Philolaus, Fragm. 3 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 1).

The ruling brotherhood appears to have been overthrown by a popular outbreak at Croton; it is, indeed, surprising that the ascendency of a philosophical coterie should have been tolerated at all. But Pythagoreanism long survived this blow, and gave to Greece, in later days, two of its noblest statesmen, Epaminondas and Archytas: no other school could claim to have trained rulers equally great. In its original form Pythagoreanism was fatal to the authority of the State, for it set on foot a brotherhood whose power overrode the local authority of the separate States; and we notice that at this point Plato and Aristotle wholly diverge from Pythagorean traditions, for their principle always is to make the City-State the source of authority. But it is impossible not to see how much both of them, and especially Plato, owe to Pythagoreanism.

Hippodamus of Miletus.

When we pass from Pythagoras to Hippodamus of Miletus, we pass from a great personality whose work stood the test of a stormy time to the mere author of a shadowy ideal. Before the ideal of Hippodamus took shape, great events had happened. Persia had been driven back not only from Greece, but from the Aegean coast: perhaps the turning-point of Greek history had been passed, and the policy of Cimon had been vanquished by that of Pericles. Cimon's gallant attempt to hold together the two leading powers of the Greek world, the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States, may have already failed, and the Periclean scheme of an absolute democracy at Athens, outspoken antagonism to the Lacedaemonians, and a pronounced Imperialism in relation to the allies may have already triumphed over the policy of 'friendship among Greeks and war with the barbarians,' with fatal ultimate results to the unity of Greece and to the internal harmony of every Greek State. Hippodamus was largely employed by Pericles; he laid out the Peiraeus for him in broad rectangular streets, he built Thurii; but there are indications in his ideal that he can hardly have sympathised with the unmixed Periclean democracy.

He had one advantage over Pythagoras; his connexion with Athens placed him at the very centre of the Greek world. But he is not treated by Aristotle with much respect, and we know from the Republic that philosophers who began by being τεχνῖται were not favourably viewed by Plato (Rep. 495 C sq.). Like the sophist Hippias[1], he seems to have had crotchets about dress, and Aristotle, who takes account of the life of a philosopher in judging of his claims to authority[2], evidently thinks the less of Hippodamus for his eccentric fancies. He belonged to the brilliant and aspiring generation which immediately followed the Persian wars—a generation which threw itself with ardour into every department of study (*πάσης ἤπτοντο μαθήσεως*, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 31)—and we find him described not only as a physical philosopher[3], but also as the first man who without experience as a statesman attempted to express an opinion with respect to the best constitution.

His aim was not, like that of Phaleas, the mere avoidance of civil disturbance, but the founding of a well-ordered and powerful State. Aristotle seems to be struck with his threefold divisions of things, and to think him fanciful. The population, the territory, laws and lawsuits, verdicts of juries, subjects of administration, all, he thought, fell easily into three groups or sections. This feature may point to Pythagorean influences (cp. de Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 10 sqq.)[4], or it may reflect the influence of the philosophy of Ion of Chios[5], if indeed Ion did not himself derive his 'triad'

[1] Plato, Hipp. Min. 368 B sqq.

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 15 sq.: 1. 3. 1095 b 14 sq. Cp. also Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1445 b 29 sqq.

[3] The view is expressed in a fragment ascribed to the Pythagorean Archytas, that the nature of the Whole must be studied, if any department of it is to be studied successfully. *Καλῶς μοι δοκοῦντι (οἱ περὶ Πυθαγόραν) τὸ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα διαγνῶναι, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄτοπον ὀρθῶς αὐτὼς περὶ ἕκαστον θεωρέν. Περὶ γὰρ τᾶς τῶν ὅλων φύσιος καλῶς διαγνόντες, ἔμελλον καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷά ἐντι, ὀψεῖσθαι* (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 564).

[4] The carefulness of Hippodamus about oaths and his dread of perjury may also be indications of Pythagoreanism (Diod. 10. 9. 2).

[5] The following passage from the *Τριαγμός* of Ion of Chios—perhaps its opening passage—has been preserved by Harpocration (s.v. *Ἴων*): *ἀρχὴ δέ (ἥδε* corr. Lobeck, Agl. p. 722) *μοι τοῦ λόγου. Πάντα τρία καὶ πλέον τοῦδε πλέον ἔλασσον (καὶ οὔτε πλέον οὔτε ἔλασσον*, corr.

theory from Pythagoras. Ion was a friend of Cimon, and opposed to Pericles and the extreme democratic party; he may very well have been a friend of his fellow-Ionian, Hippodamus. Hippodamus' division of the citizens into three classes—warriors, cultivators, and artisans—is quite opposed to democratic sentiment, for in democracies 'all men shared in all functions' (*μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων*, 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32); it savours rather of Egypt or the Lacedaemonian State. His laying out of the Peiraeus perhaps already reproduced the straight thoroughfares of Babylon. The military class was to be maintained from public land specially assigned to it, like the military caste in Egypt. He perhaps thought that cultivators and artisans made bad soldiers; at all events, he excluded them from the use of arms, though not from political rights, for they were to have a voice in the election of magistrates, and apparently, though this is not distinctly stated, to sit on dicasteries. We do not learn whether office was to be confined to members of the military class; Aristotle himself does not seem to have known how this was to be (1268 a 20), but, as he says, the two other classes can hardly have been eligible for the more important offices (1268 a 23). Aristotle's remark is evidently correct, that the cultivators, who bear no arms, and still more the artisans, who have neither arms nor land, would be at the mercy of the military class. If Hippodamus was against a popular army, he was also unfavourable to the democratic institution of the lot, for which he would in all cases substitute election. His dicasteries were to be controlled by an elective Supreme Court of old men, which would not, indeed, possess, as the

Bentl. Ep. ad Mill. p. 67) *τούτων τριῶν. Ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἀρετὴ τριώς, σύνεσις καὶ κράτος καὶ τύχη.* Cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 268, *Ἴων δ' οὐ πλείω τριῶν* (sc. *τὸ πλῆθος ἔφη εἶναι τῶν ὄντων*). See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 49. Democritus also wrote a work called *Τριτογένεια: τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν* (adds Diogenes Laertius, 9. 46), *ὅτι τρία γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῆς* (Pallas or Wisdom), *ἃ πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα συνέχει*—namely, *εὖ λογίζεσθαι, λέγειν καλῶς, ὀρθῶς πράττειν* (see Zeller's note, Gr. Ph. 1. 831. 6, and the references he gives). The fancy seems to have been popular in that age.

Areopagus would seem at one time to have done at Athens, the right to supervise the administration of the State[1], but was nevertheless to have a power which the Areopagus had not—that of reversing and correcting the decisions of the dicasteries. It does not appear who were to say when these decisions were to be submitted to it for correction: all we are told is that they were to come before the Court, when they were not thought correct; we do not learn who was to judge of this. Perhaps the Court itself. In that case its position and power would be almost greater than that of the Areopagus. If, on the other hand, the scheme is to be construed as allowing an appeal from the dicasteries to the supreme court, this was an arrangement which found no parallel in the judicial procedure of Athens. Open appeals against decisions of dicasteries were not recognized there[2]. Even Plato in the Laws (767–8: cp. 956) allows only of appeals from the judgment of the magistrates (768 A) or of the judges of the village and the tribe (956 C), not from the judgment of the people.

If the ideal scheme of Hippodamus was put forth in the high and palmy days of Athens, the fact is remarkable and reflects credit on his foresight, for he must have been already dissatisfied with the extreme democracy, one weak point in which—its dicasteries—he seems to have hit. It is not impossible that his scheme of a Court to control the dicasteries was suggested by his connexion as a Milesian with the dependent allies of Athens, whose sentiments as to the Athenian dicasteries may be gathered not only from Thucydides, but from the paper on the Athenian Constitution which finds a place among the writings of Xenophon.

His proposal that those who placed useful suggestions or discoveries at the service of the State should be rewarded was conceived in a more democratic spirit. A readiness to welcome valuable hints, whencesoever they might come, counted as a note of democracy (cp. Eurip. Suppl. 424 sqq.).

[1] Plutarch, Solon c. 19, *ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων.*

[2] C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. I. § 145.

Aristotle evidently fears that it would give a stimulus to legislative innovation and constitutional change.

Altogether the ideal constitution of Hippodamus bears traces of compromise and mixture. The possibility of a mixed government never occurs to Herodotus when he makes his Persian grandees discuss the comparative merits of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, but the scheme of Hippodamus is an effort, though perhaps a crude one, in that direction. His model would seem to be the Lacedaemonian State, if we may judge from his severance of the soldier-class from the cultivators and artisans, and from his institution of a Supreme Court of old men appointed by election; yet he appears to contemplate the existence of popular dicasteries, and he seeks to establish a more equal relation between his three classes than that which prevailed between Spartans, Perioeci, and Helots.

The eulogists and critics of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States.

Many men of his generation were, unlike him, unqualified admirers of the Lacedaemonian State. Ion praised it in the well-known lines which have been already quoted (p. 325). It was a State, not of talk but of action and wisdom in action. It was a State whose life-breath was obedience to law. Law was the source even of the courage of its sons and of their alertness in battle[1]. Its citizens acquired their great qualities by submitting to a course of laborious training. Submission to law and to the magistrates lay at the root of its greatness. Silence, obedience, endurance, the suppression of self—these were the qualities that made it what it was.

Even the warmest friends of the Lacedaemonian State at Athens, however, betrayed in their mode of life that they were far from resembling its citizens. Cimon would hardly have been at home at Sparta, and Xenophon must have been conscious that his literary gifts and his interest in philosophy drew an impassable barrier between him and the State which he so greatly admired. To measure the

[1] Thuc. 1. 84. 5: L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 174.

gulf which parted the Athenian ideal from the Lacedaemonian, we have only to read the Funeral Oration of Pericles in the record of Thucydides. In that eulogy of Athens there is a constant, though tacit, reference to her rival, and the feeling expressed is substantially this, that while the Lacedaemonian State purchased its greatness at an immense cost of civilization and elasticity of spirit, by keeping oratory and philosophy at a distance, by excluding aliens, by reserving politics and the higher interests of human life for the few, and by insisting on a gloomy and laborious training, Athens combined greatness as a State with a life rich in human interest, shared in by all, pleasurable, spontaneous, and unconstrained [1]. The view of Aristotle was anticipated that the ideal State is that which enjoys 'the most desirable life'—that it is of the essence of the State to realize the highest quality of life. But Pericles held that all men, even those who toiled for their daily bread, might share and ought to share in the things that give greatness to human life. Rich and poor must work together for this end. Here was an ideal which testified to a far greater faith in human nature and in the possibilities of social life than any other Greek ideal known to us; and Thucydides perhaps hints a sense that it was too high-pitched and unsubstantial, when he passes on from it to an account of the plague [2].

The time was one rather of sanguine aspiration and varied genius than of firm faith, or full knowledge, or even settled opinion. Aristotle would reply to Pericles that if a

[1] Pindar would have said of Pericles' eulogy of Athens, that it omits to give the glory to God. Cp. Pyth. 8. 73 sqq.:

εἰ γάρ τις ἐσλὰ πέπαται μὴ σὺν μακρῷ πόνῳ,
πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ πεδ' ἀφρόνων βίον κορυσσέμεν ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς·
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κεῖται· δαίμων δὲ παρίσχει,
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὕπερθε βάλλων, ἄλλον δ' ὑπὸ χειρῶν.

[2] So again his record of the Melian Controversy immediately precedes his history of the Sicilian disaster. Thucydides keeps himself and his point of view, which was not that of extreme, but rather of qualified democracy (8. 97. 2), a good deal in the background, but his own contemporaries were probably far more conscious than we are in reading his history, that he was by no means a neutral in politics.

State was to be all he pictured Athens as being, its citizens must be men of full virtue (σπουδαῖοι), united by a common ethical belief, firmly held and followed in practice. Pericles had spoken of a 'fear of the laws,' but that was not enough[1]. And then again, Aristotle would ask, what means did Athens take to secure the permanence of the 'spirit' (τρόπος) described by Pericles? Did Athens develope it by a well-considered course of education beginning in childhood? Nothing of the kind. Aristotle charges the Greek State with universally neglecting even to give its citizens an education suitable to the constitution (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.) and such as would contribute to its permanence.

The Sophists.

The early physical philosophy of Greece had now well-nigh received its death-blow: the philosopher had become a sceptic and simultaneously a teacher of 'virtue,' or rhetoric, or both, wandering from city to city and infinitely more ubiquitous and influential than his more believing predecessors. The Protagoras of Plato describes how these great teachers moved through Greece, each of them followed in his wanderings by a train of devoted admirers and winning fresh recruits wherever he went.

The writings of the 'sophists,' as they are called, have perished or all but perished, and we are left to gather the nature of their teaching from the pages of their opponents, but it seems pretty clear that some of the most conspicuous men in the group of professional teachers which comes to the front in the latter half of the fifth century before Christ, brought the questioning spirit, which now prevailed in the treatment of physical and ontological questions, to bear on morals and politics.

The first effect of their teaching, indeed, was inspiriting and stimulating. At a time when the 'good and well-descended men' (ἐσθλοὶ ἀπ' ἐσθλῶν) were still apt to claim a monopoly of virtue, men listened gladly to the offer which some of the sophists made to teach it to all[2],

[1] Another weakness of Periclean Athens was that the resources which enabled it to live this glorious life were largely derived from the tribute of the allies, but we cannot be sure that Aristotle was alive to this defect.

[2] See Schmidt, Ethik der alten

and to teach it in a few short weeks or months. There can be no question that they did the world a service by awakening intellectual interest and stimulating the natural eagerness of the Greek race to excel. There was something to be gained, no doubt, by sitting at the feet of a man of genius like Protagoras, however unsatisfactory his grasp of dialectic might seem to Socrates.

The myth of Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 320 C sqq.).

The teaching of the myth which Plato puts in his mouth is, indeed, quite in harmony with Greek traditional feeling, for it refers men to the State as the source of their virtue. Men learn to be just by living in a well-ordered Hellenic State and breathing its atmosphere. They learn justice first from parents and nurses, next from teachers of poetry, music, and gymnastic, lastly from the voice of the State speaking through its laws. We do not gather that the instructions of the sophist or teacher of rhetoric are absolutely necessary for its production. Justice is the inheritance of all members of a civilized community, and this is why the knowledge of what is just 'grows on every hedge[1]'. Here was another comfortable doctrine, too comfortable perhaps to be true.

Plato agreed with Protagoras that justice (*αἰδὼς καὶ δίκη*) is the uniting principle in the State (yes, he would add, and in the soul of the individual also), that all members of a State need to possess a sense of justice, and that in every society a process of education goes on which insensibly communicates to the individual the ideas of right and wrong current in the society, but then he does not hold that the ideas thus communicated are necessarily correct, or that all men living in Hellenic States have a true notion of justice. The theory of Protagoras not only pointed to democracy, but implied that a knowledge

Griechen, 1. 158–162, whose work will be found here as elsewhere instructive. Isocrates makes some comments on this offer in his Contra Sophistas, and Plato refers to high promises of this kind in Rep. 518 B sq.

[1] Plato perhaps has Protagoras' myth in view in Polit. 299 C, *οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον· οὐδένα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν τό τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ναυτικόν· ἐξεῖναι γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια ἤθη κείμενα.*

of what is just comes insensibly to men bred up in a civilized society, and that no special study or effort is essential for its acquisition. How mistaken this view was, is shown by the dialectical failure of Protagoras himself in the dialogue. For he turns out to be unable, notwithstanding all that he has said, to give a satisfactory account of virtue. Without dialectic the just cannot really be known. This is the point in which he is most at fault, though Plato would also probably dispute his identification of justice with the political art, and his assumption that the aim of human society is the preservation of the species. Still Protagoras is represented in this dialogue as holding law to be a source of virtue (324 A sqq.), and not a mere guarantee for the observance of men's rights, which some sophists held it to be. The myth, indeed, appears to imply that whatever any State teaches as justice is sure to have a tendency to hold society together. The teaching of the State is always sound. The justice it inculcates is always absolute or natural justice[1]. A view ascribed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus (167 C) that whatever any State holds to be just is just for it, so long as it holds it to be just, betrays more consciousness of the possibilities of variation on the part of the State in this matter, but it still refers the individual to his State as the arbiter of justice, though only of a relative, not of an absolute justice.

Other sophists.

Other sophists are more distinctly credited with opinions imperilling the authority of the State. They marked off the 'naturally just' from the 'conventionally just,' and found but little of the former in existence. It is evident that the Greeks had been in the habit of tracing the social arrangements under which they lived to sources so venerable—the will of the Gods or Nature—that they were conscious of a painful and demoralizing shock when

[1] 'Law appears in the myth of Protagoras as natural law: the later distinction between natural and positive law is unknown to the speaker' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 1001).

they were told that many of them had only a conventional value. They liked to find the hand of God or Nature in the laws of their State, yet now they learnt that only the immutable is natural, and that most laws varied from State to State and from epoch to epoch. Hippias, as we have seen, allowed only those laws to be divine which are accepted everywhere (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 19). Glaucon in the Republic, representing the doctrine of Thrasymachus (Rep. 358 E sqq.), goes further, and traces back *all* justice and law to a social compact[1], the object of which is to prevent one man from wronging another. Doing injustice, according to this view, is by nature good, and suffering injustice by nature evil, and the evil is greater than the good. As it is found to be impossible to get the good without the outbalancing evil, men tolerate justice as the lesser evil, and frame laws and agreements (*ξυνθήκας*) to exclude both the doing and the suffering of wrong. A cognate view is ascribed to the sophist Lycophron in the Politics (3. 9. 1280 b 10). We see that the theories of a primitive social compact and of the limitation of the functions of the State to the protection of men's rights took their origin at about the same time. To a Greek the authority of Law and the State would seem greatly impaired when it could no longer claim to rest on Nature. And then came the further question, how could a compact of this kind claim to hold good against the right of Force? If natural right existed at all, was it not identical with might? The State thus became a scramble for power, and the

[1] Cp. Laws 889 E, *θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλά τισι νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δή τινι φύσει.* The way in which men come to hold these views is thus explained in the Republic (479): men look only at 'the many beautiful and the many just,' not at 'the one just and beautiful,' which they cannot endure even to hear of, and they find that every one of these 'many beautiful' is easily made to appear also ugly, and each of the 'many just' unjust. The remedy for their scepticism is to become true philosophers and look to the Idea, which is ever the same.

forcible exercise of authority by the most powerful individual or group of individuals within it was accepted as normal and legitimate. In one State Democracy, in another Oligarchy, in another Tyranny had force on its side, and therefore the right to rule, so long at least as this was so. Tyranny was placed on a level with the two other constitutions, and the forcible empire of one State over others was justified on the same grounds.

The view that Might is Right is one that needs no sophist to set it afloat—indeed Pindar had incautiously used language which was construed as stating it [1]—but now we find it ascribed not only to sophists and their adherents, but to philosophers like Democritus [2]. The inquirers who expressed these views deserve the credit of being the first to recognize the fact that political supremacy gravitates to the side of superior Force. It is true, as Aristotle frequently remarks [3], that the government of a State must have Force at its back, and it was well that attention should be drawn to the fact [4]. What they failed to see was, that while all governments must have Force behind them, the goodness or badness of a government, and therefore its claim to rule, depends on other considerations.

Doctrines of this kind would be especially popular and especially dangerous in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Athens was holding together by force a recalcitrant empire; she was engaged in a task repugnant to Greek feeling, which always favoured local autonomy; and here were men who justified what she was every day doing [5]. But then if they justified the exercise

[1] Plato, Laws 690 B: 714 E: Gorg. 484 B; and Stallbaum's notes.

[2] Stob. Floril. 47. 19, *φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήιον τῷ κρέσσονι.* The expression, however, is rather vague and may possibly not bear this meaning.

[3] E. g. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16, *καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου.*

[4] 'Physical force,' it has been said, 'however disguised, is the ultimate basis and sanction of all law.'

[5] Isocrates looks back upon the time of the Peloponnesian War as a time of wide-spread folly and lust of tyranny at Athens: this is his view, at all events, in the

of sway over unwilling subjects, they also placed all governments which had Force at their back on one level: Tyranny and Oligarchy were the same to them as Democracy, and had a right to displace it, if they could prove that they possessed superior force. The new ideas were a double-edged weapon politically, and morally also they were very dangerous. For they traced that which was accounted just in each State to the voice of law, and law to the will of the stronger, so that the claims of morality rested only on the claim of the stronger to rule. To do right was to live like a slave for the advantage of the stronger: to do wrong, at any rate on a considerable scale, was evidence of a vigorous and masterful spirit, which well beseemed a freeman (Rep. 344 C)[1].

The questions raised by the sophists were questions which needed to be raised, and many of the ideas they set afloat were ideas which had a great future before them, but it was unfortunate that they were promulgated at a moment when a social war was shaking society and morality to their foundations, and when a reign of force prevailed[2]. The later reign of force which followed the death of Alexander was in some degree qualified by the ascendency of great schools and great ethical teachers —Theophrastus, Xenocrates, Zeno of Citium—but now philosophy seemed to be in the anti-social camp. The advent of Socrates could not have been more timely.

In the view of earlier generations morality rested on law, and law on nature or the will of the Gods. The voice of

Oration De Pace (see §§ 75–94). In later days, he says, Athens came to the conclusion 'that it is not just for the stronger to rule over the weaker' (§ 69).

[1] The form which opinions of this nature assumed in the luxurious cities of South Italy and Sicily, to which temptation came in the form of a love of pleasure rather than power, may be gathered from the language of Polyarchus, 'surnamed the luxurious,' in the address to Archytas and his disciples which has already been mentioned (Aristox. Fr. 15: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 276: Athen. Deipn. 545 A sqq.).

[2] In mediaeval Europe, at the moment when the customary morality of feudal times was losing its power, the moral vigour of the world was opportunely restored by the Reformation and Puritanism. Greece, on the contrary, at a somewhat similar epoch in its development found itself in the hands of the sophists.

the State was the voice of God. But now a new view of the origin, nature, and functions of the State had been set forth. The State was the creation of a compact, or the outcome of Force—in either case, it was of purely human origin. It was too variable to be anything else. So far as it originated in compact, it was a *pis aller*—the lesser of two evils. If it was still held to be the fountain-head of men's conceptions of justice and temperance and other virtues, it followed that these virtues had no higher origin or sanction than the authority which gave them currency. But some held that the function of the State was simply to protect men's rights, not to make them virtuous.

It is evident that there is much in these views to interest the modern inquirer. We ask, why did not the defenders of the claims of morality cut it loose from the State altogether? Why did they not say—the State may be no more than you allow it to be, and yet the claims of morality may be as binding as ever? The theory of Hippias did suggest, as we have seen, that the common consent of men should take the place of the State as that which makes the just to be just. One thing at any rate was for the future impossible: no one could now accept the voice of the State to which he might happen to belong as an unerring oracle in questions of right and wrong. Was then the individual to be his own guide, aided only by any competent teachers whose help he could secure? Or was the State to be reformed, so as to serve as a guide to him? Either view might be taken. The latter was the one most in harmony with the traditions of Greek life, which rightly refused to sunder the individual from the whole to which he belonged. But the other view also won ground. The teaching of Socrates has, as we shall see, affinities with both; it holds them both, as it were, in solution. It is only in the hands of his disciples that they become conscious of their own antagonism.

Socrates.

Many, no doubt, held that the collapse of belief could best be healed by an abandonment of philosophical speculation altogether, and a recurrence to that unquestioning

acceptance of the customary and the traditional which prevailed, or was believed to have prevailed, in earlier days; some perhaps envied the Lacedaemonian State for its deadness to thought, which was, however, soon found to have dangers of its own. Socrates, on the contrary, insisted that the true remedy lay not in an abandonment, but in an increased intensity of inquiry. Abandon, he said, any fields of inquiry in which knowledge is not possible, but bring a closer scrutiny to bear on those in which it is. Investigate by question and answer, not by long continuous deliverances: search for the definition of the thing you wish to understand.

In this spirit he asked 'what the State is' and 'what the Statesman is' (Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16). We are not told in so many words what answer he gave to these questions, but his answer may be gathered from the general tenour of Xenophon's record. The State, he held, does not exist for the pleasure of the stronger, or merely for the protection of men's rights; it exists to make men better. Socrates said of the Thirty Tyrants, that 'it would be surprising if the herdsman of a herd of cattle, after thinning their numbers and making them worse in condition, should still claim to be a good herdsman, but it would be still more surprising if the ruler of a State under similar circumstances should claim to be a good ruler' (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 32). 'The mere possession of a sceptre gives no claim to power, nor does election by chance persons (*τῶν τυχόντων*), nor the lot, nor the exercise of force or cunning, but knowledge only' (ibid. 3. 9. 10).' Ruling means directing men what they ought to do, and being ruled obeying such direction; ruling and being ruled is not a thing apart, but one with which we are familiar in daily life; when we take a voyage, or when we are ill, we accept the rule of one who knows, the captain or the physician; why should we not do so in affairs of State (ibid. 3. 9. 11)? True, the representative of Force—the tyrant—may reject the guidance of reason, and even kill the wise man, but, if he does so, he will only ensure his own destruction (*πότερα γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον*

οἴει σώζεσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ποιοῦντα ἢ οὕτω καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν ἀπολέσθαι; ibid. 3. 9. 12–13). Vis consili expers mole ruit sua. Yes: but then the 'consilium' which the ruler must needs possess for his own preservation is not necessarily the knowledge how to make men better, and this is, according to Socrates, the knowledge which makes a man a Statesman.

The myth of Protagoras had already implied that men learn virtue of the State, and this was no other than the traditional and accepted view. To Socrates, however, virtue is knowledge. The wisdom of the age, as we have seen, had been affirming it to be folly, and in asserting the contrary Socrates adopted the simplest means of at once emphasizing his own dissent, and appealing to an age which valued cleverness above everything else, in language which it could understand. Virtue, he said, is wisdom: it is vice that is folly (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 4 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 351 A). His antagonists were met on their own ground. We infer that if the State makes men better, and virtue is knowledge, the State must communicate knowledge. It is not, however, clear how the State communicates knowledge in the Socratic sense—knowledge of the definitions of things, knowledge acquired through Dialectic. Nor does Socrates explain how it is that habituation is also a means of acquiring knowledge and virtue, though he clearly recognizes the fact (e.g. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 1 sqq.). Of course, the larger the share ascribed to habituation in the production of virtue, the easier it is to regard virtue as the offspring of the State. If, on the other hand, Dialectic is the path to knowledge and virtue, virtue would seem to be due to agencies not necessarily presupposing the co-operation of the State. The Stoics, in fact, who reverted to the Socratic view of virtue as knowledge, denied that virtue acquired by exercise is virtue at all (Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, E. T. pp. 238–9), and consistently enough regarded the State rather as a field for the exercise of virtue than as its source.

The doctrine that the right to rule is conferred by know-

ledge was not likely to bring Socrates popularity. Its meaning, to begin with, was misconceived. He was credited, for instance, by his accuser with the view that any son to whom he had taught wisdom had the right to treat an untrained father as a lunatic and put him in bonds; nay, replies Xenophon, he taught that a lunatic father should be thus treated, but that an ignorant father should receive the instruction he needed (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 49 sqq.). He was further charged with depreciating men's relatives in comparison with teachers of wisdom like himself: what he really taught, however, was that relatives whose claims to respect rested simply on relationship and not on service to their kin, deserved but little consideration (ibid. 1. 2. 51 sqq.). It is clear that the new doctrine brought Socrates into collision not only with democratic sentiment, but also with the ties of kinship. It is in order to correct erroneous impressions on this subject, that Xenophon describes how earnestly he insisted on the claims of the parental and fraternal relations (Mem. 2. 2–3). The Memorabilia is, in fact, an apologetic work, intended to recommend Socrates to ordinary Athenian opinion, and to show how false was the charge on which he was put to death, and this must be borne in mind in estimating the weight of its testimony. It remains true that the central principle of Socrates' teaching—the authority of the wise—might easily be misinterpreted as setting up the authority of the wise teacher against that of the wise parent, and even when interpreted aright, did tend to invalidate the authority of unwise parents, unwise rulers, and unwise laws. It was also easy for the outer world to confound the Socratic 'wisdom,' which was not only wisdom but virtue, with mere cleverness, and to suppose that Socrates meant to justify the claims of men like Critias to rule. In reality, the wise ruler, as Socrates conceives him, is a man of a wholly opposite type. He is no self-seeker, nor does he live for his own pleasure. Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus (Rep. 419 sqq.) when he asks Socrates in the Memorabilia of Xenophon (2. 1. 17)—ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν

βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες;

It is true, however, that this doctrine of the right of wisdom to rule did make in favour of the Few. The political art was not, as the myth of Protagoras alleged, given to all men belonging to civilized States, but like any other art, to those who set themselves to learn it. The reasoning of Socrates pointed directly to the rule of the few who know. Indeed, as knowledge meant to Socrates knowledge of the definition of a thing, a dialectical education was apparently essential to the ruler. One step more, and Socrates, we feel, would have found himself depicting an ideal in some respects similar to that which Plato depicts in the Politicus. This step he did not take. On the contrary, he identified the legal and the just, and explained that he meant by law whatever the citizens of a State agree to enact as embodying their views of what ought and ought not to be done (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 12–13). He thus apparently treated the laws of all States as just, and his strict performance of his duties as a citizen of Athens shows that he did not regard any defects of the Athenian constitution as releasing him from his obligations to his State. If he permitted himself to dream of an ideal, his fancy wandered no farther afield than to the Athens of Solon (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 14) and to the Lacedaemonian State (ibid. 4. 4. 15 sqq.: Xen. Symp. 8. 35, with which Henkel compares Plato, Crito 52 E). He praised the latter State for its obedience to law, which gave it a happy life in peace and irresistible strength in war, and for the unanimity of its citizens, which rose far above the level of a mere similarity of taste, and expressed itself in conformity to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 15–16).

He was, in fact, too good a citizen to push his own theory to its consequences. His aim was twofold, like that of Aristotle after him; he wished to show the State what it might

and ought to be, and he wished to restore the authority of the actual State. The State, he held, ought to be in the hands of those who know, if only for the reason that when men reject the rule of the wise, they suffer for so doing. For the true test of that which is right was not, in his view, universal consent, or immutability, or universal observance, but the fact that men lose by not practising it (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 24: cp. 3. 9. 12–13). It was one thing, however, to claim authority for a State ruled by the wise, and another to re-establish the authority of the actual State. The Sophists had dealt the actual State a fatal blow. Even Aristotle's patient efforts to reform it failed to replace it in its primitive position as the guide of life. If Socrates in reasserting the claims of the State reasserted only the claims of a non-existent State, much the same thing may be said of Aristotle.

Socrates impaired rather than restored the authority of the actual State. He did not even show how the actual State could be improved. Where were 'those who know' to be found, and how could they be placed in power? His political teaching threw little light on the pressing question, how the State was to be made better[1], and yet at the same time it was irritating. Plato tells us (Rep. 488 B) that it was as much as a man's life was worth, in a society like that of Athens, merely to assert that the art of politics is communicable by teaching, and Socrates not only insisted on this, but held that what a man could not communicate to others, he did not know himself (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 1). We need not wonder that he paid the penalty[2]. Yet Socrates seems, unlike others after him, to have treated the art of politics as one which men of all classes and occupations might acquire. He is credited, indeed, with the saying that 'idleness is the sister of freedom,' but there is no indication that he held 'knowledge' to be incompatible with the practice of the lower occupations. Unlike Pythagoras and the Sophists, who had addressed them-

[1] It is true, however, that he laid stress on the importance of education (e.g. Xen. Mem. 4. 1. 3).

[2] Cp. Plato, Polit. 299 B sq.

selves to rich and noble youths, Socrates appealed to men of every grade. He practised his dialectic not only in the houses of rich men like Cephalus, but in the open market-place and in the workshop of the leather-cutter Simon. In doing so, he acted in the spirit of the Periclean ideal, according to which the highest interests of life were to be open to the poor as much as to the rich. Antisthenes, who belonged to the despised class of 'half-breeds' (*τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*), was as fully his disciple as the patrician Plato. Even if Socrates held that Dialectic is a condition of political knowledge and of the right to rule—and this we are not distinctly told—he apparently held that skill in Dialectic is accessible to all. Plato and Aristotle, on the contrary, tend to detach the philosopher from 'necessary work.' The 'rule of the wise' consequently assumes a new aspect in their hands. If Plato in the Republic opens, as he does in a way open, philosophical training and the rule of the State to all ranks, he does so on the condition that no attempt shall be made to combine the higher with the lower occupations.

Plato.

While Socrates belongs to the age of the Peloponnesian War, and Aristotle to the disorganized epoch at which Macedon rose to greatness, after the Athenian, Lacedaemonian, and Theban States had successively failed to retain the supremacy which they had successively won, Plato belongs to the intermediate period of Lacedaemonian supremacy. He outlived Leuctra, it is true, by upwards of twenty years, but during the best years of his life he beheld the Lacedaemonian State either on the eve of its triumph over Athens or in full fruition of empire. He was probably about fourteen years of age when the disaster at Syracuse happened, and about fifty-six in the year of Leuctra. He may perhaps have been acquainted with Socrates for about seven years—the last seven years of Socrates' life, when he himself was between twenty-one and twenty-eight. He witnessed in youth the rise and fall of the Four Hundred at Athens, and saw the worst side of oligarchy under

the *régime* of the Thirty Tyrants. A little later, his great teacher was put to death by the restored democracy, and Plato is said to have left Athens with others of the school for ten or twelve years. Few men have lived through such experiences before the age of thirty. His alienation from all actual forms of government could not fail to be far greater than that of Socrates. Where was a satisfactory government to be found? Not in Democracy, or Oligarchy, or Tyranny. Not even in the Lacedaemonian State, for Plato's absorbing interest in philosophy and literature made it impossible for him to find his ideal there. Besides, the Sparta of Archidamus, which had won the admiration of Socrates, was now a thing of the past, and the less noble Sparta of Lysander had taken its place. Plato's sketch of the 'timocratical man' (Rep. 548 D sqq.) perhaps gives us a clue to his conception of the Spartan character:—

'He is not wholly unlike Glaucon, but more unyielding and less a votary of the Muses, though still their votary; fond of listening to talk or song, but no orator; he is gentle to freemen, though harsh and severe to slaves; very obedient to magistrates; fond of office and honour, but one who holds that a title to power is won by military and political achievements, not by oratory; fond of athletic exercise and hunting; a scorner of money in youth, but growing far otherwise as he becomes older, because he is without the surest safeguard of virtue—reason mingled with the study of μουσική (λόγος μουσικῇ κεκραμένος).'

The picture here drawn is the picture of a Hellene, though a Hellene of an exceptional type—farther removed, perhaps, from the Roman than from the Athenian, for he is a 'votary of the Muses,' and the love of personal distinction and pre-eminence has not been subdued in him to the same extent as in the Roman of the best days of the Republic; nor has he the Roman genius for law and legal government. He is, in fact, rather a soldier than a ruler; not sterner than the Roman, but wilder and fiercer, though also more Hellenic—lacking at once the patient skill which

laid the world at the feet of Rome and the wisdom to govern a conquered world aright.

The Spartan nature was harsh, narrow, imperfectly cultured, self-seeking, and Plato must have turned from it with pleasure to the recollection of Socrates, himself a Spartan in his powers of endurance, his simplicity of life, his scorn of ease and comfort, his devotion to his country, yet wholly unlike a Spartan in his intellectual greatness, his dialectical enthusiasm, his contempt for wealth and power, and his kindly zeal for the good of others. He became acquainted in his wanderings with another type of character—the Pythagorean—resembling the Socratic in its simplicity and self-mastery, but ascetic and fanciful, which Socrates never was, the musical and mathematical culture of the school passing, by a transition not infrequent in Greece, into religious mysticism. He would find the Pythagoreans full of faith in the power of education and the ordered life of a brotherhood of friends, convinced that States are made to be ruled by the wise, and not without recollections of a lost political ascendency.

But if the Spartan type of character was defective, there was much to be learnt from the institutions of the Lacedaemonian State. Socrates, as we have seen, had not asked how his ideal 'man of knowledge' was to be produced or placed in a position to rule, but Lacedaemonian experience threw some light on this subject. The example of the Lacedaemonian State showed how much the State could do for virtue by systematic training from the earliest years and by the regulation of adult life, by freeing the best minds from ignoble cares and adjusting social functions to capacity, and by inculcating obedience to law and authority. Imagine a State that should set itself to produce, not a body of soldier-citizens, but a Pythagorean brotherhood of wise men; or, better still, a brotherhood of men possessing knowledge in the fullest sense of the word—men who have learnt to know things as they really are, to study, not shadows, but the reality, and to rule by the light of this better knowledge. In a State ruled by

such men, the Many would no longer snatch greedily at power; they would be well satisfied to confine themselves to the functions for which they are fitted and to surrender office into the hands of their betters; they would no longer need to be excluded from the State and enslaved, like the Helots; on the contrary, they would be the fellow-citizens of their rulers, linked to them by membership of a common State. Plato inherited from Socrates and from Pythagoras the conception of the State as an union of unequals, of protectors and protected, the wise and the ignorant. Let the protectors, Plato said, be what they should be, and the protected will know their own place, and the ideal of the State will be realized. It was thus that the conception of the ideal State of the Republic grew up in Plato's mind.

Sketch of the political teaching of the Republic.

The opening conversations of the Republic reveal to us that the aim of the dialogue is fully as much ethical as political. They relate to the nature of justice, and place before us certain popular impressions on this subject, which it will be the object of the dialogue to correct. We see that in the view of many to be just was to live for the advantage of another and for the advantage of the stronger —a poor-spirited and slavish thing to do—while from a second point of view justice was a *pis aller*, not a good thing in itself, but merely the least of two evils. Plato seeks, on the contrary, to show that justice is in itself a good, and the most essential of goods, for it is the condition of unity and happiness, both in the soul of the individual human being and in the State[1]. It also enables all the other virtues to exist and to accomplish their work (Rep. 433 B). It means, in fact, the execution by a part of a Whole of the work for which it is fit[2]. In the just soul and State the

[1] Cp. Rep. 423 D, τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας πρὸς ὅ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τοῦτο ἕνα πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὅπως ἂν ἓν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ εἷς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις μία φύηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί.

[2] Socrates had already commended the quality which he terms εὐπραξία, and the justice of the Republic is not far removed from the Socratic εὐπραξία: cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 14, τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν εὐπραξίαν νομίζω, καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεύοντες

lower elements do not usurp the work of the higher, the higher elements accept the co-operation of the lower.

The mode in which Plato arrives at this conclusion is altogether novel and significant. No one had yet employed the Science of Politics to throw light on the dark places of Ethics, but this is what Plato in effect does. He constructs an ideal State, in order to show what the true nature of justice is. Justice, he says (Rep. 434 E), can only be detected in a good State, and existing States are not good. The portraiture of a good State, according to him, will convey, not only political, but also ethical instruction, and dispel the ethical errors which were exercising so fatal an influence. A new importance was thus lent to political inquiry.

In constructing the 'good State' from which he hopes to learn so much, Plato follows out his favourite principle of specialization[1] with much persistence. There must be a class to till the soil, another to build, another to weave, and on similar grounds there must be a class to fight and a class to govern. The principle is Socratic, though Socrates does not seem to have pushed it to its consequences. Plato, on the contrary, does so, and finds himself led on to exclude the mass of men from the functions of defending and governing the State, and to reserve these functions for two separate and comparatively small classes. His reasoning is plausible, and it is not at first sight obvious why the work of governing should not, like that of house-building, be made over to a special class. There is no doubt that in the Greek State of Plato's time the soldier, the judge, and the statesman were all of them insufficiently professional. The interests of the State were then, to a far greater extent than they have ever been since, confided to persons neither specially trained nor specially excellent. Democracy gave power to every free-

δοκοῦσί μοι εὖ πράττειν· καὶ ἀρίστους δὲ καὶ θεοφιλεστάτους ἔφη εἶναι ἐν μὲν γεωργίᾳ τοὺς τὰ γεωργικὰ εὖ πράττοντας, ἐν δ' ἰατρείᾳ τοὺς τὰ ἰατρικά, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς τὰ πολιτικά.

[1] Rep. 397 E, οὐκ ἔστι διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἓν πράττει.

man, oligarchy gave power to the rich. Plato claimed that governing must be made over absolutely to a class which should do nothing but govern. Here we have the germ of the Republic. He learnt before he died that only the 'sons of Gods' could be trusted with the powers which he gave to the rulers of the Republic. In the Laws he does not give up the assimilation of the work of women and men, but he does give up the unchecked rule of a governing class. Aristotle allows unchecked power only to his παμβασιλεύς, a hypothetical being of superhuman excellence and capacity. He and he alone is emancipated from the restraints of law: even the ideal citizens of the Fourth Book of the Politics are subject to them.

The State, or rather city (πόλις), which comes into existence before our eyes in the Second Book of the dialogue, originates in men's needs, for Plato does not, like Aristotle, conceive of man as a naturally social being, or recognize (in the Republic at all events) the priority of ties of blood, such as those of the household. It begins in men's need to live[1], their need of food, lodging, and clothing. Its earliest members are the cultivator, the house-builder, the weaver, shoemaker, smith, and carpenter: four or five men of this stamp suffice to constitute a city, though a city of the barest kind (369 D). Here again Aristotle disagrees. The judge and the soldier are as essential ingredients in a city as the cultivator or artisan (Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.). Each man, Plato continues, follows a vocation of his own, both because he does his work better and more easily thus, and because men are born with different aptitudes (370 A–C). Herdsmen, merchants, retailers, day-labourers swell the population, and now our society is apparently complete (τελέα, 371 E). Plato dwells for a moment on the happy social life[2] of this baby State—a State too undeveloped to be the home of either virtue or vice, yet, if he is in earnest in 372 E, the State in its

[1] Rep. 369 D: cp. Aristot. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 29, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν.

[2] 372 B, ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις.

most genuine and healthy form; he dwells on its simple luxuries, its beds of leaves, its mainly vegetable diet[1], its praises of the Gods, its freedom from poverty and war, its innocence of soldiers and law-courts.

But he knows that men's desires are not easily confined within these healthy limits; they will ask for something more: new classes will be added—huntsmen (for Plato does not apparently, like Aristotle, regard hunting as one of the most primitive and natural pursuits), painters, sculptors, poets, actors, dancers, milliners, barbers, nurses, cooks, and finally swineherds. Then physicians will be necessary, and men's unlimited striving for wealth will give birth to war[2], the territory proving too small to satisfy the desires of its now numerous occupants. Then, and not till then, soldiers will be necessary, and they will have to be a separate class, if we are to be faithful to the principle which we adopted at the outset. Thus a body of guardians (φύλακες, 374 D) becomes essential.

To Aristotle the Republic must have seemed to start with a false conception of the State. It is, in his view, precisely the life of the classes which are wanting in the 'genuine and healthy' State of Plato—soldiers, judges, statesmen—that gives the State its value. They are to the rest what the soul is to the body (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.). Without them the State is not really a State. They do not exist to restore health to a 'feverish' society, but to live their own life, which is the true ideal of human life. The State should not be composed of a mass of traders and producers (χρηματιστικοί), protected and schooled by a handful of noble men, but of an adequately numerous

[1] Oxen will be used for ploughing and drawing, and their hides will serve together with the wool of sheep for raiment (370 D–E). Neither sheep nor oxen will apparently be used for food. Cheese, however, is an article of diet (372 C). Swine will not be kept (373 C). With all this Aristotle does not agree. Nature designed the other animals to serve as food for man, as well as to supply him with clothing (Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.).

[2] Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that one kind of war at all events falls within the natural form of the Science of Supply, which does not make an unlimited amount of wealth its aim (Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 23 sqq.).

body of persons capable of living and purposed to live the best life.

The class of guardians are to be to the rest of the State what dogs are to a flock of sheep [1], at once protectors and guides. They must be 'philosophic and spirited and swift and strong' (376 C); they must be brave, truthful, temperate, not fond of money (386–391); and in order that they may possess all these qualities, they must receive a correct 'musical' and gymnastic training. Plato, like Aristotle after him, undertakes a reform of *μουσική* and *γυμναστική*, but his treatment of the subject is in many respects different from that of Aristotle. We notice, in the first place, that while Aristotle concerns himself in the Fifth Book of the Politics only with the musical side of *μουσική*, Plato treats it as including poetry, tune, and rhythm, and pays fully as much attention to the substance and form of its poetic element, as he does to its accompaniment of tune and rhythm (*ᾠδῆς τρόπος καὶ μελῶν*, 398 C: *ῥυθμοί*, 399 E), and to the question of the instruments which are to be used (399 C sqq.). Then again, we observe that the two inquirers approach the subject with different aims. The aim of Plato is to devise a scheme of education which will fit his guardians for the position assigned to them in his State: the aim of Aristotle is to produce a class of citizens capable of living the highest and most complete life. Thus Plato is naturally concerned for the most part with the value of *μουσική* as an ethical influence, whereas Aristotle is careful to point out in how many different ways it enriches human life. Plato admits *μουσική* without debate to a prominent place in his scheme of education: Aristotle debates its claims at some length, and learns by debating them how varied are its services to man. When the musical and gymnastic training of the guardians has been fully discussed, the further question arises, how are the rulers to be selected from the ranks of the guardians (412 B)? They must be older than the other guardians,

[1] Ultimately it is the class of 'auxiliaries' who are likened to dogs: the rulers are shepherds (440 D).

they must be wise and capable men (*φρόνιμοι, δυνατοί*), men who feel their interests to be bound up with those of the rest, and whose minds are therefore immovably set on doing that which is best for the whole State; they must be 'lovers of their State and vigilant in their care for it' (*φιλοπόλιδες*, 502 E: *κηδεμόνες τῆς πόλεως*, 412 C)[1]. The ruler must be 'proof against illusion, must keep a strict guard over himself, and never forget the lessons of his "musical" training, but always bear himself well (*εὐσχήμων*), and, whatever happens to him, prove himself rhythmical and harmonious (*εὔρυθμος, εὐάρμοστος*, 3. 413 E)'[2]. He will be 'wise' (*σοφός*) in the sense of 'prudent in deliberation' (*εὔβουλος*), we learn in the Fourth Book (428)—he will possess that kind of science 'which deliberates with a view to the well-being, not of some particular thing in the State, but of the State as a whole, and considers how it should conduct itself, both in its internal relations and in its relations to other States' (428 C)[3]. Such will be the character of the 'complete guardians' (414 B); the younger guardians will be the 'auxiliaries' (*ἐπίκουροι*) carrying their decrees into execution. Below these two classes, the traders and producers (*χρηματιστικοί*) form a third, and the three classes together make up the State.

In order that there may be nothing to render the rulers and their auxiliaries otherwise than as good as possible, or to incline them to act wrongfully (*κακουργεῖν*) by the other citizens (3. 416 C), they must not possess any property of their own, not even a house or a treasury (*ταμιεῖον*)

[1] We are reminded of the Pythagorean dictum already referred to (above, p. 379), that 'rulers must not only be men of knowledge, but loving to those they rule' (cp. Rep. 412 D).

[2] If we turn to the Seventh Book (522 A), we shall find the training here prescribed treated as inadequate and other than that which produces philosophers. It is a mere training through habit and produces, not a knowledge of principles, but only an instinctive grace of character (*εὐρυθμία, εὐαρμοστία*, 522 A). This is said of *μουσική*.

[3] Compare Ephor. Fragm. 67 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 254), where Ephorus, after noticing the shortness of the period during which the Thebans retained their ascendency in Greece, adds—*αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς.*

—treasuries, we learn in the Eighth Book (550 D), are the ruin of timocratic States like the Lacedaemonian—and they must receive year by year only just that amount of necessaries which they need for their own use (416 D sqq.); they must not possess or even use gold and silver, in the form of coin or in any other form. Once let them be owners of land, and houses, and coin, and they will pass their lives hating and hated by their fellow-citizens and in daily fear of violence (417 A sq.)[1]. Later on, in the Fourth Book (423 E), a hint is dropped that, so far as these two classes are concerned, not only property but also women and children will be as far as possible, like the goods of friends, in common.

When Adeimantus remarks that the guardians will be more like a garrison of hired auxiliaries than citizens—pauper protectors of happy householders rather than themselves happy men, the Platonic Socrates in effect replies that if they live up to their position, there is no reason why they should not be the happiest members of the community. Their duties will be—to keep both wealth and poverty[2] away from the State; to preserve the unity of the State without unduly contracting its dimensions, so that it shall be neither over-small nor yet, like many large States, two States in one; to make such transfers from the trading and producing class to the class of guardians and *vice versa* as will secure that every one shall have the work to do for which he is fit, and thus that the State

[1] It has been already noticed (above, p. 159 note), that while here in the Third Book the reason why the two higher classes are to hold everything in common is that otherwise they may be tempted to wrong the rest of the citizens and to earn their hatred by so doing, Plato assigns another reason in the Fifth Book (464)—the prevention of disharmony in the ranks of the two higher classes: if the members of these classes are at one, he says (465 B), the other citizens are sure to be so too.

[2] Similarly in the soul the rational and spirited elements are to take charge of the appetitive element and to prevent its growing over-large and over-strong on a diet of bodily pleasure (4. 442 A); or rather (9. 571 E), to lull it to sleep by taking care that it has neither more nor less than its due share of nutriment, so that it may not trouble the best element of the soul by its joy or grief, but leave it to pursue its investigations in peace.

shall be one (423 D); but, above all, to attend to the rearing and education of the young—the children of the two upper classes are apparently referred to—and to see that this undergoes no change.

The State which has now been constructed is pronounced to be good and normal, and all others to be bad and aberrant from the normal type (5. 449 A): it is the best possible (4. 434 E), perfectly good (*τελέως ἀγαθή*, 4. 427 E). Justice must consequently exist within it; and after a short search it is identified, and found to be—both in the soul of the individual human being and in the State—the fulfilment by each part of its appropriate function (*τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν*).

So far the first four books of the Republic carry us, and even in them we seem to rise from time to time above the plane of Socratic thought. We are not, indeed, far from the Socratic point of view, when the wisdom which the rulers are required to possess is explained to be 'wisdom in deliberation' (*εὐβουλία*, 428 B), or a knowledge how the State should behave to itself and other States (428 C–D), though Socrates would have described the art of governing rather as a knowledge how to make men better. We feel ourselves further from the Socratic stand-point, however, when the ruler is required to know how to act so as to preserve the harmony of the parts of the State (443 E: cp. 442 C), for the conception of the State as a Whole composed of parts which need to work harmoniously together is rather Platonic or Pythagorean than Socratic. Right action, in Plato's view, is not the outcome simply of knowledge, but springs, in the case of an individual, from the co-operation of the parts of the soul—in the case of a State, from the co-operation of its elements. Not only must the ruling element of the soul possess knowledge, but it must be seconded by the spirited element, and even the lowest section must have virtue of a certain kind. And so in the State the virtue of the rulers must be supported by virtue in the second class and virtue in the third. There are irrational elements present both in the soul and in the State, which may be so constituted

as to refuse obedience to reason, and their co-operation is essential to a satisfactory result. In the State the third class—as in the soul the appetitive nature—is fully a member of the κοινωνία, though a subordinate member. The traders and producers (χρηματιστικοί) are citizens and parts of the Whole, so long as they do their part and refrain from meddling with the work of others. When they insist on ruling, as in an oligarchy or democracy, it is as if the appetitive element claimed supremacy in the soul.

The aspiration of Plato in the first four books of the Republic is for a State in which the mass of the citizens are content to live the life of production and trade for which alone they are fit, and look for protection and guidance to a comparatively small soldier-class specially trained to find in an educated sense of proportion and harmony the secret of courage and temperance, and saved from temptations to misrule by holding women, children, and property in common—a class which in its turn accepts the rule of its wisest members, men who consecrate their lives to the good of the State as a whole, and rule in such a way as to maintain the co-operation of the three classes, and yet, notwithstanding their pre-eminence in wisdom, regard the two other classes as fellow-citizens and brothers.

The interruption of Polemarchus and Adeimantus at the beginning of the Fifth Book forms, however, as has often been noticed, a turning-point in the course of the dialogue. Some[1] hold that the three books which intervene between the Fourth and Eighth, whatever the date of their composition, found no place in the original scheme of the dialogue, and are a subsequent addition. It is difficult, however, to suppose that the bold communistic proposals of the Republic were adopted without more discussion than they receive in the Third and Fourth Books, or that the assimilation of the occupations of men and women formed no part of the earlier draft; and we gather from a passing expres-

[1] Krohn has argued elaborately for this view in his instructive book, 'Der Platonische Staat' (Halle, 1876).

sion in the Third Book (416 B, *τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄξιον διϊσχυρίζεσθαι . . . τῆς ὀρθῆς παιδείας, ἥτις ποτέ ἐστιν*), that the Platonic Socrates is even then not absolutely certain that the whole truth has been uttered as to the best education for a guardian [1]. So again, we find at the close of the same book, that the question of the selection of rulers and guardians (*ἡ ἐκλογὴ καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων*) has as yet been dealt with only in outline (*ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας*, 3. 414 A). Perhaps the interruption of Polemarchus and Adeimantus assures Socrates for the first time of the keen interest they take in the discussion—or perhaps it was necessary to avoid mixing up the search for justice with highly debatable matter, and to bring it to a close without unreasonable delay; at any rate, in the Fifth Book Socrates gives utterance to three great paradoxes in succession, of only one of which—the proposal of a communistic plan of life for the guardians—have we had even a hint before. The two others —the identification of the pursuits of the men and women of the guardian class, and the choice of carefully trained philosophers as rulers—are altogether new. The question how the constitution already described can be realized —how it is to be brought into existence—furnishes the occasion for the utterance of the last and greatest of the three paradoxes. It cannot be brought into being, till philosophers are kings, or kings become philosophers (5. 471 C: 472 E sqq.) [2]. These are the lowest terms on which it can

[1] It should also be noticed that the Third Book (402) allows no man to be truly *μουσικός*, who has not learnt from his study of *μουσική* to discern the 'essential forms' (*εἴδη*) of temperance, courage, and other virtues, so that there would seem to be a philosophical element even in the study of *μουσική*, notwithstanding what we are told in 7. 522 A.

[2] If Themistius may be trusted, Aristotle dissented from Plato's doctrine that kings should be philosophers—*φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ οὐχ ὅπως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φάσκων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμποδών, τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀληθινῶς ἐντυγχάνειν εὐπειθῆ καὶ εὐήκοον* (Aristot. Fragm. 79. 1489 b 8 sqq.). In the Fourth Book of the Politics, however, he seems to regard philosophy as the best security, in the case of citizen-rulers at all events, for the right use of leisure (4 (7). 15). He appears also to have recommended the study of philosophy in the *Προτρεπτικός* which he addressed to Themison, King of the Cyprians (Aristot. Fragm. 47. 1483 a 39: Heitz, die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 208).

be realized (cp. 473 B, *τίνος ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις*). The subject of the choice of rulers is now taken up again and considered afresh (*τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ*, 6. 502 E). It now appears that it is not enough for the ruler to have acquired an unerring sense of proportion and harmony in feeling and action (*εὐρυθμία*, *εὐαρμοστία*), an unshakeable devotion to the good of the State: he must be tested not only in labours and fears and pleasures, but in studies (503 D); the 'perfect guardian' is a philosopher (503 B), and we must take care that ours becomes one. He cannot do so unless he starts with great natural gifts—a tenacious memory, quickness to learn, breadth and elevation of mind, a gracious and measured nature (*ἔμμετρος καὶ εὔχαρις*, 486 D), an instinctive love of truth, justice, courage, and temperance (487 A). His keenness to get to the heart of things (*ἀλήθεια*, 490 A) is the central feature of his character and the source from which his moral excellence flows. Eager to pass beyond the shows of things to their inner reality, he presses on from the varying and manifold forms of the just (*τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια*) to its unmixed and unchanging essence or idea; he traces the just up to its source in the Idea of Good, which is also the source of all existence, and acquires from contact with that which truly exists (*τὸ ὄντως ὄν*)—the only sure source—a healthy and orderly character, temperance, courage, and the rest of the virtues (490 A–C). His virtue, unlike that of those who are only virtuous through habit (522 A: 619 C), has a firm foundation in knowledge. He has seen 'that which is just and beautiful and temperate' both as it exists by nature and as it exists among men (501 B), and has a 'divine pattern' in his soul to guide him in fashioning the State over which he rules and the characters of its citizens (500 C sqq.); no hand but his can make the State happy and dear to God (500 E sqq.). He is the true guardian, the true 'designer of constitutions' (*ζωγράφος*

Not a few Romans probably held that philosophy was hardly a study for a future ruler (Suet. Nero, c. 52: Tac. Agric. c. 4).

πολιτειῶν, 500 E), the true 'saviour of the constitution' (502 D). Plato evidently has hopes that some son of a king or potentate (δυνάστης) may arise, fit to be made a philosopher, at whose hands citizens would be willing to accept the constitution which he has described (502 A–B)[1]. He feels, indeed, that the permanent presence of an element of this kind in the State is essential (497 C).

Thus rule is now given, not, as before, to men possessed of mere deliberative wisdom (εὔβουλοι), knowing how the State should behave to itself and to other States, but to men of high natural excellence trained in a long series of studies calculated to evoke thought and draw it in the direction of true Being. The creation of a class of this kind is not only the 'Open, Sesame' of the Republic—the condition of its being brought into existence—but also, it would seem, the condition of its satisfactory working, for Plato appears to hold that the permanent rulers of the State must be men of this type.

As early as the age of 20 (537 B), at the close of the period of pure gymnastic training, the youths who have shone most in their musical and gymnastic studies are parted from the rest and treated with special distinction, and have their attention called to the inter-connexion of the various branches of science and their relation to true Being. From this select body a further selection is made on the completion of the thirtieth year, and those are picked out and surrounded with especial honour who successfully undergo a dialectical test, and prove most capable of leaving sight and sense behind, and penetrating with sureness to that which truly exists. Five years are to be devoted by them to the exclusive study of Dialectic; fifteen more are to be given to the acquisition of practical experience in military commands and posts suitable for young men (νέων ἀρχαί, 539 E); and then at the age of 50 those who have survived all these tests and come out best both in practical work and in scientific study (ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις, 540 A)

[1] Dion, according to Plutarch (Dion, c. 53), attempted some bold constitutional innovations at Syracuse.

are to be bidden to lift up their eyes and look on that which is the source of light to all, the Idea of Good, and using it as a pattern, to order for the rest of their lives the State and private men and themselves, each ruling in turn[1]. They will pass most of their time in philosophic pursuits, but when the proper season comes, they will not shrink from the disagreeables of a political life, but consent to govern from a feeling of duty to the State and as a thing rather necessary than noble or glorious (540 A–B).

It is under their auspices, and theirs only, that our ideal State can come into existence. Let men of this type, once in power, 'send off into the country all those who are over ten years of age' and 'train the remainder in their own ways of life, being those which we have described[2]. Brought into being in this, the shortest and easiest, manner, our State will both itself enjoy happiness and be a blessing to the race in which it arises' (541 A). These are among the closing words of the Seventh Book.

Throughout the dialogue the question how the State is to be made at one with itself and happy seems to be even more prominent than the question how it is to be made to produce virtue. True, Plato asks (Rep. 456 E)—'Is there anything better for a State than that women and men as excellent as possible should be produced in it?'—but shortly after (462 A) he also asks: 'Can we name any greater evil for a State than that which tears it asunder and makes it many States in place of one, or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?' Perhaps, indeed, the two things are hardly separable; it is virtue that gives unity to the State, unity that gives it virtue. But we feel that nothing comes home more to Plato than the disunion of all existing States (for even in the Lace-

[1] Plato speaks of his ideal State as assuming the form of a Kingship or an Aristocracy, according as one of the rulers, or more, possesses transcendent excellence (4. 445 D): in the Ninth Book, however, it is called a *βασιλευομένη πόλις* (576 D).

[2] This is evidently a softened version of the sentence which Heraclitus passed on the Ephesians for expelling Hermodorus (see Diog. Laert. 9. 2: and above, p. 263 note).

daemonian State (547 C) the two upper classes are at enmity with the third, which they have conquered in war), and that he has nothing more at heart than to make his State not two States but one (423 D). He shows infinite ingenuity in devising means for securing this end. His main reliance is placed on justice, or, in other words, the correct distinction of social function, but no care in the selection and education of the two upper classes will suffice, if they are not set free from the temptations which come with the possession of households and several property. Then the original sketch of the education of the rulers is revised: it is not enough that they should be trained to rhythm and harmony—they must have learnt virtue from contact with 'that which really exists.' They must have learnt that there is a life which is better than the life of a ruler, and come to the task of ruling with reluctance[1]. No such class exists at present in any State; a wholly new class needs to be created. When it exists, men will not hesitate to accept its authority. If at present illegitimate claimants grasp at power, it is because the true rulers do not exist.

Plato holds up his ideal constitution not only as the best —which is all that Aristotle claims for his—but as the only normal form (449 A), realizable whenever and wherever a class of this kind can be brought into existence. The Eighth and Ninth Books illustrate the consequences of its depravation or absence[2]. Power falls into worse and worse hands. The review of actual constitutions given in these books is

[1] Rep. 520 E, *εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ ἄρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη.*

[2] There is much in them which carries our thoughts back rather to the Second, Third, and Fourth Books than to the Seventh. *Μουσική* to our surprise regains the credit which it had lost in the Seventh Book (522 A), where it is treated as a mere education of habit, not communicating science. In the Eighth Book, on the contrary, the decline from the ideal State begins with the rule of *ἀμουσότεροι φύλακες* (546 D), and reason mingled with *μουσική* (*λόγος μουσικῇ κεκραμένος*, 549 B: cp. 560 B) is declared to be the true preservative of virtue, the true qualification for rule. On the other hand, there are passages in the Ninth Book (e. g. 585 B sqq.: 586 A, *πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν κ.τ.λ.*, cp. 7. 525 D) which are more in the spirit of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Books.

designed to show that all States other than that in which justice reigns are unhappy, and increasingly unhappy, the further they are removed from the ideal model, and it naturally places them before us in a sombre light. The Lacedaemonian State still retains a few features of the ideal community: the distinction of social functions (or justice) so far survives there that the soldier is marked off from the cultivator and trader; the old respect for magistrates, the old military habits of life, the old interest in *γυμναστική* also survive. But the third class has been enslaved, separate households and property have been introduced, the class of 'wise men' (*σοφοί*) has been corrupted and has lost its hold of power. The State is in the hands of men in whom the spirited element rules, contentious and ambitious men (*φιλόνεικοι καὶ φιλότιμοι*, 551 A). The *régime* is one of perpetual war, and love of money has come in with the decline of communism.

In the oligarchy the money-getting spirit has won complete mastery. Rich men rule over spendthrifts whose purses they have drained: all but the rulers are poor (552 D). Functions are no longer distinguished; the soldier is also a cultivator or a trader. The oligarchical State is weak for war, for it is really two States—a State of the rich and a State of the poor—and it dares not arm its poor. It is in the oligarchy that the drone, stinged or stingless, or in other words, the idle spendthrift (564 B), is first engendered.

Democracy is rather the rule of the stinged drones than of the many. There are three classes in a democracy—the drones, stinged and stingless; rich money-making orderly men; and a large body of poor labouring men, who seldom assemble together, but are all-powerful when they do. The drones of a democracy are far more formidable than those of an oligarchy, being now admitted to office, and they plunder the rich for the benefit of the poor. This is one feature of a democracy; another is its excess of liberty. A democracy is organized anarchy. We do not learn why the supremacy of the third class (the *χρηματιστικοί*)

should be accompanied by this excessive impatience of control.

Anarchy leads by a natural reaction to tyranny[1]. The people loves to have a champion; democracy commonly means the supremacy of an individual (565 C); and the champion easily passes into a tyrant. Many of the touches in Aristotle's well-known picture of tyranny will be found to have been drawn from Plato's sketch of the tyrant, if the two are compared.

Plato speaks throughout of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny as if there were only one form of each, and that the most extreme form. He is naturally led by the aim he has in view to make the worst of each of these constitutions. We must not look for scientific exactness in these vigorous sketches, which have a perennial truth and value; Plato's aim is rather to show the misery of misrule than to trace with accuracy the path of constitutional change, or to reproduce every *nuance* of the various constitutions (Rep. 548 D). When Aristotle, at the close of his book on Political Change, brings his unrivalled knowledge of the facts of constitutional change in Greek States to bear on Plato's brilliant series of dissolving views, we feel that his matter-of-fact criticisms, however cogent they may be, are rather thrown away.

Remarks.

Socrates had not designed an ideal State, but simply pointed to the Lacedaemonian State or to Solonian Athens. Plato reverted to the old practice, and the fact that he did so indicates an increased dissatisfaction with the actual State. The Republic is written from 'the fulness of the heart'—with a keen sense of the need of moral and political reform; far more so than the Politicus, more so perhaps than even the Laws. Hence in part its boldness of touch, its breadth of treatment, and the novelty of the remedies it suggests.

Plato knows that moral and political improvement must

[1] Did Plato think that Athens would end in a tyranny?

go hand in hand, and thus while he seeks to persuade men of the happiness of virtue and the misery of vice, his criticism is especially directed to existing political institutions, which he thought had much to do with the moral shortcomings of the age. He spares much that is merely Hellenic and temporary, and rejects much that experience has shown to stand on a far firmer basis, much that many would say is broadly human and for all time. He is for a State of small extent with a city at its centre, for games and festivals and athletic contests, for State-control over religion —so far he follows Hellenic traditions. The institutions which he challenges are mostly not specially Hellenic, but the common property of all ages and countries—the household, the right of several property, the distinction between the occupations of men and women, the drama. He requires wealth and numbers to submit to a denial of the claims which they have at all times and everywhere made to political authority.

The faulty distribution of political rights in all existing Greek communities did much, in his view, to destroy the unity of the State, and to make the rise of the only class that could redeem it—the philosophic class—impossible and hopeless (497 A sqq.). The Greek States were ruled either by harsh soldiers, pugnacious and keen for personal distinction, like the Spartans, or by rapacious oligarchs, demagogues, or tyrants. The rule of the few meant the *exploitation* of the many by the rich. The rule of the many meant anarchy, political and moral, and the spoliation of the rich. The rule of the tyrant meant misery even to the tyrant himself.

The picture which Plato draws in the Republic of the political state of Greece is probably too dark, for we know from Aristotle's testimony that moderate forms of oligarchy and democracy did exist, and that the extreme form of democracy can hardly have found a place in many States (Aristot. Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.). Yet Aristotle himself dwells on the intolerance of compromise, the determination not to share power with others, but to crush them or be

crushed by them, which had come to prevail in men's minds (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 40 sqq.).

Changes of character seemed to Plato to be needed in all ranks. The producing and trading classes must be just—that is, they must be content to do their own work without meddling with matters too high for them—and temperate—that is, they must be willing to accept the rule of their betters. If they were excluded from office, they were none the less citizens for that; they were citizens and members of the Whole[1], but that Whole must be 'vitalized,' if we may use the word, by two added classes—the one designed to fight, the other to rule. Far the larger part of the best State[2] was to be of very ordinary material, but it was to be headed with silver, and its tip was to be of the very purest gold. The fighting and ruling classes must be distinct—not identical, as Hippodamus had made them—and they must be educated in an altogether novel way and live an altogether novel kind of life. So far as they are concerned, the household and the right of several property must be abolished. Plato speaks, indeed, of an extension of the household tie, but the practical result of his proposals would be its abolition. So long as the guardian classes had wives and children and property of their own, they would not rule so as to win the love of the mass of the population, nor would they be united in feeling among themselves or a source of union to the rest. Private households and property were a fruitful source of litigation and disagreement (464 D), and we learn from a curious passage[3], how keenly Plato felt the weariness of the task of caring for children and providing the wherewithal for the maintenance of a

[1] Cp. Rep. 552 A, *μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἱππέα μήτε ὁπλίτην.*

[2] Rep. 428 E sq.: cp. 442 A, where the appetitive part of the soul, which corresponds to *τὸ χρηματιστικόν* in the State, is said to be the largest portion of it.

[3] Rep. 465 C, *τά γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσίων, ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ὅσας ἐν παιδοτροφίαις καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἐξαρνούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναῖκάς τε καὶ οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὅσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἷα πάσχουσι, δεινά τε δὴ καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.*

household, though freedom from this burden is, he sees, a comparatively small matter. The proposal to assimilate the pursuits of women and men was probably suggested in part by the teaching of Socrates[1]. Of course, the establishment of communism was thus facilitated, and the regulation of women's lives made more easy. The luxurious life of the women had done much to ruin the Lacedaemonian State, and Plato probably desired to prevent the same cause being fatal to his own ideal community.

Even these sweeping changes, however, would not suffice without an entire change in the education of the soldiers and rulers of the State. There was much that was wrong in the poetry and music which formed the most potent element in the education of the day. The poets sang of Gods who were the cause of evil to men, and who were deceivers and false. They sapped men's courage by their ill pictures of Hades, men's self-control by their wailings for the noble dead and their representations of excessive mirth. The true μουσική makes men brave, orderly, and temperate (424 E, ἔννομοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι)—correct in a thousand little matters which law cannot reach or touch (425 A–B). The State must keep an eye on all the arts, but especially on poetry and music, and see that they 'moralize their song' and teach men to know virtue in all its forms, and also vice in all its forms, as they know their alphabet (402 A–C). The drama is to be excluded. The education of those who are to rule is only to cease at the age of thirty-five, and in it all studies which lead the mind in the direction of true Being are to find a place—especially Mathematics and Dialectic. Contact with true Being and, above all, with the Idea of Good is the secret of complete virtue.

[1] Socrates had said (Xen. Symp. 2. 9) that the nature of women is not inferior to that of men, but only falls short of it in wisdom and strength (γνώμης καὶ ἰσχύος). The tendency of the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue was to discourage distinctions between the virtue of men and the virtue of women, such as that implied in a saying of Gorgias (Fragm. 17: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 145), which Thucydides had tacitly amended in a famous sentence of one of his speeches (2. 45. 4).

Plato's hope is that if the State were once absolutely in the hands of rulers possessed of high natural gifts, yet saved from the corruption which ordinarily befel the possessor of such gifts, trained from their earliest years to be temperate, orderly, and gentle, as well as brave[1], devoted to the wellbeing of the State as a whole, and freed from all disturbing influences of relationship and property—rulers mature in age and experience, and knowing what goodness and temperance and justice are as only philosophers can know this—the political problem would be found to have been solved. Rulers of this type would not oppress the ruled, and their authority would be willingly accepted by all. Disunion would vanish, the State would be not two but one, and 'peace with virtue' would bring happiness[2].

The thought which underlies Plato's project of a State is that the mass of men are fit only for industrial or trading pursuits, and should leave the defence of the State to a small separate class, and the government of it to a still smaller class selected from the fighting class. Indeed, he thinks that the mass only grasps at political power when the holders of it are unworthy of their position. Let these be all they should be, and the common herd will gladly leave politics to them. There is a kernel of truth in this view, and Aristotle has said something not very dissimilar (e. g. Pol. 2. 7. 1267 b 5 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11–1319 a 4). It is the organization of Plato's State in detail, that is so startling; the broad conceptions on which it rests may be so stated as to lose all appearance of paradox. If Plato had said that the main stress of ruling must be borne by

[1] Cp. Plato, Politicus 306.

[2] Spinoza says (Tractat. Pol. 5. 2): 'certum est quod seditiones, bella, legumque contemptio sive violatio non tam subditorum malitiae, quam pravo imperii statui imputanda sunt. . . . Si itaque in una civitate malitia magis regnat, pluraque peccata committuntur, quam in alia, certum est id ex eo oriri, quod talis civitas non satis concordiae providerit, nec iura satis prudenter instituerit.' But he does not go so far as to say that internal harmony is out of the question in the absence of rulers of heroic or angelic mould.

a few well-selected, highly gifted, well-trained natures devoted to the common good and distracted by no private interests, knowing what is great and excellent in human life and ordering everything with a view to it, valuing goodness more than wealth or distinction or empire, and supported by the love of a people conscious of its own inferiority and content to till the soil, or trade, or fight, and to leave ruling to those who understand it—we should have recognized the substantial basis of truth which underlies his social ideal, and not have lost sight of it in marvelling at the strangeness of his machinery.

It is another question whether a State of this kind, composed to a large extent of men who are content to be ruled by others, and who neither take nor are fit to take any part in guiding the State to which they belong —who are, in fact, rather in the State than of it—is really the highest type of State that can be imagined. We may feel inclined to agree with Aristotle that it is not.

Influence of the Republic on the political philosophy of Aristotle.

But the 'Republic' formed a turning-point in the history of Greek political philosophy, and gave it a direction which it was slow to lose. The political philosopher was to be no mere apathetic analyst of social phenomena, but the watchful physician of the State, unflinching in his diagnosis of its maladies and outspoken in pointing to the true remedy. The political philosophy of Greece would perhaps have gained in many ways, if its aim had been less practical. The broad, profound principles which it asserts would not have been buried in ephemeral detail. Its theoretical basis would have been more firm, more consistent, more fully thought out. But it would have lost something of 'actuality'; its authors would no longer claim our sympathy, as men keenly interested in the wellbeing of their race and eager to help it through its difficulties. They might perhaps be profounder anatomists of society, but they would hardly impress us to the same extent as good citizens concerned for the future of their country. The greatest master

of political inquiry that had yet appeared in Greece gave in the 'Republic' a clear intimation to his successors in that field, that Political Philosophy was to keep watch on the maladies of the age, and to try to heal them: the political philosopher in Greece was to be all and more than all that the prophet had been to another people. When Plato discovered that the remedies suggested in the Republic were impracticable, he wrote the Laws in the hope of doing better service to his generation, and was prepared even to depict a 'third State'; his intention was to be useful to his time and country, even if, as a matter of fact, his least ideal State was too ideal to be of much practical service to existing communities (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 33 sqq.). It is from Plato that Aristotle inherits the practical aim of his Political Philosophy.

So again it is from Plato that Aristotle inherits the plan of depicting an ideal State, though, unlike Plato in the Republic, he does not claim that his 'best State' is universally applicable, or the only normal State. He inherits Plato's conception of πολιτική as ordering everything in the State—supreme over law, economy, rhetoric, and strategy, and also apparently over poetry and the arts, though Aristotle would leave to poetry and music a far greater freedom of development than Plato was prepared to allow them. To him, as to Plato, Scientific Knowledge is essential to the ruler, though of a different kind from that which Plato insisted that he should possess. He inherits Plato's view of the State as a Whole, whose parts must be adapted to each other and to the work they have to do, if the Whole is to prosper, though he criticises the co-ordination of parts in Plato's Republic as imperfect, and not such as to secure happiness either to the Whole or to its parts. He approves the view that the individual citizen ought to consider himself as belonging to the State and not to himself, though he holds that no sacrifice of the individual's happiness should be involved in this, whereas Plato's scheme involved, in his opinion, a sacrifice of this kind. Like Plato, again, he places trading, industrial,

and agricultural functions in other hands than those to which he entrusts the defence of the State, and also marks off the military class from that to which he assigns the duties of government. Both followed, or rather improved upon, the tradition of the Lacedaemonian State in this matter.

But if the 'Republic' has left many traces of its influence in the political philosophy of Aristotle, Aristotle is by no means prepared to accept the State depicted in it as the ideal State, even if he could regard the portraiture of an ideal State, or indeed of two or three of them, as an adequate treatment of Political Philosophy.

Points in which the political teaching of Aristotle diverged from that of the Republic.

While Plato had regarded his State as realizable wherever a body of true philosophers, or even a single philosopher-king, could be brought into existence and entrusted with power, Aristotle admits that his best State can only be realized under quite exceptional circumstances—only where Fortune and Nature conspire with the lawgiver to bring it into being (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.). Plato himself, when he wrote the Laws, had come to see that he had taken too sanguine a view of human nature in the Republic, and had given to philosophic men powers which can only be given with safety to 'gods and the children of gods.' Aristotle saw far more clearly than Plato how seldom institutions of at all an ideal cast can be applicable to average communities, and hence it is that he takes far greater pains than Plato to show how even the least favoured community may improve its institutions and come to enjoy a tolerable political organization. He is far from holding his best constitution to be the only normal (*ὀρθή*) constitution. Every constitution is normal which is just and for the common good. The State is a thing that may legitimately assume a variety of forms. Some of these are better than others; the Absolute Kingship and the Aristocracy are better than the Polity. But even the deviation-forms have their better and worse types, and it is a great thing to have shown a deviation-form of the worst type how to become a deviation-form of a better type, or even how to become not too intolerable to last. Aristotle appears to set more store by tolerable

constitutions than Plato: to him the difference between a tolerable constitution and a bad one is immense. Even democrats, he feels, may be glad to learn how to construct a democracy that will last, and it is as much the business of Political Philosophy to tell them how to do this as to depict an ideal State.

But then Aristotle also thinks that Plato's State is not the best possible State. In the first place, he objects to Plato's organization of his three classes, as leaving the two upper classes in an insecure position. If the third class, he says (Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 17), is to live a communistic life like the two others, it will have all the moral advantages which, according to Plato, accompany such a life; it will be too like the other classes to profit by their rule, as inferiors profit by the rule of superiors; indeed it will not submit to their rule, unless special precautions are taken. If, on the other hand (and this Aristotle had in an earlier passage —c. 4. 1262 a 40 sq.—rightly taken to be Plato's meaning), the third class is not to live a communistic life, but to have private households and rights of property like the rest of the world, then Plato's State will be just what he wishes it not to be—two States in one—for the two parts of its citizen-body will be living entirely different lives; one of them will be as it were a garrison, while the other will be the real citizens. So again, on this hypothesis, the third class will be fully exposed to all the drawbacks, such as litigation and squabbles, which are said by Plato to attach to private households and property; indeed, when Plato says that not many laws will be needed in his State, seeing how good an education he provides for it (Rep. 425 B sqq.), it must not be forgotten that he has provided only for the education of the two upper classes. Uneducated as it is, the third class will have the lands of the State in its hands, subject only to the payment to the two others of a portion of the produce; it will be more aspiring and unmanageable than the class of Helots in the Lacedaemonian State. If, on the other hand—a third supposition —Plato's plan is that the members of the third class shall

have lands of their own but women in common, other difficulties will arise.

At all events, the whole subject of the social and political status of the third class should have been fully treated, and their constitutional organization, their training, and the laws under which they are to live, should have been clearly set forth. For the existence of the society which the two upper classes form (*τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν*, 1264 a 40) depends on the character of those who compose the third class. If this class is not as submissive and fitted for its position as it should be, the superstructure will collapse. In full accordance with the view here expressed, Aristotle commits in his Fourth Book the functions discharged by Plato's third class, not to Hellenes, but to non-Hellenes whose submissiveness can be relied on[1]. So far from according even a nominal citizenship to those who discharge 'necessary work' in his State, Aristotle makes many of them slaves.

Then again (he continues) in Plato's State the same persons always rule. This is the best arrangement in the abstract, no doubt[2], but then rulers can seldom be found possessing the commanding superiority, mental and physical (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq.), which alone can justify this distribution of power, or make it agreeable to the ruled. The Absolute King of Aristotle is to do so, but evidently Aristotle does not expect Plato's first class to stand in the same relation of overwhelming superiority to those they rule as his Absolute King. If they do not do so, however, Plato's rulers will hardly win willing obedience from a spirited and warlike class, like his second class.

The very measure which Plato thinks would do most to bind the two upper classes together and to promote unity of feeling throughout their ranks—the abolition, so far as they are concerned, of the household and several property

[1] The *γεωργοί* of Aristotle's State, at all events, were to be non-Hellenic, if serfs (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.), and would probably be mainly so, if slaves. The *ἔμποροι* are also *ξένοι*, which does not, however, necessarily imply that they are non-Hellenic.

[2] This opinion is expressed by Aristotle in Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 37 sqq.

—would, in Aristotle's opinion, have the contrary effect. It would not be productive of concord and affection, but the reverse. Less care also would be bestowed on children and property, the pleasures of life would be diminished, and the State would be morally the poorer for the loss of opportunities for the exercise of some important virtues. The State exists to make men happy by giving full scope and play to all virtuous tendencies of human nature. Plato forgets this, when he takes the 'flower of his flock' and deprives them of all real relatives. He requires them to live without wives or daughters or sisters, without sons or brothers; they are not even to have the means of helping a friend in distress; he expects them, in fact, to live a life that cannot be lived by man (2. 5. 1263 b 29).

The initial failure of the Republic, however, is its failure to understand the true nature of the citizen. The citizen, as Aristotle is careful to show at the beginning of the Third Book, is a man who shares in deliberative and judicial office; he is a man who is capable, not only of being ruled, but of ruling. The members of Plato's second and third classes are excluded from all share in government and held to be unfit to rule; yet they are accounted citizens by Plato. It would be impossible to say of all the citizens of the Republic what Aristotle says of the citizen of the best State (3. 13. 1284 a 1), that 'they are able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life of virtue.' If Plato ascribes to his third class the virtues of temperance and justice, Aristotle holds that men in their position, when they possess these virtues, possess them in a form quite distinct from that in which they are possessed by the ideal citizen, for the justice and temperance they possess will be the sort of justice and temperance possessed by 'one who is ruled' (ὁ ἀρχόμενος)[1], whereas the citizen both rules and is ruled. Put in its simplest form, Aristotle's view is that the citizen of a State must have something more than mere passive virtue; he must be able to take a share in guiding its destinies, he must live its full life. Indeed, Aristotle

[1] Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 18 sq.

would hardly allow that full *κοινωνία* exists between men so unequal as the members of the first and third classes of the Republic; yet, if full *κοινωνία* does not exist between them, how can they be fellow-citizens?

Nor is this all. Not only is Plato's best State encumbered with citizens who are not really citizens, but it fails to fulfil the first condition of a best State (4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq.)—it does not realize the most desirable life. The best State is what it is, not because it realizes the maximum of unity, nor even because it makes men virtuous better than any other[1], but because it realizes the highest quality of life—life of the fullest and completest kind (2. 2. 1261 b 10 sqq.). Its citizens must be happy—that is to say, they must have all qualifications, internal and external, for living, and be purposed to live, in the active exercise of all forms of virtue, moral and intellectual; their 'virtuous activity' must be that fully equipped and wholly unimpeded 'virtuous activity' to which alone Aristotle concedes the name of happiness; they must live a life in which the moral virtues work hand in hand with their nobler kin, the intellectual virtues. It is not possible for the State as a whole to live this life, unless some at least of its citizens do so; but where is the class in the Republic that lives it? Not the third class, not the second; not even the first, for this lacks the full provision of external goods which is essential for such a life, and besides, it seems to be intended to live rather for rule over its inferiors than for philosophy, which is to Aristotle the highest aim in life[2]—not even for rule over its likes, but for rule over inferiors. Yet the better the ruled, the better is the rule exercised (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 25, *ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων*). Aristotle's dream is of a State, not composed of protectors and protected, nor even of 'guardians' alone or 'guardians fully provided with external means' alone, but of *σπουδαῖοι*—

[1] Πολιτική, indeed, according to Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 29), not only makes the citizens virtuous, but also *πρακτικοὶ τῶν καλῶν*.

[2] Plato also speaks of the philosophic life as 'better' than the life of ruling (Rep. 520 E).

men of many-sided excellence, intensifying by their mutual relations as parts of a society each other's virtue and happiness, and doing all that can be done for women, children, and the social adjuncts, while they also possess external means in just that amount, neither more nor less, which will enable them to live a life of this kind. His ideal State is not a State of protectors and protected, but is one composed of fully-developed men, rejoicing in each other's manhood. The perfection of their life lies in the fact that they are a large company of σπουδαῖοι, not intermixed with any feebler elements. The best State is that which is all gold, not that which is tipped with gold[1]. If we are to construct a best State, he seems to say, let us construct one which, while it is not impossible, shall be really the best. 'Ten just men' do not make a good State, any more than one swallow makes a summer. The secret of a State's excellence lies in the fact of its consisting of a large body of excellent citizens organized aright. Plato had sacrificed much that makes life worth having without realizing in any one of the three sections of his State the most desirable life.

A broad resemblance, however, exists between the political ideal of Aristotle and that of Plato.

Yet if we note the points in which these two ideals differ, we should also bear in mind their broad resemblance. Both Plato and Aristotle find the secret of political well-being in the supremacy of a rational love of τὸ καλόν over that craving for external goods which carried everything before it in their day, as it has carried everything before it since. The State, they hold, will never be all it might be until its rulers (Aristotle would say, its citizens) count wealth and even distinctions as nothing in comparison with τὸ καλόν—until justice and wisdom are more to them than fame or riches. Both in Aristotle's State and in Plato's, the motives which play so large a part in the State as we know it are to lose their power. The quest of wealth is permitted only to the third class of Plato's State,

[1] The inferior materials which Plato admits into the structure of his State are excluded from the State by Aristotle, and expressly declared not to be among its 'parts.'

and even in their case only within certain limits (Rep. 421 E sq.): Aristotle hopes to bring all his citizens to see that wealth is but a means to higher things, and to abandon its unlimited and irrational pursuit. That love of praise and of distinctions which was the 'last infirmity' of the Greek mind was to be well controlled in both societies. In both the rulers rule well, not because they love wealth, or the praise of men, or social distinctions, not even because they are patriots and lovers of their country, but because they know and love τὸ καλόν, and because they would be unhappy if they did not rule well. They govern aright for the very same reason for which they act aright. Neither Plato's philosophic rulers nor Aristotle's citizens are impeccable, for they are human beings, and their likes perhaps already existed here and there; that which did not as yet exist was an organized body of such men—men in whom the element of desire is overshadowed and permeated by the element of reason. In Plato's State men not of this type would be excluded from power, though not from citizenship; in Aristotle's they would form no part of the citizen-body or the State. Both hold that wise laws will go for little if they do not produce by education and habituation 'wise and understanding' men, who will count wealth and distinction as dross in comparison with virtue. Plato is content if the rulers of the State are men of this stamp; Aristotle, with more consistency, requires that the whole citizen-body shall be so.

The organization of modern States is so elaborate, that we are apt to forget what Plato and Aristotle never forget, that as is the people, so is the State. Their teaching is that institutions are good for little in the absence of great qualities in the nation. Hence the importance which they attach to education and social habit. Modern States leave more to chance, but they are not unconscious of this truth. England knows perfectly well, that its wellbeing mainly depends on the preservation and multiplication of the nobler types of English character.

The Politicus.

The Politicus, whatever its date[1], is concerned with the Statesman (ὁ βασιλικὸς καὶ πολιτικός, Polit. 311 C) and his art, rather than with the State, as indeed its title implies. It does not embarrass itself with an attempt to depict an ideal State, nor does it even inquire, like the Republic, how the true ruler is produced; it merely seeks to point him out, to show what he is and does, and to distinguish him from the false ruler—to part off πολιτικοί rightly so called from the 'rout of Centaurs and Satyrs' (303 C: cp. 292 D), who usurp the name in actual States. Even more than the Republic, it traverses ground already traversed by Socrates, who had inquired 'who the Statesman is' (Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16), though he had not sketched an ideal State. But it deals with the question in an intentionally elaborate and cumbrous way, unlike that in which Socrates probably dealt with it, and the chief part in the conversation is taken by a 'Stranger.' In the Politicus we have to win our way to the political kernel through a husk of logic; and if it is true that in the Republic we approach Politics through Ethics, the two main topics of the Republic are infinitely nearer and more congenial to each other than the two main topics of the Politicus. The latter dialogue seems at least as much intended to illustrate an interesting logical process —that of disentangling the statesman's art from the general mass of things—as to arrive at political truth. The dialectical interest and the political cross each other throughout the dialogue; each seems occasionally to overpower the other. Thus the first and highest object of it is said (Polit. 286 D) to be to 'assert the great method of division according to species,' and to 'make those who take part in the inquiry better dialecticians[2] and more capable of expressing the truth of things' (287 A). Elsewhere, however, Plato seems to be carried away by his interest in some political lesson—the folly, for instance, of regulating the practice of

[1] The refusal to divide mankind into Greeks and barbarians (Polit. 262 D) looks as if it was subsequent, not prior, to the totally different procedure in the Fifth Book of the Republic (470 C–471 B).

[2] This was a frequent aim of Socrates (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 1).

the political art by written rules, when other arts are not so fettered, or the need of harmonizing the two dispositions prominent among men—and then the dialectical interest falls into the background. The eliminative method of the dialogue sets the King or Statesman in strong contrast to unqualified pretenders to rule. The slave, the money-changer, the merchant, ship-owner, and retailer, the hired labourer, the herald and scribe, the diviner, the priest are successively warned off the statesman's province. Plato is sure in the Politicus (290 A) that day-labourers and wage-receivers, retailers and merchants will not claim to possess the political or kingly art; there is more chance of heralds, scribes, prophets, and priests doing so, to say nothing of the 'Centaurs' and 'Satyrs' who commonly bear rule (291 A–B). The fact that rule is in the hands of One or a Few or Many—of the rich or the poor—that it is imposed by force or willingly accepted—that it is exercised in subjection to written law or not so, has nothing to do with its legitimacy or illegitimacy (292 A)[1]. Statesmanship is a science—*ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς*, 292 D—a science to which few, perhaps in reality only one man in a community, can attain. The Statesman is not quite what a shepherd is to his flock, as Socrates said he was: he does not feed those over whom he rules, but rather tends and takes care of them. The comparison of Socrates comes nearer to reproducing the relation of ruler and ruled as it existed in the days of Cronus, than that which prevails now under the sway of Zeus. The test of the true ruler is that he rules with science and justice for men's good, preserving them and making them better (293 D: 297 A sq.).

At this point the listener, whose interruption reminds us of that of Polemarchus in the Republic, betrays his surprise at the proposal that the ruler should govern without law; and the defence of this paradox is one of the most

[1] Contrast Laws 832 B–D, *τούτων* (democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny) *γὰρ δὴ πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, στασιωτεῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι λέγοιντ' ἂν ὀρθότατα, ἑκόντων γὰρ ἑκοῦσα οὐδεμία, ἀλλ' ἀκόντων ἑκοῦσα ἄρχει σὺν ἀεί τινι βίᾳ*—comparing with this latter passage Cic. de Rep. 3. 29. 41: 3. 31. 43.

vigorous portions of the dialogue. The principle of a parallel between πολιτική and other arts lies at the root both of the Politicus[1] and the Republic, but a different lesson is drawn from it in the two dialogues; in the Republic the lesson of specialization, in the Politicus the lesson that the true ruler should not be fettered by law —one which had not been dwelt on in the Republic with equal emphasis or at equal length. But Plato admits that if a King possessed of the Kingly Science and ruling without law is not forthcoming, then the next best thing is Kingship with law, and so he carries us down a scale of States through Aristocracy with Law and Democracy with Law, to Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny without it. Thus while the Politicus, like the Republic, exhibits a scale of States, it groups them more openly in an order of merit and classifies them more carefully: for instance, it distinguishes two forms of Democracy, while the Republic had known but one. The distinction between the two forms, however, is made to rest merely on the observance or non-observance of law, and so is that between Aristocracy and Oligarchy—an account of the matter which can hardly have satisfied Aristotle. Still the fact that a number of constitutions are indicated in this dialogue as tolerable make-shifts, in the absence of the best and only normal one, shows that Plato was increasingly sensible of the difficulty of realizing the latter, and also prepares us for the wider conception of the problem of political philosophy which we find in the Laws and in Aristotle's Politics.

Just as in the Republic the χρηματιστικοί are parts of the Whole and fellow-citizens of the ruling class, so in the Politicus the other arts are co-operators (συναίτιοι) with πολιτική. Yet even the personages who stand nearest to the Statesman—and the possessors of musical, rhetorical, military, and judicial science come far nearer to him than any others—are carefully marked off and distinguished from him at the close of the dialogue. The business of the Statesman is to take his stand high above the practitioners

[1] See e.g. Polit. 298.

of the other arts and to combine their efforts—to weave together all the forces at work in the State (*πάντα ξυνυφαίνει τὰ κατὰ πόλιν*, 305 E)—to wed courage with orderliness in the minds of the ruled, partly by means of education, partly by means of marriage, and to draw them together by instilling into their minds one common opinion as to what is just and unjust, good and evil.

The Politicus works out the Socratic principle of the rule of knowledge with an *ex cathedra* absoluteness which is absent in the Republic. The latter dialogue, while claiming unchecked rule for knowledge, half disarms criticism by pointing out how many noble qualities, moral and intellectual, must be present in one who possesses full knowledge, what a long and arduous training knowledge presupposes, and how great and profound a thing it is, piercing to the central source of Being; and again, how willingly men acquiesce in the rule of those who possess it. In the Politicus no attempt is made to meet the reader halfway on this subject, or to remove his hesitations and doubts: the knowledge for which the right to rule is claimed is merely the 'knowledge how to rule men,' the knowledge how to draw them together—a less august thing than the Science of Being which the Republic enthrones. It is in favour of the possessor of this kind of knowledge that we are called on to sacrifice Law and to accept the autocracy of an individual. Nowhere is the tendency of Plato's political teaching to an autocracy of the One or Few Wise more clearly revealed than in the Politicus. Aristotle, on the contrary, insisted that there is nothing in Law or in a numerous body of citizens interchanging rule, that is incompatible with the true ideal of the State.

Sketch of the State described in the Laws.

We know not what interval of time separates the composition of the Laws from that of the Republic, nor do we know for certain whether the Politicus intervenes chronologically between the two. To some extent the Laws takes up the line of thought suggested in the Politicus. Already in the Politicus we trace a misgiving as to the practica-

bility of the best constitution, for we find certain tolerable forms of constitution other than the best enumerated there; and in the Politicus, as in the Laws, we are taught to fall back on Law in the absence of the heaven-born rulers, who are always scarce and few; the teaching of the Politicus on particular points, again, is echoed in the Laws (compare, for example, Polit. 310 C sqq. with Laws 773 A–D). On the other hand, the stress laid in the Laws on the advantage of government by persuasion reminds us rather of the language of the Republic than of that of the Politicus[1], and no State resembling that of the Laws appears in the list of States given in the Politicus, for though the State of the Laws is a State under the rule of Law, it is not a Kingship, nor an Aristocracy, nor a Democracy; it is rather a mixture of the two latter constitutions with something of Plutocracy or Oligarchy.

There can be no doubt, however, that the dialogue is the work of Plato's old age[2]—an old age overflowing with interest in social and political legislation down to even its minutest details[3], all the more so, perhaps, because Plato

[1] Read the criticism of the timocratic character—*οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι*, Rep. 548 B; and contrast Polit. 293 A, *τούτους δέ γε, ἐάν τε ἑκόντων ἐάν τε ἀκόντων ἄρχωσι . . . νομιστέον κατὰ τέχνην ἠντινοῦν ἀρχὴν ἄρχοντας.*

[2] If it belongs, as Zeller thinks (Plato E. T. p. 548), to the last ten years of his life, it may have been written while his friend Dion was seeking to remodel the constitution of Syracuse on a somewhat similar plan, or after he had perished in the attempt (B.C. 353). *Ἐπενόει δὲ (ὁ Δίων) τὴν μὲν ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν, ὡς οὐ πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ παντοπώλιον οὖσαν πολιτειῶν, κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, κωλύειν (κολούειν ?), Λακωνικὸν δέ τι καὶ Κρητικὸν σχῆμα μιξάμενος ἐκ δήμου καὶ βασιλείας ἀριστοκρατίαν ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν καὶ βραβεύουσαν τὰ μέγιστα καθιστάναι καὶ κοσμεῖν, ὁρῶν καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους ὀλιγαρχικώτερόν τε πολιτευομένους καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πράττοντας* (Plutarch, Dion c. 53).

The fact that Plato wrote that which is by far the longest of his dialogues when a very old man, may partly explain the inconsistencies and other defects which lead Ivo Bruns (in his work 'Plato's Gesetze') to find considerable traces of another hand (that of Philippus of Opus, he thinks) in the dialogue. Some of these defects are so glaring that they would perhaps hardly have escaped a final revision by Plato, and it may be that this final revision was wanting. It is true that inconsistencies occur in dialogues of Plato which must be regarded as intact.

[3] Thus Plato insists on householders rising early and not spending the whole night asleep (807 E sqq.: cp. Hom. Il. 2. 24)—on the

had taken no active part in the politics of his own State. He revels, in fact, in his own ingenuity and fertility of resource to such an extent, that the central ideas of the work run some risk of being lost under a mass of superincumbent detail. Old age, if it had deepened Plato's dogmatism and antipathy to change, adding a slight touch of superstition and some contempt for men and their concerns (803 B sqq.: 804 B), and rendering him somewhat readier to preach or to legislate than to inquire, had not entirely robbed him of his old love of banter, or made him an absolutist, a fanatic, or an ascetic; it had, on the contrary, taught him that the world could get on better out of leading-strings than he had thought, and that to emancipate it in some degree would not necessarily lead to absolute ruin. Thus, while he is now more earnest than ever about Communism (for he says in the Laws that the best State is that in which no one has anything of his own[1], whereas in the Republic only the two upper classes have things in common), he has nevertheless learnt two important lessons: (1) that to give absolute authority even to the best and wisest of men is unsafe[2]; (2) that the social elements of wealth and numbers will not tolerate an entire exclusion from power[3]. Some share of political right must therefore be accorded even to these elements; and he now declines to trust a few gifted and highly trained natures with that absolute power which he had conceded to them in the Republic and the Politicus. How then is good government to be secured under these new conditions? The answer of the dialogue is—by making the whole body of citizens as much as possible what they ought to be—men of measure and moderation (*μέτριοι*),

abandonment, at all events by soldiers, of all coverings for head and feet (942 D) — denounces change even in food (797 E)—declaims against the thoughtlessness of boys (808 D) etc.

[1] Laws 739.

[2] See the passages referred to by Susemihl (Sus.[2], Note 191): Laws 739 A sqq., 807 B, 853 C, 874 E sqq., 691 C sq., 692 B sq., 713 C sq.

[3] Plato even seems inclined, as we have already noticed, to recognize claims to power such as those of physical strength and beauty (Laws 744 B–C), which Aristotle rejects as not directly contributory to the end of the State (Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 23 sqq.).

law-abiding, and religious—by relieving them of all lower functions, by saving them from the corrupting influence of extreme wealth and extreme poverty, by educating them and regulating their life, and also by securing that power shall fall into the hands of the most trustworthy among them, without however allowing unchecked authority to anyone. The citizens of the Laws are far more on an equality with each other than those of the Republic, but even in the Laws it is ultimately, as we shall see, only the Few who are thought by Plato to be fully capable of ruling. To be a citizen is not to him, as it is to Aristotle, to be capable of rule: more and more we discover, as we read further in the dialogue, that Plato still conceives society as an union of unequals, of protectors and protected. The ideal basis of human society to him is the reverence of the inferior for the superior; the ideal organization of society is that which prevailed in the days of Cronus, when men were ruled by gods. We still trace the influence of this ideal in the Laws, though Plato now feels that the rule of men over men cannot be safely assimilated to this model. Reverential submission to autocratic rulers cannot be the keystone of a purely human State; the ruled must in such a State reverence the Law. Law is here to be supreme, and reverence for law is to be more highly honoured than the greatest military services to the State (922 A): the State in which the law is obeyed is enthusiastically eulogized (715 D), though we find a confession elsewhere (875 C sq.: 966 C), that obedience to law is the second-best thing only, and the best a mind which knows and spontaneously cleaves to that which is just and for the common good.

The type of character which the citizen of the Laws is expected to realize is, accordingly, one apt for obedience to Law—a moderate or measured (*μέτριος*[1]) and temperate (*σώφρων*) type. We hear so much of temperance, that the State of the Laws might well seem to be built on this foundation, as that of the Republic is built on justice. It is

[1] *Μετριότης* implies, among other things, freedom from all extravagant and violent desires (Rep. 572 B).

temperance that enables men to deal aright with pain and pleasure, to rest content with a limited authority, and to render a willing obedience to law, and not only to law in its compulsory, but also to law in its suasory form (*νόμος ἀναγκαστικός—συμβουλευτικός*, 930 B: 921 E)—for conformity to law through compulsion is distinguished from hearty acceptance of its persuasions or recommendations (*ἔπαινοι*, 730 B, 773 E: *διδαχὴ καὶ νουθέτησις*, 788 A: *ἐπιτήδευμα*, 808 A). Obedience, however, must further be intelligent, for we find that obedience founded on unintelligent habit is unfavourably contrasted with obedience founded on intelligent comprehension (951 B). Temperance must, therefore, be crowned with moral prudence (*φρόνησις*), for this is the natural guide and complement of the other virtues (688 A sq.); our State must be built upon *τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν* (712 A): nay, we learn, before the dialogue closes, that the supreme control, even in the State of the Laws, must rest with a few philosophical minds, able to discern the One in the Many and to trace the various virtues to their source in the Idea of Good (965 B sqq.). Thus, that approach to an equality among the citizens which we seemed at the outset to detect in the State of the Laws, as contrasted with that of the Republic, ultimately to a great extent disappears: we find that even among the magistrates of the State, while 'some walk by true opinion only,' others 'walk by wisdom' (*φρόνησις*, 632 C); some work at the studies prescribed by the law in an exact and scientific way (818 A), others do not. There is, however, one great difference between the position of philosophers in this State and in the Republic: here they not only rule in obedience to and as ministers of the law (*ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις*, 715 C), but they owe their position in part to the amount of their property, the goodwill of their fellow-citizens, or the chances of the lot, and they will have to render a strict account of their conduct in office.

Virtue in this State will be something far other than the lame and one-sided asceticism of the Lacedaemonians; it

will be based on a fuller experience of life; it will be capable of dealing aright not only with pain but also with pleasure; it will 'draw from the fountains of pain and pleasure, where and when and as much as it ought'[1]. The virtue expected of a citizen of this State will indeed be more complete than that expected of any class in the Republic, except the highest. Virtue, however, will not by itself suffice: morality must become religious; behind and above the laws glimpses must be caught of something still higher (715 E sqq.: 762 E); not (for most of the citizens, at all events) the Idea of Good, but Gods—Gods loving righteousness and hating iniquity. A belief in good gods is evidently held to be for men of the stamp of the citizens of the Laws a more potent motive for right action than respect for Law, or even virtue itself. Virtue must rise into reverence for the gods, if this State is to prosper; a reverence based not so much on what they give as on what they are—on their kinship to that which is best in their worshippers, for if these are, as they should be, measured and orderly (*μέτριοι*), God is 'the measure of all things' (*ἁπάντων μέτρον*) and measured and orderly himself (716 C).

God is conceived by Plato in the Laws, not as the Idea of Good, as elsewhere, for here the Ideas retire into the background, but in the more personal and popular form of 'Soul allied with Reason,' the source of all rational and orderly movement in earth and heaven, the source of correct opinion and right conduct in man, no less than of the ordered movement of the heavenly bodies—nay more, the source of existence in all things (897–899). We are far here from the anthropomorphic, material gods of the popular religion, even though their names are still used by Plato. The distance between man and God has increased[2]: man must walk humbly with the superhuman Power of which he is the chattel or even the plaything. Yet elsewhere, by a far

[1] 636 D (Prof. Jowett's Translation, 4. 157).

[2] See Prof. Lewis Campbell, Introduction to Plato's Statesman, p. xli, in his edition of the Sophistes and Politicus.

closer approach to the popular view[1], Plato speaks of the State as comprehending Zeus and Athene as participants in its constitution (*κοινωνοὶ πολιτείας*, Laws 921 C), so that when a citizen defrauds an artisan of the payment due to him, he breaks asunder the links between the State and the gods, its mighty co-partners[2]. So fully is every relation in this State made to rest on religion.

Ethics, Politics, and Theology seem in the Laws to find a common basis in the idea of 'limit,' from which the transition to the idea of 'the tempered,' in character and government, is easy: we find *τὸ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ξύμμετρον* contrasted with *τὸ ἄκρατον* (773 A: cp. 773 D). Religion not founded on virtue is worthless: the bad cannot fittingly approach God, even by prayer (716 D sq.). Little is said in the Laws of the immortality of the soul[3]; nor is the doctrine needed, for the State is to be pervaded with the conviction that virtue is happiness, and that external goods are as nothing in comparison with virtue. It is through the diffusion of this conviction throughout all the members of the State that Plato hopes to secure that unity of feeling, the secret of which the Republic had sought in devotion to noble rulers, saved by their communistic life from temptations to forget the public interest. Now that power is no longer placed in the hands of a few, it becomes essential that the whole body of citizens shall be animated by the saving belief that virtue is happiness.

To these leading principles the political organization of the State is adjusted. In the absence of semi-divine rulers, the law must rule; but this need not involve a coercive type of rule, such as that objected to timocratic States like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan in the Republic (548 B). Persuasion should be mistress in the State, as it is in

[1] Cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 6, *Διοσκόροιν τοῖν ὑμετέροιν πολίταιν.*

[2] 921 C, *ἐὰν . . . λύῃ μεγάλας κοινωνίας, νόμος ὁ βοηθῶν ἔστω τῷ τῆς πόλεως ξυνδέσμῳ μετὰ θεῶν.*

[3] It is referred to in 959 B, and the value of the doctrine of metempsychosis for the prevention of voluntary offences is recognized in 870 D sq., where this doctrine is said to be taught by *οἱ ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακότες.*

the Universe (Tim. 48 A : 68 E : see Grote, Plato 3. 249 n.). Like physicians whose patients are freemen, the State addresses the reason by advice and exhortation: when this has been done in vain, then, and not till then, it adds the threats and penalties with which it cannot altogether dispense (823 A : 859 A). It assumes a more human, more paternal attitude than that of mere blank command. It seeks to win an intelligent conformity from those whom it addresses. It endeavours to imitate the methods of the generous and prudent human rulers whose place it takes[1].

In our survey of the State, we must begin with its territory. This is to be so situated that the city at its centre shall be ten miles from the sea; it is to be sufficient in extent to maintain the citizens in a 'temperate,' perhaps really in a somewhat meagre fashion; it is to be rather hilly than level, and varied in produce, though devoid of ship-timber. Imports will therefore be few, and exports also, and the State will be predominantly agricultural. It will have no fleet to ruin its national character and its constitution. Its city will be grouped round a central market-place surrounded by temples, close to which will stand the dicasteries and houses of the magistrates, and will be unwalled, though in a strong position, except so far as the plan on which the houses are erected renders them equivalent to a fortification. The population of the State should

[1] 'When Turgot came into full power as the minister of Lewis XVI . . . . he introduced the method of prefacing his edicts by an elaborate statement of the reasons on which their policy rested' (J. Morley, Critical Miscellanies, second series, p. 206). Plato's idea that the State should make its voice heard in accents of persuasion, and should not leave this mode of influencing men to unauthorized persons, such as orators, dramatic poets, or even actors (817 C), was novel and weighty. The office of the preacher was little familiar to antiquity, and dawned only gradually even on the Hebrews. Preaching through the Statute-book was not, however, destined for the world's adoption. The rise of a Church satisfied in some respects Plato's craving for a gentler and more ratiocinative influence than that of threats and penalties. We note that Plato, though he excludes Forensic Rhetoric from the State (Laws 937 D sqq.), allows the State itself to call Rhetoric to its aid.

perhaps, on the whole, be drawn not from one single stock and one single city, but from more sources than one. It will come from all Crete, and of other Hellenes, Peloponnesians will be the most welcome. We must remember that Plato is founding a colony in Crete, and that Crete had already received Peloponnesian colonists.

The citizens must be sufficiently numerous for self-defence and for rendering aid to neighbours unjustly attacked. The exact number fixed upon (5040) is chosen mainly for its ready divisibility.

The next thing is to secure them against extreme poverty. Each citizen will have a lot of land sufficient, and not more than sufficient, for the sober maintenance of himself and his household[1]. This is to be indivisible, whether by sale, inheritance, or testation, and inalienable. The lot is to be left to, or inherited by, one son, whom the owner, if he has more sons than one, may select: the other son or sons are to be adopted by childless owners. Daughters are to be given in marriage without dowry. If there are no sons, but only daughters, the same principle of the indivisibility of the lot is to hold (924 E). Only in one extreme case (856 C sq.)—a case little likely to occur—is crime to involve the confiscation of the lot by the State. The lot will thus be a constant minimum on which the poorest citizen can count, though it will not be possible to mortgage it. Plato hopes that these arrangements will secure the State against pauperism—in this Aristotle does not agree with him, and with good reason (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 39 sqq.) —or else that the evil may be cured by further measures (740 D–E). Each citizen is intended to hold an equivalent

[1] In reality, however, when the son and heir has married, which he is obliged to do before he is 35, and has a wife and children of his own, the lot will have to maintain two households, that of the father and that of the son. This Plato sees himself (775 E sqq.), but he perhaps counts on the father being by this time relieved of his daughters by marriage, and of any other son by adoption. There is, however, the further difficulty that moveable property being allowed to increase up to a limit of five times the amount of property held by the poorest citizen, the security for sobriety of life sought in a limitation of the size of the lot vanishes.

amount of land, and no one will be richer than another by more than a five-fold proportion; it would be too much to enforce an absolute equality of property. The increase of wealth, however, is discouraged by the enactment that the coinage is to have no value outside the State, and by the prohibition of loans on interest; also by the prohibition of trade and handicrafts to the citizen. Citizens are not to find their vocation in money-getting. Rich husbands are to marry wives from poor families (773 C–D). The cost of funerals is regulated (958 C sqq.).

Each of the lots of land consists of two portions, one of them near the city, the other at some distance from it (745 C sqq.), with a house on each portion. On these lots the citizens will reside, but the lots at a distance from the city will commonly be occupied by the married sons of the citizens and their families (775 E sqq.), and the citizens themselves will for the most part, it would seem, be resident on the lots near the city.

The 5040 citizens fall into 12 local tribes (760), each tribe being as far as possible on an equality with the rest in respect of the agricultural value of its territory, and the central city is also divided into twelve parts (745 B sqq.). Each tribe is to receive consecration as a division of the State (*τὴν διανομὴν θεῖσαι*, 771 C–D), by being connected with a special god or son of a god, whom it is to honour with sacrificial gatherings (771 D). The tribe will thus be a well-realized unity, especially as it is also to be a military unit (755 E). So again, the agronomi are to be tribal (760), and each tribe is to have a dicastery of its own for judging suits between private individuals, though there is to be an appeal from it to the select judges (768). In the State of the Laws, as at Athens, the tribe would be an important subdivision of the State. In the Republic we hear nothing of the tribe, any more than of the phratry: the abolition of the household appears to carry with it that of the tribe and phratry, so far at least as the two upper classes are concerned, and on the organization of the third class Plato dwells but little.

Still more important than the tribal division, however, would seem to be the division into property-classes, in which an Attic model is evidently followed. It is this division, which, as we shall see, enables Plato to throw power into the hands of the *élite* of the better-to-do citizens, though why he should prefer to trust the higher property-classes with power in a State where the richest man can only be five times as rich as the poorest, where all citizens are alike forbidden to engage in trading and industrial pursuits, and where both rich and poor receive the same education and live the same simple life, is by no means clear. Probably he thinks that the richer man will have enjoyed more leisure, and be less open to pecuniary temptation. If, however, he distrusts the qualifications of those included in the lower property-classes, why should not all the citizens in his State possess the higher amount of property? He is free in founding a State to give them as much as he thinks best[1], and the *raison d'être* of the two lower property-classes is not obvious. Aristotle perhaps is conscious of this: at all events, in his best State all the citizens are designed to possess that amount of property which is conducive to virtuous action, and to a temperate, though liberal, mode of life.

In the State of the Laws, as in that of the Republic, women are to follow the same pursuits as men—a noticeable fact, for it indicates that Plato held this change to stand on a different footing from the communistic innovations of the Republic and the absolute rule of philosophers, both of which he abandons in the Laws, and not to be beyond the reach of a society such as that which he is now founding. He claims, indeed, in so many words, that the example of the Sauromatae on the Pontus proves its practicability (805 C). His wish is to bring women out into the light of day (781 C), and prevent them dragging the men down to their own level; hence γυναικονόμοι are naturally absent in this State,

[1] Perhaps, however, Plato hardly feels that he is altogether free, for he calls to mind (744 B) that some of the settlers in the new State must necessarily bring with them more property than others.

their function being to keep women at home (Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4 sq.). Women are to render military service and to be eligible for office (785 B), though not quite under the same conditions as men. It is not, indeed, clear that Plato intends all offices to be accessible to them; he may be speaking in the passage just referred to only of offices appropriated to women, like the one mentioned in 784 A (cp. 795 D). Nor is it said whether they are to serve in the assembly and dicasteries. There would apparently be nothing to exclude a woman from positions of this kind, if she succeeded to one of the lots of land. Must a woman succeed to a lot, in order to become eligible for offices not appropriated to her sex? If so, the assimilation of the occupations of women and men in this State is confined within narrow bounds, for women would rarely succeed to a lot. If, on the other hand, women, or indeed men, are eligible for office without being holders of a lot, the number of citizens will overpass the limit of 5040. Plato's intention, however, apparently is that none but holders of a lot shall be accounted citizens, or be included in the four property-classes, the condition of eligibility for office. In fact, the political rights of men whose fathers were still living would be much limited, and as a man might marry as early as twenty-five years of age (or according to another passage, thirty), he might have a son who would be excluded from citizenship for the first forty or fifty years of his life. Aristotle, perhaps, has this difficulty in view, when he postpones the age of marriage for men to 37 (4 (7). 16. 1335 a 28), adding that the son will thus succeed at the commencement of his best years of life, and when the father is well stricken in years.

If we turn to the constitutional organization of the State, we shall find that it is evidently devised with the view of throwing power into the hands of the best of the men of mature age belonging to the higher property-classes.

There is to be a popular assembly, but it will have little power. Attendance at its meetings is to be enforced only on the two higher property-classes, unless it should be other-

wise ordered on any particular occasion (764 A). Its duties, however, are not mentioned, and they cannot have been numerous; it was to have a share in the trial of offences against the State (767 E sqq.), and a voice in the almost impossible contingency of a change in the laws becoming absolutely necessary (772 D). Whether questions of peace, war, and alliance are to come before it, we are not told: the review of the conduct of magistrates during their term of office, which Solon entrusted to the assembly, is reserved for the priests of Apollo[1]; even the right of electing to the more important magistracies is withheld from it[2]. Its powers, therefore, will be but limited.

A Boulê also exists, though this was an institution which savoured of democracy (Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 9), but we hear little of its functions as a whole[3]. Most of its members, we are told (758 B), will be at home for the greater part of the year, attending to their own concerns. Important powers, however, are given to the sections of the Boulê, twelve in number, which successively watch over the State for a month, the members of each section being termed Prytaneis, as at Athens, during their month of office (755 E: 766 B: 953 C). Each of these sections in turn acts as 'guardian' of the community, serves as a kind of General Secretariate, deals with any internal disturbances that may arise, and, as the presiding authority of the State, convenes and dissolves all assemblies (756–8: cp. Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 12 sqq.). In all this it acts in conjunction with the magistracies. The members of the Boulê are to hold office for a year, and to be elected out of all four property-classes in equal proportions by an intricate scheme (756) practically

[1] The powers of the 'whole city' in this matter are apparently confined to the election of three citizens not under fifty years of age, who are to nominate the priests of Apollo.

[2] It elects the Nomophylakes (*πᾶσα ἡ πόλις*, 753 C), but only out of a list of 300 names submitted to it by those who are serving or have served in war as horse-soldiers or hoplites, or in other words, its better-to-do members.

[3] Some of them are referred to in 768 A and 850 B.

securing to the higher property-classes the greater voice in the election.

Passing on to the magistracies of the State, and confining our attention to the most important of them, we find a distinction drawn between war and military affairs on the one hand and the general supervision of the State on the other, the former being made over to the three strategi, while the latter falls to the 37 Nomophylakes, who must be men of over 50 years of age and who hold office till they attain the age of 70, but not after. Their election is to take place in an especially deliberate and methodical manner. Three hundred names are selected, after full consideration, by those who are serving or have served in war among the hoplites or cavalry—the lowest property-class, at any rate, would probably thus be excluded from taking part in the election—and out of these names the whole city chooses first 100, and then 37. Their duties are very varied, but appear to consist, generally, in watching over the behaviour of all belonging to the State and enforcing the observance of the laws. The Nomophylakes of Plato do not seem altogether to resemble the magistracy of that name which Aristotle more than once mentions as occurring in oligarchical (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 27 sqq.), or rather aristocratic, States (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 6 sqq.), for this seems to have been a magistracy answering in aristocracies to Probouli in oligarchies and to the Boulê in democracies, and probably its business was to see that projects of law or resolutions proposed for adoption did not contravene the laws. The functions of Plato's Nomophylakes were far more varied and extensive.

The important subject of education is reserved for a single magistrate, the superintendent of education, who is to hold office for five years, but he again is to be elected out of the Nomophylakes. All the magistracies of the State, except the Boulê and the Prytaneis, are to assemble in the temple of Apollo, and to select one of the Nomophylakes, consequently a man over fifty, who must also be

the father of legitimate sons or daughters, if not of both (765–6). This officer, however, is not empowered to devise a scheme of education, but only to administer the scheme drawn up by the founder of the State, which is to be as little subject to change as the rest of his legislation (772 A–D).

The judicial machinery of the State was to be organized on somewhat more popular principles. It was to be different in respect of private suits and of offences against the State. As to the former, litigants were first to try the arbitration of friends and neighbours, next to have recourse to courts of the village or tribe (767–8, cp. 956 B sqq.), if dissatisfied with the finding of the arbitrators, and last of all, if still discontented, to come before a court of select judges, named by all the officers of the State out of their own number. This court was not to be numerous, but it was to be public and to be annually renewed. The trial of offences against the State, on the other hand, must be begun and concluded before the people, for here all are wronged and all will expect to have a voice in the decision (768 A); but the serious examination of the charge is to be conducted by three high magistrates, or magistracies (768 A), to be agreed on by the parties. All cases of sacrilege of a capital character, however, are reserved for a dicastery composed of the Nomophylakes and the select judges (855 C), and the same rule applies to attempts to change the constitution by force and to cases of treason (*προδοσία*: 856–7). The judicial organization of the State seems then to be placed on a slightly, but only slightly, more popular footing than its administrative organization.

Civil, military, and judicial functions are thus lodged in different hands, though the Nomophylakes combine to some extent legislative, judicial, and administrative competence; but over all the magistracies of the State rises as a supreme authority of review, with power to examine the conduct of magistrates at the close of their term of office and to award praise or blame, distinction or punishment, the great society

of the priests of Apollo, withdrawn a little from the turmoil of affairs by their residence in a temple-precinct, and themselves not exempt from review at the hands of the select judges. Plato holds (945 B sqq.) that those with whom the power of review is lodged must be better than the magistrates reviewed [1], and that a neglect to observe this rule, as he adds in a remarkable passage (945 D), involves the destruction of the only possible security for the harmonious co-operation of the various parts of the State with a view to a single end, breaks up the accord of the magistracies, and shatters the unity of the State, till it perishes through faction.

Last of all, in the concluding pages of the dialogue, the lawgiver establishes the Nocturnal Council [2], an union of the oldest Nomophylakes, the priests of Apollo, and the superintendent and ex-superintendents of education, together with the best of those travelling commissioners for the inspection of other communities, whom the State will accredit after assuring itself of their worth (951 D–E: 961 A). This body of elderly men, for no member of it will be under fifty, is to bring to its deliberations an equal number of younger men between thirty and forty years of age selected for their recognized excellence, who are, under

[1] Aristotle, on the contrary, thinks, as has already been noticed (above, p. 254 sqq.), that in certain cases at all events, there is much to be said for a popular reviewing authority (Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 40 sqq.), and argues that the Many, though individually inferior to the Few Good, may be collectively superior to them.

[2] The idea that wisdom comes with night was one familiar to the Greeks: compare (e. g.) the utterance of Olbius recorded in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, c. 26 (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 2. p. 25):

νυκτὶ φωνήν, νυκτὶ βουλήν, νυκτὶ τὴν νίκην δίδου,

and the saying, *νυκτὸς δέ τοι ὀξυτέρη φρήν*, as well as Eurip. Heraclid. 959:

καὶ πόλλ' ἔτικτον νυκτὶ συνθακῶν ἀεί.

Plato is also a foe to unduly prolonged slumbers: cp. Laws 807 E sqq., and the lines of Homer (Il. 2. 24–5), which were present to Plato's mind—

Οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα,
ᾧ λαοί τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν.

We learn indeed in the passage of the Laws to which reference has just been made, that not merely rulers, but ordinary citizens and mistresses of households should wake early and sleep little.

the guidance of the elder members of the council, to make laws their study (951 E sqq.), to be the 'eyes' of the council as the seniors are its 'mind,' and to inform it of all that happens in the State (964 E sqq.). The council will thus consist of two orders, corresponding in some degree to the 'guardians' and 'auxiliaries' of the Republic, and will be enabled to 'save the State' (965 A) by teaching it its true aim, virtue and reason (962 B: 963 A). Its members will need for this purpose to receive a more careful training than the rest of the citizens; they must learn to see 'the one in the many,' the common element in the various virtues—learn to understand the real nature of all that is good and beautiful, and, above all, to know the Gods, as far as is possible for men (965 C sqq.), much as in the Republic the 'perfect guardians' learnt to know the Idea of Good.

Here, and here alone, the philosophical spirit is encouraged to assert itself and find a home; here the ordinary education of the State finds its crown and completion in philosophical study, which is, however, reserved for a very few select minds and delayed till the age of thirty.

Remarks.

The whole scheme of the State and its education appears to be designed with a view to secure a willing and intelligent submissiveness to the laws—a temperate, orderly, sensible habit of mind, neither too eager nor too slow and cautious (773 sqq.), based on a feeling for measure and correct artistic taste, and still more on correct views of the true sources of happiness and the nature of the gods, content to accept a limited authority, and to give their due to age, wealth, and virtue, while these social elements in their turn are foremost in acknowledging the supremacy of the laws. Not fear, but orderliness and reverence are the mainspring of the whole—reverence for the voice of the law, which is none other than the voice of the gods (762 E); reverence crowned with intelligence, which in a few select natures placed at the summit of the State must rise into philosophy.

In the Laws, as in the Republic, the aim of Plato is to

call upon the State to do more for its citizens than it had yet done, and to be more to them than it had yet been. Why should the State, which depends for its existence on virtue, be so indifferent to its production? Plato had before his eyes the moral and political anarchy of contemporary Greece, and knowing that the days of mere customary morality were gone for ever, he felt that some authority was needed to revive and make rational the sense of right and wrong, and that the only authority capable of effecting this was a reconstituted State. He was the first to insist on this, and the strength of his position lay in the fact that his view of the true function of the State was, as has been said already, that to which all the traditions of Greece pointed, that which was engrained in the Greek conscience. The Greek mind was especially ready to be swayed by the voice of the community for good or for evil. The individual Greek was in an exceptional degree 'the child of his people'—one thing at Sparta, another at Athens, another at Thebes. The example of the Lacedaemonian State showed how much the State could effect if it dared to assert its authority. The State must, however, be reconstituted. Plato's first impulse had been to hand it over to a few carefully trained men of high natural worth and capacity, but his next was to recoil from that bold step; he now sought to diffuse throughout the whole citizen-body respect for law, pure religion, and the conviction that virtue is happiness, and to call for the active co-operation of all in the working of the State. But his heart seems to have failed him from the first, and we find him in the Laws over and over again reserving effective authority for the best men of the wealthier class, and giving the poorer citizens only the semblance of a share in power—'reverting,' in fact, as Aristotle says, 'to his earlier constitution,' but in a less pure form.

Still the great conception of a State systematically training the whole of a large body of citizens to virtue—not, as in the Republic, confining its educational activity to two small classes—had been once for all clearly put forward.

The State was no longer to be perverted into a mere creature of party—toiling 'in Gaza at the mill with slaves' —or to be barbarised by absorption in aims of conquest and empire; it must be readjusted to its true function—that of producing virtue. Plato claims to have kept this aim before him in framing every institution of the State of the Laws (705 E). He called on the State to do that which Church and State together have in later days, even at their best moments, failed to achieve. Socrates had already set this aim before the State, but he had not seen that an entire reconstitution of the State was necessary, before there could be any hope of realizing it. We may hold that even Plato's reconstitution was not far-reaching enough, if only because he failed to hit on the conception of a Church working in harmony with the State; we may further hold that it went wholly wrong in detail; but the broad fact remains that he was the first, if not to see that society ought to do much more than it did for the moral guidance of the individual, at all events to demand its reconstruction for that end.

The dialogue forms an epoch in Political Science in another way. It puts forward with more emphasis and more systematically than had ever been done before the conception of mixed government, which, familiar as it was already to Thucydides (6. 39: 8. 97), and possibly to Hippodamus of Miletus, or even to Solon, did not gain till the fourth century before Christ the accredited position in political speculation which it has never since entirely lost. Its increased prominence at this epoch was probably due in part to the prestige enjoyed by the Lacedaemonian State for a while after its triumph in the Peloponnesian War. Some recognized in the 'mixture of all constitutions,' which they traced in the Lacedaemonian constitution (Laws 712 D–E: Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.), the best type of mixed government. Plato, on the contrary, depicted a wholly different form of it in the Laws, where we look in vain for parallels to the Lacedaemonian kingship, ephorate, and senate: it would seem, there-

fore, that he did not hold with this view. There is, however, rather the appearance than the reality of mixed government in the Laws: what Plato has here at heart, is rather that the government of his State shall be sober, than that it shall be mixed; he allows a share of power to wealth and numbers, not because the State is the gainer by this, but because the opposite course is unsafe. The share of power allowed to numbers is, in fact, as we have seen, little more than nominal, and Aristotle's censure (Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.) of those who, in founding aristocracies or other constitutions, resorted to ingenious devices (*σοφίσματα*) to deceive the demos, was perhaps intended to apply to the constitution of the Laws amongst others. Supreme authority would here in reality rest with a small number of men over fifty years of age belonging to the higher property-classes. Plato never completely abandoned the view that in the normal State the rank and file of the citizens are to be taken in charge by the few. This view recurs in a softened form even in the Laws.

The life of the mass of the citizens could hardly be of a very attractive or active type, whatever Plato may say to the contrary (807 sqq.). The more important State-business would be managed for them by those few of the men over fifty years of age who would succeed to the great offices, and though it must be admitted that some considerable positions would be open to men below this age, they would commonly find their way to members of the higher property-classes, and being in many cases held for long terms, only to a few of these. The mass of the citizens would thus be relegated to private life, not indeed to what Aristotle calls 'necessary work,' but to the supervision of their households, if households can be said to exist where the women are required to take their meals at public meal-tables, and where the education of the children is entrusted to public officers; in reality, to the supervision of their slaves and their farms[1], on which, however, they are

[1] In the careful provision of a lot of land for every citizen we are conscious of some departure from the central dogma that virtue is

not apparently intended (806 D–E) to work with their own hands, to the celebration of festivals, the discharge of military service, the observance of the numerous laws of the State, and the maintenance of the tone of feeling prescribed by the legislator. The studies in which they are trained in youth (and these do not include any philosophy, or more of Greek literature than a small, though carefully selected, fragment) do not appear to be continued in their maturer years: forensic rhetoric is excluded from the State: little, if any, place seems to be found in their lives for literature or for any fine art, save that of music: only a few, after the age of thirty, become possessed of any philosophical knowledge, and these learn what they learn rather for purposes of government than for the sake of the subject itself. There appears to be no provision even for advanced mathematical study.

Aristotle's principle, on the contrary, is—we recognize the best State by its life. Do its citizens live a life which calls forth all that is best in their nature, gives full play to their noblest faculties, and satisfies their highest aims, and are the rest organized so as to aid them in living that life, each doing work adjusted to his capacity? Does everyone find himself 'in his element,' the whole society culminating in a body of *σπουδαῖοι* equipped to live, and helping each other in living, a life of political and speculative activity? The State of the Laws can hardly be said to answer to this aspiring ideal; its dominant characteristic is rather a religious *σωφροσύνη*.

Aristotle could scarcely rest satisfied with a State of this kind, especially when put forward as the best attainable by a community of *men*, unaided by divine or semi-divine fellow-citizens. To him it seemed neither the one thing nor the other—neither practicable nor ideal. Philosophy, he thought, could do better than this for Greek politics, and

sufficient for happiness, which is to be the most cherished article in the creed of every citizen of the State. If a certain amount of property is so essential, then happiness would seem to depend in part on *χορηγία* in Plato's view no less than in that of Aristotle.

its last word must not be taken to have been spoken by Plato. Two States, at least, needed to take the place of the State of the Laws, if the Republic were indeed out of the question; one, a more ideal—the other, a more practicable State. The first is that which is incompletely sketched in the Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics; the other is the constitution which rests on the moderately well-to-do class (ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία[1]).

Looking back, we see how much the study of Politics in Greece had gained from the increased earnestness of ethical inquiry.

If we glance back over the history of political inquiry in Greece, we shall see that but little progress was made till its relation to Ethics was brought out by the discussions which followed the advent of the sophists. It was then found that Ethics and Politics were closely connected. The new ethical views led to new views as to the State, and the effort to combat them threw fresh light not only on the nature of right, but also on that of the State. If natural right is the will of the stronger, then every form of the State which has Force on its side is legitimate: Tyranny is legitimate, and right may vary from State to State, or in the same State from year to year. The State may assume any form which the element for the moment strongest within it may choose to give it. If, again, natural right rests, not on Force, but on the general consent of mankind, then how little in the arrangements of society can claim to be naturally just. The case becomes worse, if natural right does not exist at all, and the just is based on nothing but convention.

The future of human society seemed to depend on the possibility of finding a firm and satisfactory basis for natural right. Socrates had in effect said that natural right is that which experience proves to redound to the advantage of the man who conforms to it in practice; but Plato was not satisfied till he had exhibited it as the source of health, unity, and happiness, not only in the soul of the individual,

[1] The Polity was, in fact, the type of constitution which, in Aristotle's view, Plato sought to realize in the Laws, though not with much success (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 26 sq.).

but also in the normally constituted State. He was led into the field of Politics by his desire to restore the authority of right. Right is best studied in the ideal State of which it is the life-breath, just as a leaf is best studied in connexion with the tree on which it grows. The study of Ethics leads on to the study of Politics. We see best what justice is when we see it at work, and especially when we see it at work in the State. And if the study of the State reveals to us what justice is, it also reveals to us how virtue is brought into being. Plato is more alive than any one before him to the extent to which the individual is 'the child of his people.' It is only in a well-constituted State that even the best-endowed natures can grow up aright[1]. We need not wonder that to Plato the study of Politics stands in the closest relation to the study of Ethics, that he seems to consider no State worthy of close scrutiny which does not embody justice and make men good, and that his attitude to defective States is one of far less qualified antagonism than that of Aristotle. We see that he began the study of Politics with an ethical aim—the aim of rescuing justice and right from those who denied them a basis in nature.

Plato entered on the study of Politics with an ethical aim.

To Plato in the Republic the construction of the ideal State is more or less an episode in an ethical inquiry, and no time is lost over it. Armed with the one doctrine of the specialization of functions, and perhaps, though he traces the structure of the State before he proceeds to trace that of the soul, influenced in some degree by the psychological parallel, Plato feels himself able to proceed rapidly with his sketch of the true State. If we contrast Aristotle's procedure in the First and Third Books of the Politics, we shall see how much slower and more tentative it is. He begins with the simplest elements of the household and State, and inquires patiently into the nature of the δεσποτικός, the χρηματιστικός, and the οἰκονομικός, distinguishing the one

[1] Yet in the Laws (951 B), with characteristic elasticity, he says that 'divine men' are to be found as often in ill-ordered as in well-ordered States.

from the other, and then into the nature of the citizen, long before he attempts to determine the true structure of the State. In these investigations he never loses sight of current opinion and likes to find in it a dim forecast of the truth. Plato, on the contrary, starting from the fact that in actual societies justice was not to be found, naturally builds up a State in strong contrast to all existing States, for his State must be one in which justice may readily be detected and identified. The ideal State is not perhaps even to Plato simply the antithesis of the actual State, for one or two actual States had gone some way on the road to its realization. But his breach with the past is far more conspicuous than Aristotle's. Even where, as among the Lacedaemonians, some vestiges of the true State are discernible, the true ruling principle had not been called to power, the more civilizing influences of life were excluded, and the welfare of the State was forgotten in the pursuit of private ends. His attitude to the existing order of things was natural enough. Here was an 'impatient soul', whose personal experience had been bitter even in youth. Far as all personal reference recedes into the background in the best Greek literature of the best age, a few stray hints reveal to us even in the Republic, how deep an impression the fate of Socrates had made upon Plato's mind[1]. Society in its actual form either corrupted the best men, or if it could not do so, deprived them of life. The fate of individual and State in his day was one and the same. In both, the lower elements triumphed over the higher, with the inevitable result of internal disunion and unhappiness. Indeed, the higher elements could hardly be said to exist, and the great problem was how to bring them into being. The State must be so organized as to develope within it a class of true philosophers, and this class must be placed in possession of absolute power. Reason must recover its supremacy both in the State and in the heart of the individual. In most great movements of reform the man to

[1] See (e. g.) Rep. 488 B : 361 B sq. : 409 C–D : 492 D.

whom 'all things here are out of joint' comes first, and some little time elapses before it is discovered that things have not gone as far astray as had been thought, that the new ideal has its roots in the past, and is that which 'prophets and kings desired to see.' The new teaching has to assume a militant and aggressive, perhaps even a fantastic and exaggerated, form before it gets a first hearing. The influence of Socrates and Plato might have been less, if the life of the one and the doctrines of the other had been less novel and striking.

But Plato, as we have seen, did not always maintain this uncompromising attitude. In the later days of his life, he came to see that his recoil from the actual State and his sense of homelessness in it had carried him too far, and had led him to trust his ideal rulers with powers which only semi-divine personages could be expected to use aright. Nor was he content with merely re-issuing the Republic with this amendment: he now sought not only to show men the genuine face of Justice, but to meet actual States half-way, and to set before them a model less difficult of imitation than the ideal State of the Republic. The impatient idealism of his earlier days had passed into a wish to be of use to his race in its difficulties. It was in this spirit that he wrote the Laws, and was prepared to carry compromise still further and to frame a 'third State,' but he seems never to have done so, and too much of the ideal spirit of the Republic survived, so Aristotle thought, in the Laws.

Plato had done much for Political Science, but had also left much for a successor to do.

Plato had done much, but he had also left much for a successor to do in the field of political inquiry. The philosophical basis of his teaching on this subject needed to be made clearer and to be more systematically set forth; it needed to be reconsidered and amended; his conception of the State, its end and true organization, also needed to be revised. He was right, Aristotle thought, in seeking to make the State more to the individual than it had yet been. He was right in holding that the State should be a city-State and small—a common life as well as a common

government. He was right in investing Political Science with supreme authority over the life of the individual and the arts and sciences dependent on it, and requiring it to rise to the level of the great position thus assigned to it. Above all, he was right in ascribing to Political Science (1) an ethical aim; (2) a practical purpose, and yet an ideal method. Whatever else it did, Political Science was bound to construct an ideal State. That it needed to do something further—to make itself useful to men by tracing the outline of a State easily workable by men—Plato had already implied. But he was as one who after setting out for a destination stops halfway on the road to it, for even the Laws gave little practical help to statesmen struggling with the problems and difficulties of Greek politics. Plato's political teaching required not only to be restated and amended, but also to be completed.

Something to be gained by greater closeness of investigation.

Success in this enterprise was hardly possible without a new method. The political inquirer must begin at the beginning with the simplest elements of society and work methodically upwards, not ignoring current opinion or practice, but correcting its confusions with the aid of a distinct conception of the end of human life and of the State; he must make clear to himself and others the principles on which he proceeds; he must study the physiology and pathology of Society, the occasions and the profound causes of social change; he must master the technical side of Political Science, and be prepared to deal practically with the concrete problems of political organization as they present themselves every day—to construct an oligarchy, or a democracy, or a tyranny, so as to be as little hostile as possible to human wellbeing. His treatment of political questions must be more patient and detailed, must rest on a wider knowledge of the past, must be more reasoned and systematic. And if the deepest thoughts and highest aspirations of the political inquirer would still find utterance in the portraiture of a 'best State,' this best State will no longer be seriously proposed for adoption everywhere; it

will be a State *κατ' εὐχήν*[1]—an ideal representation of the acme of human society, realizable only when Nature and Fortune are in their most favourable mood. Neither its portraiture nor the portraiture of two or three less high-pitched ideals will exhaust the problem of Political Science: the political inquirer must pass on to grapple with the task of ameliorating actual institutions and making them tolerable.

Something was to be gained by a mere change of the form in which many members of the Socratic school had placed their ideas before the world[2]. It was natural enough that the disciples of a converser should set forth their teaching in dialogues, and also that at Athens, where the dramatic spirit was so strong, philosophical literature should assume a dramatic form. Thucydides had already put his best thoughts in the mouth of some statesman or other. It was inevitable, however, that the two aims—the quest of truth and the quest of literary charm—should come more or less into collision. The language used in a dialogue must appeal to the reading world at large; it must be as little technical as possible, it must avoid the appearance of over-precision and pedantry. The course of the inquiry needs to be accommodated to the characters, and its depth will vary with their calibre. The toil of the way should be relieved by wit, sarcasm, irony, eloquence, conversational charm. Bright, genial remark, even if paradoxical (e.g. 'no man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good'—Laws 829 A), or inconsistent with the general tenour of the views expressed (e.g. 'man is made to be the plaything of

[1] As to the meaning of this phrase, see the Theages ascribed to Plato 125 E–126 A, *εὐξαίμην μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἔγωγε τύραννος γενέσθαι μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων . . . ἔτι δέ γε ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν.* Aristotle, however, excludes aspirations for the impossible (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 17).

[2] See Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 141–5. Is it not probable that after Plato opened a school, one of his aims in writing dialogues was to show his pupils how discussion should be conducted? Xenophon (Mem. 4. 6. 1) is careful to describe, how Socrates *διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας.*

God, and this is the best of him'—Laws 803 C), is always welcome. Long deliberative, half-baffled pauses have to be cut short. The investigation of historical fact, even a careful regard for historical truth, seems out of place in a gathering of friends. Like his kinsman the dramatist, the dialogue-writer makes use of myths, and if he uses history also, he will be apt to treat the latter with the same genial freedom as the former. Each dialogue, again, claims to be complete in itself. Each is too perfect an artistic whole to serve as a mere chapter in a statement of philosophical doctrine. In each there must be something fresh in the line of attack. Hence inconsistencies, which increase in number, if, as in Plato's case, the dialogues are written at intervals during the course of a long life. They naturally conflict with each other. Occasionally consistency is not maintained even within the limits of a single dialogue[1].

Thus the interpretation of Plato's meaning comes to demand a genius almost as subtle and sympathetic as his own. It is hard to distinguish how far an utterance reflects only the momentary mood of a speaker, or the attitude he chooses to adopt towards a given opponent, or the sentiment suggested by the dramatic situation. Plato had as it were imprisoned his philosophy in some beautiful semi-transparent material[2]; his revelation of it was tantalizingly incomplete. The greater its value, the greater the call for some intervention which would bring it forth into the full light of day. Plato, indeed, had taken some steps in this direction himself. In his later dialogues, whether from a decline of dramatic feeling or an increase of interest in positive doctrine, the conversation tends more and more to become a monologue; the Socratic aim of arousing thought is more and more lost sight of in the effort to communicate truth. Still the decisive step is not yet taken; the dialogue-form is not

[1] See Prof. Jowett's Plato 4.169* (ed. 1): 'so little power has Plato of harmonizing the results of his dialectics, or even of avoiding the most obvious contradictions.'

[2] As the sculptor Pauson (or Pasôn) had enclosed a figure of Hermes in a pellucid stone: cp. Aristot. Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 19, and Bonitz' note.

abandoned. Even Aristotle wrote many dialogues, though he made the important change of reserving the part of chief interlocutor for himself. But much of his work was of a kind to which the dialogue was inapplicable. It was hardly possible, for instance, to state the results of his zoological investigations in a dialogue, and it was probably not merely in the interest of his pupils, or merely in works intended for their perusal, that he abandoned the Socratic manner of treatment. Nor was he apparently alone in so doing. In the Academics of Cicero (Cic. Acad. Post. 1. 4. 17 sq.), we find the Academical speaker 'designating the dogmatic formulation of the system as a departure from the Socratic manner common to Aristotle and the contemporary Platonists' (Zeller, Plato E. T., p. 565. 25).

Plato's successor, Aristotle.

It was a fortunate circumstance that Plato's philosophical inheritance passed to a successor sufficiently at one with him to maintain the continuity of speculation, and sufficiently independent to give a fresh impulse and direction to inquiry.

We do not know the length of the interval which elapsed between the composition of the Laws and that of the Politics. We do not indeed know that all parts of the Politics were composed at or about the same time. The Fourth and Fifth Books may be severed by some interval of time from the first three, and the remaining three books may be later than the Fourth and Fifth, or again the book on Constitutional Changes may be earlier than the two books which immediately precede and follow it, as early perhaps as any book in the whole work. We cannot, indeed, always be certain that the contents of any one book (apart from any possible interpolations) date as a whole from the same epoch.

But whatever we conceive the length of the interval to have been, much had happened in the course of it. The career of Philip of Macedon was needed to make the failure of the free States of Greece quite manifest. It was not till 346 B. C. that Isocrates wrote his oration to Philip, in which

the full tale of Greek failure and disunion is told[1], and Plato died in 347 B. C. But the main change was in the man, not in the times.

Aristotle was so far in a better position than Plato to speak to Greece as a whole, that he was less closely connected with any one place in it. Plato was an Athenian of long descent: Aristotle was one of those who had been saved for philosophy by belonging to a small State; indeed, his city for some time lay in ruins, so that he was then, in the most literal sense, ἄπολις διὰ τύχην. He was not, like Plato, the citizen of an extreme democracy; he can hardly be said to have been a citizen at all, or to have lived the life of a citizen; he had not the passions of a citizen. He judges the Athenian democracy *ab extra*, unlike Thucydides, who had learnt its strength and weakness by living under it and taking part in its working. He was forty years at least younger than Plato, and belonged to a time when philosophy was coming to be more to men and politics less. He was not, like Plato, the first explorer of the field of Political Science, and had not the impatient, sweeping views of a first explorer. He was also naturally calmer and more circumspect than Plato, and came to the study of politics fresh from less exciting studies—studies which had trained him to accumulate facts and to weigh them patiently.

Sketch of Aristotle's life.

It seems a mistake to speak of Aristotle as a 'half-Greek.' Some great Greeks were so, but Aristotle was not. His father was a member of the long-descended *gens* of the Asclepiadae, and belonged to the Andrian colony of Stageira; his mother was of Chalcidian origin. His early life is involved in a good deal of obscurity, but whether he came to Athens and became Plato's pupil at the age of seventeen or later, he had been his pupil for a considerable time when Plato died in the year 347 B.C., and the days he thus spent at Athens no doubt left a permanent impress on his mind and character[2]. On Plato's death Speusippus his

[1] Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 40, οἶδα γὰρ ἁπάσας (τὰς πόλεις) ὡμαλισμένας ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν.

[2] Aristotle's early dialogue entitled Eudemus appears to have stood in a very close relation to

nephew succeeded to his school, and Aristotle quitted Athens with his friend Xenocrates, an attached disciple of Plato. Probably neither of them wished either to work under Speusippus or to open a rival school. Speusippus was considerably senior to both, besides being Plato's nephew. That Aristotle did not leave Athens in any spirit of antagonism to Plato seems proved by the fact that Xenocrates accompanied him. On leaving Athens he went not to Macedon[1], but to Atarneus, drawn thither by his old friendship for Hermias, and perhaps also by the connexion of Proxenus, the guardian of his youth, with the place. His pupil Theophrastus also belonged to Eresus in the neighbouring island of Lesbos. Hermias had been the pupil both of Plato and Aristotle at Athens, and hence both Aristotle and Xenocrates would be interested in him. He was engaged in an attempt to form a principality at the expense of Persia in this district, which afterwards became the centre of the kingdom of Pergamon. It is probable that he was an instrument of Philip of Macedon[2]. Hermias had been a slave and was an eunuch and a tyrant, and the friendship of these philosophers for him was undoubtedly an offence to Greek prejudice. We need not attach too much importance to the well-known epigram of Theocritus of Chios[3]. Theocritus was a bitter democratic epigrammatist, and a fit foe for the bitter historian Theopompus, his contemporary and fellow-citizen: both made themselves intolerable to those with whom they had to do, and came to

the Phaedo, and to have been highly Platonic both in form and contents (see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 59. 1).

[1] Stageira had been razed by Philip in the course of the Olynthian War, and was still in ruins.

[2] See Boeckh, Hermias von Atarneus, p. 143, who refers to [Demosth.] Philipp. 4. p. 139 *sub fin.*, a passage which a highly probable emendation in Ulpian 42 C connects with Hermias.

[3] Ἑρμίου εὐνούχου τε καὶ Εὐβούλου τόδε δούλου
μνῆμα κενὸν κενόφρων θῆκεν Ἀριστοτέλης·
ὃς διὰ τὴν ἀκρατῆ γαστρὸς φύσιν εἵλετο ναίειν
ἀντ' Ἀκαδημείας Βορβόρου ἐν προχοαῖς (Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 2).

According to Plutarch, the river at Pella was called Βόρβορος (de Exil. c. 10). Cp. Plato, Rep. 533 D, ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω.

evil ends. A familiar distich of Sophocles, however, ran (Fr. 788 Nauck)—

> Ὅστις γὰρ ὡς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται,
> κείνου ἐστὶ δοῦλος, κἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ,

and we must remember that Socrates was said to have refused to visit Archelaus of Macedon, Scopas of Crannon, and Eurylochus of Larissa (Diog. Laert. 2. 25), that Euripides and Aristippus had not gained in repute by adopting a different course, and that the service of princes came to escape condemnation only in the Alexandrian period[1]. The father of Aristotle, however, had been in the service of a king, and we need not wonder that Aristotle himself took a different view. We know from the Politics how he regarded the kind of slavery which is not by nature, and Hermias cannot have deserved to be a slave. Even Tyranny in his opinion had its better forms, and Hermias apparently ruled in conjunction with a group of friends: Ἑρμίας καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι is the term employed throughout his treaty with the Erythraeans[2]. We are reminded of the passage in the Politics (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 29 sqq.), where Kingship is said to find safety in friends, while distrust of friends is characteristic of Tyranny.

Aristotle remained with Hermias for three years[3], perhaps till the latter met his fate through Persian treachery[4], and he seems to have felt a real enthusiasm for his character and career. We know from the Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle combined a high estimate of the contemplative life with a high estimate of the pleasures of true friendship, and a noble conception of it. It was partly because the household relations are forms of friendship, that he argued so stoutly in defence of the household. His hymn, or

[1] Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 269 n. Plutarch discusses the question in his 'Philosopho esse cum principibus viris colloquendum,' and argues strongly in favour of bringing the philosopher and ruler into contact, as a disciple of Plato was likely to do.

[2] Boeckh, ibid. p. 151. See the treaty in Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. Gr. 1. p. 167.

[3] Apollodorus ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 9.

[4] So Strabo, p. 610, but see Boeckh, Hermias p. 142 sqq. and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 20.

scolion, to Virtue gave rise to comment, for, as Grote remarks (Aristotle 1. 19), it introduced the name and exploits of Hermias, the tyrant, eunuch, and ex-slave, 'as the closing parallel and example in a list beginning with Herakles, the Dioskuri, Achilles, and Ajax.' It was untruly made out to be a paean to Hermias (Athen. Deipn. 696 a–b), and on this ground as well as on that of a sumptuous offering after his death, Aristotle was subsequently accused of paying him divine honours[1]. The whole episode is interesting for the light which it casts on Aristotle's character. We see that the cool, circumspect, methodical philosopher was capable of enthusiastic devotion to his friends, and cared little whether his display of it brought him into conflict with ordinary Greek prejudice. We seem to discern in his nature a mixture of affectionateness and combativeness which is not unpleasing. Traces of a certain eagerness of spirit and pugnacity perhaps survive in his literary style. Sometimes we notice in his writings that one thought follows another so rapidly that the two, as it were, collide, and the strict grammatical construction suffers shipwreck. He is also fond of tacitly contradicting certain persons—Plato, for instance, and Isocrates. The feud we hear of between him and the latter must belong to his earlier period of Athenian residence, which ended with the death of Plato, for Isocrates was dead when he returned to Athens after Chaeroneia.

[1] Cp. Lucian, Eunuch. 9, *εἰς ὑπερβολὴν θαυμάσας* (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης) *Ἑρμείαν τὸν εὐνοῦχον τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀταρνέως τύραννον, ἄχρι τοῦ καὶ θύειν αὐτῷ κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοῖς θεοῖς.* We learn from Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 5. 4: cp. Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 2. 5) that comments were also made on a similarly sumptuous sacrifice of Aristotle's in honour of his wife Pythias after her death —*ἔθυεν ὑπερχαίρων τῷ γυναίῳ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ Ἐλευσινίᾳ Δήμητρι*: see Boeckh, Hermias p. 147, who refers to these passages. The same feeling appears, though in this case there was better ground for it, in the diatribe of Theopompus against Harpalus in his letter to Alexander (Theopomp. Fragm. 277: Müller, Hist. Gr. Fr. 1. 325), and in the caution of Plato, Rep. 540 B, *μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς* (his philosophic rulers) *καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία ξυναιρῇ, ὡς δαίμοσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις.* Compare also Duris ap. Plutarch. Lysandr. c. 18, (Λυσάνδρῳ) *πρώτῳ . . . Ἑλλήνων βωμοὺς αἱ πόλεις ἀνέστησαν ὡς θεῷ καὶ θυσίας ἔθυσαν· εἰς πρῶτον δὲ παιᾶνες ᾠδήθησαν.*

The death of Hermias left his niece and adopted daughter without a protector, and Aristotle married her, partly out of attachment to his memory, partly for her worth and unmerited misfortunes[1]. He may have already left Hermias before he experienced this severely felt blow at the hands of Persia—a blow soon to be far more than repaid by his great pupil; at any rate we next hear of him at Mytilene; but in 343 or 342 B.C. he was summoned to Macedon to become the teacher of Alexander.

Philip of Macedon had perhaps come in contact with Pythagoreanism in the days when he resided as a youth at Thebes; Isocrates credits him with some tincture of philosophy[2]; and he is said to have owed to Plato's intervention in his favour with Perdiccas the principality, his possession of which at the critical moment enabled him to win the throne of Macedon[3]. Aristotle had probably already resided at Pella in his boyhood, for his father Nicomachus had lived at the court of Amyntas as his physician and friend. He may have already written several of his dialogues, and become known as a diligent reader and book-collector, habits rare even among philosophers at that time. But his selection as Alexander's teacher was probably rather due to his hereditary connexion with the Macedonian court, to his being not only a philosopher but also a student of rhetoric[4], and, above all, to the fact that he possessed a full measure of Athenian culture without being an Athenian or alien to court-life. It is creditable to Philip that he selected for the work a man

[1] Strabo, p. 610: Aristocles ap. Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 2. 8–10, who however speaks of her as the sister and adopted daughter of Hermias.

[2] Philip. § 29.

[3] Speusippus ap. Athen. Deipn. 506 e. See also Diog. Laert. 3. 40: A. Schäfer, Demosthenes 2. 37.

[4] Cp. Cic. de Orat. 3. 35. 141: rerum cognitionem cum orationis exercitatione coniunxit. Neque vero hoc fugit sapientissimum regem Philippum, qui hunc Alexandro filio doctorem accierit, a quo eodem ille et agendi acciperet praecepta et eloquendi. 'During the first sojourn of Aristotle in Athens, while he was still attached to and receiving instruction from Plato, he appears to have devoted himself more to rhetoric than to philosophy, and even to have given public lessons or lectures on rhetoric' (Grote, Aristotle 1. 32).

likely to be able to hold a comparatively independent position. The years that Aristotle had spent at Athens were a guarantee that he would be no mere echo of Macedonian feeling. His extraction and career might seem to mark him out as a link between Macedon and Hellenism. For three years, but only three, commencing when Alexander was about 13 years of age, he had an unbroken time for the education of his pupil. On attaining the age of 16, Alexander began to be employed in affairs of State, which can have left Aristotle only occasional opportunities of supervision.

It is hard to imagine him a resident at Pella during these years, if Philip's court was what Theopompus describes it, and if Philip was as hostile to men of orderly behaviour as Theopompus asserts[1]. The descriptions of this historian—an outspoken witness, but one not on the whole unfriendly to Philip—lend some point to the surprise of Theocritus of Chios, that Aristotle should have been willing to exchange the Platonic Academy for Pella. A sacred precinct of the Nymphs (*νυμφαῖον*) existed at Mieza (a Macedonian city, which Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 27. 4) follows Geier in placing in Emathia south-west of Pella), where even in Plutarch's days men pointed out stone seats and shady walks which were believed to have been at one time used by Aristotle (Plutarch, Alex. c. 7); and Plutarch seems to suppose that Alexander received his instruction here. Aristotle appears during his stay in the North to have induced Philip[2] to refound Stageira and to restore to it the remnant of its citizens, and we may be sure that he watched with intense interest the culmination of the king's fortunes at Chaeroneia. The death of Philip and accession of Alexander two years later (336 B.C.), together with the preparations for the Oriental campaign, would indicate to him that no reason existed any longer for his stay in Macedon, from which Alexander seemed likely to be absent some time. He may perhaps have preferred the milder climate of the South[3]. The

[1] See Theopomp. Fragm. 136, 178, 249, 298.

[2] See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 25. 3.

[3] It is thus that Blakesley

destruction of Thebes in 335 B.C. made Alexander's Asiatic expedition possible without imprudence[1], and was the most effective warning that could have been given to Athens and the rest of Greece. It now became possible for Aristotle to settle at Athens.

He wished to be at Athens, mainly, no doubt, because his philosophical views could not be effectually placed before the world in any other way. Xenocrates had now succeeded Speusippus at the Academy. Aristotle had been unwilling to found a rival school when Plato's death was still recent, and in competition with his senior Speusippus, the nephew of Plato. He does not seem to have felt the same reluctance in reference to Xenocrates. His divergence from Platonism may have increased in the interval. The Macedonian leaders were probably glad that he should be there. Antipater, who knew that Aristotle 'added to his other gifts that of persuasiveness[2],' may well have been glad to send to Athens a man so capable of leading the best minds into peaceful paths. The *mot d'ordre* of the Macedonian party at Athens was 'peace[3],' and a philosopher who taught that the end for which the State, no less than the individual, exists is to live nobly, finding happiness rather in the arts of peace than in those of war, that a State may be great

(Life of Aristotle p. 58), interprets 'the expression of Aristotle cited by Demetrius, de Elocutione, sec. 29, 155: *ἐγὼ ἐκ μὲν Ἀθηνῶν εἰς Στάγειρα ἦλθον διὰ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν μέγαν, ἐκ δὲ Σταγείρων εἰς Ἀθήνας διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τὸν μέγαν.*' But, supposing that the fragment is authentic, the phrase *ὁ μέγας χειμών* may here simply mean 'the great storm,' as in Plato, Protag. 344 D, or again, if it means 'the great winter,' it may be used, as in Aristot. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 31 (see Ideler *ad loc.*) in the technical sense of the winter of the 'great year,' in which the sun, moon, and planets assume a certain relative position in the heavens—a winter attended with torrents of rain. A 'great winter' in this technical sense did probably occur in 342 B.C. (see Appendix G), but it is not easy to connect it with Aristotle's return to Athens seven years later.

[1] Alexander gained by terror that freedom to act in Asia which Isocrates thought could only be gained by winning the goodwill of Greece (Philip. §§ 86–8).

[2] Plutarch, Alcib. et Coriol. comparatio c. 3.

[3] See Bernays, Phokion p. 68, who refers to Demosth. de Cor. § 89, *τῆς νῦν εἰρήνης, ἣν οὗτοι κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος τηροῦσιν οἱ χρηστοί*: § 323, *ἐν οἷς ἀτυχησάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐτύχησεν ἕτερος, ταῦτ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ὅπως τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον διαμενεῖ φασὶ δεῖν τηρεῖν.*

without being at the head of a hegemony or an empire, that the contemplative life is the highest, and that the aim of the political life is not party-triumph, or the quest of wealth and power, but the promotion in one's fellow-citizens of virtuous activity in all its forms, would exercise, it might be expected, a calming influence on men's minds, and give a new and better direction to their thoughts.

Aristotle may well have hoped to be of service both to Macedon and Greece. He probably long held—perhaps he did so to the last—that the interests of Macedon and Greece might be reconciled. Isocrates had already pressed Philip first to restore harmony between the four leading Powers of Greece—the Argives, Lacedaemonians, Thebans, and Athenians—and then to become its Agamemnon in a war against Persia—to be, not its tyrant dividing in order to govern (Philip. § 80) and plotting for selfish ends (§ 73 sqq.), but the leader of a confederacy, the common friend of all its States[1]. Aristotle, in his turn, counselled Alexander to rule the Greeks as the head of a hegemony and only the barbarians as a despot[2]. On the other hand, Greece was to place power in the hands of the μέσοι, its soundest and most rational class (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 1 sqq.). We thus find Aristotle, in effect, inculcating moderation on both sides.

The departure of Alexander for the East left the direction of affairs in Greece in the hands of Antipater, a man with whom Aristotle had more in common than with either Philip or Alexander. Antipater was probably some years

[1] The Philippus of Isocrates (346 B.C.) is an appeal to Philip to change his present unsatisfactory policy (§ 17: § 80), and to falsify his opponents' account of his designs (§ 73 sqq.). It reminds him of his Heraclid extraction, and urges that plots for the subjection of Greece which would be creditable to a king of Persia are quite out of place in a Heraclid (§§ 75–6). A certain distrust of Philip and a desire to point out to him a 'more excellent way' are traceable throughout it. Agelaus gave similar advice to Macedon at the Congress of Naupactus a hundred and thirty years later (Polyb. 5. 104: Prof. Freeman, History of Federal Government 1. p. 561).

[2] See the well-known passage in Plutarch's first oration 'de Alexandri seu virtute seu fortuna,' c. 6, and cp. Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 20 sqq.

older than Aristotle, but like him in moderation of tone and strong sober common sense. For the first time in the course of Greek history the hegemony of Greece rested with a man who, as the servant of a king, was neither an oligarch nor a democrat, and who could have no wish to press either oligarchy or democracy on the States of Greece. Is it possible that Aristotle is to some extent addressing Antipater, when he insists that one and the same constitution is not applicable to every State, that the form which suits one will not always suit another, and that the important thing is to ameliorate oligarchy and democracy where they must exist, and at the same time to point to some form of constitution at once satisfactory and generally applicable? There is no clear evidence of a design on Aristotle's part to influence the policy of Macedon, so that this surmise must remain a surmise. It is to all appearance wholly in the interest of Greece that he recommends the constitution which gives predominance to the moderately wealthy class (ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία). Only one of those who had played a leading part in the affairs of Greece had encouraged the introduction of this form (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 sqq.). The reference is probably to Theramenes, whom we know (Plutarch, Nicias c. 2) that Aristotle grouped with Nicias and Thucydides the son of Melesias, as combining high worth and social position with a hereditary goodwill to the people. His inauspicious name is for obvious reasons suppressed. We find Theramenes striking the first blow at the power of the Four Hundred at Athens by insisting that 'it was high time to institute the Five Thousand in reality, and not in name' (Thuc. 8. 89. 2), and these Five Thousand were made, when he carried his point, to include all hoplites (εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται, Thuc. 8. 97); they would thus comprise the μέσοι of Aristotle[1]. Later

[1] It should be observed that this constitution, which gave political supremacy to the hoplites and put an end to the payment of office-holders (including probably members of the assembly and dicasteries: see Classen *ad loc.*) meets with the approval of Thu-

on, in the struggle with Critias which proved fatal to him, Theramenes is still true to the same 'Left-Centre' policy. In that reply to Critias which won the boulê to his side, and which Critias could only parry by ordering his execution, he declares himself the foe of those who will have no democracy which does not go the full length of giving a share of power to slaves and to men so poor that they would sell their country for a drachma, no less than of those who approve no oligarchy which does not make a handful of men tyrants of the State. His opinion, he adds, was still the same as it had ever been, that supremacy in the State should rest with those who are able to serve it as knights and hoplites[1].

Aristotle expresses a similar view when he claims supremacy for the *μέσοι*, for we must not confound the *μέσοι* of a Greek State with the classes which we now-a-days group under the comprehensive term 'middle class.' They were the best-trained and most effective soldiers of the State; nor was this their only claim to power, for Aristotle describes them as being well-fitted both for ruling and being ruled, and therefore for the duties of citizenship, as swayed by reason rather than impulse, and exposed neither to the corrupting influence of extreme wealth nor to the equally ruinous effects of extreme poverty. They deserved to exercise a predominant influence in the State, and, wherever they were at all numerous, their military training as hoplites would enable them to do so. Aristotle may possibly have thought, though, as has been said, we have no evidence of the fact, that if the hegemony of Macedon were used to bring this class to power, it would be a blessing to Greece. Nothing could be worse than her

cydides, as it subsequently met with that of Aristotle. See Thuc. 8. 97, *καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γ' ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.*

[1] Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 48: cp. Plato, Laws 753 B. Men could not be hoplites unless they had not only means enough to furnish themselves with the arms appropriate to the hoplite, but also the leisure to practise the necessary exercises (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 748. 7).

present faction-ridden condition, which was both morally and politically ruinous.

It is easy in reading the calm discussions of the Politics to forget the impression which Aristotle's political views must have made on his contemporaries, and especially on the Athenians amongst whom he lived. We do not know, indeed, how far the work was published in his lifetime, or how far the nature of its teaching was generally known to the citizens of Athens. Some knowledge of Aristotle's political views, however, must have been possessed even by those who did not belong to any philosophical school, and it is impossible to suppose that his recommendation of a transfer of power from the Many to the μέσοι, coming as it did from one who was deep in the confidence of Antipater, was not viewed with uneasiness and indignation. Ever since Chaeroneia the existence of the Athenian democracy had hung by a thread, and the change suggested by Aristotle in the hearing, as it were, of Antipater was a very feasible anti-democratic move. True, Aristotle's comments on the extreme form of democracy were no severer than those of Plato, and Plato had lived undisturbed at Athens to the last, but now the times were far more critical, and Plato had suggested no such dangerously easy change. Aristotle's less ideal political method had led him into questions of everyday politics, the treatment of which was attended with far more risk than the portraiture of any number of ideal States. We find him in one passage pointing out how to organize a tolerable kind of democracy, the important thing being 'to eliminate from the citizen-body the worse elements of the demos' (τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν, 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1): in another he recommends the constitution in which supremacy rests with men of moderate means (ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία). A polity or moderate democracy had once existed at Athens during the poverty-stricken and desperate period which followed the fall of the Four Hundred, and Aristotle's advice was destined to be acted on in the very year of his death, when the new constitution which Antipater

forced on Athens, by confining political rights to those possessed of a qualification of 2000 drachmae, disfranchised 12,000 citizens out of 21,000, and drove many to accept the victor's offer of a residence in Thrace[1]. The religious views, again, implied in the Politics would be extremely unsatisfactory to many pious Greeks. True, the gods are recognized and their worship provided for, but where in its pages would be found that recognition of their intervention in human affairs which we constantly notice in the writings of Xenophon? Xenophon traces the successes of the Thebans against the Lacedaemonians to the anger of the gods against a people which first swore that the cities of Greece should be autonomous, and then broke its oath by seizing the Cadmeia of Thebes (Hell. 5. 4. 1). He even ascribes to the influence of some superhuman power, bent on bringing the Lacedaemonian State to destruction, the mistaken decision of the Lacedaemonian assembly which resulted in the battle of Leuctra (Hell. 6. 4. 3, *ἤδη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν*). Plato had rebuked views of this kind (Rep. 379 A sqq.), but his innovations in religion were probably less repellent than the reticence and chilliness of Aristotle on the subject.

But in truth the mere fact of Aristotle's close connexion with Alexander and Antipater and with Macedonian agents such as Nicanor, would suffice to make his position at Athens precarious, quite apart from the unpopularity of his political and religious views. Xenocrates and the Academy seem to have held more aloof from Macedon. Already in 330 B.C., when three-fourths of the Peloponnesus rose under the Lacedaemonian King Agis against Antipater, to be crushed at a second Chaeroneia, and Aeschines shortly after, notwithstanding that defeat, failed in his prosecution of Ctesiphon and his attack on Demosthenes, Aristotle must have felt himself in the midst of foes. Another crisis occurred in 324 B.C. when Harpalus, the fugitive Mace-

[1] Diod. 18. 18. Long since the above was written, I have found my remark anticipated in Bernays' Gesammelte Abhandlungen, 1. 167.

donian satrap of Babylon, took refuge with his vast treasure at Athens, and claimed, though without success, protection against Alexander, who had now returned to Susa from his wanderings in the depths of Asia, and soon signalized his reappearance on the horizon of Greece by the ominous decree for the restoration of all exiles from Greek States, which Nicanor was ordered to make known to the Greeks assembled for the festival at Olympia. The restoration of exiles meant the restoration of all property taken from them, its re-transfer from its present to its former holders. Hitherto Alexander had sought to conciliate the Greek States, but the East was now conquered, and Macedonian supremacy was free to show itself in its true colours. Macedon evidently desired to have in each Greek State a body of men owing everything to it and therefore devoted to its interests[1], and it would stop short at no interference in the internal affairs of Greek States that was at all likely to contribute to this end.

Aristotle, it is clear, had connected himself with a Power which had failed to listen to his warning that Greeks must be ruled in a different way from Orientals. The conqueror of Asia had been exposed to the intoxicating homage of Orientals and familiarised with the subservient manners of the East, while still young and plastic in character. Even if he had approved the policy which Aristotle recommended to him, of making a distinction between his methods of rule in the case of Hellenes and Orientals, he was by this time incapable of the double attitude. His breach with Callisthenes, whom Aristotle had introduced to his service, had alienated him to some extent from Aristotle. Thus Aristotle was too good a friend of Macedon for the Athenians, too firm in the assertion of Hellenic dignity and self-respect for Alexander.

The crisis came when the news of Alexander's death (June, 323 B.C.) reached Athens. A storm of anti-Macedonian feeling arose, which spared Phocion but struck Aristotle. He was indicted for impiety on account of his

[1] Diod. 18. 8.

scolion to Hermias and the honours which he had rendered to his memory. Charges of this sort were weapons frequently used against political adversaries both at Athens and elsewhere[1], and we may be sure that his real offence was his intimacy and influence with Antipater, his connexion with Nicanor, the promulgator at Olympia of Alexander's decree, and his past connexion with the Macedonian Court. He retired before trial to Chalcis, which was a Macedonian stronghold[2] and was also connected with the Chalcidian cities of the Thrace-ward region from which he came (cp. Aristot. Fragm. 93. 1492 b 24 sqq.). He died at Chalcis in 322 B. C.

Aristotle's relation to Hellas and to Macedon.

'Aristotle,' a great authority has said, 'had no attachment to Hellas as an organized system, autonomous, self-acting, with a Hellenic city as president; which attachment would have been considered by Perikles, Archidamus, and Epameinondas as one among the constituents indispensable to Hellenic patriotism[3].' It would seem, however, from the Politics (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 29 sqq.), that he viewed the Greek race as the race best fitted to rule, and the πόλις (possibly under a παμβασιλεύς), not the ἔθνος, as the best depositary of power. Ideally, therefore, rule was, in his opinion, best placed in the hands of a well-constituted Hellenic City-State. So far as the rule of Macedon was not Hellenic, nor the rule of a City-State, it must have been unsatisfactory to him. But the actual City-State of Greece seemed to him very defective, and he certainly did not hold that the substitution of the Hellenic king of Macedon for Thebes, as the dominant power in Greece, was necessarily 'finis Graeciae.'

Some modern observers are inclined, while fully admitting the greatness of Demosthenes, to say that the boundary of Hellas was rather arbitrarily drawn when Macedon was left outside it, that the Macedonians were akin in language and religion to the Greeks[4], that in these latter

[1] E.g. at Corcyra, Thuc. 3. 70. 5.
[2] Schäfer, Demosthenes 3. 35.
[3] Grote, Aristotle 1. 14, note.
[4] See O. Abel, Makedonien

days the Northern races were more vigorous and unspoilt than any others[1], and that looking to the rising greatness of Rome, it was important that Greece should not cut off from herself a promising kindred race, or shrink from accepting its lead[2] for no graver reason than that of an ethnological difference[3]. But Aristotle did not go so far as this. To him the Macedonians are still perhaps barbarians (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 15), though barbarians of a far nobler sort than those of Asia, and it is the Hellenes who have the best right to rule, in virtue of their well-balanced union of heart and intellect. We may conjecture, however, that he hoped that a 'modus vivendi' might be established between Macedon and Greece. Let Macedon be content to rule the Greeks subject to her as freemen should be ruled. Let Greece silence her factions and call to power those who would rule rationally and for the common good.

The 'logic of facts' did by degrees impose some degree of moderation both on Macedon and on Greece. The break-up of Alexander's empire, the rivalries of his successors, the descent of the Gauls on Macedon, the rise of rulers like the earlier Ptolemies and of governments like those of the

vor König Philipp p. 115 sqq. Bernays says (Phokion p. 74) that 'the differences of language were not greater than those which existed between Dorians and Ionians, and differences of religion were wholly absent'; but to this statement Gomperz (Die Akademie und ihr vermeintlicher Philomacedonismus, *Wiener Studien*, 1882, p. 117) opposes the view of Deecke (*Rhein. Mus.* 36, 577 and 596), who connects the Macedonian language with those of the Epirotic, Illyrian, Thracian, and Phrygian races, and regards this group of languages as 'occupying an intermediate position between the Iranian and the Greek.'

[1] See Mommsen, History of Rome, Book 3, c. 8 (E. T. vol. 2, p. 215). 'In steadfast resistance to the public enemy under whatever name, in unshaken fidelity towards their native country and their hereditary government, and in persevering courage amidst the severest trials, no nation in ancient history bears so close a resemblance to the Roman people as the Macedonians' (p. 216).

[2] Greece eventually came to see this. See the remarkable speech of Agelaus of Naupactus (Polyb. 5. 104) and the remarks of Prof. Freeman upon it (History of Federal Government 1. 560 sqq.).

[3] It is easy to see how fortunate a thing it was for Rome that no such contrast as that of Greek and barbarian formed part of her traditions. By insisting on regarding far the larger part of the Balkan peninsula as alien to her, Greece greatly added to the difficulty of uniting it to herself.

Achaean League, Rhodes, and the Pontic Heracleia, did tend in this direction. More perhaps might have been achieved if Greece had been wiser and less exhausted[1], and if Macedon had trusted less to garrisons and tyrants[2]. Still it was much to have preached wisdom and moderation to an age in which conquerors and conquered were alike impatient of compromise.

We naturally expect to find in the teaching of the Politics clear traces of Aristotle's close connexion with Macedon. It would be natural that we should do so, even if the work was written before the battle of Chaeroneia: after it, one would have thought that some reference to the altered position of Greece would be unavoidable. Now the mention of Philip's death in the Seventh Book[3] does not prove that the whole of the Politics, or even the immediate context, was written after that event, but it shows that if this was not so, Aristotle made at least one addition to that part of the work subsequently to the accession of Alexander, and we may reasonably infer that his political views remained unchanged at that date.

No reference, however, to the relation of Greece to Macedon appears in the Politics; the fact that a mighty power had suddenly arisen on her Northern frontier is absolutely ignored. For all that appears to the contrary in its pages, the Politics may have been written while Thebes was still the leading power. Not a particle of Aristotle's

[1] 'It is a great mistake to consider the political history of Greece as at an end, when she was once compelled to submit to the Macedonian yoke.... If she did not recover the position in which she stood when Philip mounted the throne of Macedon ... it was chiefly because she wanted an eye to see her new position and relations, and a hand to collect, husband, and employ her remaining resources' (Thirlwall, History of Greece 7. 245). 'There was ground to believe' (in 318 B.C.) 'that the time might not be far distant, when the ruler of Macedonia might find an equal alliance with Greece necessary to his safety, and when it might even be desirable for her, that he should be a man of energy and talents like Cassander, rather than one so feeble and contemptible as Polysperchon' (ibid. 7. 263).

[2] Polyb. 9. 29: Prof. Freeman p. 232.

[3] Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 1.

attention is diverted from the πόλις to the ἔθνος. The improvement of Greece is the central object of the work. It is the πόλις, not the ἔθνος, which Aristotle makes it his aim to reform[1]. It is the πόλις that brings men completeness in respect of good life, as distinguished from completeness in respect of necessaries. It is in Greece, not Macedon, that the future of human society is to be made or marred.

Aristotle writes as a Hellene and a disciple of Plato, not as one whom circumstances had more or less attached to the fortunes of Macedon. The great spirits of antiquity, and Aristotle among them, seem to draw their creed from sources too deep to be greatly affected by accidents such as that which had connected him with Macedon. He still follows in the track of his philosophical predecessors, and especially of Plato, with whom he stands in complete filiation. The object of the Politics is to carry on and complete the work that Plato had begun—the work of re-adapting the πόλις to the promotion of virtue and noble living. Aristotle's relation to Plato was the critical fact of his life, not his relation to Philip or Alexander. He broke much fresh ground, it is true; yet over great regions of thought he found a track already made by his predecessor: in fact, it is the close sequence of two minds of this calibre, and in this particular order[2], that forms the most exceptional feature of the history of Greek philosophy, and goes far to account for its greatness.

Contrast of form between Plato's writings and those in which Aristotle's philosophi-

The first contrast which we note between the writings of Plato and Aristotle, as they have come down to us, is a contrast of form. This contrast would no doubt have been much softened, if the dialogues of Aristotle had been preserved to us, for we possess a few fragments of them which show, as indeed do some few passages in other writings of his, that

[1] History justified the leaning of Aristotle. The future rested not with the Macedonian ἔθνος, but with Carthage and Rome. On the other hand, it is true to say that Rome was what it was to the world by becoming rather a nation than a city, and rather a World-State than a nation.

[2] Would as much have been achieved, if Aristotle had preceded Plato?

Aristotle could be eloquent if he chose. He may have continued to write dialogues even after his return to Athens, but the works with which we commonly connect his name are of an entirely different character. Whatever view we take of these works, whether we regard them as having to a large extent arisen out of lectures (which we may do without denying that Aristotle wrote them) or not, it is clear that they handle the subjects of which they treat quite differently from the dialogues of Plato: of Plato's lectures we possess no record.

cal teaching is embodied.

All considerations of literary charm drop out of sight in them; the ascertainment of the truth comes to be the one aim of the inquiry. In place of the easy windings of the Platonic dialogue—flowing, one would say, it knows not whither, were it not that a subtle and hidden art governs its course—we have a careful mapping-out of the investigation into separate and successive inquiries, evidently arranged beforehand, not starting up even in appearance on the spur of the moment—the subject of each being announced with an angular formality before it is entered upon, and the whole series being pervaded by one uniform tone, so that the mind of the inquirer and that of the reader are steadily kept in one unvarying attitude of reasoning inquiry, without any intervals of eloquence or dramatic by-play to relieve the intentional monotony. The scientific spirit no longer feels itself bound to put itself under the protection of its elder sister, the literary spirit—no longer, like Teucer, hurls its shafts from beneath the shield of Ajax; it has reached years of emancipation and trusts to its own claims and deserts. Investigations relating to one and the same subject are no longer scattered over several writings, which need to be compared. While Plato had, for instance, never succeeded in reserving one whole dialogue for questions relating to the constitutional structure of the State and nothing else[1], Aristotle adheres closely to this one subject

[1] The Republic mingles together Ethics, Psychology, Metaphysics, and Politics; the Politicus Logic and Politics; the Laws unites with the quest of the second-best constitution an attempt to

throughout the Politics, and collects within the limits of a single work the main body of his political doctrine, so that it brings to a focus and treats in close connexion speculations spread over the Republic, the Politicus, and the Laws of Plato, to say nothing of other dialogues.

There is no longer any obstacle to the use of the most systematic and searching methods of inquiry. The careful ascertainment of historical fact is no longer out of place[1]. Myth disappears; philosophy returns to the sober facts of history. Yet some virtues of the dialogue-form are preserved. From time to time, when a fit occasion presents itself—especially, it would seem, in introductory discussions[2], though we do not distinctly gather the principle on which the occasion is chosen—a question is proposed, and a dialogue-group formed; in other words an *ἀπορία* is discussed. The parties to the discussion are commonly anonymous, so that there is nothing to prepossess us in favour of this side or that. All dramatic interest has vanished: no interlocutor is more overbearing, or more inexperienced, or more skilful than his fellows. But the comparison of views, if less artistically managed, is quite as thorough and as fruitful of result. Two or more opinions, each with a grain of truth in it, are allowed to collide, till some reconciling principle issues from their collision which embodies the truth they contain without the error. Aristotle, who has studied throughout to preserve the impartiality of a Chairman[3], accepts the result of the discussion. These aporetic debates thus form, as it were, easy paths by which we ascend from the plane of ordinary Hellenic opinion to the higher level of Aristotelian insight, carried upward rather

set forth in detail a system of Laws. 'In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist, we have observed the tendency of Plato to combine two or more subjects, or different aspects of the same subject, in a single dialogue' (Prof. Jowett, Plato 3. 543, ed. 1).

[1] The Second Book of the Politics would have been impossible in a dialogue, and not less so the fulness of concrete inquiry and remark which we find in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books.

[2] 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 11 sq.

[3] Cp. de Caelo, 1. 10. 279 b 11, *δεῖ διαιτητὰς ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιδίκους εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας τἀληθὲς κρίνειν ἱκανῶς.*

by the force of facts than by any overt intervention of the philosopher.

There is still much in the Politics to remind us that we are reading a Greek and not a modern work. It is not at first sight easy to detect the connecting thread on which its successive inquiries are strung. The order in which they are arranged is not always the order in which a modern writer would have arranged them. Thus we have in the First Book a sketch of the Household as it ought to be, before the question comes up for solution in the Second, whether the Household has any claim to exist. A conclusion established by argument is sometimes not taken as established later on, but proved afresh, and occasionally by different arguments. We find the same question started for debate, and debated, more than once, even in one and the same μέθοδος or inquiry, and in cases where the text seems not to have been tampered with or disturbed. Sometimes this appears to be done with the view of eliciting some fresh lesson in connexion with the subject. Unreconciled contradictions are not uncommon, some of them perhaps due to the fact that the work is made up of three or four parts, not completely harmonized nor perhaps composed at the same time. Still Plato's rapid and constant changes of tone are absent, and the exposition is systematic and strict in comparison with his.

Style of Aristotle.

A new style and a new terminology came into existence with the new method. The fourth century before Christ was prolific in prose-styles. History and oratory were rapidly finding the style that best suited their purpose. Philosophy was now to do the like. Aristotle said of Plato's style, that it was half-way between poetry and prose[1]. The style which Aristotle chose for the systematic exposition of his philosophy, though not, probably, for his dialogues, was altogether different. It is an easy,

[1] Diog. Laert. 3. 37. The Greek language was successfully used for poetry for several centuries before it began to be used for prose, and naturally acquired a bent which it was slow to lose.

unpretending style, almost conversational or epistolary in its freedom, yet never substantially inaccurate or seriously off its guard. It makes no pretension to literary grace; it does not scruple to use technical words, often borrowed from the everyday language of Greeks, but used in new and fixed senses. It very rarely rises into eloquence, hardly ever in the Politics, a little oftener in the zoological works and the Metaphysics. It has a rapid and eager movement; it is concise and elliptical, often hinting an argument in place of fully setting it forth; it is occasionally rough and slipshod; it seems, in fact, to expect in the reader some such quickness and delicacy of apprehension as grows up in societies of an intimate nature where a pregnant word or two suffices to convey a thought[1]. Deliberation is its very life and being; nowhere does it seem to attain such a pace and swing as to exclude the interposition of a doubt or a conflicting fact; the assent is held oscillating so long, that when at last it is accorded, there is no feeling that any point of importance has escaped consideration. Anything that might throw the judgment off its balance, or interfere with a cool, circumspect, and dispassionate habit of investigation is carefully avoided.

Whatever may be the literary defects of Aristotle's style in his extant works, the extent to which Theophrastus and other disciples retain it is an evidence that it really supplied a philosophical need, and that there was a certain congeniality between the form which he chose for the exposition of his philosophy and its substance. The style of the Stoics and of Epicurus was apparently still further removed from that of ordinary literature.

Contrast of substance between the political teaching of Plato and that of Aristotle.

If we pass from the form to the matter of Aristotle's political philosophy, we shall notice an equally great contrast.

Plato had found real existence impugned on all sides. Not every one, indeed, went as far as Gorgias, who sought

[1] Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 967 (Nauck): ἡ γὰρ σιωπὴ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστ' ἀπόκρισις.

to show that nothing has any real existence, but many held that only the sensible[1], or the necessary, or the invariable exists by nature. The more the field of full existence was narrowed, the more the field of possible knowledge was narrowed also. Plato's first and main aim had therefore been, as has already been noticed, to point to a really existent and knowable world, which he found in the world of Ideas. He did not, however, stop here; we have seen that he went on to seek in the Ideas the explanation of the phenomenal world. If the cure for scepticism was to look from the variable Many to the unchanging One, the next step must be to use the knowledge thus gained for the explanation of the Many and the amelioration of the Actual. The reassertion of Existence and of the possibility of knowledge led on to the assertion that a fixed standard exists to which the structure of the State must conform. This standard is the Idea. The true founder and ruler of States must look up from 'the many just' (*τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια*) to 'that which is essentially temperate and just and good' (*αὐτὸ τὸ σῶφρον καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν*), and must then proceed to work these Ideas into the State with which he has to do. Plato sees that Experience is necessary to the ruler[2]; still his primary need is philosophy. If, in things political, earth and heaven ever come to mingle, it is through the philosopher. The world of social phenomena lies lost in its variability and semi-existence before him, and he calls it to full life by fixing his gaze on the Idea and remoulding society in its likeness. The philosopher is a kind of semi-divine demiurge: we feel for the moment that he is everything, and the material on which he works is nothing.

But this is not quite Plato's view. The Idea is not to Plato the sole source of existence, for, as we have seen[3], he allows to things 'a kind of existence that cannot be derived from the Idea': thus a second power is revealed to us in the world, the power of Necessity immanent in Matter, which may co-operate with or thwart the Idea.

[1] Laws 889 A sqq. [2] Rep. 539 E. [3] p. 53.

We infer, therefore, that the philosophic statesman can do little without favourable Matter, and if we do not hear much of this in the Republic, where we are taught rather to ascribe the unsatisfactoriness of things to the fact that no one has lifted his eyes to the Idea, Plato seems in the Laws more conscious of the insubordinate element in things. Men are not made of wax, to be moulded by the legislator at his pleasure (Laws 746): there are things which law cannot touch[1]. He does not, however, go beyond attributing to things a power of resistance.

Aristotle ascribes more influence to Matter. Where Plato sees passivity or resistance, Aristotle sees a capacity of growth and the beginnings of a process. Things have an immanent bent in the direction of good, but they have also immanent tendencies which may warp them to evil. In morals and politics these latter tendencies appear to be especially active. It is only in the best races that a sense, however dim, of the goal and of the right path to it is present, and even in them it is clouded by all manner of confusions; nor is full knowledge enough: communities which possess it may be prevented by some unavoidable peculiarity of their social structure, originating perhaps in some accidental characteristic of the territory, from attaining the true end. What, then, is the business of the philosophic inquirer? It is to point out to those who are free from lets and hindrances the ideal end and method of political and social organization, and to assist the inherent tendency of things to go right; and where insuperable impediments exist, which is the more common case by far, to ascertain by a close and minute study of society as it is, what course is the best under the circumstances. In both departments of her work, Political Science will have the same aim in view—to secure rational government, in whatever degree this may be possible: so far Aristotle is at one with Plato; but Aristotle accepts and humours the tendencies that he finds present in the particular case to a far greater extent

[1] Laws 788, 807, 822. Something of this kind had already been said in the Republic.

than Plato. The problem of Political Science is no longer a single or twofold or threefold problem; on the contrary, it breaks into a multitude of ramifications, and is as multiplex as the Matter dealt with. Political Science must be flexible, must adapt itself freely to circumstances, if its existence is to be of any use to mankind. The study, as Aristotle understood it, gave full scope even to the astonishing combination of gifts which Aristotle possessed. His analytic and systematizing power, his marvellous mastery of facts, his historical faculty[1], his strong common sense, his knowledge of human nature, all found in it abundant occupation. The Politics is at once the portraiture of an ideal State and a Statesman's Manual.

Nor was this the only way in which Aristotle's Theory of Becoming influenced his political method. It afforded him a rational justification for a free use of the collective experience of the Greek race. For here, if anywhere, we might look to find the nearest approach to the normal and natural evolution of the State, though even here a constant reference to the end of human society was necessary to correct deviations. The interval between philosophy and 'the common sense of most' was thus bridged. In the field of Morals and Politics the insight of the philosopher is but a higher potency of the insight of the φρόνιμος of everyday life. The statesman is the man of full virtue. His business is not to reveal a new world, but to bring a stronger light to bear on everyday things. He should unite a thorough knowledge of the end of Man and the State, which is to Aristotle what a knowledge of the Ideas of Temperance and Justice and Goodness is to Plato, with a knowledge of the means by which it is to be attained, and this involves a close study of the facts of society. Aristotle's conception of 'Nature' (φύσις) perhaps led him to attach more weight to the outcome and leading features

[1] 'We use the expression, "Aristotle the historian," for our conviction is that the first prize after Thucydides in Greek historical writing falls of right to him' (A. Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum p. 56).

of Greek civilization than they altogether deserved. The same broad principle which underlies his defence of the household, of several property, of Tragedy and poetry generally, led him to defend slavery and to rest content with the existing position and education of the female sex. But it also involved the abandonment of that attitude of sweeping antagonism to the Actual which Plato at one time took up. Political Philosophy might well be content to bear itself as the child of its race and time; its business was rather to correct than to create anew.

We see, then, that the metaphysics of Aristotle pointed to a new conception of the problem and method of Political Science. But the difference between Plato's treatment of the subject and Aristotle's is no mere accident of their metaphysics; it reflects a thorough difference of character and aim. To Plato a more or less ideal view of politics probably seemed the only view worth taking. The question that interests him is what the State ought to be. The technical side of politics—the question, for instance, how a democracy is constituted, or even how it should be constituted so as to be durable—interests him hardly at all. He found the claims of Justice to be something more than a conventionality seriously impugned, and his aim was to raise her from the dust, and to show that her indwelling presence is that which makes both States and individuals happy. Politics is to him a more concrete sort of Ethics; we learn to know Justice and Temperance better by viewing them enshrined in a congenial State.

Plato seemed to Aristotle to have grappled with only one of the problems of Political Science, and to have failed to solve even that. He had constructed two ideal States, the second diverging to some extent from the first, but resting in reality on the same principle, the supremacy of the few wise. This supremacy was based in the Republic on the willing assent of the soldiers and landowners of the State; in the Laws on ingenious constitutional devices, by which the majority was deluded with a semblance of power. Aristotle held that neither basis was satisfactory, but his

main objection to Plato's ideal was that it failed to do that which the best State exists to do—it failed to realize the best and most desirable life.

He differs from Plato as to the nature of happiness. To Plato Justice is Happiness; Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that full happiness belongs only to those who possess all the virtues, including speculative excellence (σοφία), and who, besides, possess adequate external means, and that it implies not only virtue endowed with adequate external means, but life in accordance with it. That State is not the best in which all the citizens are not capable of living the best life and steadily purposed to live it. The best State is that in which the men of full virtue are not a mere handful, but the whole State, and are numerous enough to form a complete citizen-body—in which they have all the external conditions of the best life, and also adjunct dependent classes, not included in the citizen-body, to emancipate them from 'necessary work.' The best State is a brotherhood of men of full stature, intellectual and moral, animated by a common aim—the aim of living and helping each other to live the noblest life, active and speculative, that men can live. Aristotle purges the citizen-body of the feebler elements that Plato had left in it[1], and launches it on a fuller and more aspiring life. The State at its best exists, in his view, not for the protection of the weaker elements of its citizen-body—no weak elements must find a place within it—but for the full-pulsed life of the strong men of whom it is composed—for the unimpeded exercise of every noble human faculty. It exists, not that the wise may shelter the weak, though this they will do, but that the wise may live the life of the wise. No infraction of justice or of the common good must take place—the weak must be gainers by their share in the best State—but those who can live the true life must have the fullest opportunity of doing so. The State does not exist that they may minister to the common herd, and develope in them that imperfect type of virtue and

[1] In the Republic, at all events.

happiness of which alone they are capable, though this will be one of their cares; it exists that they may realize the best life possible to man; it is in their life that the State attains its true end.

It was a principle of Aristotle's Teleology that everything exists for the sake of the noblest work it can do and of the element which does it, and he could not refuse to apply this principle to the State. His view, of course, jars on modern feeling [1], but it is not difficult to see how he came to hold it.

His is in some respects a bolder and more ideal conception of the best State than Plato's, for it requires in the citizen a more varied combination of goods, and calls on him to live a life of perfect and many-sided manhood. But if Aristotle's Political Philosophy is in some respects more ideal than Plato's, it is also more practical. He sees that constitutions must be suitable to the communities to which they are applied, and that the best constitution, presupposing as it does an exceptional share of the favours of Nature and Fortune, is in nine cases out of ten inapplicable. Thus a new department needs to be added to Political inquiry. Hitherto Political Science had been so busy in creating new worlds that it had failed to map the rugged region through which the Statesman had actually to pick his way. He must no longer be left without guidance. He must be shown not only what is the best constitution, but what is the best constitution attainable in the particular case; he must further learn how to construct any given constitution [2], and how, when constructed, it can be made to last as long as possible; he must learn, still further, what constitution is at once satisfactory and attainable by most communities. The statesman, again, must cease to suppose that democracy and oligarchy have each of them only one

[1] Contrast with it the view of Condorcet, that 'all institutions ought to have for their aim the physical, intellectual, and moral amelioration of the poorest and most numerous class. This is the people' (J. Morley, Rousseau 2. 190).

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3, *καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν.*

form: the varieties of both these constitutions must be pointed out to him, and he must be taught in how many different ways these varieties can be conjoined; he will thus be enabled intelligently to repair and reinvigorate existing constitutions. Lastly, he must learn what laws are suitable to each constitution[1].

The Political Science of Aristotle, though still ethical in aim, concerns itself more largely with the technical side of politics than that of Plato. It concerns itself not only with the construction of an ideal State, but also with the improvement of the constitution and administration of the actual State; nay, it even undertakes to show how any given constitution, good or bad, is to be constructed; it points out how we are to construct an extreme oligarchy or democracy[2]. Even here, however, the ethical point of view is not wholly lost sight of, for these constitutions must be constructed so as to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.), and they cannot last unless their worst features are removed or softened.

Contrast between the three concluding books of the Politics and the earlier ones.

We seem to pass at the commencement of the Sixth Book into a wholly new department of political inquiry. An attempt is indeed made to soften the transition by representing the Sixth Book as taking up the unexecuted portion of the programme of the Third. The Third Book had enumerated six constitutions: two of these, Kingship and Aristocracy, have now, we are told, been dealt with, and it remains to treat of the four others. Some imperfect forms of Aristocracy, however, are described in the Sixth Book, and much is said about Kingship in the Seventh. Besides, the principle on which the enumeration of six constitutions in the Third Book was based is left far in the rear. We were there told that six constitutions exist because there are three possible supreme authorities (*κύρια*) —the One or the Few or the Many—and these three supreme authorities may govern in one or other of two

[1] Pol. 6 (4). 1.

[2] 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.

different ways—either for their own advantage or for the advantage of the State. Even there, indeed, we learnt rather to rest the division of constitutions on their varying ὅρος—on the attribute to which they respectively award supremacy. But now the diversity of constitutions is made to rest on their varying combination of varying parts of a State.

We are conscious also in the Sixth and two following books of a change in the spirit of the inquiry. Ἀπορίαι well-nigh disappear. The discussions bristle with historical facts, and throughout them the aim of giving assistance to the practical statesman acquires a new prominence. It had not been wholly absent before, but now its presence is constantly felt. Political Science must know how to construct any constitution and how to amend existing constitutions; it must know how to furnish each constitution with laws appropriate to it; and it cannot know these things unless it has come to know how large is the number of constitutions—how many shades of each constitution exist. A minute technical study of each constitution and all its sub-forms thus becomes necessary. The Seventh Book even carries us into questions of administration, and shows how constitutions must be administered if they are to be durable.

The three books are evidently the work of a man thoroughly familiar with the Greek State—its varieties of organization, its administration, and its constitutional history—and adding to his thorough knowledge the skill to suggest improvements both of a broad and a minute kind. The ideal point of view is now thrown aside, and the conception of the end of the State, which had played so great a part in its ideal reconstruction, is hardly at all brought to bear on its amendment. We recognize an echo of the earlier teaching when the moderately well-to-do (μέσοι) are selected for rule because they are more rational than either the very rich or the very poor, and more capable both of ruling and being ruled as freemen should rule and be ruled. Aristotle, however, has done with the

ideal State; he now assumes a wholly different tone, and seeks to do all that can be done for the State not specially favoured by Nature and Fortune.

The books with which we have now to do are written with a breadth of view which no practical statesman could have approached, to say nothing of the constitutional and historical knowledge they display, which no one but the collector of 158 constitutions probably possessed. Their author evidently belongs to the school of Theramenes; he lays stress on doctrines on which we know that the more moderate wing of the popular party at Athens laid stress. One of the cardinal points of his political teaching was a cardinal point with Theramenes also—the principle that the well-wishers of a constitution must be stronger than its opponents, if the constitution is to stand [1], a principle which pointed to a somewhat broad-based constitution. But Theramenes was probably a stranger to the view that no single constitution is applicable everywhere, and that the social conditions of a State go far to determine its political constitution. He would have had neither the inclination nor the capacity to advise every form of constitution—not only the Polity, but Kingship, nay even Tyranny and the extreme forms of Democracy and Oligarchy—how to make the best of itself. If he had attempted to advise statesmen how to govern so as to avoid revolution, his teaching would probably have been far more unscrupulous and Machiavelian, and far less really wise, than the teaching of Aristotle in the Seventh Book. Even the extremest varieties of the deviation-forms are taught by Aristotle to be in their own interest as righteous as they can be. His advice to them, indeed, is sometimes open to the objection that it asks them in effect to cease to be what they are. Nor would Theramenes, or anybody but a philosopher with a strong faith in education, have pronounced the chief omission of the actual State to be its omission to produce in its citizens by training a character and behaviour suitable

[1] Compare Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 19–20: 2. 3. 42, 44 with Aristot. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sq.: 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sq.

to the constitution[1]. Laws, Aristotle holds, require to be supported by an appropriate type of character (*ἦθος*), which does not spring up of itself, but needs to be produced by discipline and culture.

We feel that political inquiry has passed from the hands of idealists and partisans into those of one whose patience and grasp of detail have been matured in unimpassioned studies, and above all in the study of animate nature. Aristotle studies a constitution as he might study an animal, or perhaps with even more sympathetic care, for in politics he may hope to amend what he finds.

It would have been well for Greece if political inquiry had continued to follow the same quiet and fruitful path. But this, we shall find, was not to be.

Questions arising as to the programme of the contents of the last three books which seems to be given us in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12 sqq.

The following passage (6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12–26) seems to supply us with a programme of the remainder of the Politics:—*ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἱρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλὰ ταῖς πλείσταις ἁρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαία δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δ' αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας, τέλος δὲ πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν, τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.*

If we compare this enumeration of questions to be treated with the list of political problems with which the Sixth Book begins, we shall find that it omits all reference to one or two of them. Thus, though at the outset of the book we are told that one of the questions which the political inquirer has to consider is, what laws are the best

[1] Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.

and which are appropriate to each constitution[1], we are not prepared in the programme for any future treatment of this subject[2]. Nor again is the programme in full harmony with the discussions which follow. We find in c. 9. 1294 a 30 sqq. an account of the way in which polities and aristocracies (cp. 1294 b 40 sq.) are to be constructed, though the programme does not prepare us for any treatment of this question; all that it promises us is an account of the way in which each variety of oligarchy and democracy is to be constructed. We also gather that this question will be treated before the question of the causes of change in constitutions and the means of preserving them is dealt with; but if this order is to be followed, we shall have to place the Eighth (or old Sixth) Book before the Seventh (or old Fifth), a course which we can hardly take without entangling ourselves in fresh difficulties.

Again, the programme hardly prepares us for the discussions which we find in the three concluding chapters of the Sixth Book, so far at all events as they relate to other constitutions than oligarchy and democracy. Nor again does the programme prepare us for the treatment of *συνδυασμοί*—constitutions combining an oligarchical deliberative and magisterial organization with an aristocratic judiciary, and the like—which we are promised at the outset of the Eighth Book, though the subject is not, in fact, dealt with in what we have of the Politics.

Some may suspect that this programme has been added by a later hand. It may be urged, however, on the other side, that an interpolator would probably have made it correspond better with the sequel, and that rigid precision is not much studied by Aristotle. It is not impossible that here as elsewhere he may have been led in working out the subject to deviate somewhat from his announced

[1] Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 5.

[2] The first four chapters of the Sixth Book, as will be pointed out elsewhere (see Appendix A), seem to be in a somewhat chaotic state, though it is not easy to say how they came to be so. It is not therefore surprising that discrepancies should exist between the list of political problems given in the first chapter and the programme given in the second.

track. The Seventh Book may well be an independent treatise not originally planned to form a part of a larger work, but there are evident advantages to be gained by inserting it before, and not after, the question of the true mode of organizing democracies and oligarchies comes up for treatment. There is much in the Seventh Book to prepare us for the recommendations of the Eighth. The main aim in these recommendations is to secure that the constitution shall be durable (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sq.: 6. 1320 b 30–1321 a 4). The secret of permanence both in oligarchies and in democracies, and especially in the former, is moderation—an avoidance of those abuses of power which alienate the rich in the one constitution and the poor in the other. The necessity of bearing in mind the lessons of the Seventh Book is, in fact, dwelt upon in a passage which is the less likely to be an interpolation, that it cannot easily be detached from the context in which we find it (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37–1320 a 4).

Sketch of the contents of the Sixth Book:—1. Many varieties both of oligarchy and democracy: strong dissimilarity between the mode-

It would carry us too far if we were to attempt here more than a rapid survey of the teaching of the last three books of the Politics.

The broad object which Aristotle has in view in the Sixth Book is to uproot the general impression that there are but two or three constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 25)—or at the outside four—these three and aristocracy (6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37 sq.)—and that oligarchy and democracy have each of them only one form[1]. The statesman who allows himself to fall into

[1] 'Demosthenes,' says Hug (Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum p. 71), 'in common with the practical statesmen of his time, treated Oligarchy and Monarchy (i.e. Tyranny) as constitutions similar in principle, and distinguished them sharply from Democracy. There are thus, according to him, virtually only two principal forms of constitution—Democracy and Oligarchy: Monarchy is merely an exaggerated form of Oligarchy. . . . This was the dominant view of the fourth century before Christ, so far as the current opinion of the time is concerned. It is connected with the notion which we often find expressed in the writings of Demosthenes and others, that Democracy is the constitution under which the laws rule, or at any rate should rule, while in Mon-

error as to the number of constitutions is, in Aristotle's opinion, lost. He fails to recognize the polity, and to see how different it is in spirit and aim from oligarchy and democracy; he fails to see how vastly superior some forms of oligarchy and democracy are to others, and he runs the risk of travestying each form and sub-form of constitution by giving it an inappropriate organization—by clothing a moderate oligarchy or democracy in the institutions of an extreme one, or *vice versa*. Aristotle's aim, however, probably was not only to save the designer of a State from committing constitutional solecisms, but to draw attention to the less defective varieties of the deviation-forms, and to remind his contemporaries that a democracy might be a democracy without being an extreme democracy. rate and extreme forms of each.

It is thus that at the very outset of the book we find frequent assertions that there are many constitutions and many forms of oligarchy and democracy. There are as many different forms of constitution as there are possible combinations of possible forms of each of the parts of the State[1]. Till the statesman knows how many different forms of oligarchy and democracy there are, he cannot improve existing constitutions, nor can he fit out each constitution with appropriate laws (c. 1. 1289 a 5–15). Each form of oligarchy and democracy reflects the predominance of a different supreme authority: in the moderate democracy, for instance, the cultivators have the predominance and generally those who possess a moderate amount of property, and it is not till 'revenues' (*πρόσοδοι*) are forthcoming from some source or other, which can be used to enable the poorest of the poor to take an active part in public affairs, that demo-

archy and Oligarchy the rulers attend only to their own convictions or caprice, laws being either non-existent or unobserved.' Aristotle combats the doctrine that there are but two constitutions, Oligarchy and Democracy, in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 11 sqq., and his teaching is that Oligarchy is not necessarily at all more lawless than Democracy: there are forms of each of these constitutions in which the laws are supreme, and also forms in which they are not so.

[1] On the third and fourth chapters, which seem to give two inconsistent accounts of the parts of the State, without distinctly substituting the one for the other, see Appendix A.

cracy becomes extreme. Thus the classes which have the upper hand in these two forms of democracy are quite different from one another. The same thing is then shown to hold of oligarchy also.

Aristotle's object seems to be to make it clear that the extreme oligarchy and democracy differ *toto caelo* from the moderate oligarchy and democracy, and are really more like Tyrannies than the constitution whose name they bear, and that the statesman would go altogether astray who, deceived by the common name and failing to take account of this difference, should organize a moderate democracy or oligarchy as an extreme democracy or oligarchy should be organized. If democracy means freedom and equality for all, then the moderate democracy is in a truer sense democracy than the extreme, for under it both rich and poor share in power (c. 4. 1291 b 31–1292 a 37). He also makes it clear, by connecting the extreme democracy with large cities and abundant revenues (1293 a 2 sq.), that it is only in place here and there. The same thing is shown to be true of the extreme oligarchy, for this also has its appropriate social conditions; it exists where cavalry is the most effective military force, for, in the mind of the Greek, cavalry presupposes a class of ἱπποτρόφοι, and the ἱπποτρόφοι of Greece were the wealthiest of its wealthy men.

Aristotle abstains for the moment from pressing his examination of oligarchy and democracy further. He is content to have distinguished the more moderate from the more extreme forms of each, and to have pointed out the circumstances under which the various forms arise. Plato had spoken in the Republic, as Aristotle remarks in a later book (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 25), as if there were only one form of oligarchy and one of democracy, and hence the care with which Aristotle insists on the fact that each has several forms. It is still a truth, and an important truth, that a democracy of wages-receiving labourers and artisans is a totally different thing from a democracy of small farming proprietors, and that a close hereditary oligarchy, in which the privileged class is very small, is a totally different

thing from an open oligarchy resting on a moderate property-qualification. So far as we can see, Aristotle was the first to call attention to these important facts.

2. Mixed constitutions:—A. the ἀριστοκρατία improperly so called.

He passes on in the Seventh Chapter from oligarchy and democracy to two other forms of constitution—the aristocracy, commonly so called, and the polity—the latter of which appears to have escaped the notice of those who sought to enumerate the various kinds of constitution (c. 7. 1293 a 40), though there were constitutions to which the name was commonly applied (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24). It is clear that in the ordinary use of language the term 'aristocracy' was applied to constitutions which Aristotle did not think worthy of the name. It was applied to combinations of oligarchy and democracy which inclined towards oligarchy, while combinations of oligarchy and democracy inclining towards democracy were called polities (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34 sqq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sq.). Aristotle explains at some length in the Eighth Chapter of the Sixth Book how the term 'aristocracy' had come to be thus used[1], and argues that it ought properly to be reserved for constitutions which take account not only of wealth and numbers, oligarchy and democracy, but also of virtue, and that all constitutions which take account of wealth and numbers only should be called 'polities.' In strictness, indeed, the only constitution which, in his view, deserves to be called an aristocracy is that which he has described in the 'first discussions' (πρῶτοι λόγοι) of the Politics; still he sees that there are constitutions which pay some regard to virtue in elections to office, and that these need to be distinguished from oligarchies on the one hand and polities on the other; he will not therefore refuse them the name of aristocracies (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). Nor does he even

[1] How common was the confusion between ἀριστοκρατία (the rule of the best) and oligarchy—a confusion which still appears in our own use of the word 'aristocracy'—may be seen from c. 12. 1297 a 7 sqq., where Aristotle complains that even men whose intention was to found aristocratical constitutions resorted to sophistical devices (σοφίσματα) intended covertly to secure preponderance to the rich.

insist in the Seventh Chapter, notwithstanding what he says in the Eighth, on denying the name to those combinations of oligarchy and democracy inclining towards oligarchy, to which it was commonly conceded. Thus he reckons as aristocracies, in addition to the best constitution, not only those constitutions which, like the Carthaginian, take account of virtue, wealth, and numbers, or, like the Lacedaemonian, take account of virtue and numbers only, but also, though he places them lowest on the list (*τρίτον*, 1293 b 20), those combinations of wealth and numbers which incline towards oligarchy (1293 b 14 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.). The aristocracy, we see, is, in all forms of it save the ideal form, a mixed constitution in the sense in which Aristotle uses the term. It is mixed, not because it divides power between king, nobles, and people, but because two or more of the social elements which can justly claim power in a State share power within it.

B. the Polity.

Next, he turns to the polity, a mixture of wealth and numbers, or of oligarchy and democracy, and therefore better discussed now that oligarchy and democracy have been discussed than before. We have already seen that, in opposition to the common view, Aristotle prefers to regard as polities all mixed constitutions which take account only of wealth and numbers, and not of virtue, though he does not always adopt this classification, but occasionally (e.g. in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20 and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.) falls in with the popular view on the subject.

Having now sufficiently marked off the polity from the aristocracy, Aristotle proceeds (c. 9) to ask, in what way the constitution which is known as a 'polity' comes into being, and how it should be instituted[1]. Aristotle holds that the polity deserved more attention than it often received, and he makes it one main object of the Sixth Book to draw attention to this neglected constitution. He describes in detail the way in which it is instituted and organized. The

[1] Cp. c. 1. 1288 b 28, *δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη τίνα τρόπον ἂν σώζοιτο πλεῖστον χρόνον.*

framer of a polity must effect a fusion of oligarchy and democracy. Sometimes he will adopt an institution from both, sometimes he will steer a midway course between them, sometimes he will borrow partly from the one, partly from the other. He may count himself successful, if the constitution framed by him can be called both a democracy and an oligarchy.

3. Tyranny.

A short notice of Tyranny follows, which shows that even Tyranny has more kinds than one; and now Aristotle is free to turn to the question which stands next in the programme. What is the best constitution for most States—for those which are not specially favoured by Nature and Fortune nor provided with an exceptionally good system of training? It is that which gives power neither to the very rich nor to the very poor, but to men of moderate means. Men thus situated are more ready than others to obey reason[1]; they are capable both of ruling and being ruled, whereas the very rich from childhood upwards will not hear of being ruled, and the very poor are incapable of ruling and are as slavish as the others are masterful. A State of very rich and very poor men is a State of slave-owners and slaves, the former contemptuous, the latter envious; it has nothing of social friendship and unity[2]. It

What is the best constitution for most States?

[1] The meaning of the words, *ἔτι δ' ἥκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν* (c. 11. 1295 b 12), is very doubtful, and they have therefore been passed over in the brief sketch given in the text of the contents of this chapter. Perhaps, however, if we read *φυλαρχοῦσι* (not *φιλαρχοῦσι*), some light is thrown on them by Oecon. 2. 1347 a 11, *ὅσοι τε τριηραρχεῖν ἢ φυλαρχεῖν ἢ χορηγεῖν ἢ τινα εἰς ἑτέραν τοιαύτην λειτουργίαν ἤμελλον δαπανᾶν*, where *φυλαρχεῖν* is probably used (see Göttling's note, Aristot. Oecon. p. 102) of persons undertaking the public burden of feasting their fellow-tribesmen (cp. *ἑστιάτωρ, ἑστίασις*). It is possible, therefore, if one may hazard the suggestion, that Aristotle's meaning in the passage of the Politics before us is, that the moderately well-to-do class was little given to undertaking these costly and ruinous public burdens (Eth. Nic. 4. 5. 1122 b 19 sqq.), which he himself regards as detrimental to the State. The office of *βουλαρχος* ('President of the Boulê,' Gilbert, Griech. Staatsalt. 2. 123) may have been one of those mentioned in Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31 sqq., to which the duty of giving great sacrificial feasts attached, and may have so far resembled that of the *ἑστιάτωρ*; perhaps, indeed, it was a still more costly office.

[2] Aristotle evidently has in his mind Plato, Laws 756 E, *ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσον ἂν ἔχοι*

is the nature of the State, however, to be an union of likes and equals, and it succeeds best in being so where the men of moderate means are strong. Lastly, the moderately well-to-do class is the class which is least exposed to overthrow, for neither do those who belong to it covet the goods of others nor are their goods coveted by the needy[1].

Hence the best constitution is that which gives power to this class: the State is very fortunate whose citizens possess enough but not too much. This constitution is alone free from civil trouble (*στάσις*)[2], for it is the existence of a large moderately well-to-do class in large cities that makes them less liable to civil disturbance, and democracies are for the same reason safer and more durable than oligarchies. A democracy, in fact, is in peril, when this class is absent and the numbers of the poor are in excess. The reason why the constitution which gives power to men of moderate means is of rare occurrence is in part that the moderately well-to-do class is often small, in part that those who have attained a position of supremacy in Greece have hardly ever favoured its introduction: besides, men have everywhere now become so heated by a long continuance of party-conflict that they are indisposed to compromise; they will not share power with those of the opposite party; they prefer either to conquer or to submit.

What constitution is best under given circumstances (*τίς τίσιν αἱρετή*)? If the circ-

There are, however, cases in which the constitution must be either a democracy or an oligarchy, the social balance declaring itself clearly in either one way or the other. What is to be done in these cases? We thus reach the next question in the programme. What constitution is

μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἧς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν· δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιντο φίλοι.

[1] The *μέσοι πολῖται* of Aristotle are, of course, not to be confounded with a modern 'middle class.' They are 'moderately well-to-do' people. Still we may compare with Aristotle's picture of the *μέσοι* James Mill's enthusiastic description of the middle class of a modern State in his Essay on Government (quoted by Lord Macaulay, Miscellaneous Writings I. 315).

[2] 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 7, *μόνη γὰρ ἀστασίαστος*: contrast Plato, Rep. 464 D, where Plato says of those who have all things in common—*ὅθεν δὴ ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι.*

most suitable to those who are specially situated (*τίς πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποίοις*)?

cumstances favour oligarchy or democracy, how should the lawgiver proceed? If they favour polity, how should the polity be constituted?

The broad principle to be kept in view is this, that those who are in favour of the constitution must be stronger than those who are against it. Every State is made up of quality (free birth, wealth, education, noble birth) and quantity (numbers). Quality and quantity may be in different hands, and those who have the advantage in point of numbers may not surpass the few in this respect so much as they are surpassed by them in quality. In this case the conditions point to oligarchy, and one form or another of oligarchy will tend to prevail according to the nature and degree of the superiority possessed by the few. If, on the other hand, the few are more surpassed in numbers than they surpass the rest in quality, then the conditions point to democracy, and to that one of the various forms of democracy which answers to the variety of demos that happens to be in excess. Still in either case the legislator may and should win the men of moderate means to the side of the constitution. If the social conditions oblige him to found an oligarchy, he should keep them in view; if a democracy, he should constitute it so as to conciliate them.

So far we have had to do with the case of the rich or the poor possessing a decided social predominance, but now we will take the case of the men of moderate means being predominant. Wherever this class preponderates over rich and poor put together or over either of these classes singly, there the legislator is no longer forced to make his State a democracy or an oligarchy; he is free to establish a durable polity[1], for the rich will never combine

[1] 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 39, *ἐνταῦθ' ἐνδέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον.* These words have usually been translated—'here it is possible for a durable constitution' (not Polity) 'to exist'; and this rendering *may* be correct, for democracy and oligarchy are elsewhere said not to be durable constitutions (7 (5). 1. 1302 a 4, *οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν*); but we look for the mention of a definite form of constitution in this passage, for not only are democracy and oligarchy mentioned in the corresponding sentences, 1296 b 26, 32, but the question under consideration is, *τίς πολιτεία τίσι συμφέρει* (cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10, *ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν*

with the poor against the moderately well-to-do. A constitution which gives power to this class is the fairest and most inclusive possible, for you cannot give rich and poor successive turns of office—they distrust each other too much—the only plan is to set up an arbitrating authority between them, and the midway class is the natural arbitrator[1].

The more wisely the polity is mixed, the more durable it will be. It is a mistake to do what many even of those whose intention is to found aristocratical constitutions do[2]. They are not content with the error of giving too much power to the rich; they commit the further error of trying to deceive the demos. For false goods end sooner or later in real ills: the rich encroach, when the constitution gives them the upper hand (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19), and their encroachments are more fatal to constitutions than those of the poor[3]. Men sought by means of these devices

ἁρμόττει πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εἴρηται πρότερον). On the whole, therefore, it seems likely that πολιτείαν is used in 1296 b 40 in the more restricted sense of Polity.

[1] Cp. de An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων. It is evidently because the relations of rich and poor in ancient Greece were very unfriendly and unsatisfactory, that Aristotle attaches so much importance to the influence of the moderately well-to-do class. Under other social conditions its value might well be less. Aristotle notices elsewhere (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.), that the institution of Kingship in its best moments served a similar purpose, doing justice between rich and poor and saving each of these classes from being wronged by the other. Monarchy has sometimes discharged this function in the history of modern Europe.

[2] Charondas is referred to a little further on, 1297 a 23. But perhaps Plato is also among those who are alluded to. In Laws 764 A he makes attendance at the assembly compulsory on the members of the first and second property-classes on pain of a fine of ten drachmae, but he imposes no fine for non-attendance on the members of the third and fourth property-classes, and leaves them free to attend or not, except when the rulers command the attendance of every one. We have here one of the σοφίσματα referred to by Aristotle (Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq.). Contrast also the language of Plato in Rep. 459 C.

[3] Contrast the saying which Menander puts into the mouth of one of his characters—

ἐμὲ δ' ἀδικείτω πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πένης·
ῥᾷον φέρειν γὰρ κρειττόνων τυραννίδα

(Fab. Inc. Fragm. 68: Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 253).

covertly to discourage the participation of the poor in the popular assembly, in magistracies, in dicasteries, in the possession of heavy arms and the practice of military exercise. Democracies in their turn resorted to similar methods against the rich.

Clearly, if the polity is to be fairly compounded, measures favouring the participation of the rich in political life should be combined with measures favouring the participation of the poor, for thus all will have a share of power. The citizen-body, however, should consist of none but those possessing heavy arms[1]; not that any definite and invariable property-qualification can be fixed; its amount must be the highest which will allow those who are enfranchised by the constitution to outnumber those who are not. The poor will be quiet enough, even though they do not share in office, if no one outrages or plunders them. A little kindly considerateness goes a long way with the poor. Thus they are apt to refuse to serve in time of war, if no promise of maintenance is made them, but, if maintenance is given, they serve cheerfully enough.

Those who have borne heavy arms may perhaps be included in the citizen-body, as well as those who are actually bearers of them: in Malis both classes formed part of the citizen-body, but only those actually serving could be elected to State offices.

If we look back to the earlier days of Greece—Aristotle is always careful to claim the sanction of antiquity for his proposals, when he can[2]—we shall find that in the time which succeeded the era of kingship political power rested with those who fought for the State—originally with the knights, for the knights were the most effective soldiers; then when cities grew larger (cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sq.) and the hoplites learnt better how to act together in organized bodies, the oligarchies were succeeded by what were once

[1] As the polity is evidently conceived to give rights to the poor as well as the rich, and therefore would seem to include poor men among its citizens, we must apparently infer that poor men would be found even among the hoplites (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12).

[2] Cp. 4 (7). 1329 a 40 sqq., and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6 sqq.

called democracies, but would now be called polities. The moral of this historical retrospect appears to be, that if we follow the example of the ancient State, and give power to the class which is most effective in war, we shall now give it to the moderately well-to-do class.

Aristotle, we see, feels that Oligarchy is really almost as much an anachronism in his own day as Kingship. He sides with Theramenes, not with Critias. Plato has far more faith in the rule of a few than Aristotle. Aristotle is more alive to the necessity that the rulers of a State should have force on their side. To him the rule even of the Few Wise must inevitably be an insecure rule, for it is not in human nature to be content to see power always in the same hands, unless indeed there is a vast and unmistakable disparity of excellence, and the scanty body of rulers is not only intellectually and morally, but even physically, far above the ruled[1]. His principle is that the well-wishers of a constitution must be stronger than those who wish it ill; and this will not often be the case unless the holders of power are a fairly numerous body.

Reasons which led Aristotle to advocate the Polity. Nature of the extreme democracy.

We shall best understand why Aristotle, like Theramenes and probably Thucydides before him, was in favour of the polity, if we bear in mind the characteristics of extreme democracy in Greece. In the extreme democracy—the example of Athens is naturally especially present to Aristotle's mind[2]—the assembly and dicasteries were everything, and their meetings consequently needed to be very frequent.

[1] 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. : cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 6 sqq.

[2] Democracies may well have existed more extreme than the Athenian, but it is hardly doubtful that, in Aristotle's opinion, most of the characteristics of a τελευταία δημοκρατία were traceable in that of Athens. We need not appeal in proof of this to the language of the last chapter of the Second Book of the Politics (1274 a 9 sqq.)—a chapter the authenticity of which is open to question—nor to the saying about the Athenians ascribed to him in Diog. Laert. 5. 17, for it would seem from Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 7 that the τελευταία δημοκρατία existed wherever demagogues were found, and Aristotle can hardly have held that demagogues did not exist at Athens. It is true that the γραφὴ παρανόμων still subsisted there, so that the laws were nominally supreme, but it is questionable how far it was regarded by Aristotle as an effectual check upon the demagogues.

The better-to-do section of the citizens had property or business to attend to, and even if they resided in the city or near it, and were not often called away to a distance, would find it hard to spare the time to be present at meetings which recurred so frequently; hence the poorer citizens, who had no property to distract their attention, who were well content with the State-pay, and who were always on the spot, seem in practice to have furnished far the largest contingent to the assembly and dicasteries. Aristotle even speaks as if the rich often ceased to attend (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 sq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.). They were not compelled to attend by law; they could ill spare the time from their business engagements; and the result was that the management of State-affairs was abandoned to a needy class led by demagogues. At Athens, in the earlier part of the Peloponnesian War, the assembly was probably very differently constituted, for the well-to-do class had not yet been thinned by the war (Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 sq.: Isocr. de Pace, § 88); but in the days of Plato and Aristotle most of the citizens seem to have been very poor. It is true that even then the Athenian assembly, like our own House of Commons, had great traditions; it was also still susceptible of kindly and generous impulses. We need only read the interesting comparison of the Athenian and Carthaginian democracies which we find in the Political Precepts of Plutarch (c. 3) to see this, for his remarks appear to apply both to the fourth and fifth centuries. We have no class among ourselves which corresponds at all to the poorest class of Athenian citizen—a class which, pauperised as it was, constantly sat in judgment on the plays and music and poetry of men of genius, hung on the lips of the best orators, and recognized even in its decline the greatness of Demosthenes and Menander.

Still it could not be well for a State that its supreme deliberative authority should be an immense and unwieldy gathering, largely composed of very poor men and guided by demagogues. The wonder is that the rich suffered as little as they did. In the days of the Athenian Empire the

contributions of the dependent allies served to diminish the demands upon them, and it was not probably till the latter part of the fifth century that the wealthier class felt the full pressure of State-burdens. Isocrates describes how in his youth men displayed their wealth, while in the later years of his life they were glad to conceal it[1]. Perhaps if we read between the lines of Xenophon's essay De Vectigalibus, we shall see how desirous the rich were of pointing out means of increasing the State-revenue otherwise than at their own expense[2]. The moderately well-to-do seem indeed to have suffered more than the wealthiest class, till Demosthenes interfered and re-adjusted the pressure of taxation. Some burdens, it is evident, were far more willingly borne than others: men seem to have been ready enough to undertake choregiae and other liturgies which brought them prominently before the public (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 17): the eisphora, on the other hand, was extremely unpopular (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20). Ten times more bitterness of feeling, however, was produced in all probability by the occasional resort of the dicasteries to confiscation, than by any kind of taxation (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq.). The paid dicast who lived by his calling was naturally tempted, when revenues from dependent allies or State-mines or similar sources fell short, to ensure his own subsistence by confiscating the property of some unpopular rich man for the benefit of the State. How often this occurred, we have no means of knowing, but the rich can never have felt absolutely secure at Athens. They seem, if we may trust Theopompus[3], to have often lived self-indulgent, dissolute lives, for which they had the excuse that they were little more than ciphers in the State; and the poorer freemen who were its masters naturally enough followed in the track of their betters and demanded that the State should provide generously for their amusements. Demosthenes might galvanize a society of this kind into

[1] De Antid. § 159 sq.: Areopag. § 35.

[2] See, for instance, De Vect. 4. 40 and 6. 1.

[3] Fr. 238: cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 286 sq.

life by his eloquence, but he could not restore its vanished energies. The Athenian people of his day still retained their intellectual acuteness and their quickness of perception, but political greatness is more a question of character than intelligence, and Demades was not far from the truth, when he described Athens as a mere shadow of her former self.

The extreme democracy, however, had other faults in the eyes of Aristotle than its treatment of the rich, and its habit of catering at their expense for the comfort and amusement of the poor. He held its worst fault to be its lawlessness. It destroyed the authority of the magistrates and the law, giving supremacy instead to the resolutions of the assembly, or in other words to the will of the demagogue and the humour of the moment. The State, he held, should be through its law the guide of man's life: the extreme democracy made it the mere creature of the momentary impulse of its members, and nullified its influence by insisting on every man being allowed to live as he pleased (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.).

The root of the evil, Aristotle thought, lay in the extreme poverty of the mass of the holders of power (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 33, *δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἄπορον ᾖ, τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν*), which obliged them to minister to their own needs and to consult their own interests with as little regard to law as possible. Hence Aristotle advises genuine friends of democracy to purge the citizen-body of its pauper-element by giving the pauperised classes a helping hand, starting them in trade or farming, and thus enabling them to improve their position by industry. The surest way, however, to secure a sound constitution in which law would be supreme, and the magistrates would have real authority, was (wherever the social conditions were favourable) to institute a polity. Power must be given to those who would be neither too poor to possess self-respect nor rich enough to be overbearing. Such a class Aristotle found in

The Polity.

the moderately well-to-do or hoplite class. A citizen-body composed of the hoplites of the State would be neither too narrow and consequently insecure, nor too inclusive and consequently inferior.

The broad outline of the Polity is already traced in the Nicomachean Ethics (8. 12. 1160 a 31 sqq.), where the name of Timocracy is suggested as preferable to that of Polity, and in the Second Book of the Politics, where we are told that it is a midway form between oligarchy and democracy, and that the hoplite class form the citizen-body in it (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.), a class which, we elsewhere learn (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12), belongs rather to the well-to-do than the poor. We are further told in the Third Book (c. 7) that the military citizen-body which is supreme in the polity rules for the common advantage, and in c. 17 that offices are 'distributed in it among the well-to-do according to desert,' which seems to imply that they are filled by election.

We obtain a far more detailed picture of the polity, however, if we put together the scattered notices of it which we find in the Sixth Book of the Politics.

The assembly of a polity, we gather, would not have a very great deal to do[1]. Membership of it would be confined to those who possessed a moderate property-qualification (probably that implied in the possession of heavy arms), and it would have the right to decide questions of war and peace and to review the conduct of magistrates at the expiration of their term of office[2]. It would differ from the assemblies of most democracies, and even from that of Solonian Athens, in resting on a property qualification[3];

[1] We find this confirmed by Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 4 sqq., where the Carthaginian constitution is criticised as giving the popular assembly more power than a polity should give it.

[2] If we adopt the reading ἀριστοκρατία ἢ πολιτεία in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 7.

[3] We hear of democracies in which there was a property qualification for office (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39), but not often of democracies in which there was a property qualification for membership of the assembly. We see, however, from 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq. that there were democracies in which a property-qualification of this kind existed. It perhaps existed at Aphytis and in other agricultural democracies (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq. : cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq.).

still we learn from a passage of the Politics (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24) that the constitutions which were known as polities in Aristotle's day had in earlier times been called democracies. In the later form of democracy the assembly met often; in the polity its meetings would be rare, and it would have little temptation to set itself above the law.

The magistrates of a polity, on the other hand, would have considerable powers. None but citizens would be eligible for office, and the holders of office might, it would seem, be either elected or chosen by lot, or the two plans might be combined, or again some offices might be filled in the one way and others in the other. The plan by which successive sections of the citizen-body elected, suited well with a polity[1]; and the election might be made out of all the citizens or only a part of them[2]. It is evident that a polity would vary a good deal according to the mode in which its magistracies were filled. There would commonly perhaps be no separate property-qualification for office in a polity, though we hear of one polity in which a property-qualification for office existed, even after it had ceased to be 'a somewhat oligarchical kind of polity' (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27 sqq.). The magistrates of a polity would probably be less wealthy than those of the moderate democracy (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.) or of Solonian Athens, for the polity is conceived to consist largely of men 'like and equal' (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25 sqq.).

The judicial organization of a polity would be such as to give a share of power both to the rich and to the poor. Either some of its dicasteries would be differently organized from others, the jurors of one sort of dicastery being taken from the general body of citizens, and those of the other from a special part of the citizen-body, or the two classes of jurors

[1] The arrangement by which at Carthage one of the most important magistracies of the State was appointed by self-elected Pentarchies holding office for an exceptionally long term is said to be suitable rather to an oligarchy than a polity (Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 13 sqq.).

[2] See the passage 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq.: it belongs, however, to a part of the Fifteenth Chapter the text of which is very uncertain.

would be combined in the same dicastery—the selection of jurors being made either by choice or lot or by the two methods combined. Measures would be taken to secure the presence of both rich and poor on the dicasteries, but there would be no very poor members, for the very poor class would be excluded from citizenship.

We see that the polity was not without some strikingly popular features: for instance, all magistrates might be appointed by lot, and the payment of jurors would be permissible if the rich were compelled by fine to serve on the dicasteries. Still the powers of the assembly were small and those of the magistrates large. Its most prominent characteristics, however, were its legality, its freedom from class-government, and the equality of its citizens. It was not a society of 'slave-owners and slaves' (δεσποτῶν καὶ δούλων πόλις), but of freemen and men 'alike and equal' (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq.). It would differ in this from the moderate democracy and from the moderate oligarchy[1], and still more from such oligarchies as those of Larissa or Abydos (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 sqq.), where the magistrates were oligarchical grandees who owed their election to the people and thus needed to court its favour. Oligarchies such as that of the Pontic Heracleia (1305 b 34 sq.), where the dicasteries were at one time composed of those outside the governing class (πολίτευμα), would also probably be quite unlike a polity.

The State sketched by Plato in his Laws comes far nearer to the type of a polity than any of these; Aristotle says himself that it seemed meant for a polity (2. 6. 1265 b 26). But Plato has not Aristotle's confidence in the hoplite class: the power which he gives them with one hand he takes back with the other, and the best of the richer citizens are made the virtual rulers of the State. It is an oligarchical aristocracy rather than a polity of like and equal citizens.

The purer type of the so-called aristocracy, again, would differ from the polity in giving a larger recognition to the Good. It gave power, in Aristotelian language, to virtue,

[1] Nearly as this approached it (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21).

wealth, and numbers, or to virtue and numbers: the polity gave power to wealth and numbers. Elsewhere, it is true, Aristotle implies that military virtue bears sway in the polity, so that here also virtue of a kind obtains recognition, but it is virtue of a humbler and more popular type than that which finds a place in an aristocracy. The heroic few would have less power in a polity than they had, for instance, in the Lacedaemonian State, when it was at its best. We can guess the probable character and policy of a polity from the description which Aristotle gives of the hoplite-citizens who would be its guiding spirits. The tone of public opinion in it would be neither hectoring nor servile, but self-respecting and orderly. Its citizens would be under no temptation to plunder the rich or to oppress those poorer than themselves, for they would sympathize with both classes. They would willingly accept the supremacy of law, which tended to be impaired where the very rich or the very poor had things their own way.

The class of moderately well-to-do men was probably less numerous in proportion to other classes in Greek States than it is in many modern States, for the professions were little developed, and trade was largely in the hands of resident aliens, but it was more military in character and might well be thought more capable of imposing its will on other classes. In discouraging the commercial and industrial spirit, Aristotle unconsciously did much to impede the development of the class which he favoured.

The polity must not be confused with another constitution which Aristotle frequently praises, and in which the few ἐπιεικεῖς who rule rest content with the honour that rule brings and leave gain to the Many, both sections of the State being thus satisfied and political equilibrium secured (Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 5 sqq.: 9. 6. 1167 a 35 sqq.: Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 31 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 1 sqq.: 2. 7. 1267 b 5 sqq.). Under this form, and this form only, says Aristotle (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 38), is a combination of aristocracy and democracy possible; for, office bringing no gain but only honour, the Many will willingly abandon it to men of standing and

position (γνώριμοι), and the democratic measure of opening office to all may be resorted to, while nevertheless power will practically be in the hands of men of worth and capacity. A polity is not an union of a few ἐπιεικεῖς and a passive Many, but a State of free and equal citizens.

The polity, however, is not applicable everywhere.

The polity, then, is most in place, and thrives best, in States where the moderately well-to-do are numerous. It is not equally applicable everywhere: some States are doomed by their social composition to be oligarchies and others democracies, and, more than this, to be oligarchies or democracies of a particular type, some moderate, others extreme. Hence it becomes one of the duties of Political Science to point out how each of the less satisfactory constitutions should be organized. The Seventh Book indeed goes further than this, for it also deals with the question how constitutions should be administered in order to be durable.

Contents of the remainder of the Sixth Book.

Aristotle, however, has not yet by any means done with the satisfactory constitutions: the last three chapters of the Sixth Book deal with all forms of constitution (except perhaps Kingship and Tyranny[1]), and the Seventh Book deals with all forms without any exception. By the time we reach the threshold of these three chapters, we have learnt when each constitution is in place, and we have also learnt something about the structure of each, but we have not as yet penetrated into the minutiae of their organization. The last three chapters of the Sixth Book carry us for the first time deep into the *technique* of politics; we learn that the excellence of a constitution depends on the way in which its deliberative, judicial, and magisterial elements are organized, and that these are differently organized in every form and sub-form of constitution. Which mode of constituting them is appropriate in each case, Aristotle points out in detail.

The deliberative element.

His account of the various ways in which the deliberative element was organized in Greek States is especially significant and interesting. We see that the functions of the

[1] Μοναρχία is, however, referred to in c. 15. 1299 b 22.

deliberative extended not only to questions of peace and war and of alliance, or to questions of legislation, or the review of the conduct of magistrates, but also to the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and that all these great powers might be confided to a single magistracy or distributed among a number of magistracies, or some might be given to magistrates and others to the whole body of citizens, or the whole body of citizens might be intrusted with all. The whole citizen-body, again, might be content to act in successive sections, or might exercise its power through the collective popular assembly, which would thus in its gathered thousands have to deal with delicate questions of criminal justice, no less than with broad political issues. This was the mode in which, according to Aristotle, the deliberative was organized in an extreme democracy. In an extreme oligarchy, on the other hand, all these high functions were concentrated in the hands of a small knot of hereditary oligarchs.

It is not wonderful that Aristotle should seek to amend these more advanced forms of deliberative organization. He advises the extreme democracy, which enabled the poor to attend the assembly by means of pay, also to enforce by penalties the attendance of the rich; or to give deliberative authority to a body composed of members selected by election or lot in equal numbers from each tribe or section of the State; or only to give pay to a portion of the poor sufficiently large to hold its own against the rich. Aristotle evidently feels that the numbers of the deliberative body in an extreme democracy made wise deliberation impossible. It would also seem from his account, as we have already noticed, that the rich often absented themselves from the deliberations of the popular assembly.

His advice to oligarchies, on the other hand, is to associate the people to some extent in their deliberations. Either certain persons should be chosen from the people by the authorities to join in deliberation, or deliberative power should be allowed to a popular assembly on the condition that no subjects shall be discussed except those

on which decrees have been proposed by a Board of Nomophylakes or Probouloi, or that the people shall vote either the resolutions placed before them by the authorities or nothing contrary to them; or again the popular assembly might be allowed only a consultative voice. He advises oligarchies to adopt the rule of making the voice of the people definitive in voting against any proposal, but not in giving an affirmative vote. The rule followed in polities should, in fact, be reversed, for in them the few had final authority in negativing a proposal, while if they voted affirmatively, their vote had to be confirmed by the people.

The magistracies.

Aristotle turns in the next chapter (the fifteenth) to the next of the three 'component elements of all constitutions'[1] —the magistracies of the State. This element also may assume many different forms. The magistracies of a State may be few or many, they may differ in province and function, and also in term of tenure; their holders may be selected in different ways, and from and by different persons. 'In respect of all these matters the scientific student of politics ought to be able to point out with exactness, how many different arrangements are possible, and then to match each with the constitution to which it is appropriate, so as to make it clear what magistracies are suitable to each kind of constitution' (c. 15. 1299 a 12).

The first question is, what is a magistracy? A discussion follows which results in the conclusion that a magistrate is broadly one who has to deliberate on any matters, and to come to a decision, and issue orders, the last of these functions being more especially characteristic of a magistrate. This definition applies to all officers of State, but perhaps not to priests, though they are included under the head

[1] Μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, c. 14. 1297 b 37. Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 13 sq.) takes πολιτεία here to mean 'universitas civium,' and it is true that what are here called μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν are called μόρια τῶν πόλεων in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 25. But we have μέρος τι τῆς πολιτείας (explained by ἀρχήν τινα) in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 18, and perhaps πολιτεία here bears its usual meaning. Μόρια is often used of things 'quae naturam alicuius rei constituunt ac distinguunt' (Bon. Ind. 473 b 55 sq.).

of magistrates in the Eighth Book (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 18 sqq.); on the other hand it clearly includes military and naval officers (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34 sqq.). The 'giving of orders' which constitutes a magistrate must be taken to refer to public affairs only; otherwise the head of a household, or the manager of a farm or factory, would have to be accounted a magistrate.

Aristotle turns from this question, which is one rather of theoretical than practical interest, to the more pressing one, what magistracies are necessary, and what are not indeed necessary but of service, in a good constitution. It is desirable to ascertain this, for in small States magistracies have to be amalgamated, and it is well to know which magistracies belong to either class, in order that we may know which may be amalgamated and which may not (1299 b 10 sq.). Then again, we need to know what subjects should be given over to special magistrates with powers extending over the whole of the territory, and in what cases magistracies should be, not specialized, but local—that is to say, confined in authority to a particular district, but with full competence to deal with all matters arising in that district; and in what cases, again, it is better to give jurisdiction over particular classes of persons (e.g. women and children), and not over particular subjects of administration. Another point to be studied is, whether magistracies vary with the constitution (like the deliberative), or whether they do not. This is a question which Aristotle answers at once. They not only vary, but some magistracies are peculiar to particular constitutions and do not exist outside them.

Such then are the questions which arise as to magistracies, but Aristotle proposes to discuss only one of them at present—the mode in which their holders are selected. He enumerates with elaborate care all the possibilities of variation in this matter—variations in the persons who appoint, in those from whom the selection must be made, and in the way in which it is made—and then he points out which variety of organization is appropriate to each constitution. He adds the following words at the close of

the investigation: *οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοσοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμόν εἰσι, καὶ διῄρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις, ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τίνες εἰσίν, ἔσται φανερόν* (1300 b 5 sqq.). Thus he would appear to reserve his treatment of the questions, what magistracies are suitable to particular communities, and in what manner magistracies ought to be filled[1]—questions which he had marked out for discussion in c. 15. 1299 a 12—till he has studied the subject of the functions and nature of the various magistracies.

This subject is dealt with in the concluding chapter of the Eighth Book. Here Aristotle inquires (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 4 sqq.), how many and what magistracies should find a place in the State, and what should be their functions. We need to know this, he says, because a State cannot exist without those magistracies which are necessary, and cannot exist nobly without those which contribute to orderliness and seemliness of life. Besides, in small States it is necessary to amalgamate magistracies, and it is desirable to determine which should be amalgamated and which should not[2].

The result of Aristotle's investigation is a list of magistracies and of the subjects with which they deal, and a classification of magistracies in three classes—those which are most necessary, those which are necessary but of a more dignified character, and those which exist to secure seemliness and good order (*εὐκοσμία*).

We may probably infer from Aristotle's own statements that one of his aims in making this classification is to indicate that magistracies belonging to different grades ought not to be amalgamated. But he has other reasons besides this for distinguishing between necessary magistracies and higher ones. Access to magistracies belonging to the former category might often with advantage be con-

[1] If we refer to the previous chapter, we shall see that questions similar to those which he thus postpones, so far as they refer to magistracies, have been treated in relation to the deliberative (c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.).

[2] Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 10 sqq.

ceded to those who would have to be excluded from magistracies belonging to the latter: thus in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 24 the framer of a moderate oligarchy is advised to make the property-qualification for merely necessary magistracies lower than for more important ones: the supreme magistracies of the State, on the contrary, should be reserved for those privileged by the constitution (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 sq.). Aristotle is always, however, careful to mark off the necessary from the noble; it is in this spirit that he relegates to the 'necessary' (or commercial) agora in his ideal city certain magistracies belonging to the necessary class (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.). Still the question uppermost in his mind is that of the policy to be followed in the amalgamation of magistracies, and some of the most important passages of the last chapter of the Eighth Book seem to be those in which he points out, for the benefit of small States[1], that while there is no harm in their placing the charge of military affairs in the hands of a single magistracy (1322 a 38), and the same thing also holds of sacred functions (1322 b 22 sqq.), it would be a mistake to give the law-court which tries and condemns the invidious additional functions of executing the sentence and assuming the custody of prisoners—even these two functions, indeed, are better separated—and that it would also be a mistake not to part the magistracy which audits from those which administer the public money.

We expect that, having now studied the subject of the functions of magistracies, he will go on in conformity with his promise (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 7 sq.), to point out what is the best way of selecting those who are to fill them, but this he does not do[2]. Some light is, however, thrown in the chapter before us (c. 8. 1322 b 37 sqq.) on the other

[1] This attention to the special difficulties of small city-States reminds us that Aristotle himself belonged to one. Many of the pupils for whom he wrote probably also belonged to small States; but irrespectively of this, his view always is that Political Science, if it is to deserve the name, must be ready and able to show how the best is to be made of all sorts of circumstances.

[2] The Eighth Book is incomplete, as its closing words show—*περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν.*

question referred to in 1300 b 7 sq., 'what magistracies are suitable to particular communities,' and an answer is tacitly given to the question raised in the Sixth Book (c. 15. 1299 b 14 sqq.), what offices should be differentiated in respect of place, and what in respect of subjects or persons. The agoranomi, astynomi, and agronomi have special places under their control: other magistracies have to do with special subjects, and others again—for instance, the γυναικονόμοι and παιδονόμοι—have special classes of persons placed under their charge.

The judiciary.

The last chapter of the Sixth Book deals with the third and last of the elements of the constitution—the judiciary. It enumerates the various ways of constituting the judiciary known to the Greek State, and points out which are appropriate to each constitution.

We thus reach the end of a Book which more than any other in the Politics insists on thoroughness in the study of constitutions. The scientific student of politics must not only know under what conditions each form and sub-form of constitution is in place, but must know how the deliberative, the judicial, and the magisterial elements should be organized in each. He must know both the 'when' and the 'how' of each form and sub-form. No previous Greek composition had taken equal pains to throw light on the path of the practical statesman in Greece. The principle that the constitution of a State is dependent on its social conditions had probably never been enunciated with anything like equal clearness before, and there was perhaps at least as much novelty, in the view that the scientific student of politics must be no dreamer of airy fancies, but versed in every detail of constitutional lore.

Sketch of the contents of the Seventh Book:—1. Plato's account of the causes

The Seventh Book investigates the causes of change in constitutions and the means of preserving them. Plato had already had his attention drawn to the subject of constitutional change. In the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic he indulges for a moment in the dream that

his ideal State and ideal man have come into existence, and traces in imagination the successive steps by which the organization which secures internal harmony and happiness to each is first impaired and then absolutely overthrown, and Desire enthroned in the place of Reason. His vigorous series of sketches is mainly designed to teach the lesson, that the willing acceptance of the rule of Reason by the two lower elements of the State and the soul is the true source of happiness, and that the less there is of justice in a State or a soul, the less there is of happiness.

of change in constitutions criticised.

We need only read the conclusion of the Seventh Book of the Politics (1316 a 1 sqq.)[1] to see in how totally different a spirit Aristotle studies politics, especially in this part of his work. The Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic are intended to support and enforce the central lesson of the dialogue; they are too full of 'tendency' to be coldly exact to history; they have nothing of Aristotle's zoological precision. Even if Plato had been capable of this, it would have been out of place in the Republic.

The Republic, we feel, has a great practical end in view —to recall the State and the individual to a right view of the importance and nature of Justice—and we can forgive it, if in its language on the subject of constitutional change it to a certain extent sacrifices historical accuracy. Aristotle, however, who is often a somewhat unsympathetic critic, loses sight of this, and bluntly enumerates the points in which Plato's account of the subject falls short. He felt,

[1] This passage is tacked on rather strangely at the close of the book, just after a summary of the subjects treated in it, and without any final summary of its contents to wind it up. It seems too characteristic of Aristotle not to be his, but it may be of a somewhat later date than the rest of the book. Its criticism of Plato is unusually blunt, outspoken, and decided. It is in this chapter that we find two statements about Carthage—that it is a democracy, and that it was once under a tyranny—which it is difficult to reconcile with the account of Carthage in the Second Book. The Fifth Book, as we have it, closes in a very similar way with a criticism of certain views about Music expressed by the Platonic Socrates in the Republic. This criticism also, no less than that at the close of the Seventh, might easily be detached from the context in which it stands.

no doubt, the great practical importance of correct views respecting it, and we must also remember that this was one of the many fields of inquiry in which he had broken fresh ground, and that his natural combativeness was heightened by the eagerness of a first discoverer.

His objections to Plato's account of constitutional change are, briefly stated, the following. The cause which the Platonic Socrates gives for the change from the best constitution to a Timocracy like the Lacedaemonian is one common not only to all other constitutions but to the whole world of Becoming (*τῶν γινομένων πάντων*, 1316 a 13), whereas we need to study with reference to each constitution the causes of change special to it (*ἴδια*)[1]. Then again, his whole account of constitutional changes presupposes that constitutions change into the form which is most akin to each. More often, they change into an opposite form[2]. Then again, his series closes with tyranny. But does not tyranny change into any other constitution? Again, he speaks as if the change to oligarchy was always due to the holders of office becoming lovers of money, and as if the change to democracy was always due to well-to-do men becoming poor. The rise of oligarchy is rather due to a feeling among the rich that those who have nothing cannot fairly claim as much power as those who have much. And as to democracy, it may come into being without any one becoming poorer than he was before, if the numbers of the poor increase. It is only when some leading man becomes impoverished that constitutional change is apt to ensue, and then the change is not necessarily a change to democracy. There are many other causes besides impoverishment for the rise of democracy—the exclusion of the people from power, wrongful or humiliating treatment of them, and so forth. Lastly, no account is taken in the remarks of the Platonic Socrates on Constitutional Change

[1] Cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24, *δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς.*

[2] Contrast the teaching of Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21, *μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν.*

of the fact that there are more kinds of oligarchy and democracy than one[1].

2. Purpose and subject of the Seventh Book.

The Seventh Book of the Politics addresses itself to the study of constitutional change with no homiletical aim, but as a scientific and historical problem. It proposes to inquire 'what things lead to change in constitutions and how many, and what is their nature, and in what ways each constitution is brought to destruction, and into what forms each form mostly changes, and again, what ways there are of preserving constitutions generally and each of them in particular, and by what means each of them is most likely to be preserved' (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 20 sqq.).

This summary does not prepare us for the distinction between *πολιτεῖαι* and *μοναρχία*[2] which is a conspicuous feature of the book, and in fact breaks it into two halves, for the subject of change in constitutions strictly so called is treated apart from that of change in kingships and tyrannies. Another noticeable feature of the book is, that though it now and then recognizes the distinction between the moderate (*πατρία* or *ἔννομος*) form of democracy or oligarchy and the absolute (*κυρία*) form of both, it seems nowhere to refer to the four or five varieties of oligarchy and democracy enumerated in the Sixth Book. Its teaching, however, is on the whole very similar to that of the books which precede and follow it, though it may probably have been originally composed as a separate treatise, and not designed for the place which it now fills in the Politics, or possibly for any place in the

[1] It is worthy of notice that Aristotle does not remark on Plato's observation (Rep. 545 D) that all constitutional change is due to the rise of *στάσις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι τὰς ἀρχάς*, though he cannot have agreed with it.

Plato is much inclined to adopt in the Laws (708 E) a quite different account of constitutional change—*ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδείς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν· ἢ γὰρ πόλεμός τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους, ἢ πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νόσοι ἀναγκάζουσι καινοτομεῖν, λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολὺν ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν πολλάκις ἀκαιρίας.* Aristotle does not notice this account, which Plato seems to accept in an amended form (709 B).

[2] We trace the germ of it in Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 13. Isocrates is familiar with the distinction (e. g. Paneg. § 125).

Politics at all. Whether it is the inquiry respecting the causes of revolution announced at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1181 b 15 sqq.), it is difficult to say. It would seem at any rate to throw but little light on the question what constitution is the best.

The subject of the book, we gather, is to be change in constitutions (*μεταβολὴ πολιτείας*). This includes changes in some part of a constitution, and changes of degree in constitutions. But we soon learn that changes in the holders of power not accompanied by constitutional change also fall within the limits of the subject (c. 1. 1301 b 10 sqq.). Not much, however, is said as to this last matter, and we may take the subject of the book to be broadly constitutional change. This is apparently viewed as being usually, though not always (c. 3. 1303 a 13), accompanied by civil disturbance (*στάσις*); so that this is perhaps as much the subject of the book as constitutional change. Change in constitutions, again, is studied whether accompanied by violence or not, for violence is not a necessary accompaniment of it (c. 4. 1304 b 7 sqq.). Our word 'revolution' does not exactly correspond either to *στάσις* or *μεταβολὴ πολιτείας*.

We must not expect from the book a study of constitutional development or evolution—of the way in which constitutions are adjusted to varying social or ethical conditions; it does not view constitutional change as in many cases a good thing and seek to assist it; it looks at it from the point of view of the constitution in possession, and regards it as a thing to be avoided and kept at bay; its aim is to advise every constitution how to maintain itself. As, however, its teaching is that constitutions can only be durable by being moderate in spirit and wisely administered, we naturally find in its pages many recommendations for the improvement of the various constitutions and of the methods of administration adopted in each. It is thus not out of harmony with the books between which it stands.

In seeking the causes of civil disturbance and constitu-

tional change, Aristotle reverts to the often-considered question as to the cause of the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions, which he rightly considers to be closely connected with the subject before him. Constitutions are many in number, he says, because men do not agree as to what is absolutely just. The rich or well-born take one view, the poor another. The men of virtue and worth (οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς) might justly also put in a special claim for themselves, but they are little apt to do so: later on, we are told that they are too few to do it with any chance of success (c. 4. 1304 b 4). The broad cause and source of civil trouble then is a difference of view as to what is just. If all men took the same view on this subject, there would be but one constitution, and there would be no such thing as constitutional change.

3. Aristotle's account of the causes of constitutional change.

There are, however, three heads under which the sources and causes of civil discord and constitutional change (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ αἰτίαι τῶν στάσεων καὶ μεταβολῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, c. 2. 1302 a 16–18) should be arranged. We should know in what frame of mind (πῶς ἔχοντες) men stir up civil disturbance (στάσις), and with what ends in view, and what are the occasions (ἀρχαί) of movements of this kind[1]. The ends for which men have recourse to them are gain and honour and the avoidance of their opposites, for themselves or their friends. The main cause which produces a frame of mind favourable to revolution (1302 a 22) is a desire for equality in relation to these things, where men think equality their due, or for superiority, where they think they have a title to it. The occasions of civil disturbance—the things which awake in men this desire for equality or superiority in respect of gain, honour, and the like (1302 a 34 sq.)—are the sight of others justly or unjustly enjoying gain and honour, exposure to outrage on the part of those in power, the fear of being wronged or of undergoing deserved punishment, contempt for the numerical weakness or indiscipline of the holders of power, or again the excessive preponderance in the State of a

[1] A similar classification is employed in the Rhetoric (1. 10. 1368 b 27).

single individual or a number of individuals, or lastly the disproportionate increase in number or wealth of some section of the State. Changes of constitution, however, may occur without civil disturbance (*στάσις*), brought on by a wish to check the intrigues of canvassers for office, or by self-confident negligence, or by a succession of small changes[1].

Other occasions of civil trouble are a want of homogeneity in the people of a State, for a State needs time to weld its materials together; even contrasts of site, like that between Athens and Peiraeus, are productive of disunion. So small are the things which give occasion to it, though the things for which the makers of revolutions struggle—gain, honour, and the like—are not small, but great. Small things are most productive of civil discord when they concern those who belong to the ruling class. To illustrate this, Aristotle refers to a number of instances in which great consequences had flowed from feuds arising among the leading men of a State from trivial causes—love-quarrels[2], or failure in suits for the hand of an heiress, or differences about property and the like. So again, the increase in credit or power of some magistracy or section of the State is apt to bring about constitutional change—a change to oligarchy, democracy, or polity, as the case may be. Thus the credit gained by the Council of the Areopagus at Athens in the Persian War gave increased stringency to the constitution, and then the exploit of the seamen of the fleet (*ναυτικὸς ὄχλος*) in winning the victory of Salamis, and putting Athens in the way of acquiring the headship of a hegemony, had the counter-effect of strengthening the democracy. Aristotle

[1] It is not clear whether Aristotle regards that sense of not having one's due which he finds at the root of constitutional change, as present or absent in cases of this kind.

[2] Lord Clarendon mentions in his Autobiography (1. 12–15, ed. 1759) an event of this kind which 'made such impressions upon the whole Court (of Charles the First) by dividing the lords and ladies both in their wishes and appearances, that much of that faction grew out of it, which survived the memory of the original; and from this occasion (to show us from how small springs great rivers may arise) the women, who till then had not appeared concerned in public affairs, began to have some part in all business.'

gives other instances of the same thing from the history of Argos, Syracuse, Chalcis, and Ambracia. It may be said, broadly, that the winners of power for a State—be they private individuals, or the holders of a magistracy, or a tribe, or any other section of the community, large or small—are apt to become the cause of civil disturbance, for either their honours excite the envy of others and thus produce a rising, or their own heightened sense of importance makes them discontented with a position of mere equality. On the other hand, an even balance of the parts of the State—of the rich and poor, for example, where the moderately well-to-do class is weak or absent—will also often bring about civil trouble and constitutional change.

Such, then, is the broad outline which Aristotle gives of the causes and occasions of constitutional change. It acquires additional definiteness in the chapters which follow, but the general drift of his views is clear enough already.

He evidently holds that the causes of constitutional change are far more numerous and complex than Plato had held them to be in the Republic[1]. Among its main sources may probably be reckoned dissension among the holders of power and ill-treatment of those outside their ranks; but given the existence of that sense of unsatisfied claims to gain or honour on the part of the rich or poor, or even on the part of a single individual, which commonly in Aristotle's view underlies revolution, a thousand little circumstances[2] may set fire to the train and cause an ex-

[1] Far more numerous also, than they were held to be by those who thought that civil trouble always originated in questions about property (2. 7. 1266 a 37).

[2] The same view is implied in the narrative about Naxos quoted from Aristotle's Polities by Athenaeus, Deipn. 348. It is not impossible that the narratives in the Seventh Book of the Politics (7 (5). 4. 1303 b 19 sqq.), which are designed to illustrate the fatal effects of trifling feuds arising among the great people of a State, are derived from the Polities, for Plutarch (Reip. gerend. praecepta c. 32) tells one or two of them at greater length and in more detail than they are told in the Seventh Book, and he may well have quoted them from the Polities. It should be noticed that Demosthenes had already used the expression (in Lept. c. 162)—*μικροὶ καιροὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων αἴτιοι γίγνονται.*

plosion. Some mute process of social change—some accidental increase in the numbers or prominence of a class or a magistracy—some microscopic cause of quarrel may suffice to bring about a revolution. And when a constitution changes, it may pass into any other constitution, for an oligarchy does not necessarily change into a democracy, or a democracy into a tyranny.

We note that constitutional change is conceived by Aristotle always to imply a desire on the part of individuals to win honour, gain, or glory, or to avoid their opposites, though this desire often needs the spur of oppressive or fraudulent conduct on the part of the rulers[1], or dissensions among them, to wake it to active effort. Disinterested changes or changes proceeding from common consent seem not to be noticed by him. Nor are changes originating in conscientious feeling, religious or other, untainted by a longing for power and spoil, if such there be. Religion was seldom a cause of constitutional change in the history of Greece and Rome, until Christianity appeared on the scene. The makers of revolutions are viewed by Aristotle, with that absence of sentiment which is characteristic of the best Greek writers, as men keen for power, or wealth, or glory. Even Dion, we seem to gather[2], in undertaking to dethrone the younger Dionysius—an enterprise famous in Greece for the odds against which it was undertaken[3]—was actuated, in Aristotle's view, simply by a love of glory coupled with a contempt for the feebleness of the tyrant. We do not know how Aristotle would have classified an act like that of Timoleon, who planned the assassination of his brother Timophanes, when he found that the latter had assumed, or was on the point of assuming, the tyranny of Corinth: the act, indeed, was probably unique.

We see also that Aristotle is far from holding that revolutions always 'begin in hunger': the promoters of a revolution, as he has already said in his chapter on

[1] 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 13 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq.

[2] 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 21 sqq.: cp. 1312 a 4.

[3] Diod. 16. 9.

Phaleas, might be, and often were, not only men whose physical wants were fully satisfied, but men positively wealthy, for wealthy men often seek, he says, for an increase of power and position.

We might have expected a different theory of Revolution from Aristotle, looking to his teaching in other parts of the Politics. Constitutions, we have been told by him, differ because the holders of power, in some, rule for the common advantage, in others for their own, or because, in some, certain sections of society are dominant, in others certain other sections; and we might have expected that changes of constitution would result from some ethical change in the society in which they occur, or from the rise of some new section or sections of society to predominance. An increase in the numbers of the rich will tend to oligarchy; an increase of the moderately well-to-do to polity; an increase of the poor to democracy. We might have expected also that constitutional change, though often for the worse, would sometimes be for the better, and that we should learn in the Seventh Book how to help forward changes for the better, and to prevent or delay changes for the worse. The Seventh Book, however, sets itself to show how all constitutional change is to be avoided, and we are taught to view it as arising only partly from changes in the composition of society—ethical changes seem to escape notice—and far more often from faults committed by the holders of power. We learn here the wholesome lesson that, if constitutions 'habent sua fata,' much may still be done by watchfulness, fairness to those excluded from power, and moderation to preserve them even under unfavourable circumstances.

Here, as elsewhere, Aristotle seems to be unconscious of the inconsistencies in his teaching, which become apparent when different parts of it are brought together and set side by side. He is great as a systematizer, but he is also fond of dealing with a subject part by part, and hence a not infrequent 'patchiness' of treatment; he is in one passage possessed by one point of view and in

another by another, and he does not pause to bring the two sections of his work into absolute harmony; indeed, he seems usually unaware of the defect. He inherits much of the Platonic freedom of handling, which had its good side, for a narrow systematizer misses much truth.

4. Causes of change in oligarchy, democracy, aristocracy, and polity, taken separately.

The three chapters which follow (cc. 5–7) place in a strong light the perils of an over-narrow constitution. They describe the besetting weaknesses of each of the four constitutions, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and polity. It is easy to see that of these forms, as might be expected, the narrowest, oligarchy, was the most precarious and the most exposed to overthrow. It was in a higher degree than aristocracy, and in a far higher degree than polity, the rule of a few, and of a few not marked out by merit for rule, but only by wealth or birth.

The beginnings of change in oligarchy might arise either within or outside the ranks of the holders of power. When the blow was struck from outside, it might be struck by an oppressed and infuriated people, or by rich men excluded from power; or again the people might rise from a simple feeling of indignation at the narrowness of the oligarchy. If, on the other hand, the causes of change arose within the privileged body, they might be at least equally various. War and peace were alike fatal to oligarchies. Trifles often sufficed to tear them asunder. Like all constitutions resting on a property-qualification, they were liable to alter in type with every increase or decrease in the prosperity of the State.

Democracies were far less apt to be overthrown. Their overthrow was commonly due to the unscrupulousness of demagogues, who forced the rich to combine against the democracy by confiscating their property, or plundering them of its proceeds by means of public burdens, or by calumnious accusations intended to excite ill-will against them and so to make the confiscation of their property possible. Democracies were at one time apt to change into tyrannies, but that had ceased to be common in the

days of Aristotle, for demagogues had then ceased to be skilled in war, and the demos was no longer resident in the country far away from the centre of affairs, and no longer needed a soldier to champion its cause. They still, however, were liable to changes of type, the moderate form often passing into the extreme.

Turning to mixed constitutions, we find that aristocracies were more exposed to change than polities. Aristocracies, as we learn from instances drawn for the most part from Lacedaemonian history, were imperilled by the fewness of those who held office in them, especially when the less privileged Many think themselves of equal excellence with their rulers, or when men of high position and unsurpassed merit are dishonoured by men of still higher position, or when an individual of vigorous character is excluded from office, or when extremes of wealth and poverty arise in the State—a frequent accompaniment of war—or when some great man, having the power to make himself still greater, seeks to be monarch. Both aristocracies and polities, however, most often owed their fall to some deviation from justice in their combination of social elements. Most of the constitutions which were commonly termed aristocracies, Aristotle here tells us, were like polities in this, that they sought to combine, not virtue, wealth, and numbers, but the two latter elements only; the one constitution, in fact, differed from the other only in the mode in which it combined these elements, aristocracies commonly so called inclining towards oligarchy, and polities commonly so called towards the Many: hence polities were more durable than aristocracies, for not only is the numerical majority stronger, but the Many are more content with equal rights: the rich are apt to encroach, if the constitution gives them the upper hand, and thus to provoke revolution. Aristocracies were often over-indulgent to rich men, leaving them far too free to do as they would, and this had often caused their ruin. Another very frequent cause of their fall was the thoughtless permission of slight and gradual changes in the constitution.

5. Means of preserving constitutions.

We now know how constitutions are overthrown, and it is easy to guess by what means they are preserved. They are preserved by the opposites of the things which overthrow them.

Special delicacy of the political balance in Greek City-States.

The Eighth and Ninth chapters of the Seventh Book are full of political wisdom, won from the study of the small Greek City-State, a form of society in which the political balance was exceptionally delicate, and power easily shifted from hand to hand. The rulers were always under the eyes of the ruled, and familiarity often bred contempt. In most of the States of modern Europe any aberrations on the part of the city-populations can be checked by the interposition of a vastly larger rural population (commonly of conservative tendencies), or of an army mainly recruited from peasant homes; but in ancient Greece the city-populations were usually supreme, and even where the cultivators were not serfs or slaves, seem to have been well able to get their own way. Arms were probably possessed by a far larger number of persons than in modern communities, except where the possession of them was expressly forbidden, and the thirst for power was far greater and more diffused. Civil life in Greece perhaps never entirely shook off the traditions of the age in which it began—an age to which fighting was everything. An ill-natured epigrammatist might have said, not altogether untruly—'Grattez le Grec, et vous trouverez l'Épirote.'

The relations of rich and poor were exceptionally bad. The poor were often unmanageable, partly because they had been oppressed and plundered by the rich, partly (in some States at all events) from a sense of their own importance, for the oarsmen of Athens had won victory and empire for their country, and the fleet was naturally the main-stay of a Power to which exclusion from the sea meant starvation; partly because they were pressed hard in the labour-market by the competition of slaves[1], and still more, per-

[1] This cause of friction must have existed, though it seems to be little, if at all, noticed by Greek writers. The wholesale enslavement of cities and populations in war, and the wholesale importation

haps, because in most cities of ancient Greece the pursuits of the poor were regarded by the rich and educated with scorn, and poverty thus brought with it some loss of self-respect. It was natural enough, under these circumstances, that the poor should press into political life, and seek to exchange inglorious industries for judicial and official positions, which, however, they could only fill with the aid of State-pay, or in other words, at the expense of others. Frequently, again, there must have been a difference of race between rich and poor; this would be the case not only in colonies or in States founded on conquest, but also in States in which the citizen-body had been replenished, after wars or famines or pestilences, with slaves or aliens[1]. We can imagine how bitter struggles of race must have been, when carried on within the walls of a small city. Above all, the methods of party-conflict were often of the most uncompromising kind—massacre, assassination, exile, and confiscation. The combatants in each successive intestine struggle were infuriated by the experience of atrocities or the recollection of them in the past[2].

The relations of rich and poor being often of this nature, it was only too easy for ambitious individuals, first to win influence with the mob, and then to become tyrants and betray it. The tyrant was a dazzling personage, surrounded with wealth and glitter and luxury and all the outward signs of power, and half-deified in the eyes of many Greeks, not only by his good luck, which was interpreted to imply the favour

of slaves must have made the lot of the poor freeman harder by cheapening the labour-market.

[1] Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 6, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν· διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν.* The common people at Miletus were called by the rich 'Gergithes' (Heracleides Ponticus ap. Athen. Deipn. 523 f, *στασιαζόντων γὰρ τῶν τὰς οὐσίας ἐχόντων καὶ τῶν δημοτῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι Γέργιθας ἐκάλουν*). As far back as the days of Cleisthenes, the lower classes at Athens must have been of mixed race: *πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους* (3. 2. 1275 b 36).

[2] The case of Corcyra was famous, but Argos also was notorious for its outbreaks (Diod. 15. 57 sq.: Isocr. Philip. § 52), and as to the early days of Miletus, see Heracleides Ponticus ap. Athen. Deipn. 523 f sqq.

of the Gods, but also by his life of magnificent plenty, which seemed to recall the 'easy life' of their Olympian abode[1]. The admirers of tyranny in Greece were commonly admirers of luxury. This was true even of men like the brilliant historian Philistus[2], long the chief adviser of Dionysius the Elder and of his successor. The things which fascinated these men were precisely those which aroused the contempt of men of nobler character. It was fortunate that Greek despotism was felt by men of this stamp to be a vulgar thing; it sinned against that manly taste for simplicity of life which was one of the best traditions of Greece, confirmed by influences as dissimilar as those of Lacedaemonian institutions and philosophy.

Defects in the working of Greek constitutions indicated in the Eighth and Ninth Chapters.

The two chapters before us (the Eighth and Ninth) suggest a most uninviting picture of the Greek State as it actually was.

The holders of power in it, we gather, were often a mere handful of men, who used their supremacy to enrich themselves and to oppress those they ruled, and yet were

[1] Aristoxenus, in a fragment of his life of Archytas to which reference has been more than once made, describes how the envoy of the younger Dionysius, Polyarchus the luxurious (*ὁ ἡδυπαθής*), dwelt on the life of the Great King: *εἰπὼν δὲ τούτοις ἐξῆς τὰ περὶ τῆς θεραπείας τῆς τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως, οἵους καὶ ὅσους ἔχει θεραπευτῆρας, καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων αὐτοῦ χρήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν χρῶτα αὐτοῦ ὀδμῆς καὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας καὶ τῆς ὁμιλίας καὶ περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀκροαμάτων, εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔφη κρῖναι τῶν νῦν τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα· πλεῖσται γάρ εἰσιν αὐτῷ καὶ τελειόταται παρεσκευασμέναι ἡδοναί. Δεύτερον δέ, φησί, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννον θείη τις ἄν, καίπερ πολὺ λειπόμενον· ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἥ γε Ἀσία ὅλη χορηγεῖ, τὸ δὲ Διονυσίου χορηγεῖον παντελῶς ἂν εὐτελές τι φανείη πρὸς ἐκεῖνο συγκρινόμενον* (Aristox. ap. Athen. Deipn. 545 f: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 276). Epicurus, following, he says, the common opinion, held the two characteristics of Deity to be immortality and happiness (Diog. Laert. 10. 123). Contrast the view of Plutarch (Aristides c. 6): *τὸ θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἀρετῇ, ὧν σεμνότατον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θειότατόν ἐστιν.* The tyrants themselves seem to have been aware how much a luxurious court impressed the Greek spectator (7 (5). 11. 1314b 28 sqq.). Not every race even now, we must remember, admires the *bourgeois* virtues in its ruler.

[2] Plutarch, Dion c. 36, *φιλοτυραννότατος ἀνθρώπων . . . καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀεὶ ζηλώσας καὶ θαυμάσας τρυφὴν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ πλούτους καὶ γάμους τοὺς τῶν τυράννων*: Pelopidas c. 34: Timoleon c. 15.

negligent and self-indulgent and jealous of each other. Even in the 'aristocracy,' which rested power on a somewhat broader basis than the oligarchy, trust was often placed in transparent devices intended to diminish the influence of the people. Some aristocracies and oligarchies, we are told, stood their ground well, simply because 'the magistrates behaved well both to those outside the pale of the constitution and to those within it, abstaining from all oppression of the former class and bringing those of its members who were capable of command within the privileged body, and being careful neither to wound the self-respect of the few nor to wrong the many in matters of profit, while treating as equals those recognized by the constitution'—a remark from which we may infer that many aristocracies and oligarchies pursued a totally different course. The magistrates in these constitutions seem to have often, in Aristotle's opinion, held their offices for over-long terms; access to office was thus confined to a few, and these few were made too great for the safety or good government of the State.

In every constitution it seems to have been common for the holders of office to have opportunities of making large illegitimate gains; and this was especially fatal to oligarchies, for the Many, though often well content to be relieved from unremunerative political responsibilities and set free to attend to their own concerns, felt it hard that they should be expected to sacrifice both office and profit[1], and hence had every motive for making an assault on the holders of power. In democracies, again, the rich were often as much oppressed as the poor in oligarchies.

Three principles of the utmost importance were commonly ignored in the organization of the State. In the first place, no care was taken that the constitution should have force on its side—that those who wished well to it should

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 8, *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.*

be stronger than those who did not. This mistake was probably often made in oligarchies and aristocracies. Next, the votaries of each deviation-form were not content, unless they pushed their favourite constitution to an extreme, and thus constitutions which, though faulty, might perhaps have been bearable, became altogether oppressive and intolerable. We gather that the members of a Greek party actually took oaths to each other, and even swore to injure the members of the party opposed to them; each party thus became a band of sworn brethren, and it was perjury not only to change sides, but even to abstain from plotting injury to the opposite faction. The result was that each State came to be two States, and not one.

The third and last mistake, however, was in Aristotle's view the greatest of all. No attempt was made to produce in the classes possessed of power the character and qualities which would enable them to maintain their position. The sons of oligarchs were allowed to indulge in luxury, while the poor they ruled derived vigour from their labours and hardships. Democracy, again, made it a principle to allow men to live as they liked, and accepted the momentary will of the majority as decisive, not seeing that it too needs the support of a congenial ἦθος, moulded by law and education in the way most conducive to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

Means by which, according to Aristotle, constitutions may be preserved.

The way to preserve a constitution was, according to Aristotle, to take an exactly opposite course in respect of all these matters.

Aristotle dwells first on the necessity of watchfulness, which is natural enough in one who held that small matters, or gradual social changes not easy to detect, are often at the bottom of revolutions. Well-balanced constitutions must be on their guard to prevent infractions of legality, and especially small infractions, for these tend to repeat themselves, and to mount up in the end to something considerable. Constitutions often stand their ground better for being set in the midst of perils, for danger produces

vigilance. There should be laws to check the rise of quarrels and rivalries among the more important citizens, and no effort should be spared to save those who are not yet involved in these quarrels and rivalries from being drawn into the vortex: this is work which calls for the keen eye of a statesman[1]. The same vigilance must be shown in reference to the property-qualification for office, if the constitution rests on one; it must be adjusted to any change in the wealth of the State—in small States every year, in large ones every three or five years; the character of the constitution will thus be maintained unaltered. Whatever may be the nature of the constitution, it is well to take care not to aggrandize any single individual unduly; offices with a limited competence tenable for a long term are better than great offices tenable for a short one. But if great offices have to be conferred on the same individual all together, they should not be taken away all together, but gradually. The laws should, as far as they can, make it impossible for an individual of this kind to arise, strong in the numbers of his friends and in his command of wealth; but if he does arise, any removal imposed on him should be a removal beyond the limits of the State[2]. Again, since men's ways of life often lead to designs of innovation, a magistracy should be instituted to keep watch on those who live in a manner inexpedient for the constitution, whether it be a democracy or an oligarchy. For just the same reason it is necessary to take precautions against the various sections of the community enjoying prosperity singly and by turns, not simultaneously[3]—to see that the rich do not flourish and the poor suffer, or the rich suffer and the poor flourish, and that the better

[1] Cp. Demosth. de Cor. c. 246, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ' ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανε· οὐ παραιτοῦμαι. τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθέσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ταῦτα πέπρακταί μοι.*

[2] 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 19, *ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.* Cp. Plato, Laws 855 C and Stallbaum's note.

[3] No student of English history is ignorant, how often the very thing which Aristotle here counsels statesmen to guard against has occurred in the course of it, often without attracting much notice from anybody till too late.

classes do not feel themselves in the shade, while the many are in the sunshine, or *vice versa*. Inequalities of this kind lead to civil trouble, and the way to prevent their occurrence is to see that all elements of the State have a share in office, and to try either to link together (*συμμιγνύναι*, 1308 b 29) rich and poor, or to increase the strength of the moderately well-to-do.

Above all, care should be taken to prevent office being a source of gain, both by laws devised for this end and by the arrangements of the State in general. When matters are so ordered, oligarchy is freed from one of its most pressing perils, and democracy has for once the chance of allying itself with aristocracy [1], for while office will be open to all, it will be willingly abandoned by the people to men of position (*γνώριμοι*), and thus both classes will have what they want [2].

Watchfulness, however, is not everything. Good government is also necessary. Aristotle insists on the conduct of the magistrates and the arrangements as to the magistracies being such as to satisfy both those within the pale of the constitution and those outside it. Fair and kindly treatment of both is essential. In a democracy not only the capital of the rich, but their incomes should be tenderly dealt with. Aristotle evidently desires to relieve them, even against their will, of the less useful public burdens, such as the provision of choruses and torch-races [3]. In an oligarchy the poor should be well cared for: lucrative offices should be abandoned to them, and outrages committed by rich men on poor men should be punished more severely than those committed by rich men on members

[1] A saying was ascribed by tradition to Periander that democracy was best when it most nearly resembled aristocracy ([Plutarch] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 11). Isocrates also had eulogized (Panath. § 131) the kind of democracy which allied itself with aristocracy (*δημοκρατίαν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ χρωμένην*)—the democracy which placed at its head 'the most capable of the citizens and those likely to manage the affairs of the State in the best and justest way' (Panath. § 132).

[2] Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 34, *οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται οὗ ἐφίενται.*

[3] Cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 3.

of their own class. The concentration of property in a few hands should be discouraged: property should be transmitted by inheritance, not by will or gift, and no single individual should be capable of taking more than one inheritance; fortunes will thus be more equal, and a larger number will be raised from the ranks of the poor to those of the well-to-do. Both in oligarchy and democracy those who have the smaller share in the advantages of the constitution should enjoy a superiority over the rest, or at least an equality of position with them, in respect of all offices which are not 'supreme over the constitution' (*κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας*), for offices of this nature must be confided to those favoured by the constitution either exclusively or in such a way that the rest will be in a minority. They should be given to men who are not only well-affected to the constitution and skilled in the work to be done, but also endowed with the type of virtue which is most in harmony with the particular constitution [1].

Generally (Aristotle continues) whatever provisions of law we describe as advantageous to constitutions, are preservative of them [2]; and especially attention to that principle which we have repeatedly mentioned as one of the highest importance—the principle that those who wish the constitution well must be stronger than those who do not [3]. But then we must not suppose, as the framers of oligarchical and

[1] As the citizen under every constitution must possess the type of virtue appropriate to the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 30: cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.), it is only natural that Aristotle should expect this of the holder of a *κυρία ἀρχή*.

[2] 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 14, *ἁπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σώζει τὰς πολιτείας.* Cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40, *τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους, οἳ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς πολιτείας*: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 29, *τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεῖα ταύτης*: 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 12, *ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς.* The provisions of law which are suitable to a democracy are enumerated in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18 sqq.

[3] Question and answer before the Lords' Committee on the Irish Land Act (1882): 'Q. What should you regard as a stable equilibrium? A. I should regard as a stable equilibrium that position of things in which the majority of the people would be anxious to be conservative in the best sense' (*Times*, May 2, 1882).

democratic constitutions often seem to do, that the laws of a democracy or an oligarchy should be made as democratic or oligarchical as possible; on the contrary, the mean must always be kept in view. Nor is legislation everything: the wisest laws will be of little use, if the citizens are not trained to live in the way which is most conducive to the maintenance of the constitution of the State, whatever it may be. The best security against weakness (*ἀκρασία*) in the case of an individual is a formed habit of right action, and the same thing is true of a State. It must become a 'second nature' to the citizen to live in the way most conducive to the maintenance of the constitution. We remember that Aristotle has elsewhere said that the virtue of the citizen is relative to the safety of the constitution, just as that of a sailor is relative to the safety of the ship, and that the constitution is the mode of life adopted by the State (3. 4. 1276 b 20 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40).

Aristotle's views on this subject contrasted with those of the writer of the paper on the Athenian Constitution which is included among the writings of Xenophon.

Vigilance, good conduct, thoughtfulness for those excluded from power, moderation, a suitable training for the citizens—these things, according to Aristotle, are the safeguards of constitutions.

If we read the short paper, or extract from a letter[1], on the Athenian Constitution which finds a place, rightly or wrongly, among the works of Xenophon, we shall see in how totally different a spirit it is written.

It implies throughout that the true way of preserving a democracy is to study exclusively the interest of 'the poor and the common people and the inferior sort' (*οἱ πένητες καὶ οἱ δημόται καὶ οἱ χείρους*, 1. 4)—to increase their numbers to the utmost[2], and to swell their prosperity and to diminish

[1] It is addressed, apparently by an Athenian of oligarchical sympathies (*ἐποιήσαμεν*, 1. 12), to a friend (*σὺ νομίζεις*, 1. 8), and is intended to correct his impression that the constitution of Athens and the arrangements of the State generally were a monument of folly. There is much method, it argues, in the supposed madness of the Athenians.

[2] Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., *πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν* (sc. *τὴν τελευταίαν*), *καὶ τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν εἰώθασιν οἱ προεστῶτες τῷ προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους κ.τ.λ.*

the wealth and the prosperity of 'the rich and the good' (*οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί*), for these are always foes to democracy (1. 4–5). 'It is precisely the policy followed by the Athenians of favouring the poor at the expense of the "good," that most clearly proves them to be effectual preservers of their democracy, for the more the poor and the common people and the inferior sort flourish and increase in number, the more the democracy thrives, whereas, if the rich and the "good" flourish, the popular party makes the side opposed to it strong' (1. 4). If Athens allows any one who pleases to get up in the assembly and take an active part in its deliberations, however poor and low and ignorant he may be, it adopts the best means for preserving the democracy (*ἡ δημοκρατία μάλιστ' ἂν σώζοιτο οὕτως*, 1. 8). The poor are better advisers for a democracy than the rich, for the rich with all their virtue and wisdom are not well disposed to democracy, and would not advise it for its good, but for their own[1]. It might be in the interest of 'orderly government' (*εὐνομία*), if only the cleverest and best men were allowed to address the assembly, but a democracy has to disregard considerations of 'orderly government,' for 'orderly government' means the supremacy of the 'good' and the silencing and slavery of the demos. A democracy must indulge slaves and allow them to grow rich[2], for otherwise their owners will lose the sums which they pay by way of contribution (*ἀποφορά*), and be unable to furnish the State with the means of maintaining a fleet. The metoeci must be indulged for similar reasons. The democracy of Athens puts down the students of gymnastic and music[3], for it knows that pursuits of this kind are not for poor men, but it encourages rich men to undertake the costly functions of choregus, gymnasiarch, and trierarch, because the demos derives advantage from their outlay in

[1] Contrast the view expressed by Aristotle in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq., where he says—*βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους.*

[2] Cp. Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sq.

[3] C. 1. 13, *τοὺς δὲ γυμναζομένους αὐτόθι καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἐπιτηδεύοντας καταλέλυκεν ὁ δῆμος.*

these positions; the poor receive pay for singing and dancing in the choruses, for running in the races and rowing in the triremes, and thus they gain and the rich become less rich (1. 13). If the Athenian demos plunders the rich in the dependent States of the Empire, and exiles them and puts them to death, it does so in order to weaken them, for it knows that if this class once became powerful in the dependencies, it would soon have to say farewell to its empire (1. 14).

The writer sums up as follows—'As to the Athenian constitution, I do not commend it, but since it is the pleasure of the Athenians to be democratically governed, they seem to me, in following the policy which I have described, to take the right means to preserve the democracy' (3. 1). The whole drift of the composition is that a democracy which wishes to be durable must impoverish the rich and diminish their numbers, and see that the demos is as numerous and as well off as possible. Aristotle recommends democracies to adopt a diametrically opposite course (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). The writer of the De Republica Atheniensium, though his notion of the true policy for a democracy is much the same as that of the democratic leaders referred to by Aristotle in the Eighth Book (c. 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.), appears to go even beyond them, for they do not seem to have insisted on the weakening and impoverishment of the rich. He probably wished to depict as vividly as possible the consequences and accompaniments of a democratic *régime*, and to point out that the only way of escaping them is to abjure democracy, though he allows that at Athens, where the fleet does so much for the State, democracy has a just claim to exist (1. 2). Aristotle's aim, on the contrary, is to show that there are other forms both of democracy and oligarchy than the extreme forms, and that those who are called on to administer these extreme forms will, if they are wise, seek the means of preserving them, not in oppression, but in good government and consideration for those excluded from power. Even Aris-

totle, however, does not see how much the interests of rich and poor are bound up together—how difficult it is to oppress the capitalist without impoverishing the poor.

If any one desires to test the truth of Aristotle's account of the causes of revolution and the means of preventing it, let him select for study some great and notable instances of constitutional change—the decline and fall of the 'nobilitas' at Rome or the fall of the *ancien régime* in France—and then ask himself whether Aristotle has not stated in advance many of the causes of each of these changes. Some influences, no doubt, escape his notice, and perhaps, in reading the Seventh Book, we are too much allowed to forget that constitutional change is often made necessary, and even desirable, by changes in the social conditions, but nevertheless, it may be questioned whether on the whole anything better and wiser has ever been written on the subject than these two chapters of the Politics.

Causes of the fall of monarchies and means of preserving them.

The Tenth and Eleventh chapters investigate the causes of the fall of monarchies and the means of preserving them.

At the very outset, however, as might be anticipated, a strong contrast is drawn between the two forms assumed by Monarchy in Greece, Kingship and Tyranny. They differ, we are told, in origin and nature, and we are not surprised to find in the sequel that the means by which they are preserved are not altogether the same.

The conception of Kingship was one of the earliest of the good traditions of Greece, and among the noblest and most permanently valuable of them. Aristotle did little more for it than to accept it[1], and hand it on to the Roman and medieval world. The King is, in his view, a man of high worth, or belongs to a family of high worth, or has conferred great benefits on his people—founded its greatness, secured its independence, or added to its territory—or he unites worth or service with power (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33 sqq.). Kingship, like Aristocracy, rests on desert

[1] He accepts it, though he adds that the only true King is the παμβασιλεύς.

(1310 b 2, 31 sq.). It is not won by force or deceit, but is earned. It appears to be conceived by Aristotle as usually hereditary, but not necessarily so (c. 10. 1313 a 10, *ἐν ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις*). It is regarded by him as owing its origin to the support of the better classes (*οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, οἱ γνώριμοι*), and we are told that the King stands between rich and poor to see that neither class suffers wrong from the other. He lives for that which is noble, as the tyrant lives for that which is pleasant. He is ambitious of honour as the tyrant is ambitious of wealth; the soldiers who guard him are citizens of the State, while those who guard the tyrant are aliens. The King rules for the common good; the tyrant regards the common good only so far as it promotes his own.

The same causes, however, which bring about the fall of non-monarchical constitutions—'constitutions' strictly so called—bring about the fall both of kingship and tyranny. As in constitutions, so in monarchies, the ends aimed at by those who seek to overthrow them are wealth and honour[1]. So again, men attack monarchies, as they attack constitutions, from a sense of wrong or from feelings of fear or contempt. Their attack may be directed either against the person of the monarch or against his throne. Attacks on the person are mainly due to indignation aroused by outrage, while those who assail the monarch's throne are commonly animated by feelings of contempt, or are made hopeful of success by possessing the monarch's confidence or by holding high office (1312 a 6 sqq.: 1314 a 23 sqq.).

So far Kingship and Tyranny are exposed to the same perils, but Tyranny has special perils of its own. It falls both from disagreements within the dynasty and from the action of foreign States whose constitutions are hostile to it. Tyrants are always hated, and exposed to attacks inspired by hatred, but the attacks on them which lead to the over-

[1] Those assailants of tyrants, indeed, who are moved by love of distinction (*φιλοτιμία*) do not crave for themselves the wealth and dignities possessed by the tyrant: what they seek is glory; their object is to distinguish themselves. They too aim at honour, but in a different sense from others (c. 10. 1311 a 28 sqq.: 1312 a 21 sqq.).

throw of the Tyranny are in many cases due to contempt; the founder of a tyranny is less often overthrown than his luxurious successor. Kingship, on the other hand, is less than any other constitution interfered with by foreign States[1]; its fall is mostly due to discord in the royal family, or to attempts to make the royal authority more absolute, and to raise it above the law. To moderate the power of a Kingship is the best way to make it last. Aristotle would probably have seen in the despotism of the Tudors and Stuarts the cause of the decline of Monarchy in England.

The picture of *τυραννίς* in the Seventh Book takes no account of several of the forms of it described in the Third and Sixth Books, and concerns itself only with *τυραννίς* in its extreme form (*ἡ μάλιστα τυραννίς*, 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 18), and as it presented itself in a Greek State. Aristotle's account of it is thus hardly less sombre than that given in the Republic of Plato, though, unlike Plato, he does what he can to amend its methods of government.

He draws an interesting distinction in the Tenth Chapter (cp. c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) between some of the earlier Greek tyrants and those of a later day. The earlier tyrants, he tells us, were often ambitious kings, or else holders of great offices in free States, who converted their lawful prerogatives into tyranny—the tyrants of Ionia were of the latter type, and Pheidon of Argos was not the only instance of the former—but as to the later tyrants, and some of the earlier ones apparently—for instance, Cypselus (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27)—he is at one with Plato in stating that they came forward as the champions of the demos against the rich. In those days, unlike the still later time at which Aristotle himself lived and wrote, demagogues commonly possessed military skill, and it was not difficult for them to seize absolute power. It was thus that Peisistratus at Athens, Theagenes at Megara, and Dionysius at Syracuse won their tyrannies. By the time of Aristotle, however, the conditions had altered: dema-

[1] 1312 b 38: cp. 1312 a 93 sqq.

gogues were then rhetoricians, not soldiers, so that not many of them became tyrants (c. 5. 1305 a 13). Notwithstanding this, Aristotle still speaks of tyranny in these chapters (e. g. c. 10. 1310 b 14) as beginning in demagogy.

We know from the history of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages that tyranny is a not uncommon outgrowth of the City-State; otherwise Aristotle's account of the Greek tyrant might make us wonder that such a being should ever have existed.

His rule is described as exercised over unwilling subjects and wholly based on force. The mercenaries who maintained him in power were supported by the proceeds of heavy taxes imposed on his subjects. These taxes would no doubt fall mainly on the rich, but both rich and poor are described as suffering under his rule. It is said to combine the worst features of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy. Like the extreme oligarchy[1], the tyrant deprives the people of arms[2], oppresses them, drives them from the city, and scatters them in villages. Like the extreme democracy, he carries on a perpetual war with citizens of position (*τοῖς γνωρίμοις*); he puts them to death both secretly and openly, and exiles them, for he regards them as his rivals for power; it is, in fact, from their ranks that plots for the overthrow of a tyranny commonly proceed (1311 a 18).

Aristotle's view of tyranny did not probably differ much from that current in the sounder portions of Greek society. We know that though Jason of Pherae was not an oppressive ruler[3], his murderers were publicly honoured in most of the Greek States they visited[4]. The tyrant Hiero, in the dialogue of Xenophon which bears his name, describes him-

[1] C. 10. 1311 a 9, *ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας*, but the extreme oligarchy is probably referred to, as previously in 1310 b 4.

[2] Isocrates mentions in his letter (Epist. 7) to Timotheus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, that Cleommis, the tyrant of Methymna, trusted all his subjects with arms (c. 8 sq.), but this was evidently an unusual and somewhat perilous course. Most tyrants went armed themselves, and were surrounded with armed men (Xen. Hiero 2. 8). Cypselus had no guard (Pol. 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27), but he was an exception to the general rule.

[3] Diod. 15. 61.

[4] Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 32.

self in effect as an outlaw on a throne[1]. But then we must remember that tyranny had a brighter side, which Aristotle does not here take into account. The tyrant sometimes gave his State predominance in return for its surrender of freedom. The founder of a tyranny was commonly a man of much energy and ability, capable of doing great things for the State he ruled. We may be sure that Pherae was not sorry to become the first State of Thessaly, even though it owed its aggrandisement to Jason. We may be sure that many citizens of Syracuse rejoiced, when Dionysius the Elder made their city the leading power in Sicily and South Italy, and the rallying-point of Greek resistance to Carthage. Well-cared-for mercenary troops were rapidly becoming more effective in war than citizen-soldiers[2], and the tyrant's military force was necessarily a mercenary force. Even when the tyrant was not a Jason or a Dionysius, he occasionally won the good-will of his subjects. The memory of Euphron, the tyrant of Sicyon, was idolized by the Sicyonians. He was a benefactor to his State, says Xenophon, and therefore, as often happens, his fellow-citizens took him to be what he was not, a good man[3]. They buried him in the agora, and worshipped him as the second founder of the State. Aristotle tells us that plots against the tyrant commonly originated with the rich, and it is probable that the poor often forgave him much for his oppression of their oppressors. Here and there, indeed, we find a tyrant governing well. Timotheus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, is an instance of this[4].

Aristotle himself seems to feel that tyranny might become far less intolerable, if it adopted less objectionable means than those which it usually adopted for securing its own continuance. Periander was credited with the invention of the policy traditionally recommended to tyrants, which, however, recalled in many points the practices of Persian rule. This policy was demoralizing enough. The tyrant

[1] Xen. Hiero c. 4. 4 sq.
[2] Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 5 sq.
[3] Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 12.
[4] Grote, History of Greece 12. 629.

was to cut off all individuals who towered above the rest—to put an end to syssitia, clubs, and intellectual gatherings[1]—to allow of no meeting-places for the social employment of leisure nor of any meetings for that purpose—to do all he could to prevent his subjects coming to know or trust each other, or developing high spirit and self-confidence—to get them to live in public and under his eye, and to hang about his court, so that they may think humbly of themselves—to employ spies—to promote disunion and hostility between individuals, to set class against class, and to sow divisions among the rich—to impoverish his subjects by costly works—to be always at war that they may need a leader—to distrust his friends as those most capable of overthrowing him, and to conciliate women and slaves by indulging them, so that even what passes indoors may be known to him. He will be fond of low people, for they will be his humble flatterers and fit instruments for his purposes, and will discountenance all self-respecting and independent characters; his companions will be aliens rather than citizens—artists, singers, and musicians, on whom he lavishes the sums he wrings from the hard-won earnings of the poor.

It is evident that a tyranny administered on these principles must have been fatal to that free social intercourse for purposes of relaxation and discussion which was everything to the Greek. Its evil effects would be experienced both by rich and poor, but the rich probably felt them most. The poor might suffer oppression and be degraded by the deprivation of arms, but the rich and the cultivated were robbed of all that was best in Hellenic life. A city ruled by a tyrant of this type can have been no home for Greeks, or even for honest and self-respecting men.

[1] We see that the founder of the Museum of Alexandria did that which a tyrant would not have done, when he not only tolerated, but endowed and placed near to his own palace, a large gathering of studious men and their disciples. It was natural enough that the tyrant Euergetes II should scatter the Alexandrian students by his persecutions (Athen. Deipn. 184 c). Dion's Syracusan enterprise, it may be added, received cordial support in the Academy (Grote, History of Greece II. 116).

Aristotle does not say that the traditional method of maintaining a tyranny was ineffective for its purpose, but he regards it as immoral and contemptible (1314a 12). He recommends a wholly different course for the tyrant's adoption, as Isocrates had done before him[1]. He does not tell him, as he tells the King, that he may make his throne more lasting by parting with some of its power, but he advises him to rule in such a way as to seem, not the selfish tyrant, but the public-spirited and thrifty steward of the State—in a word, to approximate his rule as far as possible to that of a king, without, however, diminishing the means he possesses of compelling obedience. As in free constitutions, so in tyranny the principle must not be lost sight of, that those who wish well to the constitution must be stronger than those who wish it ill, and the tyrant must take care to win for his tyranny either the combined support of rich and poor, or the support of the stronger of the two factions; it will not then be necessary for him either to liberate slaves[2] or to deprive freemen of their arms (1315a 31 sqq.).

Sketch of the contents of the Eighth Book.

The very first sentence of the Eighth Book reminds us how little we have heard in the Seventh of the four or five sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy which were enumerated in the Sixth. Aristotle recurs to these sub-forms at the beginning of the Eighth Book, and recalls the fact that though he has distinguished various forms of oligarchy and democracy, and pointed out under what conditions each is in place, he has not shown how each form should be constructed—he has not shown what organization is at once appropriate in each case and satisfactory. Nor has he studied hybrid forms of constitution (*συνδυασμοί*)—forms in which an aristocratic judiciary is combined with an

[1] In his address to Nicocles and his letter to Timotheus.

[2] This was probably one of the most odious weapons in the arsenal of the tyrant: cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8, where the murderer of the tyrant Euphron says in his own defence—*καὶ μὴν πῶς οὐκ ἀπροφασίστως τύραννος ἦν, ὃς δούλους μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίτας ἐποίει κ.τ.λ.*

oligarchical organization of the deliberative authority and the magistracies, or in which some other combination of differing constitutions occurs. Both these subjects, however, require to be studied. The Eighth Book, nevertheless, as we have it, breaks off before the subject of hybrid forms is reached, and the book consists of an investigation of the first-mentioned subject, followed, as we have already seen, by an epilogue to the discussions respecting magistracies which are left avowedly incomplete in the Sixth.

The fragment of the book which has reached us seems, therefore, to be intended to give technical help to the framers and reformers (1317 a 33 sq.) of democratic and oligarchical constitutions in Greece. Aristotle's object in it is to point out to them, under what circumstances these constitutions should assume a moderate or a pronounced form (c. 7. 1321 a 8), and what institutions are appropriate and desirable in each form, and to save them from constructing each in an inappropriate or undesirable way. A common error, for instance, was[1] to hold that every democracy must unite in itself every democratic feature (*ἅπαντα τὰ δημοτικά*), whereas the very thing that makes democracy vary in form is the circumstance that it need not do so: democracy may embody more or fewer of these characteristics, or all of them, as it pleases (1317 a 29 sqq.). Aristotle seeks to show how each form of democracy and oligarchy should be constituted. He points out how even the extreme democracy and the extreme oligarchy may be made tolerable, just as in the Seventh Book he had shown the tyrant how to make his power durable. His aim in the Eighth Book evidently is to give useful aid to the founders of moderate forms of democracy and oligarchy, and to guide the founders of the extreme forms into moderate paths. There is much in the book which illustrates and enforces in detail the counsel of the Seventh Book to keep the mean (*τὸ μέσον*) in view (c. 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.).

[1] C. 1. 1317 a 35 sqq.

Aristotle's conception of the problem of Political Science.

To Aristotle the political art is the means by which the individual is enabled to make the link which binds him to the State a blessing instead of a curse. It cannot, indeed, overrule Nature and Fortune, or make good all defects of material and circumstance; it cannot render human society everywhere all that it ought to be; but it can point out what the State is at its best, for the benefit of the few who can realize its best form, and it can also point out how under every variety of circumstances constitutions may be ameliorated, or at all events made to work tolerably. It must not rest content with depicting an ideal State or a series of ideal States; it must learn to do something for every form of society, however imperfect.

How far it is really the business of Political Science to enter on so many problems of detail, or to construe its functions in so practical a spirit, may well be questioned, but Aristotle's conception of its mission is as creditable to his patriotism, as his handling of the subject is to his wisdom and statesmanship. Theophrastus persevered in the same path, and supplemented Aristotle's Politics by writing a work on Laws, and teaching the statesman how to deal with those 'inclinationes rerum' (*καιροί*), which in practice so largely determine his action[1]. Dicaearchus was also an influential Peripatetic writer on political subjects, but after the death of Strato (270–268 B.C.) the Peripatetic school seems to have lost much of its vitality.

Relation of Stoics and Epicureans to Politics and Political Science.

Stoicism and Epicureanism had arisen meanwhile, and the broad tendency of their teaching was more or less to detach the individual from politics. To the Stoics Virtue was Knowledge, and came not by habituation, but by teaching; philosophy, therefore, was its source rather than society. To know the law of the Universe was virtue.

[1] Aristotle had said (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104a 5)—*τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.* Perhaps Theophrastus thought that something might be done for men's guidance even in reference to *τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρόν.*

Still political life recommended itself to them as affording opportunities for doing good. In one respect, indeed, their conception of the statesman is in advance of that of Plato and Aristotle, for in their view he lives to promote not only the happiness of his fellow-citizens but that of mankind[1]. The wise man, however, would not take an active part in the affairs of any and every State, for if the State is too unsatisfactory, he will withdraw from its concerns; and after all, 'a philosopher who teaches and improves his fellow-men benefits the State quite as much as a warrior, an administrator, or a civil functionary[2].' The σπουδαῖος, we see, is no longer necessarily a πολιτικός, as he was to Aristotle[3]. Besides, the true State was to the Stoics the World-State—a State co-extensive with the human race, or rather embracing not only men but gods. Still the Stoics wrote freely about politics. They composed treatises on Kingship, which we must not undervalue, for in the Greek world of the third century before Christ the influence of philosophers was considerable, and occasionally availed to temper the despotism of the kings. They also joined with the Peripatetic Dicaearchus in extolling a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy[4]. They took a keen interest in the Lacedaemonian State; its austerity pleased them, and not less its mixed constitution. None of them, however, appear to have studied the technical side of politics in the minute and painstaking way in which Aristotle and Theophrastus studied it, or to have attempted, like Aristotle, to amend the less hopeful constitutions.

The Epicurean school stood still more aloof from politics. Epicurus sought to ease the strain of Greek life, to still that restless ambition to shine which had been at the root both of the greatness and the unhappiness of Greece, and to teach afresh the lesson of Democritus, that if men wish for

[1] See the teaching of the Stoic Athenodorus ap. Sen. de Tranq. An. 3, who says of the statesman —'cum utilem se efficere civibus mortalibusque propositum habeat.'

[2] Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, E. T. p. 305. See Athenodorus *ubi supra*.

[3] Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 16: 3. 18. 1288 a 41 sqq.

[4] Diog. Laert. 7. 131.

cheerful tranquillity (*εὐθυμία*), they must not be over-active either in private or public life, or attempt achievements beyond their power[1]. The life of friendship, according to Epicurus, conferred more pleasure and was therefore better than political life.

> 'Ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum
> Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere[2].'

The State exists to prevent the infliction of wrong, and for no higher end: the wise man will take an active part in it only so far as is necessary for his own safety.

Too little of the Greek literature of the two centuries after Theophrastus' death has survived to enable us to say with any certainty how far Aristotle's patient effort to understand and to ameliorate the public and private institutions of Greece was continued during this period; if it was continued, however, it must have been so in the face of many discouragements. We hear, indeed, of two disciples of Arcesilaus the founder of the New Academy, Ecdemus and Megalophanes, the tutors of Philopoemen, who, according to Plutarch, 'more than any other men of their time carried philosophy forward into politics and active life[3].' But the great scientific intellects of the third century before Christ—and there was no lack of them—seem to have sought distinction for the most part in other fields of inquiry. Little, if any, progress appears to have been made in the quiet and fruitful path which Aristotle had followed in political inquiry, and it is rather to the practical politics of this century and to such new births of time as the Achaean League that we must look, if we seek to trace some approach to a realization of his principle of moderation. The Achaean League was, indeed, reared on the ruins of that Town-autonomy which

[1] Democrit. Fragm. 20, 92 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 341, 346).

[2] Lucr. 5. 1127.

[3] Plutarch, Philopoemen c. 1, *Ἔκδημος καὶ Μεγαλοφάνης οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται . . . Ἀρκεσιλάῳ συνήθεις ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ γεγονότες, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μάλιστα τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ πολιτείαν καὶ πράξεις προαγαγόντες.* Their names are variously given: see Prof. Freeman, Federal Government 1. p. 362 note.

he prized, but its government did exemplify in some degree an union of democracy with aristocracy. 'Achaia,' says Mr. Freeman[1], 'still retained its mixture of moderate Democracy and moderate Aristocracy, its freedom from the rule alike of mobs, Tyrants, and Oligarchs.'

The Politics the closing word in a long debate.

The Politics of Aristotle is thus virtually the closing word, or almost the closing word, of a debate begun by Pythagoras and the Sophists, and continued by Socrates, Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato. Aristotle's political views were the outcome of more than a century and a half of controversy. Fresh vigour had been added to the discussion in the later part of this period by the miseries of Greece.

Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Three Greek writers especially seem to have taken the state of Greece to heart—Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The orations of Isocrates, many of which are really political pamphlets, were evidently familiar to Aristotle, and were evidently thought by him of sufficient importance to be frequently glanced at in the Politics. Sometimes he agrees with opinions expressed in them; more often he does not. Isocrates is not once mentioned in the Politics, but his heresies probably lent a zest to the composition of the work, for many a tacit contradiction of them is to be found in its pages.

He held that in politics and in the affairs of life opinion usually gives better results than science[2], whereas Aristotle insisted on the value of the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη: he depreciated the legislative art in comparison with that of Rhetoric, for the former, he said, was easily mastered[3], and, after all, dealt only with the internal organization of States[4], whereas the business of Rhetoric is to treat of such matters as the mutual relations of the States of Hellas[5], and to teach men civil prudence, or wisdom in deliberation,

[1] Federal Government 1. p. 500: see also p. 475 and p. 392 note.

[2] Adv. Sophistas, §§ 8, 17: De Antid. § 271.

[3] De Antid. § 80.

[4] Aristotle appears to dissent from this view in Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11 sqq.

[5] De Antid. § 79.

which is the true end of education[1]. Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη is the supreme authority on all these subjects. It was natural that one who thought opinion a safer guide in politics and the conduct of life than Science, should seek to fit it for the discharge of this function, and should invoke the aid of Rhetoric for this purpose. Isocrates, accordingly, made it his aim to draw Rhetoric away from the humbler topics with which in his day it concerned itself, to the study of questions connected with the mutual relations of Greek States, and thus to render rhetorical training a school of civil wisdom. His strength lay in his affection for Hellas and his keen interest in her well-being. More than anyone else, he deserves credit for insisting on a right use of 'hegemonical' authority. Looking back over the past of Hellas, he saw the Athenians, Lacedaemonians, and Thebans successively rising to supremacy and successively misusing the opportunity that Fortune gave them. His orations are spread over a considerable period of time, and, perhaps in part for this reason, are not very self-consistent. In one (the De Pace) he holds that there was something corrupting in maritime empire; in others he implies that the root of the evil lay in faultiness of constitution. The constitution is the soul of a State (Areopag. § 14: Panath. § 138). Monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy are all good, if only office be in the hands of those of the citizens who are fittest to rule (οἱ ἱκανώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν, Panath. § 132: cp. Xen. de Vectig. 1. 1). But on the whole Isocrates is in favour of democracy allied with aristocracy (Panath. § 131: Areopag. *passim*). Already, however, in the Panegyric Oration (B. C. 380) he had spoken as if all would be well in Greece, if only the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians would come to an agreement, and the other States would follow their example, and all would unite in a war against Persia—this, he implies, would suffice to restore internal harmony to each State without any constitutional alterations (Paneg. §§ 173–4); and in the Philippus (B. C. 346), a work of his extreme old

[1] De Antid. §§ 261–280.

age, he recurs to this earlier view, and holds that the essential thing for Greece is that Philip should heal the feuds of her four greatest States, Thebes, Lacedaemon, Athens, and Argos—the last thing that Philip was likely to do—and then become her leader in an invasion of the Persian Empire.

Plato and Aristotle saw deeper. They say persistently what Isocrates says by fits and starts, that there must be a reorganization of the State, but they hold that the reorganization of the State must be based on a reorganization of knowledge. Plato and Aristotle base Politics, not on Opinion, but on Science, and trace back the Science of Politics to its roots in the Order of Nature. The beginnings of sound Politics lie, according to the former, in a knowledge of the Ideas—according to the latter, in a knowledge of the end of Man and the purposes of Nature.

Plato is less pre-occupied than Isocrates with the disunion of Hellas, and more with the moral and political misconceptions which had made each State two States and not one, and were ruining the best-endowed natures. Let every class possess the virtues demanded by the position which it has to fill; let the mass of men be just and temperate, the soldiers of the State be brave and obedient to its rulers, and let the rulers be men of high natural gifts and worth, to whom philosophy has given a glimpse of real existence, and who have learnt to be wise and just and good in the surest way—by contact with the Idea of Good; let the State no longer corrupt its best natures, but train them to rule by training them in philosophy. The State will then be at one with itself, and the soul of the individual will be so too; and a moral and political regeneration will proceed hand in hand with the regeneration of Science, which will itself be accompanied by a reform of religion.

Aristotle follows Plato in directing his attention mainly to the internal reorganization of the State, though he is well aware with Isocrates of the importance of regulating hegemony[1]. Unlike Plato, however, he has no panacea.

[1] He knows how much harm had been done by the prevailing misconception that the art of Politics is the art of Empire (4

Power must be allotted in each State conformably to the social conditions prevailing in it. There are States whose social conditions point to the extreme democracy or the extreme oligarchy. In States so circumstanced these highly defective forms must exist, but they must be wisely organized, so as to be as durable as possible. Elsewhere a moderate oligarchy or democracy will be in place. The holders of power will not be the same everywhere, but whoever they are, they must remember that their power will not be durable unless they not only behave well to each other, but also to those to whom the constitution assigns a subordinate position, whether these happen to be the rich or the poor. They must be moderate and avoid extremes. No government, however, deserves the name of a 'normal government,' unless it is for the common good, which no deviation-form can really be; and if we ask what government for the common good is, it is government which secures happiness to all in the measure in which they are capable of partaking of it (3. 6. 1278 b 21). Virtuous action is the main constituent of happiness; hence government which promotes virtuous action is government for the common good.

The Politics, however, like the Republic of Plato before it, is the work of one who was not only a Hellenic patriot, but also a philosopher. It seeks, on the one hand, to restore rational government in Greece, but it also seeks, on the other, to trace the ideal outline of human society. It is only by studying politics in an ideal spirit, that we discern the full scope and operation of the State. To do this, we must imagine ourselves favoured to the fullest extent by Nature and Fortune, and devise such a State as will give complete effect to the purposes of Nature in regard to man.

Man has an end to achieve—'good life'—and he cannot achieve it except in and through Society. He must join

(7). 2. 1324 b 32 sqq.), and insists on States behaving to other States according to their deserts (4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11 sqq.). Plato himself had said in the Republic that one of the qualifications of the ruler of a State is to know how a State should behave to other States (Rep. 428 C–D).

with his fellows, and the society thus formed must learn to ascend from the satisfaction of daily physical needs to the satisfaction of higher needs. Society must culminate in the πόλις: the individual must find in the πόλις a guide of life, a source of virtuous action, and so of happiness. Aristotle, like Plato before him, met the universal craving of man for some guiding and saving Power external to the individual by pointing, not to a priesthood or to a Church, or even to God, but to the State. Man's natural sociality is his salvation, if only it be preserved from distortion.

The group of individuals forming the πόλις, if it has not a living law in the person of a παμβασιλεύς or Absolute King, must frame laws and live in obedience to them. These laws must mould the conditions under which they live so as to be in the highest degree conducive to virtuous action and happiness. They must be such as to secure as far as possible to each member of the group enough and not more than enough of external goods, and an adequate supply of bodily goods. Above all, they must be such as to develope the goods of the soul—to call forth and give full play to men's highest faculties, moral and intellectual. They must begin by making the Household a nursery of virtue for husband and wife, father and child, master and slave; its head must learn to be less a breadwinner or proprietor than a ruler and a guide in the paths of virtue—to care less for the improvement of his inanimate property than for that of his slaves, less for that of his slaves than for that of the free members of his household. They must carry the same principle into the organization of the State; they must allow no one to be a citizen who is not equal to the duties of a citizen—who has not the purpose and capacity to rule and be ruled with a view to virtuous action and the highest life; they must give political power only to men of mature age and full experience, animated by the aim of ruling for the good of the whole—that is, for the development of the best and happiest life. This equal brotherhood of mature men will live for politics and philosophy, leaving war to the younger citizens

who will in time fill their places. The business of the citizens of full age will be to rule their households and the State, to guide the education of the young, and above all to live their own life—a wholly unimpeded life of the noblest activity. Their happiness will consist in this, that they are in possession of all the material and psychical conditions of such a life, that they live in the society of those who are equally fit to live it[1], and that the social conditions in which they find themselves are precisely those which best suit such a life. The ideal society is as a vessel which has all the winds of heaven in its favour. In a society thus organized man breathes at last his native air, reaches his full stature, and attains the end of his being. Society is no longer a warping and distorting, but an elevating and ennobling influence.

The State exists, then, according to Aristotle, for the sake of that kind of life which is the end of man—not for the increase of its population or wealth, or (necessarily at all events) for empire or the extension of its influence. It exists for the exercise of the qualities which make men good husbands, fathers, and heads of households, good soldiers and citizens, good men of science and philosophers. When the State by its education and laws written and unwritten succeeds in evoking and maintaining in vigorous activity a life rich in noble aims and deeds, then and not till then has it fully attained the end for which it exists. The ideal State is that which adds to adequate material advantages the noblest gifts of intellect and character, and the will to live for their exercise in every relation of life, and whose education, institutions, and law are such as to develope these gifts and to call them into full play.

This is the social and political ideal of Aristotle, broadly stated and stripped of detail. We need not trouble our-

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170a 11, *γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν*: and 9. 12. 1172a 11, *δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν "ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά."* Aristotle is speaking in these passages of the intercourse of *σπουδαῖοι* as private friends, but the same thing may probably hold of their public relations as fellow-citizens.

selves here about the organization by which he thinks that the end of the State is best attained. His conceptions on this subject are affected by the inevitable imperfection of the experience of his race and time.

Concluding remarks.

His ideal, we feel, is a noble one, the ideal of an aspiring race, perhaps rather Hellenic than Teutonic, rather ancient than modern. Moderns are apt to value excellence for its social utility: the Greek in his best moments worshipped it for its own sake, and held its production to be the *raison d'être* of human society. Yet Aristotle's State, if Hellenic, belongs to a new type of Hellenism, for much of the frivolous and feverish brilliancy of Greek life would vanish before the high aims and serious purpose which he sought to impress upon social life.

There are those, however, who will ask, as some Greeks already asked, whether the end of human life is not rather pleasure than perfection: some will hold that it is the 'greatest pleasure of the greatest number.' The study of Politics, we see, leads up at once to one of the central questions of Ethics—a question which every race and every generation will solve in its own way.

A further question is, whether Aristotle does not go too far in pointing the individual to the State and its law as the sources of his spiritual life. Do not men draw a large portion of their spiritual life—their religion, science, philosophy—from sources lying beyond the limits of the State to which they belong? Is it not well that they should be free to do so—free to adopt the best wherever they find it? Aristotle, on the contrary, apparently expects all stirrings of intellectual and religious life to accept the guidance of the State and its law. And then again, can law do as much as Aristotle thinks it can for perfection of life? It may well be that the community of which a man forms a part exercises over him an almost irresistible moulding influence, and yet that the lawgiver's power to direct and give shape to that influence is far less than Aristotle implies it to be. The influence of society over the individual is one thing; the influence of law over both is another. When Aristotle

ascribes to the lawgiver the power to determine both the written and the unwritten laws of a community, or when he conceives Law as exercising an easy supremacy over all stirrings of life and all forms of activity within it—over religion, science, trade, and production—and fashioning all things at its will, does he not greatly overestimate the power of the lawgiver?

To all these doubts there would, however, be a ready answer—that something very much like what Aristotle proposed had already been effected in the Lacedaemonian State[1]. Men remembered also the rule of Pythagoras at Croton. We ourselves recall in comparatively modern times the rule of Calvin at Geneva.

We must bear in mind that Aristotle belonged to a race which was far more conscious of what the State and the lawgiver had done for it than our own. The Greeks felt that the merits of the Spartan were not due to any peculiarity in his religion, but to his State and its laws. Many Greek States looked back to lawgivers in the past who had, they believed, devised the laws, written and unwritten, under which they had won their greatness. If some modern communities look back to religious teachers —Luther or Calvin or Knox—as their founders or refounders, ancient societies frequently referred their origin to individuals bearing the commission of the State. It was the State that had made them what they were[2]; and when they felt the need of a reform and asked themselves how it could come about, they sought it not in a reformation of religion, or at all events not in that alone, but in a reformation of the State. Plato and Aristotle were faithful to Greek traditions when they endeavoured to make

[1] Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq., *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην* (i.e. *περὶ ἀρετήν*) *μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους· παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται.*

[2] This view was asserted even more emphatically by those who regarded virtue as a convention and the coinage of the legislator, like Polyarchus (Aristox. Fr. 15: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. 276), than by those who held that it had its root in the nature of things.

the State the main lever of moral and spiritual amendment. Αὐτὸς ὁ τρώσας αὐτὸς ἰάσεται. The State exists for spiritual ends, and must be so organized as to be fit for the task of promoting them.

Everything tended to guide Aristotle to a conception of the State as a small and intimate unity, dominated from one end to the other by a single idea, inspired and permeated by its law—a more human Lacedaemon, a wiser and more many-sided Jerusalem. To him a State was not a State, if it was a mere *congeries* of individuals lacking a common ethical creed to colour its art, its science and philosophy, its political and social life. A State to him is a strongly individualized unity which impresses its dominant idea on its members; it is no mere mechanical unity compatible with infinite dissimilarities of creed and character. The contrast between this ideal of the State and the modern ideal resembles the contrast between a Greek work of art and a modern one. We may say of the Aristotelian State:

> 'Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.'

States of this kind have existed, as has been said, not only in ancient but in modern times, and when they have existed, they have been as the leaven which leavens the whole lump. Take away Lacedaemon and Rome from ancient history, or Geneva from modern, and some of the main factors of each will disappear.

In the large national States of modern Europe—'bodies wanting souls,' as Plato and Aristotle would perhaps have thought them—we are less sensible of the fashioning influence of the State and its Law. We are hardly conscious enough of the spiritual issues which hang on the making of laws and the government of States. We find it hard to trace back the traditional views of life which are current among ourselves—the tacit ideal of character and conduct which every Englishman acquires from the social 'milieu' in which he lives—to any laws ever promulgated by a law-

giver. We hold this ideal to be rather a heritage of blood, an accompaniment of race, than the product of written law. It seems to us the outcome of the national experience, developed by stress of circumstances, and modified as this or that class has gained or lost predominance. The Englishman, unlike the Greek, does not trace back his moral being to a lawgiver—hardly even to any action on the part of his State. Yet if he studies the past of his race, he will perhaps discover that he has underrated the share of his State in making him what he is. His character would have been other than it is, if there had been no French Wars, no Wars of the Reformation, or if English freedom had been less often imperilled and less often fought for. Even the law of the State has had more to do with forming the English character than we commonly remember. It would not probably be quite what it is, if English feudalism had been more like that of France. The laws which have encouraged the ambition to 'found a family,' and enabled men to do it, have greatly influenced the national character for good or ill. The laws which, in popular phrase, 'established the Church of England' have perhaps done even more to influence it. The laws which regulate marriage and the household are also potent ethical influences.

When we remember these things, we come to see the statesman and statesmanship in a new light. The statesman is revealed to us as a moral and spiritual force—a power capable of imparting to the national character a bent for good or ill, a means of lowering or elevating it. We come to feel that this is the momentous side of his activity—not the increase of the wealth or population of his State, or the extension of its empire, or even perhaps the extension of its influence in the world, but the development of its character and intellect, for if this end is attained, everything else will follow. The statesman is placed in charge of his State, not to anticipate and gratify its desires[1], but to guard and enrich its character and life, to see that they suffer no detriment at his

[1] Plato, Gorgias 517 B sq.: 518 E sq.

hands. These are the views of Plato and Aristotle. This and no other was the lesson they taught. It was because the irrational governments around them were potent sources of demoralization, potent solvents of Greek character and manhood, that they seek—Aristotle even more patiently and persistently than Plato—to facilitate the return of the State to the true path.

Aristotle, indeed, is careful to impress on the statesman that the circumstances of a State go far to determine its organization, and that his aims must vary with what is possible in the given case. He must not forget the technical side of statesmanship, and must know how to make an extreme democracy or a tyranny as durable, and therefore as little oppressive and demoralizing, as possible. When, on the other hand, fortune is wholly with him, he will take the end of good life as his guide in moulding every institution of the State.

In one respect, however, Aristotle's conception of the office of the State in regard to the promotion of good life seems to us to sin by defect. It apparently never occurs to him to ask whether the State does not exist to promote good life in others than its own citizens. His best State is to be just to its neighbours, but he is too little accustomed to regard the State as part of a larger whole to ask whether States do not in some degree exist for the elevation of those outside their limits, or even possibly for the 'education of the human race.' To us a State which, however noble in its action, fails to leave its mark upon history and the world at large, would seem not to be all that we could wish a State to be. We look back to a succession of States which have helped to build up the fabric of European civilization, and the State which has not fought a Salamis, or done great things for religion or law or science, falls, in our view, behind the State which has. We regard the State not as living to itself and dying to itself, but as influencing for good or ill the destinies of mankind. Aristotle, on the contrary, knows nothing of the historical mission of States. He looks to the quality of the life, not

to the results achieved—to the intrinsic nobility of the life lived, not to its fruitfulness in consequences. The question which determines his estimate of a State is—how far is the life lived in it a life of perfect manhood? Does it develope and give full play to the noblest faculties of man, and not to one of them only, or a few of them, but to all?

APPENDIX A.

(See pp. 98, 493, 495.)

On the Third and Fourth Chapters of the Sixth Book.

The integrity of the text in the third and fourth chapters of the Sixth Book has been much doubted, and not without reason.

The question whether there are more constitutions than one has already been discussed in the Third Book (3. 6. 1278 b 6 sqq.), and its renewed discussion is in itself surprising. But of this there are other instances in the Politics. For example, the question what is the most desirable life is discussed in the first three chapters of the Fourth Book, and yet we are again invited to consider 'what is the end of the best life' in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters (1333 a 15–1334 b 5). Aristotle, in fact, has no scruple in raising a question again, when he wishes to draw a new lesson from the discussion, as he does in each of these discussions of the Fourth Book. We notice the same thing here. The question discussed in these chapters of the Sixth Book is the same as that discussed in the Third, but the object of the discussion is different. There the object had been to obtain a rough classification of constitutions; here it is to point out how great is the number of possible forms, and to correct a prevailing impression that, however much constitutions may appear to differ from each other, they are all forms either of oligarchy or democracy. Aristotle's wish in the Sixth Book is to give aid to the statesman who undertakes the difficult task of reforming existing constitutions (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 1–15). He perhaps knew of cases in which statesmen had ignored the difference between various shades of oligarchy and democracy, and had given to one sub-form institutions appropriate to another.

The third chapter begins by affirming that the reason why there are more constitutions than one is that there are more 'parts of the State' than one, and in enumerating these it groups them under the two heads of δῆμος and γνώριμοι. Under the former head fall cultivators, traders, and artisans, each representing a different type of demos—under the latter, γνώριμοι representing various degrees of wealth, and then again those whose claims rest on birth

and those whose claims rest on virtue. To all these parts may be added any others included among necessary parts of a State *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν* (1290 a 2)—a much disputed reference, but one which we cannot stop to examine here. One constitution, Aristotle goes on, admits all these parts or classes to a share in power, another gives power to only a few of them, a third gives power to a larger number. As the parts differ in kind, the constitutions will also differ in kind, [for constitutions vary relatively to the parts]. 'A constitution is the ordering of the offices of the State, and this ordering all men distribute among themselves either according to the power of those who are admitted to political rights, or according to some common equality subsisting among them—I mean, for example, the power of the poor or the rich or some power common to both. Thus there will necessarily be as many constitutions as there are ways of ordering the offices of a State according to the relative superiorities and differences exhibited by the parts' (1290 a 7 sqq.)[1]. A common view is that there are two typical constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, and that all others are deviation-forms of these; the aristocracy is counted as a form of oligarchy, and the polity as a form of democracy. But it is better and more correct to make the best constitution (whether in one form only, or in two—kingship and aristocracy) the typical form, and to view other constitutions as deviations from that—the stricter and more despotic forms as oligarchical deviations, the looser and less strict as democratical.

It is a mistake to suppose that democracy can be simply defined as the rule of the many, or oligarchy as the rule of the few. Oligarchy is the rule primarily of the rich, secondarily of the few: democracy is the rule primarily of the free-born, secondarily of the many. We must not, however, suppose a democracy to exist, where a free-born minority rules over a subject majority, nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor. Democracy exists when the free-born and the poor, being a majority, are supreme, and oligarchy, when the rich are supreme, being few. This explanation of the nature of democracy and oligarchy is probably added to show that these terms must be used in a less comprehensive sense than that in which they were used by those

[1] Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26, *καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου*. It seems best to supply *τὴν δύναμιν* with *τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων*, but the interpretation of the passage 1290 a 7 sqq. is by no means certain. For *κατά τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα κοινήν*, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 9, *ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα*: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 40 sqq.

who brought all existing constitutions under these two heads. If democracy were the rule of the many and oligarchy the rule of the few, it might be more possible to classify all constitutions as democracies or oligarchies.

At this point the result of the discussion, so far as it has gone, is summed up, and the next subject of inquiry announced, as follows: *ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν* (c. 4. 1290 b 21-24). It would seem then that, if this passage is authentic, all that Aristotle claims to have as yet established is that there are more constitutions than one, and why this is so; he has not yet displayed their full number, or set forth what varieties of constitution exist, or why there are all these varieties. And it is true that though he has prepared us (1290 a 5-13) for the existence of many different ways of ordering offices relatively to the various forms of the *δῆμος* and *γνώριμοι*, he has not decisively told us that more constitutions exist than the best constitution (single or two-fold in form) and its oligarchical and democratic deviations. So that there is really room for a renewed consideration of the subject.

The long inquiry into the parts of the State which follows (1290 b 22–1291 b 15) is very interesting, but it gives us an entirely new account of them—one which we might suppose was intended to take the place of that given in c. 3, were it not that in c. 4. 1291 b 15 sqq. (the passage which immediately succeeds the new account) the old contrast of *δῆμος* and *γνώριμοι* is reverted to, precisely as if the elaborate inquiry (1290 b 22–1291 b 15) had no existence. So again in a later chapter of the Sixth Book (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 1 sqq.) the *μέρη πόλεως* are still *εὔποροι σφόδρα, ἄποροι σφόδρα*, and *οἱ μέσοι τούτων*. The same view prevails also in the Seventh Book (cp. 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 34–1303 a 13: 4. 1303 b 26–31: 1304 a 19 sqq.: 1304 a 38–b 4), and we find a similar view implied in the Second (2. 9. 1270 b 21–25)[1].

The account of the parts of the State given in the passage 1290 b 22–1291 b 15 is, however, quite different. We must determine the number of constitutions, says Aristotle, exactly as we should determine the number of zoological species. To do this, we should first mark off the limbs, organs, and features—in other words, the parts—that an animal *must* possess; then we should note that these assume different forms, and that each species of animal will possess

[1] A not very dissimilar account of the parts of the State is apparently implied in the Third Book also (c. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq.).

one of these forms and no more; we thus arrive at the conclusion that there will be as many species of animal as there are possible combinations[1] of possible forms of each part. Exactly the same thing holds of constitutions. To every State the following parts are necessary—*γεωργοί, τὸ βάναυσον, τὸ ἀγοραῖον, τὸ θητικόν, τὸ προπολεμῆσον, τὸ δικαστικόν, τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, τὸ δημιουργικόν* (an official class), *τὸ βουλευόμενον*. The parts now enumerated, we notice, represent, not different degrees of wealth or poverty or the like, but different *δυνάμεις* (1291 b 2). There are as many necessary parts of the State as there are separate *δυνάμεις* necessary to its existence. The parts of the State are not the rich and the poor, or the few and the many, but the *γένη* representing the 'powers' essential to it. Judges, deliberators, administrators, and soldiers are parts of the State in a far more real sense than the sections of the demos or the rich. There are therefore as many constitutions as there are possible combinations of possible forms of each part of the State, the higher parts being parts in a fuller sense than the rest. We are reminded of this principle, when in c. 14 (1297 b 39) Aristotle traces the difference between constitutions to differences of the deliberative, judicial, and magisterial elements in each.

How is it then, he in effect continues, that the mistaken view has arisen, that the rich and the poor are in an especial sense parts of the State? It is because people think that wealth and poverty, unlike fighting and tilling the soil and practising a handicraft, are mutually exclusive and cannot be combined. All claim to possess virtue and to be fit to hold most offices (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3), but it is of course impossible to be both rich and poor. Hence the rich and the poor are held to be in an especial sense parts of the State, and the former being commonly few in number and the latter many, these parts are thought to be contrary the one to the other, and thus men set up constitutions based on the predominance of the one or the other, and hold that democracy and oligarchy are the only constitutions.

After listening to this full and interesting account of the parts of a State, which agrees to a great extent with the enumeration of the *γένη* composing a State given in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., we naturally expect to find the *γένη* representing the various *δυνάμεις* of the State treated as its parts in the remainder of the Politics. But

[1] It will be noticed that in c. 4. Aristotle traces back constitutional differences to 'combinations of necessary parts of the State,' in c. 3 to the award of office to various sections of the *δῆμος* and *γνώριμοι*, exclusively or in conjunction.

this, as has been said already, is far from being the case, though we find, as we have seen, in the fourteenth chapter (1297 b 39 sq.)—and perhaps also in the reference to *συνδυασμοί* in the Eighth Book (1316 b 39 sqq.)—some echoes of the views expressed in the passage 1290 b 22–1291 b 15. What then are we to say of this passage? It seems to be imperfectly worked into the context in which it stands, but whether it was placed where we find it by the hand of Aristotle or by that of another, it is not easy to say. The fact that its teaching is echoed in the fourteenth chapter makes in favour both of its authenticity and of its insertion here by Aristotle. But then how are we to explain the circumstance that its account of the parts of the State is ignored in the passage which immediately succeeds it, to say nothing of 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 1 sqq. and of the Seventh and Second Books?

We may well have here an 'intrusive' or 'added' passage; but the difficulty of harmonizing the third and fourth chapters of the Sixth Book is far from being the only difficulty that we encounter in the course of the first four chapters of this book. There is much that is puzzling in the state in which these chapters have come down to us[1]. In this part of the Politics, more perhaps than in any other, we feel that we cannot penetrate the secrets of the workshop.

APPENDIX B.

(See p. 240.)

The result of the inquiry in the Fourth Chapter of the Third Book appears to be, that in the best State all citizens are *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί* in the sense of possessing one or other of the two kinds of the *ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ*—i.e. they possess either the virtue of the good man *qua ἀρχόμενος*, or the virtue of the good man *qua ἄρχων* (which implies their possession of the other kind, for men learn to rule by learning to be ruled)—but that only those among them who are ruling or have the capacity to rule, possess the virtue of the good man in its full form—the form in which alone *φρόνησις* is present. The subject is perplexed in 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. (where we find a recapitulation of c. 4) by the result of the fourth chapter being stated to be that no one but the ruler or he who has capacity to rule (*ὁ πολιτικός*) possesses the virtue of the good man in the best State, for it seems to be clear that a form, though an inferior form, of the

[1] See on this subject p. 492 sqq.

virtue of the good man is conceded in the fourth chapter to ὁ ἀρχόμενος πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν in the best State. It is not, however, uncommon to find Aristotle's recapitulatory summaries not absolutely exact. Thus in the recapitulatory summary given in 1. 9. 1258 a 16 the natural kind of χρηματιστική appears to be identified with the provision of food, whereas other commodities also are clearly contemplated in c. 8 (1256 b 19). And so here Aristotle probably thinks it enough for his purpose to state the most prominent result of the inquiry and the one most present to his mind, and this is, that a citizen of the best State, if he is to possess the full virtue of a man, must be πολιτικός.

But we further find him saying elsewhere in the Third Book (c. 18. 1288 a 38) that it has been proved in the πρῶτοι λόγοι that the virtue of the citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of the good man, the reference evidently being to the fourth chapter of this book. How are we to reconcile this statement with the teaching of that chapter (compare also c. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq.), where it seems to be implied that there will be citizens in the best State not capable of ruling and not possessed of φρόνησις, and therefore not possessing the full virtue of the good man? The answer probably is, that in 3. 18 Aristotle refers to the full citizens of the best State, the citizens κατ' ἐξοχήν, and not to those of its citizens who, being νεώτεροι, are not fit for rule and do not possess φρόνησις. The word 'citizen' must apparently be used in this more limited sense in a passage of the Fourth Book (c. 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.), for here we are told that a State is good in so far as the citizens who share in the constitution (i. e. in the exercise of political power) are good, and in our State, adds Aristotle, all the citizens share in the constitution. Yet the νεώτεροι of the best State can hardly be said to 'share in the constitution.' Aristotle would seem to use the word 'citizen,' as he uses the word χρηματιστική in the First Book, in two senses—a wider and a narrower one.

APPENDIX C.

(See p. 259.)

On the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters of the Third Book.

'The twelfth and thirteenth chapters,' says Bernays[1], 'contain a separate draft of a discussion (Entwurf zur Erörterung) of the same

[1] Aristoteles' Politik p. 172 n.

questions which are dealt with, partly in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, partly in the sixteenth and seventeenth chapters. As this draft offers—in its remarks on the ostracism, for instance—some fresh matter, those who were putting the Aristotelian papers in order would be unwilling to leave it unused, and the place in which it appears seemed marked out for it by reason of the kinship existing between its contents and those of the chapters among which it was inserted. . . . Aristotle's intention, however, was that the fourteenth chapter should immediately follow the eleventh.'

It is quite true that the beginning of c. 14 joins on very well to the end of c. 11, and that cc. 12 and 13 deal to some extent with questions already discussed in cc. 9, 10, and 11, and also anticipate inquiries contained in cc. 16 and 17. The discussion, for instance (c. 13. 1283 b 35 sqq.), of the question whether the statesman should legislate for the advantage of the Few Better or the Many, when the Many are collectively superior in virtue to the Few, reminds us of the investigations of the eleventh chapter, and we feel some surprise that a fresh solution of the question should be offered without any notice being taken of the fact that it has been already discussed and settled. So again, the result of cc. 12 and 13 is to modify in one important respect the conclusion announced at the close of c. 11, that the true supreme authority is law adjusted to the normal constitutions, the ruler or rulers retaining unchecked authority only where law cannot deal satisfactorily with individual cases, for we learn from these chapters that in one case (that of the παμβασιλεία) law is altogether out of place; yet no notice is taken of the fact that this conclusion conflicts with the previous decision in favour of law. The twelfth and thirteenth chapters also anticipate the sixteenth and seventeenth. They in fact explain so distinctly the conditions under which the παμβασιλεία is in place that we are surprised to find in cc. 16 and 17 a long discussion of the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws, which, after battling with the problem as if it was altogether a new one and still unsolved, eventually results in exactly the same solution as had already been announced at the close of c. 13.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether the sequence of the latter part of the Third Book would be altogether satisfactory, even if these two chapters were omitted. For though, as has been noticed, the beginning of c. 14 suits well with the close of c. 11, we hardly expect to find an investigation of the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws following the

assertion at the close of c. 11 that the true supreme authority is rightly constituted law, eked out, where necessary, by the authority of a ruler or rulers. The interposition of cc. 12 and 13, indeed, perhaps serves in some degree to soften the strangeness of this transition, for these two chapters qualify the conclusion in favour of law arrived at in c. 11[1], and prepare the way for cc. 14–17. Then again, while in c. 15. 1286 a 21 sqq. we are led back for the moment to much the same solution as that announced in c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq., no notice is taken in the former passage of the fact that something very similar had been said before. It may be added that the conclusions arrived at in cc. 12 and 13 are referred to in c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq., and that this is one of those references which cannot easily be detached from the context and which are consequently less likely than others to be due to an interpolator.

Nor can we well spare the contents of these two chapters. Nowhere else in the Politics do we learn so clearly on what principles the State is to be organized under varying social conditions. Their teaching, again, is borne out by passages such as Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq. The list given in them of rival claimants for power (*οἱ εὐγενεῖς, οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ πλούσιοι, οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπερέχοντες*) agrees pretty closely with that given at the end of Pol. 3. 9. If 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. refers to c. 12. 1282 b 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 40 sqq. to c. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq., we have another argument in their favour, but both these references are doubtful. We note, however, that c. 13. 1283 b 42 sqq. recapitulates correctly the result of earlier chapters of the Third Book, that c. 13. 1284 b 4 sqq. appears to presuppose the distinction drawn in c. 6 between the *ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι* and the *παρεκβάσεις*, and that the advice given to the lawgiver in c. 13. 1283 b 40 sq. also harmonizes well with c. 6. The view taken of the ostracism as directed against *οἱ ὑπερέχοντες* (c. 13. 1284 a 17 sqq.) agrees with that taken in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq., and c. 13. 1283 b 16 sq. may be compared with 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 23.

Perhaps the fact is that the latter part of the Third Book from c. 12 onwards is rather a string of more or less independent inquiries than a well-ordered whole. And yet there may be more method in the apparent disorder of these inquiries than strikes us at first sight.

[1] Cp. c. 13. 1284 a 11, *ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει.*

APPENDIX D.

(See p. 290.)

Susemihl (Sus.[2], Note 677) brackets the passage 1288 a 6, *πρῶτον* –15, *ἀρχάς*, as interpolated. He objects to the account of aristocracy given in it on the ground that it makes no reference to that interchange of ruling and being ruled which is elsewhere treated as a characteristic of the ideal aristocracy, and also on the ground that a population fitted for kingship is here distinguished from one fitted for aristocracy, whereas the *παμβασιλεία*, the only true form of kingship, is conceived as arising in the 'best constitution' (3. 13. 1284 b 25), i.e. under an aristocracy. As to the latter objection, perhaps he builds too much on the words *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας* in this passage. They seem there to mean little more than 'in the case of a constitution which awards power for pre-eminence in virtue.' As to the former objection, it would seem from 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12–1333 a 13, that in the ideal aristocracy sketched in that book the interchange of rule referred to consists in the younger men being ruled as freemen should be ruled (1333 a 3 sqq.) by their elders, who possess *φρόνησις*, and in their succeeding these elders as rulers when they have attained the due age. This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us. It is true that it does not include, as in its description of polity, any mention of law, though law is apparently intended to exist in the aristocracy of the Fourth Book. The account of polity is not free from difficulty[1], but the statement that the well-to-do (*οἱ εὔποροι*) hold office in it becomes comprehensible, if we remember that the hoplite class, which is supreme in the polity, is said to 'belong rather to the well-to-do than the poor' (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12).

APPENDIX E.

(See p. 331.)

If 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40–b 35 is genuine, Aristotle here pauses in the inquiry which he has been pressing forward so fast, and proceeds to justify the step which he has just taken in distributing the

[1] We note, for instance, that the statement that offices in the polity are distributed *κατ' ἀξίαν* appears to imply that they are filled by election, whereas it would seem from 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8–11 that magistrates in the polity might be appointed either by election or by lot, or partly by election and partly by lot.

population into distinct γένη, by showing that the idea of such a distribution is not an invention of his own or a notion which dates from yesterday, but one which may be traced back to an immemorial past[1]. So far there is nothing in the contents of this passage which need raise a doubt of its genuineness. Aristotle well knew the value of an appeal to antiquity. He says in the Rhetoric (2. 9. 1387 a 16 sqq.) that men more willingly accept the ancient than the new, and regard the ancient as nearly allied to the natural. He appeals in the Nicomachean Ethics (8. 11. 1160 a 25 sq.) to the purpose of ancient festivals in order to show what is the purpose of festivals generally, and in the Politics (5 (8). 3. 1337 b 29 sqq.: 1338 a 34 sq.) he seeks to discover what were the aims of those who originally introduced music into education, in order to show its true educational use (cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 17). Besides, in this very chapter he explains—herein, it would seem, adopting a doctrine of Democritus (Philodemus de Musica, 4. col. 36. 29 sqq.: Kemke p. 108)—that the things which are earliest discovered are those which are necessary to man; thus the early date of the arrangements here referred to proves their necessity. But we hardly see why he need have gone on to assert the antiquity of syssitia also, which he has not yet instituted, and still less why he should trace the origin of syssitia in so much detail. It is true that Isocrates had said that syssitia were borrowed by the Lacedaemonians from Egypt in a passage (Busir. § 18) which is evidently present to the mind of the writer, and that it is quite in Aristotle's manner to take pleasure in tacitly correcting Isocrates, but it seems hardly necessary for this purpose to go into so much detail as to the exact geographical position of the Itali; and then again, the recommendation to inquirers with which the passage closes, to accept all sound additions to knowledge already made and to rest content with completing what is left incomplete, though quite in harmony with his teaching elsewhere (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 21 sqq.), seems also somewhat superfluous, especially in the midst of an inquiry, in the course of which so many questions are postponed in order that rapid progress may be made. It may be added that it is not clear how the facts mentioned in 1329 b 8–22, which are largely taken from Antiochus of Syracuse (see Antioch. Fragm. 3, 4, 6, 8 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 181 sqq.), prove what they seem to be intended to prove, that syssitia were known

[1] Cp. Demosth. in Lept. c. 89, καὶ τούτων πάντων οὐδέν ἐστι καινὸν οὐδ' ἡμέτερον εὕρημα, ἀλλ' ὁ παλαιός, ὃν οὗτος παρέβη, νόμος οὕτω κελεύει νομοθετεῖν.

in Italy long before they were known in Crete[1]. No notice, again, appears to be taken of this inquiry about syssitia when they are instituted later on (1330 a 3). Above all, the whole passage 1329 a 40–b 35 betrays the same interest in *νομοθέται*, and chronology, and the history of *εὑρήματα*, as does the suspected concluding passage of the Second Book[2]. Is it due to the same hand? And is this hand Aristotle's?

APPENDIX F.

(See p. 341.)

The account of *εὐδαιμονία* as *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, καὶ αὕτη οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς* (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.) cannot be found *totidem verbis* in the Nicomachean Ethics. In fact, the distinction between *ἁπλῶς* and *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως* or *πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα*, so frequent in the Politics, seems seldom to occur in the Nicomachean Ethics[3], though that of *ἁπλῶς* and *τινί* is common enough there (see Bon. Ind. 77 a 21–33). Nor is *εὐδαιμονία* described there in the exact phrase *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία*, though the words *τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις* occur in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31. We rather hear of it as *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, but then, as Aristotle points out, this is much the same thing as speaking of it as *ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια* (Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 29–31). That the *ἐνέργεια* must be *τελεία*, appears from Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 26: cp. 1100 a 4. Thus the Nicomachean Ethics may be said to give an account of *εὐδαιμονία* which is not ill represented by

[1] The argument appears to be that the existence of syssitia in Italy is coeval with the name 'Italy'—a name which, it is tacitly assumed, is far older than the days of Minos. The care which the writer takes to explain the exact sense in which he uses this name may perhaps be accounted for, if we remember that it was commonly used to designate a far wider region: thus the author of the poem bearing the name of Scymnus Chius, who probably reproduces Ephorus, makes 'Italy' include the whole region lying between Terina on the West (306) and Tarentum on the East (330). He also distinguishes it from Oenotria, on which it is said to border (300). If we could trace in the passage of the Politics before us a wish to correct Ephorus, the fact would make in favour of its authenticity.

[2] A close resemblance may also be noted between 1329 b 16, *διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις*, and 2. 10. 1271 b 30, *διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων*, the latter passage immediately preceding what is apparently an extract from Ephorus, which may or may not have been placed where we find it by the hand of Aristotle.

[3] In Eth. Nic. 4. 15. 1128 b 29 we have *εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν.* In Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 16 sq. *τὰ φύσει ἡδέα* are contrasted with *τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα* (= *τὰ ἰατρεύοντα*).

the terse phrase of the Politics[1], and the passage in the former treatise which Aristotle has especially before him is probably 1. 9. 1099 a 31–end of c. 10. 1100 a 9. The tendency to mix up *εὐδαιμονία* with *εὐτυχία* is mentioned here (1099 b 7), as it is mentioned in this passage of the Politics (c. 13. 1332 a 25), and the marring effect of calamity on happiness is also dwelt on in both passages (Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 2 sqq.: Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 20). Both speak of happiness as presupposing the possession of external and bodily goods[2]. But the whole treatment of the subject in this chapter of the Politics is more detailed and definite. The view that action, if it is to be *ἁπλῶς καλή*, must have *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά* to deal with as its object-matter, seems certainly not to find equally clear expression in the Nicomachean Ethics.

APPENDIX G.

(See p. 467, note 3.)

The following passages from Censorinus and Olympiodorus, quoted by Ideler in his edition of the Meteorologica of Aristotle (vol. i. pp. 484, 257), will serve to illustrate the nature of a 'great winter':—

Censorinus, de Die Natali c. 18: 'Est praeterea annus, quem Aristoteles maximum potius quam magnum appellat, quem solis lunae vagarumque quinque stellarum orbes conficiunt, cum ad idem signum, ubi quondam simul fuerunt, una referuntur. Cuius anni hyems summa est *κατακλυσμός*, quam nostri diluvionem vocant, aestas autem *ἐκπύρωσις*, quod est mundi incendium. Nam his alternis temporibus mundus tum exignescere, tum exaquescere videtur' (cp. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 20).

Olympiodorus in Aristot. Meteorologica 1. 14. 1, *συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὴν θάλατταν ἠπειροῦσθαι καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον θαλαττοῦσθαι διὰ τὸν μέγαν καλούμενον χειμῶνα καὶ τὸ μέγα θέρος. μέγας δέ ἐστιν ὁ χειμών, ἡνίκα πάντες ἐν χειμερινῷ ζωδίῳ γένωνται, ἥ ὑδροχόῳ ἥ ἰχθύσι. μέγα δέ ἐστι θέρος, ὅταν πάντες ἐν θερινῷ ζωδίῳ γένωνται, ἥ λέοντι ἥ καρκίνῳ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος μόνος ἐν λέοντι μὲν γινόμενος ποιεῖ θέρος, ἐν αἰγοκέρωτι δὲ*

[1] Other references also in the Politics to the Nicomachean Ethics (e. g. that in 2. 2. 1261 a 30), if indeed it is correct so to describe them, are rather reproductions of the spirit of its teaching than strict citations.

[2] See also Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 4 sqq.

χειμῶνα, καὶ οὕτω γίνεται ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς οὕτω κληθεὶς διὰ τὸ εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρειν τὸν ἥλιον, ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθίσταται· τί οὖν (?) ἐστι διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου πάντων τῶν πλανήτων γινομένη τάξις, ἥτις ποιεῖ τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτόν; εἰ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πλάνητες κατὰ κορυφὴν γινόμενοι θερμαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, ἀφιστάμενοι δὲ τούτου ψύχουσιν, οὐκ ἀπεικὸς πάντας κατὰ κορυφὴν γινομένους ποιεῖν μέγα θέρος, ἀφισταμένους δὲ χειμῶνα. ἐν οὖν τῷ μεγάλῳ χειμῶνι ἡ ἤπειρος θαλαττοῦται, ἐν δὲ τῷ μεγάλῳ θέρει τοὐναντίον διὰ τόπου μὲν (*διὰ τόπου τοῦ μὲν* conj. Ideler) *ἔκκαυσιν καὶ πολλὴν ξηρότητα, ποῦ* (*τοῦ* Ideler) *δὲ ὑγρότητα.*

In answer to an inquiry on the subject, the Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford (Rev. C. Pritchard, D.D.) kindly informs me that a 'rough and approximative computation' made by him gives the result that 'in the year 342 B.C. the sun, moon, and five planets were seen together somewhere in the constellations Libra and Scorpio.' This year would seem, therefore, to have been a 'magnus annus' in the sense at any rate which Censorinus attaches to the phrase, though not in the sense attached to it by Olympiodorus, who appears to require the meeting of the heavenly bodies to take place in the particular constellations named by him, and not in Libra or Scorpio. The question, however, is one which I must leave to those who are more versed in these matters than I am.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 11, last line, *dele* comma.

P. 117, last line, *for* who *read* which.

P. 128, line 15, 'Plants and animals.' See however my note on 1. 8. 1256 b 20 (vol. ii. p. 174 sq.).

P. 129, line 3 sqq. See however my note on 1. 8. 1256 b 26 (vol. ii. p. 178 sq.), where I have on further consideration adopted a different rendering of this passage.

P. 163, note 2, *for* injustum *read* iniustum, *and for* conjuges *read* coniuges.

P. 216, note 1, *for* juris *read* iuris.

P. 230, line 12, *for* jure *read* iure.

P. 269, line 24, and p. 282, note. More strictly, a 'perpetual generalship.'

P. 294, line 22, *for* junctura *read* iunctura.

P. 406, last line. I have translated *ταμιεῖον* here 'treasury,' because Plato is evidently thinking of the *ταμιεῖον* as a place for storing gold and silver, but with respect to the Lacedaemonian *ταμιεῖα*, which seem to have been used for the storage of commodities of all kinds, see [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 32 sq. (with Göttling's note, p. 81 of his edition) and Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 3. 223 sq.

P. 430, line 29 sqq. I am indebted to Prof. Jowett's Translation of Plato for the renderings given here and p. 459, line 27 sqq.

P. 442, line 24, *dele* the second comma.

P. 467, note 3, line 17, *add* comma before 'in.'

P. 494, note, *add* [1] *before the note.*

P. 499, line 11 sqq. I should have made it clearer here that (with Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 746 sq.) I take Aristotle to regard the Polity as 'the best constitution for most States.' Compare 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 38, *τὴν ῥᾴω καὶ κοινοτέραν ἁπάσαις*, with 2. 6. 1265 b 26–31, where the Polity is called *κοινοτάτη ταῖς πόλεσι*. The Polity is described as *μέση ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας* in 2. 6. 1265 b 28, and 'the best constitution for most States' is spoken of as *ἡ μέση πολιτεία* in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 7, 37. The hoplites are supreme in the Polity (1265 b 28), and the bulk of the hoplites would probably be *μέσοι*. *Πολιτείαν μόνιμον* in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 40 seems to me, as to Mr. Postgate (Notes, p. 30), to mean, not 'durable constitution,' but 'durable Polity' (see p. 501, note 1). Mr. Postgate may possibly be right in holding that 'the best constitution for most States' will be 'in some cases,' not the Polity, but 'others of the mixed forms'—some kind of *ἀριστοκρατία*, for instance—but I do not feel sure of this. Would Aristotle hold the *μέσοι* to be supreme in an *ἀριστοκρατία*, or call an

ἀριστοκρατία a μέση πολιτεία? At any rate, the Polity is uppermost in his mind as 'the best constitution for most States.'

P. 499, note 1. In support of the suggestion here made as to the probable meaning of 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 12 sq., I may refer to Xen. Oecon. 2. 5 sq.

P. 503, note 2, *for* 4 (7). 1329 a 40 sqq. *read* 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.

P. 521, line 21, 'nowhere.' The last chapter of the Seventh Book, however, recognizes in its concluding portion, as we have seen (p. 521, line 1), that there are more kinds of democracy and oligarchy than one. But see p. 519, note 1, as to this part of the chapter.

P. 543, note 1, *for* 93 *read* 39.

END OF VOL. I.